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Abstract 
What does a digital identity token have to do with medieval seals? Is the history of passports of 
any use for enabling the discovery of Internet users’ identity when crossing virtual domain 
boundaries during their digital browsing and transactions? The agility of the Internet architecture 
and its simplicity of use have been the engines of its growth and success with the users 
worldwide. As it turns out, there lies also its crux. In effect, Internet industry participants have 
argued that the critical problem business is faced with on the Internet is the absence of an 
identity layer from the core protocols of its logical infrastructure. As a result, the cyberspace 
parallels a global “territory” without any identification mechanism that is reliable, consistent and 
interoperable across domains. This dissertation is a  investigation of the steps being taken by 
Internet’s stakeholders in order to resolve its identity problems, through the lenses of historical 
instances where similar challenges were tackled by social actors. 
Social science research addressing the Internet identity issues is barely nascent. Research on 
identification systems in general is either characterized by a paucity of historical perspective, or 
scantily references digital technology and online id ntification processes. This research is 
designed to bridge that gap. The general question a its core is: How do social actors, events or 
processes enable the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the public at 
large? This work is guided by that line of inquiry through three broad historical case studies: 
first, the medieval experience with seals used as ident ty tokens in the signing of deeds that 
resulted in transfers of rights, particularly estate rights; second, comes the modern, national state 
with its claim to the right to know all individuals on its territory through credentials such as the 
 
 
 
 
passport or the national identity card; and finally, viewed from the United States, the case of 
ongoing efforts to build an online digital identity nfrastructure.  
Following a process-tracing approach to historical case study, this inquiry presents enlightening 
connections between the three identity frameworks while further characterizing each. We 
understand how the medieval doctrines of the Trinity and the Eucharist developed by schoolmen 
within the Church accommodated seals as markers of identity, and we understand how the 
modern state seized on the term ‘nationality’ – which emerged as late as in the 19th century – to 
make it into a legal fiction that was critical for its identification project. Furthermore, this 
investigation brings analytical insights which enable us to locate the dynamics driving the 
emergence of those identity systems. An ordering of the contributing factors in sequential 
categories is proposed in a sociohistorical approach to explain the causal mechanisms at work 
across these large phenomena. Finally this research also proposes historically informed 
projections of scenarios as possible pathways to the realization of authoritative digital identity. 
But that is the beginning of yet another story of identity. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BECOMING ARTIFACTS 
Medieval Seals, Passports and the Future of Digital Identity 
 
 
 
by 
 
Mawaki Chango 
 
Diplôme d’Études Approfondies (1996) in Political Science at Panthéon-Sorbonne University, Paris I 
Diplôme d’Études Approfondies (1995), Maîtrise (1993) and Licence (1992) in Philosophy 
at Charles de Gaulle University, Lille III 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Information Science and Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
Syracuse University 
December 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2012 Mawaki Chango. All rights reserved. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my late mom, 
 
Theodora K. E. T. 
(1943 – 2011) 
 
In memoriam 
 
our feast may have been deferred 
our chant turned into a clamor of dust 
 still reverberate across all verbs of my being 
the humming of my inaugural cell and 
the streaming of our primitive waters 
until times reconfigure our cypher 
 
here too we shall abide 
 
M. C. 
 
 
  
vi 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like first to thank folks at the Internet Identity Workshop and in the Digital Identity 
community in general for being the source of the motivation for this research. More particularly, 
I would like to recognize individuals who have helped form my understanding of what digital 
identity technology entails or have informed this re earch effort in one way or the other. They 
include Eve Maler, Drummond Reed, Stefan Brands, Dick Hardt, Scott David, Phil Windley, 
Paul Trevithick, Johannes Ernst, Trent Adams, Kim Cameron, Marc Davis, Tony Rutkowski, 
Mary Ruddy, Glenn Benson and many more who, just by engaging in the conversation, have 
shed a light on the path of this inquiry. 
I also want to thank my committee members for their time, advice and fellowship during this 
long and winding process, which is full of doubts but also filled with intellectual epiphanies. I 
am thankful for having around, particularly at times of trouble, dear friends such as Jeff and Peg 
Owens as well as Pat and Ben Addom. Finally, I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to Ellen 
Hobbs, Gina Lee-Glauser and Mark Glauser for their invaluable support at the most critical of 
those moments throughout that long journey now coming to a close, with success and joy. 
For that and to all of you, many thanks! 
 
  
 
 
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. i 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. vi 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF EXHIBITS .................................................................................................................. xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...................................................................................................... xiii 
Overture .............................................................................................................................. xv 
CHAPTER 1 General Introduction: Internet and the Identity Gap ............................................. 1 
1.1 Research motivation and problem statement .....................................................................2 
1.2 Identity in Internet studies .................................................................................................9 
1.3 Research questions .......................................................................................................... 21 
1.4 Organization of this dissertation ....................................................................................... 26 
CHAPTER 2 Concepts and Definitions ................................................................................... 30 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 30 
2.2 Basic definitions ............................................................................................................... 31 
2.3 Identity and Identification ................................................................................................ 35 
2.3.1 Identity family concepts ..................................................................................................................... 35 
2.3.2 Commentary on identity as a medium ............................................................................................... 43 
2.4 Authentication and Authority ........................................................................................... 49 
2.4.1 Authentication .................................................................................................................................... 49 
2.4.2 Authoritative identity ......................................................................................................................... 52 
2.4.3 Commentary on authenticity, reliability and authority ..................................................................... 55 
2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 62 
CHAPTER 3 Research Approach and Method ........................................................................ 63 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 63 
3.2 Philosophy of knowledge: a critical view........................................................................... 63 
3.3 Approach to sociohistorical inquiry .................................................................................. 69 
3.3.1 Ground assumptions ........................................................................................................................... 70 
3.3.2 Practices and discourses of inquiry .................................................................................................... 75 
3.3.3 History and causal explanation .......................................................................................................... 80 
3.4 Research design and strategy ........................................................................................... 83 
3.4.1 Design choices and case selection ..................................................................................................... 83 
 
 
viii 
 
3.4.2 Data and analysis ................................................................................................................................ 92 
3.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 103 
CHAPTER 4 Seals and Identity in the Medieval West ........................................................... 105 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 105 
4.2 Why the Medieval West? ............................................................................................... 108 
4.3 Socio-political structures and the Investiture Controversy ............................................... 115 
4.3.1 Feudalism .......................................................................................................................................... 115 
4.3.2 The Church and the Empire .............................................................................................................. 117 
4.4 The Church as an economic organization ........................................................................ 124 
4.5 Documents, Signs and their Authority ............................................................................ 135 
4.5.1 Authority and its apparatus of signs ................................................................................................ 136 
4.5.2 Names and autograph signature ..................................................................................................... 149 
4.6 Seal-identity: A semiotic analysis and challenges ............................................................ 154 
4.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 187 
A medieval postscript: Institutional consequences ...................................................................... 190 
CHAPTER 5 The National State and Government ID ............................................................ 202 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 202 
5.2 Emergence of Written Identity and the Passport ............................................................. 203 
5.3 Expansion of the modern passport ................................................................................. 213 
5.3.1 Multiple passport policies ................................................................................................................ 213 
5.3.2 Towards a uniform passport worldwide ......................................................................................... 220 
5.4 National ID Card: the French experience ......................................................................... 235 
5.4.1 Worker booklet and internal passport ............................................................................................ 237 
5.4.2 Functions of the NIC ......................................................................................................................... 240 
5.4.3 Challenges and limitations ............................................................................................................... 254 
5.4.4 Seeking national consent ................................................................................................................. 258 
5.5 Identity Primitives: A sociohistorical analysis and challenges .......................................... 263 
5.5.1 Breeder documents .......................................................................................................................... 264 
5.5.2 Nationality or the paradoxical modernity of the state ................................................................... 267 
5.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 273 
CHAPTER 6 ........................................................................................................................ 276 
Building Digital Identity Infrastructure .............................................................................. 276 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 276 
6.2 Emergence of digital identity .......................................................................................... 278 
 
 
ix 
 
6.2.1 What is in a digital identity? .............................................................................................................. 279 
6.2.2 Why do we need digital identity? ..................................................................................................... 289 
6.2.3 A tentative timeline .......................................................................................................................... 296 
6.3 Design and architecture ................................................................................................. 300 
6.3.1 Two models for managing identity across domains ....................................................................... 300 
6.3.2 Identity metasystem architecture ................................................................................................... 309 
6.4 Description of digital identity technology cases .............................................................. 315 
6.4.1 CardSpace and Information Cards .................................................................................................. 315 
6.4.2 U-Prove .............................................................................................................................................. 320 
6.4.3 OpenID .............................................................................................................................................. 328 
6.4.4 OAuth ................................................................................................................................................ 331 
6.5 Enabling digital identity operation and rollout ................................................................ 336 
6.5.1 Registration and authentication ...................................................................................................... 337 
6.5.2 Open Identity Trust Framework: The model ................................................................................... 340 
6.5.3 Open Identity Trust Framework: An implementation..................................................................... 350 
6.5.4 The “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace” ....................................................... 353 
6.6 Issues and challenges ..................................................................................................... 358 
6.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 376 
CHAPTER 7 Causal Mechanisms and Analytical Explanation ................................................ 379 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 379 
7.2 Addressing research specific questions ........................................................................... 382 
7.2.1 Medieval seals ................................................................................................................................... 382 
7.2.2 Passports and national ID ................................................................................................................. 387 
7.2.3 Digital identity technology ............................................................................................................... 394 
7.3 Scenarios and pathways to authoritative digital identity ................................................. 406 
7.4 Mechanism-process explanation .................................................................................... 412 
7.4.1 Seals and the rule of the Church ...................................................................................................... 412 
7.4.2 Identity documents and the rule of the State ................................................................................. 419 
7.4.3 Perspectives on digital credentials .................................................................................................. 435 
7.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 449 
CHAPTER 8 Conclusion: Key findings and Recommendations .............................................. 451 
8.1 Key findings ................................................................................................................... 451 
8.1.1 Summing up the cases ...................................................................................................................... 451 
8.1.2 Contributing to knowledge .............................................................................................................. 456 
8.2 Recommendations for policy and design ......................................................................... 465 
8.3 Limitations and future directions .................................................................................... 476 
8.3.1 Research value and limitations ........................................................................................................ 476 
8.3.2 Future directions ............................................................................................................................... 479 
 
 
x 
 
References ........................................................................................................................ 480 
Glossary ............................................................................................................................ 492 
Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 493 
Vita ................................................................................................................................... 503 
 
  
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Tables: 
Table 1-1: Sequencing the general research question……………………………………23 
Table 3-1: Discourses and practices of inquiry ………… …………….……………79 
Table 3-2: Research questions and design …… ……………………………….93 & 381 
Table 4-1: Classification of signs by Augustine…. …………………………..………..158 
Table 4-2: Perspectives on universals….. ………………………… ……………...160 
Table 5-1: Early international conferences addressing passport issues ……………. 224 
Table 5-2: Contents of the prefectural identity card, France, August 1935..…….…. …252 
Table 5-3: Time line of French legislations related o nationality 
between the Revolution and the Second Empire…… …………………….. 272 
Table 6-1: Registration levels of assurance and their baseline requirements 
for identity proofing… ……………………………………………………… 339 
Table 6-2: Authentication requirement levels………………………………………….. 341 
Table 6-3: Information required by the Federal government from TFP applicant …….. 352 
Table 6-4: The policy foundation of the identity ecosystem…………………………… 355 
Table 7-1: Causal sequence and mechanism for authoritative identity …………………440 
Table 7-2: Drivers and factors in the emergence processes of identity mechanisms ….. 441 
Table 7-3: US Near-Term Action Plan for cyberspace policy ……………………...…. 448 
 
  
 
 
xii 
 
 
Figures: 
 
Figure 3-1: Two paradigms for knowing the social world…………………………………..65 
Figure 3-2: Research design………………………………………………………………….87 
Figure 4-1: Relation of the referent to engendered or created image… ………………....169 
Figure 4-2: Revised relation of the referent to engendered or created image……………...171 
Figure 4-3: God, humans and seal analogy sequences……… …………………………..172 
Figure 4-4: Identity by transfer of substance and image…………………………………...176 
Figure 4-5:  System of belief and rational discourse in the medieval West: 
dogmas, doctrines and rational arguments…… ……………..………………..178 
Figure 4-6: Model of the propositions and issue deriving from Abelard’s analogy….…...179 
Figure 6-1: Simple structure model of the identity data………………………………......284 
Figure 6-2: A simple model of identity authentication………………………………....... 286 
Figure 6-3: Complete model of identity data…. ………………………………………….289 
Figure 6-4: User-centric identity transaction matrix…………………………………....... 303 
Figure 6-5: Trust framework flowchart…………………………………………….......342 
Figure 6-6: A layered model of the Open Identity Trust Framework ……………...…......345 
Figure 6-7: OITF contractual structure. …………………………………………………...348 
Figure 6-8: Goals and objectives of the identity ecosystem (NSTIC)……………….........357 
 
  
 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
API: Application Programming Interface 
CA: Certificate Authority or Credential Authority 
CNCI: Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
CSP: Credential Service Provider 
DNS: Domain Name System 
EOP: Executive Office of the President 
(F)ICAM: (Federal) Identity, Credential and Access Management 
IANA: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN: Internet Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICF: Information Card Foundation 
IDSP: Identity Service Provider (sometimes IDP: Identity Provider) 
LOA: Level of Assurance 
LOP: Level of Protection 
MRP: Machine Readable Passport 
MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document 
NEC: National Economic Council 
NIC: National Identity Card 
NSC: National Security Council 
NSTIC: National Strategy for Trusted Identities 
PII: Personally identifiable information 
 
 
xiv 
 
OASIS: Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards  
OIDF: Open Identity Foundation 
OITF: Open Identity Trust Framework (or TF: Trust Framework) 
OIX: Open Identity Exchange 
OSIS: Open Source Identity Systems 
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure 
RA: Registration Authority 
RP: Relying Party 
SAML: Security Assertion Markup Language  
TFP: Trust Framework Provider (see also OITF) 
URL: Uniform Resource Locator 
URI: Uniform Resource Identifier 
WS: Web Service(s) 
WWI / WWII: First World War / Second World War 
XML: Extensible Markup Language 
XRI: Extensible Resource Identifier 
 
Notes: 
r. as in (r. 1345 – 1392) indicates regnal period of a ruler, e.g., a Pope or a King who ruled from 
1345 to 1392  
 
 
xv 
 
Overture 
Ithaca, at last! ... 
After long years of sailing, Odysseus (also known as Ulysses) can now see his native 
shore emerge from the horizon. He returns home after  score of years, the first decade 
fighting the Trojan War followed by another of tribulations at high seas on his way back 
to Ithaca. Now he has to confront Penelope’s wooers and suitors rivaling to replace him 
as her husband. In the face of their constant pressure, she has so far devised efforts and 
tricks to put off marriage. And now after such a long leave of absence and all the 
tribulations, there he is, Odysseus! Or is he? Under th  guise of a beggar draped in a 
halo of mist, by the favor of the goddess Athena, how to tell who that visitor is?  
Repeatedly in his encounters over the course of his epic voyage, was that man of many 
ways asked to reveal his identity, to no avail. Now that at long last he sets foot again in 
homeland, his identity once without question across the realm now is yet to be 
ascertained … by Penelope of all people! In order to regain his place by her side, not 
only did he have to decimate the ranks of the young and arrogant princes vying for her 
hand, but he now have to face her unwavering incredulity. 
When the hero of countless feats reached for the priz  of the bride, he is yet to face the 
ultimate test. Penelope figures an impromptu and less spectacular probe for the man she 
still doubts to be Odysseus. Only the two spouses kn w that one leg of their bridal bed 
was built – by Odysseus himself – out of the trunk of an actual tree. So when Penelope 
ostensibly pretends to order the bed displaced, the returning hero cannot help but be 
surprised by such request given the impossibility of the task, unless the leg of the bed was 
 
 
xvi 
 
cut off from the tree. For Penelope, there eventually lies the unbreakable proof of the 
identity of the presumed stranger: she can finally recognize and welcome back her long 
awaited mate. 
Odysseus, at long last! 1 
 
There is no better place (topos) for our departure in this endeavor than the return of Odysseus. 
Told very long ago, this story provides us with a narrative that the so-called Western world has 
come to regard as a matrix for many of its self-defining narratives – a tale of origins as well as a 
tale of identity. Only once during his epic journey did Odysseus make an attempt to tell who he 
was: to the Cyclops who asked ‘who are you?’ he cryptically dropped: My name is Nobody2 (Ch. 
IX, 366.) A person who is Nobody – for somebody. That’s where the identity quest begins. 
Hopefully, it will lead to that person being something more than Nobody, being Someone – for 
somebody. 
                                                 
1 From Homer’s Odyssey (Book XXIII), I first heard the story of Penelope and the bed test by the late Hellenist Jean-
Pierre Vernant when he came to give a talk at my Philosophy department at the University of Lille in the early 1990s. 
About Odysseus’s identity, see Vernant and Ker (1999) and Dimock (1956). Another variation on the theme of identity 
and homecoming after a long period of absence is Martin Guerre’s story: see Davis (1993). 
2 While ‘nobody’ is unambiguously a negative in English, its equivalent in many Latin-born languages is more neutral 
(and can be used negatively as well as positively). For instance, from French ‘personne’ translates to English both as 
‘person’ and as ‘nobody’ (i.e. ‘not any one person’), depending on the syntactic context. The Greek word translated in 
Latin by persona originally means mask as worn by actors representing their character in the Greek tragedy. An important 
conceptual development occurred in the post-millennium Middle Ages where the term is made to mean a facet of an 
individual, as with the Trinity of the three persons in a unique God by the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. 
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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction: Internet and the Identity Gap  
Have we ever become artifacts, as the title for this t esis may suggest? I do not mean to imply 
here the disappearance of the human race in favor of some advanced, human-like technological 
species, or cyborg. But by all accounts, it has been a historical trend that humans have 
increasingly been able to delegate parts of their agency to artifacts and machines. And if so far 
humans have not been turned into a computing species, on  may at least admit that over the last 
half-century or so, there has been a dramatic increase of instances where artifacts speak for and 
about humans, instances where human will and actions are carried out through artifacts. For that 
to be possible, artifacts must have been made able to represent human individuals or to capture 
and manifest across time and space their specific involvement in a given course of action or 
events. That, I believe, is not conceivable without cer ain notion of identity enabled through 
artifacts. In this work I will investigate how identity artifacts accomplish that and, in so doing, 
the bases and mechanisms through which humans may become – or rather be effectively 
represented by – artifacts. In this introductory chapter I provide a view of the object, context and 
motivation of this investigation, by first stating the problem that triggered it. I then undertake an 
overview of the literature closely related to identification challenges and identity systems in the 
Internet in search of possible directions for investigating the problem. Based on the result, I 
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formulate the questions that will guide this research further. Finally I outline the organization of 
the dissertation. 
1.1 Research motivation and problem statement 
This is a thesis on one of the most fundamental chal enges posed by the public and global 
development of the Internet, the basic architecture of which was not necessary designed with the 
potential empirical implications of its current scale nd scope in mind. The volume of 
communications and business being undertaken throug that medium has grown dramatically 
ever since it was made available to the broad public and to commercial activities in the early 
nineties. And now with social networking platforms the share of time and life being spent in 
online interactions has taken the Internet to the lev l of a basic utility for large swaths of 
populations. Yet, it is not as if we can foresee the end of the innovations that may bring people to 
spend even more time and do even more business on the I ternet. To the contrary, common sense 
suggests that the utility of the Internet could grow even larger if only it could be ridden of some 
of the obvious flaws that make it an uncertain place. One of those flaws or problems is the topic 
of this thesis. As a multidimensional medium, or a multi-medium, the Internet is less like a tool 
to accomplish a specific kind of function or activity (like most previous media) but more like a 
place where a person could accomplish a significant portions of their daily activities, a sort of 
facility equipped with capabilities that can conceivably carry many people through their daily 
occupations and routines for a significant length of time. As the Internet is designed however, 
that is not to happen without challenges. In the course of its rather short lifespan so far, one of 
those challenges has quickly appeared to be about how a user can know for certain who the party 
she is dealing with through the Internet really is.  
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The authentication methods known by most Internet us rs today are poor in conveying 
identity information and weak from a security standpoint. The most common one is the set of 
username (or user ID) and password, also known as “logins.” While it is more of a challenge to 
convince the bulk of the users that digital identity technology may improve their authentication 
experience and the handling of their personal data, the downsides (and frankly, the annoyance) of 
“signing up” for an account that is defined by a username and password at every Web service 
site are most likely clearer to users. Due to the lack of interoperability between online 
information systems and applications, users need to create and to remember as many different 
sets of logins as the number of accounts they have on the Internet (not practical), or write them 
down and store them within reach (not secure), or still u e one and the same set of logins for 
several accounts (not secure, either).  
Despite those downsides, the sign-up and log-in ceremonies on the Internet do still carry 
on with no other protection, spreading the user’s personal data across web servers all over the 
world to parties that are accountable only to themselves – and rather remotely and only after the 
fact, to a government agency, if any – as regards the consequences of the security standards of 
their data handling practices, or lack thereof. Theresulting multiplication ad infinitum of 
unaccountable data controllers (the parties collecting and storing user data) in the open Internet 
further exposes users to the risks of data breach and misuse. Such state of affairs is due, in 
significant part, to the fact that specification of identity capabilities in the context of an open and 
global Internet was absent from the design goals of the Internet original architecture.   
Not only is the discovery of the identity of communicating, interacting or transacting 
users not readily enabled by Internet protocols, but we shall further note that the Internet identity 
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problem goes beyond the identity of human users. It i  a two-way street, so to speak, as deceit 
can take place by “impersonating” not only users (to a Web service), but also websites (to the 
user). In fact all types of entities or objects one may encounter or have to deal with using the 
Internet can be “impersonated.” In other words, it is a universal problem on the open Internet, a 
challenge to all ends in a communication or a transaction. In that sense, the so-called phishing3, 
which may be as harmful to the user as a direct impersonation of her identity, is made possible 
by this very identity gap in the Internet infrastruct re.  
In the brick-and-mortar world you can tell when you are at a branch of your bank. It would be very difficult 
to set up a fake bank branch and convince people to do ransaction there. But in today’s online world it’s 
trivial to set up a fake banking site (or e-commerce site …) and convince a significant portion of the 
population that it’s the real thing. That is an identity problem. (Cameron and Jones 2006: 2) 
In addition to the possibility on the web to mislead with words, images whether of a 
person or of any (protected) sign or visual can also be impeccably reproduced, thanks to digital 
technology, and used to deceit or in ways that clash with the intent of the legitimate owners. 
False claims can be made using misleading verbal assertions as well as nonverbal 
misrepresentations such as images. The fact that both ends of the communication are clearly 
potential points of vulnerability contributes to making of the Internet a fertile terrain for the 
proliferation of entrepreneurs of deceit and “miscreants” of all stripes (Franklin et al., 2007). 
This universality of the problem on the Internet explains why it has been suggested in the 
industry that the core problem of the Internet is one f identity, that is, the lack of identity layer 
                                                 
3 The masquerading practice that consists of posing in a communication as a familiar and trustworthy entity in order to 
lure the user into providing their account credentials or personal data after clicking a website link provided in that 
communication. 
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in the TCP/IP protocol stack as originally designed (Cameron 2005; Cameron and Jones 2006). 
In effect, basic Internet protocols may well permit to race communication traffic based on 
identifiers assigned to every networked device it transits through, but they provide no means of 
knowing the actual identity of the entities involved in the communication or manipulating the 
machines. Therefore in addition to lacking the aids provided by all the material cues and clues 
that simply are part of the fabric of social life in the physical world, the design of core Internet 
protocols does not offer the resources needed to ascert in the identity of the end users or that of 
any agents interacting with the network from the edges.  
And yet, while all Internet identity challenge is applicable to all digital objects or 
artifacts, this investigation is primarily concerned with human identity subjects and the ways in 
which the technology might ultimately allow human beings to make identity transaction 
decisions, whether as individuals or as organizations. From that perspective, it is as if the Internet 
has created a new space – the so-called cyberspace – wh re the inhabitants are still not 
identifiable with a comfortable level of confidence, unless based on largely unwarranted 
assumptions.4 After all, it is the interactions of human users from the edges which materialize the 
cyberspace with all its other digital creatures. Despite that vacuum, users go on everyday 
providing their sensitive information to, and communicating at ease with, the party on the other 
“end” of the network and whose identity they presume. We know, however, that for all the 
panoply of fraud techniques that have thrived on the Internet, such belief is a leap of faith. In 
reality, there is little ground for the technology to “deserve” that trust which is understandably a 
practical solution for basic communications but exposes to serious risks once the stakes are high. 
                                                 
4 The unintended consequence of traceability enabled by features such as cookies and IP addressing, although facilitating 
to locate the person who is responsible for the access point and maybe the device being used, do not by themselves 
provide the identity of that person and much less that of the actual user. 
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In a sense, the absence of identity capability in the native Internet infrastructure causes 
cyberspace to assume the characteristics of a global “territory” that is lacking any authoritative 
identification systems such as provided by passport or national ID cards or the driver’s license 
in the physical world. How could that loophole and its consequences be addressed? 
The potential gap between what the technology suggests on the one hand and the reality 
on the other hand turns out glaringly actual, for impersonation and fraud have become routinely 
part of our online experience. As more and more users conduct an ever increasing share of their 
social and business activities online, so grow the value (or utility) of the Internet infrastructure as
well as the threats of which it becomes the target. At he same time that it provides people with a 
range of resources enhancing their life and busines, the Internet has also become an intricacy of 
risks and dangers, notably including increasingly sophisticated criminal practices enabled by 
identity usurpation or misrepresentations (Franklin et al. 2007). The explosion of online frauds 
speaks to the potential in the opportunity as well as in the challenge of conducting business 
online, albeit in unfortunate terms.  
To the Internet identity challenge, the computer software and Internet industry has been 
striving to respond. In 2006, the year my attention was first drawn to this problem, the phrase 
“digital identity” had only recently become an explicit theme in related expert discourse. Another 
phrase, “user-centric identity,” often appeared next to it then, which also was otherwise and 
notably expressed by one of the notable participants in the digital identity technology 
community, Dick Hardt, as “identity 2.0”.5 What I first understood then was that “user-centric 
identity” was coined with the aim to emulate the way physical identity credentials (particularly 
                                                 
5 Hardt’s presentation materials used to be found at the following URL, http://www.identity20.com, but the site was no 
longer available by March 2012. 
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the ones granted by public authorities) behave withregard to the individual subject they refer to, 
to the entities that issue them and to the ones that need to verify them or the identity of their 
holder.  
1) First of all, the user keeps her credentials with herself and uses them whenever 
and as needed.  
2) Secondly, while on the one hand there is a one-to-one relationship between the 
issuing entity and the individual identity subject, on the other hand the relationship is one-to-
many between the latter and the verifying entities.  
3) Third, identity transactions (and verification) with third parties do not necessarily 
require the intervention or even the awareness of the issuing authority. This presents the virtue of 
widening the usability scale of the identity credential.  
“User-centric identity” or “identity 2.0” was the expressed desire to realize the same patterns on 
the Internet so that the end user will be able to keep and manage digital identity credentials 
which she may then use to make identity assertions, f she’s so willing, to whomever and in 
whatever transaction require it.   
 In the face of that professed ambition, the first questions that came to my mind were as 
follows: Who could possibly issue that kind of credentials to the Internet end users in general? 
Who could have the status and the capacity to make credentials that will be confidently accepted 
as proof of identity by the variety of entities that may have a legitimate interest in verifying 
online the Internet user’s identity? Given business practices concerning personal data – the 
compulsion to collect it at every little pretext and to trade with it – why would any online 
merchant, which is used to collecting PII directly from its customers as part of its regular 
8 
 
 
 
 
business, accept to change and now have an intermediary interfering with that by collecting and 
maintaining the identity data instead? What would it take to replicate on the Internet an 
experience most people only have of identity credentials issued by public authorities in the 
physical world? I subsume that interrogation under one question which I identify as my research 
triggering question and formulate as follows:  
What are the social processes that will be required n order to bring about authoritative 
identity credentials on the Internet for the general nd user?6    
The physical (authoritative) credentials that have historically so far shown the feature that 
the designers wish to see in identity 2.0 technologies suggest that there is more than technical 
components in play. Furthermore, when Microsoft experimented with the .NET Passport in its 
initial design, the most daunting challenges it faced did not seem to be technical, but rather 
related to the reluctance of other stakeholders to see this private party erected in online identity 
authority between them and potentially all their customers owning an MSN account with 
Microsoft. This suggests that the problem we are facing cannot be solved only in technical terms. 
In that sense it is asociotechnical problem, thus it is of total relevance tosocial science research 
which is lagging behind the pace of technology evoluti n in that regard. Therefore, this thesis 
directs a particular attention to factors and conditions beyond technical capabilities and 
functionalities. In effect, the overall premise that underlies and shapes this research is as follows: 
Understanding the circumstances and the steps taken by social actors in the past in order to 
enable the ascertainment of individual identity through physical artifacts may shed a light on the 
overall workings of large-scale identity mechanisms as well as the social processes required for 
                                                 
6 See the next chapter, section 2.2 for the definition of basic terms and concepts. 
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their functional implementation. As a result, this might also help tackle some of the challenges of 
widespread identity systems in the cyberspace.  
To date, we still do not have in place the infrastructure contemplated for “user-centric 
identity.” Some of the technologists may even have come to be less hopeful about the possibility 
of its realization. In any case, while of less currency than in 2006 the term has not disappeared 
from the digital identity milieu, certainly not the values sustaining the worldview that shaped its 
discourse. To the best of my knowledge gained over about five years in researching this topic, 
there has not been an in-depth inquiry into whether a user-centric digital identity for the Internet 
end user is at all possible or not and what its enabli g social conditions and implications might 
be. In this dissertation, I seek to address that concern and to elicit the social mechanisms that 
enable such identity architecture apparently centerd on the user. But before I carry on and 
complete the framing of this investigation, I now pro ose to take a first look at the literature with 
regard to Internet identity issues and contexts for possible directions, if any. 
1.2 Identity in Internet studies 
The historical emergence of the Internet for the public at large was accompanied with libertarian 
and even utopian views that it enables a space where traditional authorities and their ruling have 
no place.7 As Goldsmith and Wu (2006) have pointed out, that utopianism short-lived and 
nation-states were quick to find ways to assert their authority and their rule over whatever may 
happen in the Internet. Nevertheless, the Internet remains a fairly opaque medium with regard to 
the identity of interacting parties for one another. As it turned out in those early years of public 
                                                 
7 See the resounding “Declaration of the Independence of the Cyberspace” by the cyberlibertarian and political activist 
John Perry Barlow’s at http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/barlow_0296.declaration 
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use, users were able to lead perhaps a more fulfilling social “cyberlife” based on new and self-
fashioned identities which were distinct from the one they had in the socio-physical realm 
(Turkle 1995). The default anonymity of the Internet, at least from the cross-perspective of 
interacting parties, has opened up a virgin territory f r users to experiment with their personal 
identity and maybe to re-invent themselves, if only i  their own imagination and that of the 
person they are communicating with, and to have full control over their commitments and the 
rules that govern the latter. The basic technology of the Internet has not changed since, at least 
with regard to user-to-user identity. However, while it still possible for the users to play with 
their identity (and potentially that of others) on the Internet, the public has grown over the last 
dozen of years increasingly aware of the limits of online anonymity and freedom paralleling the 
ever growing re-assertion of state power over the Net (Goldsmith and Wu 2006). 
Within a few years, the Internet proved itself to be much more than an entertainment 
medium and to appear an all-powerful stake for business and for government. As Internet 
transactions grew in volume and in value, the identity problem emerges as critical as it is 
instrumental, in every sense. It was no longer enough that users could play with their identities, 
or even resolve in some cases their personal identity issues. The need to ascertain identity in 
order to support and foster transactions that may have serious consequences on actual people in 
their primary social life became quickly apparent. 
Before the instrumental aspect of identity on the Int rnet became such an acute problem, 
it appeared within parts of Internet studies concered with electronic databases from the 
perspective of growing online transactions across Internet era information systems. Noting the 
paucity of investigations of human identification in that environment, Roger Clarke (1994) 
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attempts to outline conceptual bases balancing the risks for organizations and the protection of 
individual’s personal data. To that effect, he spells out the basic dimensions of formal 
identification, notably: appearance, social behavior, knowledge, token, etc. It has been 
mistakenly suggested (Harper 2006) that those dimensions articulated by Clarke provided the 
notions that will be later on summarized in stating that identity is something-you-are, something-
you-know, or something-you-have. It appears that those principles were already formulated 
twenty years earlier in the context of computer security: 
There are three generic approaches to authentication. They are often described as “something you know,” 
“something you have,” and “something you are.”  (Kent, Lynette and Millett 2003: 46, n. 19) 
The authors add as a footnote: 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology articulated these principles related to computer security 
in the 1970s (D.E. Raphael and J.R. Young, Automated P rsonal Identification, SRI International, 1974; 
National Bureau of Standards, Evaluation Techniques for Human Identification, FIPSPUB-48, April 1977). 
(Idem) 
Nevertheless, Clarke is one of the earliest research rs who made the question of identity 
in electronic transactions more popular, relating it to organizational operation and management 
and to societal concerns all at once. The privacy concerns linked to the multiplication of 
electronic databases and their operation online also fed into the legal scholarship related to 
identity and personal data as reflected in Daniel Solove’s monograph about The Digital Person 
(2004) as well as in numerous of his law review articles related to this topic. Rather than 
outlining configurations of the “digital person,” Solove (2003, 2004, 2006a and 2006b) is 
primarily interested in information privacy – the protection of personal data in the digital 
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infrastructure and its challenges as well as ways of improving on legal interpretations of privacy 
laws at least in the U.S. Perhaps the notion of ident ty beyond personal data and privacy starts 
emerging in that literature when he addresses the issue of reputation (Solove 2007) with concrete 
instances of harm caused to embodied individuals due to information circulated about them on 
the Internet. In any case, Solove’s interests, analyses and proposed solutions are mainly of legal 
relevance to privacy law, including conceptual formulations based on the analysis of statutes, 
court decisions and the history of legal thought.  
It is only around 2005 that the fact that there is a structural problem of identity on the 
Internet calling for a consequential collective action began to reflect in more direct terms in the 
literature of Internet studies and related social sciences. However, the broadest stream of this 
literature originates from authors who are closely involved either with the design of information 
technology and systems or with their implementation and management in organizational settings.  
Windley (2005) addresses digital identity from the perspective of its challenges and 
management in organizational settings. Largely due to corporations’ needs as well as computer-
networking industry interests in responding to those needs, identity management has emerged 
practically as a field of its own to address authenication and authorization processes within 
closed (e.g., corporate) computer networks. In accordance to its motivation, that streak of 
identity research is generally confined to the organiz tional level of analysis, providing basic 
concepts, procedures and operational requirements to designers and managers (Windley 2005). 
Generous amounts of literature in that same vein have regularly been published since then. 
Before this emerging generation of authentication and uthorization technologies, PKI 
and digital certificates were the most notable attempt to address related problems (trust, namely) 
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at infrastructural level. PKI is based on key pairs, one private and the other public and available 
to any potential counterparts to see, both mathematically linked in such a way that data encrypted 
by one can be decrypted by the other and vice versa, without giving away by any means the 
complex formula associating them. An entity called Certificate Authority (CA) plays a reference 
role in providing some assurance regarding the ownership of the public keys. Specifically, the 
CA issues digital certificates (or digital signatures) by which a public key is bound to an entity – 
organization or individual – known through a set of attributes such as name, email address, 
possibly physical address, etc.  Arguably, those attribu es constitute the identity of the entity as is 
to be trusted by transaction counterparts who rely on the assertions signed by the CA and the 
discoveries enabled based on the public key cryptography and infrastructure. There are no 
specific requirements as to how much of assurance the infrastructure provides, as there are no 
standard procedures for securing the legitimacy or veracity of the link between the claimed 
attributes linked to a public key and the actual entity claiming those attributes.  
A PKI provides a means for relying parties (recipients of certificates who act in reliance on those 
certificates and/or digital signatures verified using those certificates) to know that another individual’s or 
entity’s public key actually belongs to that indiviual or entity. Certification authorities (CAs) and 
certification functions have been established to address this need. (Backhouse 2002: 217) 
While PKI may still be relevant as identification mechanism in contexts of repeated uses 
whereby the same entity listed as the owner of a public key has consistently proven to be in 
possession of the corresponding private key, it still leaves room to the possibility that a false 
identity may be relied upon from the start (and may h ve been so all along) just because the 
CA’s assertions are trusted right away from the beginning without any solid verification. As a 
matter of fact, one of the most prominent CAs, VeriSign, once was victim of a digital prank by 
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an individual who, masquerading as Microsoft employee in a simple email request, managed to 
obtain digital certificates from the CA in the name of Microsoft (Backhouse 2002).   
Furthermore, as Backhouse points out, most PKI imple entations are confined if not 
within corporate boundaries at least within a single jurisdiction. Yet in order for this 
infrastructure to make any significant difference for e-business, particularly e-commerce, it has 
to be able to span across those boundaries globally.  
In this scenario, PKIs must be able to interoperate so that the digital certificates which are issued in one 
domain can be accepted in a foreign domain just as occurs with passport credentials. (Idem, p. 218) 
He goes on to insist that explicit rules and policies, as well as consequential improvements on 
trust and security, are needed in order to support interoperability while again drawing an analogy 
on passports. 
An analogy would be with globetrotters of today who can rely on the acceptability of their passports no 
matter which foreign country they seek to enter. Although different authorities are responsible for the 
issuing of their own credentials, interoperability means that, on the whole, those credentials are acceptable 
throughout the world. (Idem, p. 219)    
In order to enable interoperable CAs – subsequently preparing the terrain for the much 
needed trust in and between them – three main mechanisms are potential candidates to choose 
from (Backhouse 2002). They include international st ndards, cross-certification which involves 
every pair of CAs certifying each other, cross-recognition via accreditation schemes whereby a 
third party is mutually accepted by independent CAs to ensure that the necessary requirements 
are met by participating CAs. A fourth mechanism will be added to those in the form of market 
rating (Backhouse et al. 2006). None of these mechanisms directly addresses the challenge of 
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identity assurance through PKI. Yet the standardization and regulatory challenges attached to 
PKI are substantial, which is one of the reasons why it is deemed ill-fitted for high-value 
business (Benson, Chin et al. 2011) These authors find the trust assumptions made about the CA 
non-viable for the level of values traded in wholesa  banking and propose instead the Partner 
Key Management (PKM) model. This model has the advantage of resolving the inter-bank 
liability challenge by relegating identity assurance and management issues to the corporate client 
itself while managing (validated or non-validated) credentials only and enabling credential 
interoperability globally. Still, the digital identity challenge is as yet unresolved when it comes to 
the individual customer. In retail banking for instance, I can walk on to a bank for a first time in 
a foreign country where I am stationed and open an account with my passport as identity 
credential (and under applicable provisions of the local regulation for banking). On the Internet 
however, there is no proper identity credential readily available enabling me to do the same 
beyond the domain where pre-existing financial recod (indeed a financial history) is available to 
any service provider to tie my declared identity back to. Moreover there are plenty of other 
sectors and types of online transactions for which there is no pre-existing identity-relevant 
information such as the credit history for the financi l sector. No research at this point provides 
solutions for such proper identification mechanism online, not only for banking but for the whole 
host of identity-sensitive services that can be offred online. 
As suggested above, the Internet identity problem vis-à-vis the end user at large is of a 
different nature from the problem of devising operational procedures to manage identity 
information flows and exchanges in a controlled setting. While the identification concerns and 
capabilities that are being considered by designers and proponents in this research context are far 
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from a centralized authoritative and monolithic soluti n such as an Internet driving license 
proposed by some technical experts related to commerce and law enforcement (Mueller 2010), 
one still has to admit that: 
What really matters is the association between an ide t fier, the identified individual or entity, and an 
organization or set of organizations that have institutionalized authority over a specific domain of human 
activity. 
… What makes it [a driver’s license] an important form of identification is its relationship to a 
system of government. Its issuance and use are linkd to, and expressions of, authoritative institutions at the 
state, provincial, or national level. (Mueller 2010: 80-1)  
Noting how the emergence and evolution of the Internet equires and brings about a 
process of mutual adaption between (territorial) states and (global) networks – as opposed to 
either the latter taking over the former or the forme  reasserting itself over the latter – Mueller 
fully recognizes the scope and challenge of the ident ty problem on the Internet. 
Identity on the Internet is a hard problem – one that implies transformative changes in the relationship 
between government and citizens. As the problem of a globally functional identity on the Internet gets 
worked out, we can expect to see both new transnational governance arrangements and new technical 
standards that require altered governance arrangements to back them up. Insofar as these standards create 
authoritative and effective forms of leverage over Internet users … they create new kinds of hard power8 
that will need to be carefully regulated and controlled on a global basis. (Mueller 2010: 183)  
                                                 
8 Hard power is one that the author ascribes to natio-states competing with each other in the traditional logic of 
zero-sum game, while soft power is one that is ascribed to networks as well as related methods and regulatory 
outcomes. 
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This dissertation will document how the relationship between identifiers, individuals and 
social structures has been historically constituted through three of the largest occurrences of such 
phenomenon.  
The question of identity on the Internet as a broader social problem began to emerge in 
Internet studies and related social sciences just around 2005. Larry Lessig (2006: 45) observes: 
“While in real space (…) anonymity has to be created, in cyberspace anonymity is the given.” In 
the off-line world, at least the availability of self-authenticating facts about a person, by eye 
witnessing, is a serious enough dent into anonymity. Although error still is possible (as would 
tend to show judicial mistakes based on eye witness,) the fact of the matter is that once a person 
is exposed to sight (whether by natural or electronic means), they do not feel anonymous any 
longer, and for good reasons. Being able to ascertain individual identity is an important part of 
regulating social exchanges. As Lessig puts it: “To regulate well, you need to know (1) who 
someone is, (2) where they are, and (3) what they ar  doing” (Lessig 2006: 23).  Presumably, 
those requirements only apply to activity domains where regulation is warranted. However the 
Internet as we know it today may well address the last two items but not the first one, perhaps the 
most important of the three, certainly not in an organized and consistent manner that can be 
leveraged for a variety of relevant transactions. 
To the extent that the lack of efficient technologies for authenticating facts about individuals makes it 
harder to regulate behavior, there are architectures that could be layered onto the TCP/IP protocol to create 
efficient authentication. We’re far enough into thehistory of the Internet to see what these technologies 
could look like. We’re far enough into this history to see that the trend toward this authentication is 
unstoppable. The only question is whether we will bui d into this system of authentication the kinds of 
protections for privacy and autonomy that are needed. (Lessig 2006: 45) 
18 
 
 
 
 
The question still stands, unanswered. All to the contrary, identity and personal data is 
meanwhile requested in many transactions where it is not in fact required for those transactions 
to be effectively completed and without any particular protection. In that regard, Harper (2006: 
4) deplores “the decline of practical obscurity” while recognizing that “identified people are less 
of a threat than unidentified people” (p. 255). Yet identifying individuals in a computer network 
is quite different from physical identity verification, as the former leaves a digital trail of data, 
some of which may be virtually permanently valid about their subject. This may require different 
ways of thinking about identity, which makes Harper argue that identity is overused and 
recommends instead resorting to credentialing and no -identifying authorization. 
More recent publications on the topic include outputs of large, interdisciplinary research 
programs. ‘On The Identity Trail: Understanding theImportance and Impact of Anonymity and 
Authentication in a Networked Society’ program brings together not only public policy, private 
business, and nonprofit sectors, but also scholars from various subject areas such as: philosophy, 
ethics, feminist studies, cognitive science, sociolgy, law, cryptography, engineering, policy 
analysis, and privacy.9 Their outputs have been published on their website and in various outlets, 
and more recently in an edited volume (Kerr, Steeves, and Lucock 2009). Their research 
program tackles various topics including identity, anonymity, privacy, authentication, 
cryptography, surveillance, digital rights management, tc. Put together, the contributions in this 
volume largely elaborate on conceptual underpinnings of identity as well as these other identity-
related topics including related challenges and the societal implications of the way they are 
addressed. Tensions and gaps are highlighted, for instance with regard to the protection of 
                                                 
9 http://idtrail.org/ 
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privacy and the exercise of power, as well as the need for due process and judicial review in the 
handling of citizens’ personal data. 
The most imposing effort yet involving several academic institutions and researchers is 
found in Europe with the project ‘Future of Identity in the Information Society’ or FIDIS.10 
Tapping into a strong pool of researchers spanning more than a score of reputed academic 
institutions from all over the European Union, FIDIS is a consortium that appears as a 
powerhouse of digital identity research for the EU region. Its program is articulated around seven 
main themes as follows: Identity of Identity; Profiling; Interoperability of Identities and Identity 
Management; Forensic Implications; Privacy and the Legal-Social Content of Identity; HighTech 
ID; and Mobility and Identity. They have established Identity in the Information Society, the 
IDIS journal, publishing papers presented at their annual workshop, including thematic issues 
dedicated to the FIDIS program and outputs. Most of these are the basis of the recently published 
edited volume simply titled The Future of Identity in the Information Society (Rannenberg et al. 
2009). However, the authors struggle to provide a cle r and unifying concept of identity, noting 
the complexity of the concept and reviewing different possible perspectives without much 
critique or particular orientation. At the same time, one may take note of the chapter on “Virtual 
Persons and Identities” which elaborates on the legal tradition of using abstract constructs to 
define entities in a given capacity (personhood) to propose a model for new forms of identity, 
including virtual persons.      
It shall be further noted that the question of identity on the Internet potentially intersects 
with many other issues. For example archiving electronic records in a way that enables trust and 
                                                 
10 http://www.fidis.net/ 
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probative value will benefit from a mature digital identity technology. However, that aspect has 
not been taken into consideration so far or they ar only implied (MacNeil 2000 and Duranti et 
al. 2002).  
Overall considering ongoing efforts from practice as well as research, it is clear that: for 
one, the research problem here at hand – at mind, I might write instead – emerged rather from 
practice, not from scholarship or research, and for another social science research has not 
brought decisive answers towards its resolution, indeed no research has even questioned whether 
the objectives are attainable at this scale and if so under what conditions. In part probably 
because digital identity technology is not yet fully deployed into a macrosocial phenomenon, 
social scientists including historians and sociologists have rarely tackled the identity problem in 
the context of standard mechanisms of identity proofing and verification in the online world. 
They either address the concept with excess of abstraction or scarcely undertake to conceptualize 
the terms “identity” or “identification” which they seem to take for granted as either intuitively 
or empirically given phenomena.  
[D]espite the fact that both these terms [identity and identification] are intimately connected with the 
emergence of modern forms of public life, the issue of identification has been virtually ignored even in 
recent scholarship on the formation and meaning of identities (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 3). 
Understandably then, in order to try correct that imbalance they have observed, Caplan and 
Torpey’s (2001) focus is on the history of identification (by the modern state) but not much on 
the underpinning notion of identity. However, this only confirms the gap between those two 
streams of study (on identification and on identity) which are yet to fully inform one another.  
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In light of the above, new research effort such as the one undertaken in this dissertation is 
needed to further address that gap, help bring the multiple relevant facets of the notion of identity 
into focus, and establish a firmer and more comprehensive basis for the design of future systems 
for managing identities. If the Internet is so largely used in all aspects of social life, and if the 
Internet’s core problem is an identity problem as several technologists have pointed out, then it 
may be time for social scientists to pay a much inquisitive attention to this problem. While social 
science research will not build the technology itself, it may contribute to enlightening the path 
for future design effort and systems starting with digital technology. In turn, the technical design 
effort must include a variety of perspectives capable of yielding useful insights for building the 
sound solutions needed, while being aware of the implications of any technological solution in 
the broader society. In any case, it is time to understand digital identity effort not in isolation but 
as an instance of a class of phenomena; then we can find out what it tells about the society as a 
whole. 
1.3 Research questions 
Adding to the limitations of the literature and despite a few technology propositions already out 
there, there has been so far no implementation-case of publicly available authoritative digital 
identity services; technology solutions are still being developed and institutional arrangements 
sought. Given that reality, I am led to seek for possible insights from a broader ground. While 
currently the identity problem appears to be most acu e in computer networks and with digital 
technology, in its basic terms it might still have had past instances. By looking for those possible 
instances in the past, I for one do not suggest that the problem has ever been perfectly resolved, 
and for another, even in the best case scenario I shall take into account the differential of 
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technological capabilities available to social actors in the different historical contexts. As a 
result, the initial research question that triggered this thesis will be applied to other comparable 
phenomena or different versions of the same phenomen, keeping in mind the direction 
suggested by the technologists themselves in their willingness to compare their design objectives 
with some critical features of (authoritative) physical identity credentials. Our general question 
therefore is: How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of 
authoritative identity credentials for the public at large? 
The historical trend of technology has been to comple ent, extend or enhance human 
capabilities, or to address emerging needs – sometimes to the extent of replacing humans 
altogether in the execution of some tasks. These include not only bodily capabilities understood 
as what humans can actually do using their body, but any capabilities enabled by human 
embodiment, including things that humans have considered so far as requiring their bodily 
presence in order to get done and even their mental capabilities which are always rooted in a part 
of the body, i.e. the brain. This ongoing transformation and augmentation of human capabilities 
by technology also leads to new spaces opening up for human agency for which the materiality 
of the biological body, certainly its physical presence, is less and less required while said human 
agency itself becomes increasingly ubiquitous. Identity systems are tools that are necessary to 
ascribe any actions resulting from those capabilities o human agency and, in so doing, 
continuously extend the reach and redefine the scope of that agency.  
Furthermore, it appears that the evolution of information and communication 
technologies has reached a level where they have a transformative effect on the society, opening 
up a different era that is generally referred to as “the information society.” The novelty that 
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defines this era is the digital technology as form f creation, representation and communication 
of information. It is typically understood that the older form of technology that is being 
superseded by the digital one was brought about by the printing revolution generally symbolized 
by the Guttenberg press of the fifteenth century (McLuhan, 1962). However, the Guttenberg 
press only mechanized a technique whose elements had already been around for a number of 
centuries by then, but mostly used manually. Those elements include, on the one hand, the 
writing surface which, apart from naturally available surfaces, ranges from papyrus to parchment 
to paper, that is, any thin and flat medium that can relatively easily be stored and retrieved11 and 
which can absorb ink or retain the durable and stable imprint of drawings – whether of abstract 
letters or concrete forms – as well as other inscriptions. On the other hand, comes the ink itself or 
any other element that can leave such durable and st ble imprints or inscriptions on such thin and 
flat medium. McLuhan distinguishes that period of writing technology, which he calls 
“manuscript culture,” from the predominantly oral culture that preceded it and from the print 
culture or “Gutenberg galaxy” that followed it.  
Table 1-1: Sequencing the general research question 
General 
Question 
How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of 
authoritative identity credentials for the public at large? 
 Historical Case I Historical Case II Historical Case III 
Sequencing 
the General 
Question 
In what circumstances did the 
challenge of reliably 
representing individual identity 
within written records emerge 
in the Middle Ages and how 
was it resolved? 
How did identity credentials 
issued by the national state 
historically emerge and 
become authoritative? 
How are social actors, events 
or processes leading to the 
possible emergence of 
authoritative digital identity 
credentials for Internet end 
users at large? 
 
                                                 
11 As compared, for instance, to the Sumerian clay tablets or to the stone blocks of the Egyptian pyramids. 
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In pursuing this investigation, I will be looking for clues as to how identity mechanisms 
or systems have been related to relevant social changes over time. While we are more familiar to 
authoritative identity credentials issued by the modern state (whose bureaucracy is a feat of the 
Gutenberg galaxy), the McLuhan’s periodization above may suggest probing the manuscript 
culture as well. To that end, I will consider two large past-historical sequences. This 
periodization provides a versioning of the initial research question into three questions in 
sequence, including the present history of digital identity. I suggest calling those three questions 
not specific research questions12 but sub-questions (Table 1-1).   
First are the Middle Ages: Did the challenge of representing individuals also occur at 
some point in the pre-press era of the “manuscript ulture”? Exploratory readings indicate that 
this issue was once relevant in the medieval manuscript context, too. In effect, if digital records 
have been preceded by another type of record, then the question is warranted as to whether that 
old record type ever confronted the same challenge of enabling the representation and 
authentication of the identity of people and how it as dealt with. I start the analysis with an 
inquiry into possible medieval response to the need to make records that include the identity of 
persons. In what circumstances did the challenge of reliably representing individual identity 
within written records emerge in the Middle Ages and how was it resolved?  
Then from the end of the medieval era onwards, I examine the modern state response to 
its need to control people and therefore to document the identity of individuals. As a matter of 
                                                 
12 This is because there is no logical necessity that connects these questions to the general question (so that by addressing 
the former, one automatically completes the answer to the latter). However, one may argue that these sub-questions are 
chosen by historical necessity (which certainly is a relative one due to historical contingencies) in that they pertain to 
clear instances in the past where social actors confronted and addressed at a comparable scale the practical problem of 
making new forms of identity credentials. Specific questions will be formulated in the next chapter. 
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fact, the experience of authoritative identity credentials most present to our mind and still the 
most common at this beginning of the 21st century relates to credentials that are issued by the 
government or public authority. The second episode in this investigation will then address 
identity credentials devised and enabled by the modern state, particularly the passport which is a 
fixture of our nationally-partitioned and yet now globally interconnected world. The sub-
question here is: How did identity credentials issued by the national state historically emerge 
and become authoritative?  
 Finally, I can turn the research focus back to the starting point and proceed with the 
investigation of the contemporary efforts toward building authoritative digital identity 
mechanisms online against the backdrop of the analytic l insights thus gained. I reiterate the 
question: How are social actors, events or processes leading to the possible emergence of 
authoritative digital identity credentials for Internet end users at large? The aim is to elicit a 
more cogent, socially-aware and sustainable response t  the current challenges to building a 
digital identity infrastructure. 
By the end this dissertation will have: 
i) addressed to what extent an authoritative user-centi  digital identity mechanism can 
be implemented and what its societal requirements and implications might be; 
ii)  identified the basic factors that constitute the authority of identity issuers on the 
subject matter; 
iii)  pinpointed the most socially critical challenges to adoption and sustainability, and 
offer policy recommendations; 
iv) outlined different potentially viable pathways to a widespread adoption; 
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v) demonstrated that there are relevant lessons to be learned from the history of identity 
systems; 
vi) uncovered possible historical patterns between variance of identity systems and 
social structures; 
vii)  illuminated several fundamental yet theoretically undeveloped aspects of identity 
mechanisms. 
viii)  developed preliminary results, new concepts, ideas, or principles aiming to advance 
and deepen our understanding of identity management systems. 
ix) shed a light on the nature of the identity challenge in cyberspace. 
Overall, this inquiry will provide us with analytical tools for a better understanding of the 
formation process of large and widely relied-upon identification systems as well as related social 
changes.  
1.4 Organization of this dissertation 
This document reports on the steps that have been tak  in carrying out the investigation of the 
above research questions as well as their outcomes, in the organized outline that follows.  
In this first chapter, which is now coming to a close, I have recounted the research 
motivation and articulated the research problem and its relevance. From the initial particular 
question, I have also formulated the broader, general r search question that holds this 
dissertation together. Based on a periodization of the history of information technology, the 
general question takes on three versions (sub-questions) each applicable to a different historical 
period.    
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Next, the core concepts shaping this inquiry are defined in chapter 2. Namely, this 
chapter focuses on the relationships between identity, authentication and authority. It provides a 
detailed explanation of those concepts and identifis linkages amongst them as part of the 
constitutive processes of identifying individuals through artifacts, in general. 
Chapter 3 articulates the bases and framework of the methodological approaches, locating 
this dissertation in a historical and pragmatic (problem-driven) epistemology based on a 
relational ontology whereby interactions, relations a d exchanges constitute the matter of the 
social phenomenon. It highlights the importance of history in macro-social phenomena to the 
extent that these may be cast as mechanism-processes of a large scale, emphasizing the 
sociohistorical framework of this inquiry. Moreover, this chapter sets forth the research strategy 
used for this investigation and further develops the arguments for choosing and analyzing the 
main three cases comprising this dissertation, as well as the different approaches taken in each 
one of them. 
Chapter 4 locates the beginning of the historical an lysis in the Middle Ages. The 
historical literature shows that particularly in the period spanning from the eleventh to the 
thirteenth century, the medieval West also experienced the challenges of identifying individuals 
within the realm of paper/parchment-based handwritten records on the rise. Questions were 
raised and debated about the representation of individuals at distant times and locations, 
featuring the themes of identity, authentication and gency. This chapter first outlines the 
broader context of relevant medieval institutions. It details the capabilities of the record-making 
technologies that were used, including artifacts such as diplomas and charters (used, e.g., to 
record donations and transfers of estate properties), as well as seals, individual subscriptions and 
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manuscript signs of various kinds, notably the autograph signature. Principal actors and 
participating characters involved the king and an array of scribes. But most importantly, God was 
the supreme reference in the ordering logic of seals as identity tokens. In addition of presenting 
medieval practices, this chapter critically analyzes the medieval discourse that articulated this 
logic.   
Chapter 5 addresses the case of modern state-issued credentials as part of materializing 
processes of national identity, with an emphasis on the passport as the most universal form of 
identity credential to date. This chapter mainly focuses on the sequence of events and factors that 
combined to bring about that quintessential modern ide tity credential, outlining the historical 
mechanisms of its development up to its ultimate authoritative status. A particular attention is 
paid to the basis for defining national identity (that is, identity by the national state) and the 
claim to the identification of all citizens located in a territory controlled by the state, through a 
process of nationalizing and naturalizing the state, s I conceptualize it, whereby the nation or 
the people living on that territory is affiliated to the state apparatus, all individual members 
included.  
Eventually, I return in chapter 7 to the contemporary phenomenon that initially motivated 
this research undertaking and the original research question. While this instance of the 
phenomenon still is open, this chapter investigates th  main activities undertaken thus far in 
order to reach towards the goal of building digital identity infrastructure in order to provide 
authoritative identity credentials. It describes a sample of technology cases illustrating the 
emerging protocols that are shaping the design and c pabilities of online identity management 
systems, and outlines the current public-private partnership efforts to foster the realization of the 
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goal set forth. Overall, this chapter offers a picture of the state of digital identity processes by 
early 2012, along with a critical assessment of the challenges. 
Finally, the purpose of the Chapter 6 is to integrate the insights gained from the case 
analyses into a logical process framework that explains various dimensions in the drive toward 
establishing identity systems and identifies the main f ctors that make them authoritative. While 
I do not offer deductive predictions on the future of digital identity, I outline scenarios out of 
pragmatic projections based on what my examination of history suggests; these projections also 
include different pathways possibly leading to the desired outcome.  
In the concluding chapter, the eighth, I summarize and discuss the main findings of this 
inquiry. The conceptual or theoretical insights are fleshed out regarding the constitutive elements 
of the formation of authoritative identity systems and related social institutional processes. 
Relating to those insights, practical consequences and recommendations are outlined, particularly 
with a view to building a digital identity infrastructure that could service globally, effectively 
and in ways that facilitate rollout. Finally I point out the limits of this work and towards the 
prospect of future related research.  
Before diving into the analysis, let us now more systematically define and elaborate on 
the core concepts of this research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Concepts and Definitions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The first and most basic concept in all the phenomena this research investigates obviously is 
identity. This is a very simple word but less so a concept. At the very least it is multifaceted. It 
would therefore be a Titanesque task and probably a useless one to try to integrate in this 
research framework all the related perspectives available in the literature; if it were even possible 
the result would probably not be very coherent. As a result, I shall insist that if identity is the 
central concept of this dissertation, its understanding must however be qualified through the lens 
of the notion of identity credential – not just ‘identity’ as an absolute and abstract concept. This 
enables us to be more focused and to delineate a meaningful cluster of concepts in relation to the 
phenomenon at hand. In this chapter I specify and define those concepts. These definitions are 
supplemented by further discussions enabling a more elaborated characterization and a finer 
understanding.  
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2.2 Basic definitions 
An identity credential is an artifact that serves as proof of identity. I have labeled ‘authoritative’ 
an entity that is able to issue identity credentials, which other parties that are not in any way 
linked to those credentials or to the issuing entity recognize and accept as a means to verify or 
authenticate individuals’ identity. Such credentials or identity mechanisms are authoritative, as a 
result. The quality of being authoritative is not just based on intentions (e.g., by designers) or 
decisions (e.g., by policymakers) but on the fact tha he credential is effectively used by 
stakeholders in the conditions described above to that effect. In other word, this is a relational 
concept. An authoritative identity credential is an artifact commonly used as proof of identity 
because it is largely deemed to accomplish the goal of accurately identifyi g its legitimate 
holder, including in legally binding transactions.  
Process: As I would define it, a process is the continuum of thought or action, or a series 
of events, whether organized or spontaneous, which connects a state A of things to a different 
state B. With a sociohistorical and societal orientation as is the case in this research, the elements 
concerned – events, decisions or actions – are ordered along historical or large-time sequences. 
Social process refers to any course of such events, decisions or actions that occur in the society at 
large as requirements or enabling conditions for the realization of authoritative identity 
credentials. 
Mechanism refers to the workings of a structure or a system ( .g., a machine), 
particularly a complex one which is made of more than one simple element. Its meaning 
encompasses how something works or how something occurs by showing the behavior of its 
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meaningful components, their changes of state or changes in the relations between them. This 
term may occur in different contexts with further nua ced meanings; in this work, it is mainly 
used in two ways. The meaning of the two terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘process’ overlap to a large 
extent13, although ‘process’ arguably is broader – to include, e.g., an open-ended series of 
happenings that may be related in some way or self-occurring sequential patterns – while a 
mechanism is rather specific to an actual ‘doing’ or ‘making’ geared toward a purpose (as by 
design, albeit not necessarily always). In the sociohistorical semantic, this specificity also applies 
to the rationale of a temporal phenomenon.  
Identity mechanism: The term ‘mechanism’ is used in a context that emphasizes its 
technical and functional meaning whereby it generally efers to a series of articulated steps or 
procedures that are followed using a concrete appartus in order to get from A to B (where A and 
B are not necessarily locations, and apparatus may be a tool, a technical system or an 
infrastructure, etc.) Within the same semantic field and by extension, the term may be used as 
synonym of the system itself whose workings are being referred to, or the tool by means of 
which the change or series of changes entailed by the mechanism are effected. This is the case in 
the phrase “identity mechanism” which I use as a generic substitute to both “identity system” 
(mechanism as the system) or “identity credential” (mechanism as the tool or instrument). 
Identity mechanism then is a series of tools and procedures required to nable the identity of 
certain group of objects or subjects, from its assignment or acquisition to its discovery to its use 
– in other words, to enable identity as an artifact, identification and identity transactions.  
                                                 
13 Charles Tilly (2008) also uses both terms combined in one: “mechanism-process.” For historical analysis purposes, 
James Coleman defines a mechanism as “meaningful connection between events as the basic tool of description and 
analysis” (Somers 1998: 726; see infra). While the explanation I am providing here may or may not be debatable from 
some disciplinary or theoretical perspective, I did not intend to use these terms here as theoretical devices, hence my 
effort to explain them is merely pragmatic and not intended to make claims beyond the context of this dissertation.  
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Causal mechanism: The second relevant repertoire of meaning for the term ‘mechanism’ 
in this work is social in general, and particularly sociohistorical. In its social meaning broadly 
speaking, a mechanism includes a series of events, decisions and actions hat cohere in leading to 
a given outcome. I stated above that mechanism refers to how something works or occurs. The 
concept of “causal mechanism” in sociohistorical research puts the emphasis on that ‘how’ 
dimension as a mode of causation. In that sense, causal mechanism is a mode of causation that 
elicits the reasons why a change of state happens in a given type of phenomena based on the 
contextual accounts of how exactly it befell in known occurrences of the said phenomena; how 
certain elements or factors as well as their interactions with one another and with their 
environment effect a change of state or a variance in the said phenomena. Those elements and 
their interactions are not necessarily observable, while the change they are supposed to effect 
is.14 
In this thesis, the term ‘identity’ shall never be taken for an all-encompassing concept of 
pure abstraction. Even when used as a noun without any qualifier and to the extent that it is 
meant to refer to the object of this dissertation, the term shall always be understood as stemming 
from the basic identity notion that makes possible such procedures as the legal identification of 
an individual. In other words, ours is an empirical notion of identity, even if its manifestations 
raise questions that go beyond that which is empirically manifest.  
 As a consequence in a number of instances throughout t is thesis, identity may be used 
interchangeably with identification which is otherwise a procedure for establishing or 
discovering an identity. We may often find the following phrases used within the community of 
                                                 
14 In fact in the epistemological framework of this research, causal mechanisms are not observable. See chapter 3 for 
further development on that framework and its notion of causal mechanism. 
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practice designing the technologies this research is oncerned with, and consequently in the 
related literature: identity system or identity management system. A scheme that makes each and 
every individual member of a given population consistently identifiable is an identity system. 
Adding to that all the procedures and rules that govern the communication, exchange and 
maintenance of identity information in the identity system leads to an identity management 
system. Here too, the two phrases may be used interchangeably. As related to contemporary 
contexts, they are understood and used in this thesis to mean a set of integrated tools, artifacts, 
rules, procedures and mechanisms (in technical, functional sense) organizing the issuance, 
maintenance and proper use of identity credentials. The notion of identifying any kind of entities 
(generally humans, in the context of this thesis) impl es that some identity schema applicable to 
them is pre-defined somehow and pre-set in the system (thus, identity system.) The rules and 
mechanisms in place for conducting various operations required for the use of those identities – 
including the issuance of identity credentials supporting such use as well as their expiration time 
– qualify or specify the goal of the system as being of management. Therefore, while the 
following three phrases may be used interchangeably, ‘identity system’ is a broader formulation, 
‘identity management system’ is more specific as to the intended purpose of the said system, 
while ‘identification system’ narrowly focuses on its dentification function allowing to match 
accurately a defined identity with an actual entity.  
Identity transaction designates any sort of exchange – even non-monetary – that is 
enabled by, and can only be successfully completed as a result of, knowing or ascertaining the 
identity of at least one of the parties, as relevant for the transaction at hand. The general end user 
refers to the individual Internet user going about her own business through the Internet (notably 
on the WWW) outside any particular enterprise soluti n or corporate setting. 
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2.3 Identity and Identification 
In this section I define and discuss the first set of basic concepts forming or defining the social 
phenomenon investigated in this research and as pertaining to transactions in the physical world. 
2.3.1 Identity family concepts 
By that phrase I refer to relevant concepts that morph logically derive from the term ‘identity’ as 
well as to concepts that are required for defining the concept of identity. The term ‘identity’ in 
the context of this research is used as pertaining to the notion of identification. To identify a 
problem is to be able to pinpoint that problem or simply to come to the realization of its 
existence. It often implies however that one can cogently formulate the problem, clearly spell it 
out so as to enable its clear understanding, effective onsideration and possible resolution. More 
generally, identification is a procedure the outcome of which is the creation, manifestation or 
discovery of the actual nature of something, that is, its identity or what it (actually) is. 
Identification is predicated on a notion of identity as well as on the existence of an identity, for 
whatever means makes possible to identify a person in a given domain or for a given purpose 
potentially constitutes identity in that context. 
Furthermore, either primarily or ultimately, this thesis is concerned with identity as it 
relates to the identification of human beings. In that regard, the concept of identity is commonly 
assumed in the use of phrases such as ‘identity documents’ or ‘national ID.’ Generally, a 
person’s identity in this context is simply understood as proof or verification of ‘who’ that person 
is, based on some known facts or according to a pre-established record. Thus, the term identity is 
also often used to signify the artifact that captures or presents the relevant set of facts, or points 
36 
 
 
 
 
to the related record, whereas identification in ths case generally refers to steps taken to verify 
or discover the content of said identity in relation t  the embodied subject to which it pertains. 
For now and until I formulate the definition of the concept of identity, let us assume this 
empirical understanding of the term identity.  
I further note that in the context of human identification, the term of ‘identification’ is 
more appropriate in impersonal contexts where prior personal knowledge is not required or not 
even existent. Unless you are doing so to a third pa ty or they are trying to hide from you, you 
don’t generally identify someone you are already famili r with when you spot them in some 
location: in straightforward interpersonal situations involving, say, acquaintances, friends or 
relatives, ‘recognize’ rather than ‘identify’ appears to be a better suitable term to describe the 
encounter of an individual bearing such identity (i.e., of acquaintance, friend or relative). 
Recognition, in the sense of the obsolete “recognizance,”15 will be reserved for cases such as 
these. If identification properly speaking occurs particularly in impersonal circumstances, then 
how is it enabled? How does someone identify a person they didn’t personally know in the first 
place? The Computer Science and Telecommunications B ard of the US National Research 
Council consider that: “Identification is the process of using claimed or observed attribu es of an 
individual to infer who the individual is” (Kent and Millett 2003: 19). This definition suggests 
that attributes are the key element in achieving “impersonal identification,” as I would call it. 
Therefore within the present framework, identification is the process by which an entity 
endeavors to establish or check the identity of another entity through any form of identity record. 
In that sense, identification may consist in verifying the status of one attribute or a set of 
attributes. 
                                                 
15 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/recognizance 
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Attribute is any property, characteristic or quality of an etity that can be associated 
with it in a more or less stable manner. Depending on the scope of the purpose they are meant to 
serve, attributes may variably be inherent/innate, cquired over time or assigned. And among the 
latter, some may be more durable and others rather transient. Let us consider for instance, a 
person of a certain height, with certain reputation, having a function or holding a title in an 
organization and carrying a particular sign at a specific time: the attributes that may be 
associated with that person at the time of observation include specific contents or values for her 
height (inherent), reputation (acquired), title (assigned), and the sign held (transient), although 
some of them may exceed the context at hand and be mor  durable, such as the height and the 
reputation. However, in an effort toward standardize  and therefore consistent procedures of 
identification, identity attributes in the context of human-designed tokens (such as identity 
credentials) are commonly shared among the relevant population of identifiable entities. Those 
attributes are then documented with the corresponding particulars of each entity. In that sense, an 
attribute is a piece of information that allows specifying or disclosing some fact about an entity. 
I stated earlier that the notion of identification presupposes that of identity, and I just 
argued that as an impersonal procedure, identification is enabled notably through attributes. It 
follows that attributes may define identity. However, is there any definite number of attributes 
that define the concept of identity, or in other words, constitute identity across contexts? The 
answer is no, because identity depends on the dimensions along which any unit of a class of 
entities needs to be distinguished from any other units and those dimensions vary across contexts 
and with the applicable identification purpose. The formation of identities as well as their 
discovery thus is contextual. While the direct observation of naturally occurring characteristics 
may lead to identification (albeit in a random manner from case to case), the number or the type 
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of attributes that constitute (more consistently) an identity in a given context is the result of a 
decision or a series of decisions which may be embedded in human-designed artifacts. Implicit 
or explicit to the context of identification are assumptions, knowledge, decisions and 
expectations shaping the constitution and the repres ntation of the relevant entities in that 
context. They also provide the foundations for the types of attributes that may possibly be 
ascribed to the class of entities to be identified. 
One attribute may or may not define an identity; it may if the organizing principle of the 
context at hand is predicated on that attribute alone. For instance, there are contexts where the 
concerned entities may be defined just by their name, probably the most common of attributes. In 
an identity context where identity is defined by the value of n attributes, knowing the value of 
one attribute for a given entity only gets us every time one step (out of n) closer to discovering 
its identity. On the other hand, if it is contextual (and thus, constructed one way or the other) 
then identity does not require the inclusion of every bit of information conceivable about the 
person no more than identification requires the total disclosure of all the information available on 
that person.  
Next to the notion of attribute, there is that of identifier  which may also constitute or 
define identity. In effect, the two are close in at least one specific way and yet differ in other 
ways as I explain in the following paragraphs. But first, let me clarify how the notion of 
identifier plays out in the process of identification. There are two options for the referentiality of 
an identifier: it may refer either to an actual entity or to an identity (in some form of record about 
that entity). Identification may occur either way, that is, when an identifier can reliably be linked 
to a defined identity or to an actual entity. In effect, identifiers too may apply in a naturalistic 
39 
 
 
 
 
context and refer to the individual entity itself: for instance if I persistently depend on a mole in a
specific spot to distinguish two twins, or because I n ed to see a particular mark or the license 
plate number on that silver-colored model of Subaru sedan before I can be sure it is my 
colleague’s and not someone else’s with the same apparent attributes, the mole, the mark or the 
plate number are identifiers pointing to the actual hing16. However, for the agent in the 
Department of Motor Vehicles, that same plate number entered into their information system 
brings up one identity, or two in fact (the car’s and its owner’s.)  
I have already noted that, depending on the context, a single attribute may define an 
identity. In that case, that attribute may actually be used as an identifier because it is sufficient to 
discern which single one among many possible entitis  specifically designates in that context. 
In other words, the question-test for a given attribute in that regard is: Does it enable us to 
discover an identity fully as defined or presumed in the context at hand, that is, to support the 
inference of an entity as a whole distinguishable from another through that attribute? 
From the above, we begin to understand that by its function an identifier is more specific 
than an attribute, as it appears to require a one-t-one match-up with an identity while attributes 
are potentially many for (describing or representing) one identity. An identifier is by design a 
particular piece of information or form of token tha  is uniquely associated with a single entity 
among many, in a given setting. To the extent that an identifier is human-designed as part of an 
identity system, its association with the entity is enabled through its association with the identity 
                                                 
16 I realize here that in some of the above examples a deeper conceptual argument may be leveled in support of the 
notion that even in this case it is an identity, not entity itself, that is pointed to through those marks and clues, as they 
evoke in the mind of the informed witness a full body of knowledge associated with the individual to whom those 
tokens or identifiers belong. However, for simplicity as well as in recognition that natural identifiers (as opposed to 
human-designed identifiers) may be encountered, I do not rule out the possibility that some identifiers point directly to 
the identity subject itself (entity, individual), not just to an identity.   
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record of that entity in the system. The aforementioned token may be material (physical) or 
immaterial (abstract). Strictly speaking, an identifier is unique while an attribute is not 
necessarily so; that is the first and main differenc  between the two concepts. Because this 
research is concerned with human-designed artifacts and technological systems (and not so much 
with naturally and therefore randomly occurring identity-relevant marks, signs or tokens), an 
identifier in this context is generally a string of characters (letters, digits, symbols, or a 
combination thereof) built according to a specific syntax whereby it points to a single known or 
pre-defined identity in a given setting, or a string of characters which is understood by the parties 
involved as having a specific referent in a given stting. In this context, common identifiers 
include names, serial or ID numbers, barcodes, etc. Those identifiers are all abstract, despite the 
possible ambiguity of human individuals’ names which may be perceived or interpreted in some 
socio-cultural settings as having some material dimensions. The structure or the syntax of an 
identifier is not always transparent to anybody (e.g., barcode or even ID numbers). Furthermore, 
an identifier may become ambiguous from one domain or population to another (thus, becoming 
less of an identifier, strictly speaking). For instance, a name alone could work well as an 
identifier, that is, a self-sufficient token for identification purposes, if used in a population size or 
a setting where it unambiguously designates only one individual (e.g., a classroom), and a 
limited identifier otherwise, if at all (e.g., across the whole college campus.)  
An identifier can be strong in the sense that it allows unique mapping to a specific individual in a 
population, or it can be weak, in that it could be correctly applied to more than one individual in a 
population. Whether the identifier is strong or weak will depend upon the size of the population and the 
distinctiveness of the identifying attribute. (Kent and Millett 2003: 42) 
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In a sense, notions of identifier and attribute are close to the extent that attributes may be 
used as identifiers if they are singular enough, while some identifiers may lose their uniqueness 
and become simple attributes if, for example, the subject they relate to is diluted in a larger 
population. Other than the name (particularly human n mes) however, an abstract identifier is 
designed to apply to a definite population of entities. Shifting the boundaries of the target 
population should require redesigning that identifier in order for it to keep up with its function as 
an effective identifier applicable to the new population. Short of that, if an identifier becomes a 
weak one as suggested by the authors quoted above, I would suggest that it ceases being an 
identifier to become simply an attribute. This is shown with the example (provided above) of the 
name from a classroom to a campus setting, but this may also be the case for any other abstract 
identifier which then ceases to be the token of a single whole entity itself or of a full identity to 
become rather the token of a group of entities sharing a defined quality, that is, of an attribute.  
Ideally an abstract, human-made identifier would have  uniform format capable of 
issuing an amount of instances that can be consistetly distributed across the target population of 
the identity domain at hand while ensuring a unique mapping to every single individual member. 
The particularity of human names is that not only they can accommodate a wide range of 
variability, they also are not normally issued on the basis of a finite human population, every 
member of which is meant to be distinguished from all the others by name. In other words, they 
are not originally meant to be identifiers at the level of the whole society or the whole human 
population; them becoming identifiers depends on special or random circumstances, as when 
everybody in the classroom has a different name and the identity domain is the classroom. In this 
regard, human names are a case of ambiguity located in he overlapping zone between attributes 
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and identifiers, possibly being only the former or also the latter depending on the circumstances 
at hand. 
The development in the above two paragraphs lead me to th  second main difference 
between attribute and identifier, that is, attribute generally is substantive (it provides some 
information about the actual entity) while identifier is generally is abstract. Stated otherwise, 
whereas syntax might suffice to create identifiers t appears that attributes require some 
semantics: identifiers point to, while attributes tell about an entity (again, keeping in mind the 
particular case of the name which exemplifies the ambivalence there might be between attribute 
and identifier.) 
Finally, subsequent to the discussion of all the above ideas that compose the concept of 
identity, I shall define such concept as follows. We have learned that identity may be formed by 
one or several characteristics of an entity (also kn wn as attributes), which express the defining 
or distinctive status of that entity in a given population of similar entities. In other words, in the 
context of identification schemes, identity refers to any aggregate of more or less structured 
information relating to an entity in such a way that it can be consistently distinguished as a 
specific unit or individual instance among a potential population of similar entities. Such 
aggregate may take the form of an artifact that enables the attribution of further relevant 
information to the same and the only entity to whom or to which that information pertains. 
Ultimately, identity is a mechanism for binding any one of a collection of entities to data in 
such a way that the result can point back to, and enable the discovery of, the specific entity 
thus bound. Individuals exercise their agency through artifacts or media that are used to 
represent such data.  
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2.3.2 Commentary on identity as a medium 
Most of the time in the physical world and particularly in the impersonal context of institutions, a 
person is understood to have only one “true” or “real” identity, even over time, which for 
instance is captured by government-defined identity or other legal identity credential. We’ve 
come to accept such reification of the notion of identity, partly thanks to the now familiar 
practice of official identity documents such as national identity cards or passports, and the 
information they convey about us. Before the so-called “information revolution,” the basic 
information conveyed by that official, hard-media identity would generally include the 
individual’s full name, date of birth, place of birth, and nationality, as applicable. Sometimes the 
place of residence and the profession may also be included. (The whole will most often be tied to 
an abstract identifier, generally a number or a character string.) The public has become 
accustomed with associating that set of frontend information to the notion of individual identity 
in the context of identification procedures, and since the purpose of such procedures is to make 
sure we are not taken for, and we don’t pretend to be, someone we are not, most people 
eventually think identity is normally unique just as the physical individual it relates to.  
Individuals themselves do not experience their own ide tity as limited to or even defined 
by those pieces of information found in identity documents, official or otherwise. Nor do their 
personal relationships and community ties, from family to neighbors to friends, colleagues and 
allies. For those, there is a broader narrative behind each one of the data points included in a 
typical identity credential, which better defines their identity than the discrete and abstract data 
points themselves. Of this, one might think names ar  exceptions, and they may be in places. In 
some other places however, it also happens that official names on documents are not necessarily 
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the ones people are known by in their community. Furthermore, we may observe that in some 
cultural contexts where the uniqueness is not the goal in accounts of identity but rather 
connectedness, for instance, relevant practices will rather emphasize elements and narratives of 
identity as a link in a chain of forebears and relatives than correlate fixed attributes with an 
atomistic notion of the individual.  
There are a number of reasons, I would argue, why officially-defined identity centering 
on the body has so far appeared to be the only authoritative solution. First, human beings have 
only one body which is the ultimate base originating their agency. Furthermore, the uniqueness 
of the body for every human being makes it the bestidentifier and the primary source of 
identifying attributes for the person hosted in that body. To the extent that actual individuals are 
embodied, and that it is in their body that they live and eventually accomplish whatever they are 
capable of – including carrying out their own will as well as delegating their agency to other 
individuals or extending it through artifacts – thebody can in effect be seen as the ultimate 
marker of the substantive self, the anchor of identity, that which must be characterized or tracked 
down in order to enable most accurate individual identification. Therefore efforts to both 
characterize the body and keep track of its movements have historically been at the center of the 
techniques of identification.  
Second, thinking backward over the long arc of human history, one may intuit that before 
human agency began to extend through increasingly complex tools (writing and various media 
partaking in such increasing complexity), it was initially limited to the physical boundaries of the 
biological body, or nearly so. While nowadays indivi uals may take actions without being 
physically involved in the process, their biological body remains the single point of intersection 
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of all the different identities that they may fashion or find themselves holding – that is, all the 
roles or characters they may take on as well as all the courses of action they may involve their 
agency in.   
And third, the predominance of the official structuring of individual identity as the 
reference derives from the claim of the nation-state o define the allowances and opportunities 
afforded to individuals as well as to command their allegiance.  By its capability to make laws, 
the nation-state establishes and enforces rights and duties relevant to all the members of the 
society, one nation at a time.  
Based on those three sets of facts, an overriding need for legal accountability has made 
the government-defined identity the core of nearly ll consequential identity schemes we’ve 
known since the emergence of the national state. Because in order to be effective any 
accountability in the broad context of social transactions, as far as we know, must be legally 
defensible and enforceable; and any effective legal accountability is ultimately enacted, upheld 
and enforced by the state apparatus. The legal authority is backed by the power of the state to 
enforce rules, if necessary by coercion. It just so happen, one might say, that governments have 
found the typical attributes displayed in passports and national ID cards sufficient to help them 
define and locate the embodied individual, or they ave put a whole infrastructure in place in 
order to reach that goal using those credentials.  
Any accountability regime requires the capability to identify the possible sources of 
agency available in its jurisdiction with regard to the type of action that is to be monitored for 
accountability. In addition to that, it also needs a ystem of reward and punishment without 
which it cannot sustain. Would any meaningful collective life be possible at all, if there is no 
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way to ensure that people’s decisions and actions, hence their rights and obligations, be 
consistently attributable to them and not to someone else? In a nutshell, an ordered collective life 
needs accountability which is enabled by the capacity to enforce a system of reward and 
punishment, which in turn required capability for accurate attribution of actions.   
To the extent that the individual is increasingly capable of performing actions at distance 
while those actions can accurately be attributed to nobody but that particular individual who 
originated them, it becomes clear and normal that identity does not require bodily presence in 
order to be effective.17 In fact, one may even argue that the more an identity mechanism can help 
accomplish without the subject’s bodily presence (while retaining the capability to trace back to 
that subject the steps taken in the process,) the mor  it fulfills its purpose as identity. In any case 
while it may refer to an embodied entity, identity is not the body – understood here as the 
ultimate form of an entity in its whole manifestation.18 If the body does not identity make, 
meaning if the presence of an embodied subject does n t necessarily give away her identity, then 
clearly identity is a representation, that is, a form of mediation of a principal (the identity 
subject) by means of information communicated through artifacts, whether physical, digital or 
otherwise.  
If identity were to have any heuristic or cultural v lue, if it were to mean anything 
beyond a sterile isolation within oneness or the equally sterile circularity of sameness as self19 
                                                 
17 This conceptual gap between the actual individual and her identity, I would submit, has further conceptual as well as 
empirical implications: it enables the development of concepts that define the type of entity we are dealing with, such as 
personhood, while it gives room to accommodate more artifacts as identities or identity agents. 
18 This definition is suitable to the fact that we may use the term to refer to the biological body of human beings as well 
as the body of any other entity. Wherever I don’t specify and the context does not clearly suggest a human being, then 
the term ‘body’ should be understood in this general sense. 
19 About identity as one and the same thing in Aristotle, see White (1971). 
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(everything is identical to itself, or it is itself, indeed), then it will have to be defined in 
adequation with a purpose and in a given context. Therefore it is necessarily mediated and 
oriented towards achieving a purpose as relevant to that context or set of possible contexts. This 
leads to another, material form of mediation  
It is precisely because of the mediation and representation nature of identity that it makes 
any sense for anyone to ask a person “who are you?” while they have the whole of the embodied 
individual herself standing right there before them. What they are trying to know with that 
question is some relevant information attached to that individual, or a sufficient amount of it, 
which defines somehow the entity that she is in the current domain. In other words, the verifier is 
seeking some characterization or a number of attribu es or facts concerning that individual which 
he cannot generally discover for certain by virtue of simply seeing her: Where does she come 
from? What’s her nationality? What are her rights and privileges? What can she do, what is she 
not allowed to do, and on what basis? What are the duti s and responsibilities we may expect or 
even demand of her? etc. As a result, “who are you?” is not so much the actual question as it is 
“what are you?” since the objective is to know some relevant facts or things about you (things 
that may define your status, as relevant in the context at hand) rather than your personal history 
and detailed knowledge of who you are as a person (personal identity, in the philosophical 
sense).       
Therefore, instead of leaving it to each individual to define and fill the realm of the 
‘what’ by their own biographical narrative, standard formats will be required in order to 
streamline identity verification (if only by the same authority over time) and to extend the utility 
of identity to the maximum number of potential identity verifiers. As a result, identity schemes 
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break down “who you are” into a series of “what you are” in order to enable standard formats of 
knowing who a person is. Those standards will inevitably be predicated on partial 
representations adapted to the accomplishment of certain goals – bearing in mind the 
overarching purpose of ensuring accountability whenev r necessary.  
It is generally expected that the identity data – what a person is – will lead to who she is, 
that is, the full manifestation of her embodied person or any of her manifestations or extensions 
through which she can appropriate well-earned rights as well as be held accountable (e.g., bank 
account). To the extent that a set of data may unambiguously lead to an actual individual, to the 
extent that it reliably represents the person herself in such a way that she’s recognizable among 
others, then it defines her identity – who (i.e., which member of the subject population) she i . In 
fact “Who” equals “Which one” among the potential many. For transactional purposes, the 
‘what’ might be a sufficient, albeit not exhaustive, determination of the ‘who’ to the extent that 
what you are enables others to get to who you are. In the end, the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ are 
conflated in this notion of identity. It should be no surprise then that in the process, the ‘who’ 
(whole person) is somehow spelled out in a series of ‘whats’ (discrete attributes).  
When identification occurs over a physical encounter between the subject and the 
verifier, the objective generally is to gain knowledg  of the ‘what,’ i.e. of the information and 
attributes that are relevant to define the subject’s capabilities, entitlements, duties and liabilities 
as relevant in that context. In the other hand, attributes, credentials and claims may be presented 
outside any empirical encounter – so the ‘what’ is known first – and the process will be to get as 
closely as needed to the actual individual or to her surrogate manifestations or extensions (e.g., 
assets), as noted previously. Either way, identity requires the mediation of an informational 
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infrastructure in order to represent the actual identity subject, to such relevant and necessary 
extent as to complete the transaction at hand.  
If identification links an identifier to a known identity or to an actual subject, it must be 
clear that it will not be effective unless there is a comfortable level of confidence in that pairing. 
Identification can only be conclusive when the linking is based on robust enough evidence. The 
validation of such evidence is the object of authenication. Hence, in addition to a notion of 
identity, the second most important dimension of identification is some form of authentication 
whether weak or strong, informal or formal. 
2.4 Authentication and Authority  
I define and discuss in this section the second set of basic concepts forming the social 
phenomenon of identification processes in the physical world; this set is articulated around the 
concept of ‘authentication.’ Furthermore, I elaborate on and consolidate the central concept of 
the main research question, that is, the concept of ‘authoritative identity’ as sketched in the 
general introduction. Finally, at the end of the section I outline a broader discussion of relevant 
notions relating to those two main concepts.  
2.4.1 Authentication 
While the concept of authentication may appear less ab tract, and hence less tricky than identity, 
it nonetheless has multiple facets, too. Various items may be authenticated: written documents, 
art pieces, devices on a network, attributes, credentials, even human individuals, etc. In the case 
of official documents, for instance, an official rep sentative vetted by the relevant 
administrative or juridical institution (hence, with the appropriate authority) authenticates a copy 
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of a document by certifying that it is an authentic reproduction of the original document, and can 
therefore stand for the latter. On the other hand,  original certificate of nationality is a 
document that authenticates a fact, claim or assertion – that an individual is of a specific 
nationality – provided that as an artifact the certificate itself is authentic (with the display of all
the appropriate signs, etc.) If I, looking and sounding like I do, state that I am a national of Palau 
to someone who believes it is important for them to ascertain my nationality, they may not 
believe me about that (assuming they have a clear sense of where that country is located, or at 
least that it does exist, possibly with a rather definit  idea about what the people living there are 
supposed to look or sound like.) But if I exhibit what looks like a genuine certificate of 
nationality from Palau, then he might be much more inclined to believe that unless he has some 
serious reason to suspect my document is fake. In other words, the certificate authenticates my 
claim that I am from Palau. A passport may accomplish the same thing, based on what it states 
about my nationality. 
For nonverbal, visual artworks where the value resid s not in the similarity of content but 
in the authenticity of the artifact itself in its unique instance of original creation, authentication 
will have to establish whether the artifact is that unique piece, once a completely new creation, as 
it suggests itself to be (based on a striking resemblance, for instance, in the case of previously 
known artwork.) A claim about the value or status of any artifact, unless supported by 
unquestionable evidence, may be met with doubts or opposing claims. So because the artifact 
lends itself to be taken for one thing or another, which it might not be, authentication will be 
necessary to settle the matter, using the most appropriate techniques and procedures (assuming 
there is enough confidence in the latter themselves.) Any time authentication is required a claim 
is being made, whether directly or indirectly. Both the aim and the outcome of authentication are 
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to find out or to establish the truth about that clim – which may pertain to the content, form or 
origin of the object being authenticated, or simply to a privilege or an attribute – and to establish 
its reliability as a consequence. Authentication is “the process of establishing confidence in the 
truth of some claim” (Kent and Millett 2003: 33). 
‘Authenticate’ actually would be translated by two rds in French: ‘authentiquer’ and 
‘légaliser,’ which literally are for authenticate on the one hand nd legalize (a document) on the 
other. The former notably applies to, among other contexts, what I have explained above with 
regard to the authentication of artwork, for instance: it establishes that something is veridical, 
true, or genuine – therefore, authentic. When I am logging into my email account by providing 
my username and password, I am not legalizing it or myself, but rather authenticating myself by 
demonstrating that I have knowledge of the true or the right logins (ergo, that I am the owner or 
a legitimate user of the account).  
The second part of the dual meaning of authentication – ‘legalize,’ that is – generally 
applies to a facsimile or the original copy of a document which has to be reviewed and properly 
certified by an authority as legally valid; in the case of a facsimile this procedure shows that it is 
conform to the original document and thus is as legal y valid as the original may be. I “legalize” 
a document means that I take the necessary steps or fulfill the necessary requirements in order to 
give it a legal status or legal validity. For instance, when I take said document to the mayor 
office or to the notary public to have them check it and declare that it meets the relevant and 
required standards and that, for legal purposes, th supporting materials presented to them 
constitute acceptable evidence of the veracity of the content (including that of the identity of any 
person referenced in it), and finally have them sign and stamp the document with the official 
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signs of their authority, as a result. If need be, that document thus “legalized” (endowed with a 
legal force or authority) will be acceptable as evid nce in any court of law of the jurisdiction 
competent in the subject matter at the place of “legalization.” 
The notion of authority plays out in both instances. For the outcome of the authentication 
– of a piece of art as genuine, of a document as legally valid, or of a copy of a document as 
accurate – to be accepted by the public, it must be carried out by an entity that has the stature to 
make such claim or to determine the validity or invalidity of any competing claim made by 
others about those artifacts. Their authority may be based on expertise or on their formal function 
and official title. And when I log in to my online account, I am providing evidence that I have 
authority over that account – as may have an owner or an author over the thing they own or have 
authored. Either way, authentication involves verification and validation.   
In the end, authentication is the procedure or the act of seeking or providing evidence in 
order to establish the truth about a claim or the authenticity of an artifact. It entails some type of 
verification and, if conclusive, leads to the validtion of a claim in one form or another. In 
particular, when the claim is about or in the form of an artifact, authentication is a procedure that 
either validates said artifact for a given purpose (legal or otherwise) or establishes its true status 
or “nature.” In legal or official contexts, authenticating an artifact implies that it acquires some 
authority or efficacy as a result, giving it to the extent applicable a probative character as to its 
content or inherent claim. At the very least, its authenticity is so established.  
2.4.2 Authoritative identity 
Because identity is a representation, as we have seen, which in this context materializes as a 
token or a credential, it is enabled through certain procedures involving at least one actor other 
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than the individual being represented. The identity token or credential is the outcome of such 
procedures; it includes a number of assertions or enabl s the discovery of certain facts about the 
individual. The notion of authoritativeness in relation to identity simply derives from the concern 
as to whether the actors conducting those procedures and making those assertions (at least as per 
their representation of the individual) are believable or trustworthy in the eye of the stakeholders 
with regard to those assertions or facts. In other words: why should I trust assertions made by a 
third-party entity about the identity of other entities or individuals that it vouches for? To the 
extent that identity subjects depend on the vouching of such third party and to the extent that 
their counterparts in identity transactions accept and rely on its assertions (via a credential), such 
party is an identity authority and delivers authoritative identity. 
The adjective ‘authoritative’ here indicates that which is accepted as a reference or a 
basis for validation in the eye of a broad number of stakeholders, whether through a positive 
procedure or an implicit belief. An authoritative identity credential is an artifact that is generally 
viewed by both its individual holder and social entities needing to create, process or refer to a 
reliable and binding representation of that individual within a record system as the most 
appropriate mechanism by which to authenticate him or her for the purposes of such 
representation. In most situations where the individual or social entities need either to create or 
process a record that includes a reliable and binding representation of the individual or to verify 
the individual’s identity or status regarding a given personal attribute, an authoritative identity 
credential is largely viewed by both groups of actors as one of the most recommendable 
instruments available enabling them to achieve that go l. That credential is considered among the 
best formal or standard sources of evidence available in support of the identity of the individual, 
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whatever way such identity is conceived of at any given historical period, and within that period 
and conception, whatever way it is defined in a given domain. 
As I have already suggested in the basic definitions above, an authoritative identity 
credential is a reference instrument that provides th  best available measure of truth, or at least of 
substantive validity, for relevant identity attributes. It is accepted for that purpose and to that 
effect by a broad number of stakeholders. To be more systematic, I develop that concept in two 
steps as follows. On the one hand, an authoritative identity credential is one that is consistently 
accepted by stakeholders seeking to verify the identity of individuals as a reliable instrument for 
authenticating that identity. This may (but does not necessarily) stem from the fact that such 
credential has been issued by an established i entity authority  or, in other words, by any 
separate entity routinely regarded by most stakeholders as a reliable source of evidence for the 
authentication of individuals. Either way, the experience of both the identity subjects and their 
counterparts in applicable transactions makes them at least fairly confident that those credentials 
effectively achieve the designed or expected identifica on functions and services. 
The same concept may be preferably defined by the chara teristics of the credential itself. 
An identity credential is said to be authoritative when it meets the following three requirements:  
(1) the identity subjects depend on it to make and support identity assertions or claims;  
(2) other than the credential provider itself, counterparts in most identity transactions 
and communications accept it as proof of identity; and  
(3) it works satisfactorily enough so as (1) and (2) are routinely repeated. 
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In order for an identity system architecture to sustain on the long run once all participants 
are set in their respective role, not only the technical system needs to be reliable but the 
transacting parties also need to be confident that their expectations will be reasonably and 
securely met with regard to the role played by all the other parties. Just as authentication is said 
to secure certain level of confidence in its object, likewise well exercised authority more broadly 
has the effect to impart confidence in related social transactions. 
It is safe to say that the larger the number of parties accepting the use of identity 
credentials issued (if applicable) by a given entity, he greater the authority of that entity in 
matter of identification; in any case, the greater th  number of those parties, the higher the 
authoritativeness of the credential. In that sense, a company or a university are identity 
authorities for their employees and students in any claims predicated on their status as employees 
of that company or students at that university, possibly even beyond the boundaries of those 
institutions. However, the state or national governme t is a greater or higher identity authority 
because the identity credentials they issue are accpted by many more third parties and for a 
variety of purposes (regardless of the domain of transaction.)  
2.4.3 Commentary on authenticity, reliability and authority 
I propose here further discussion of the above concepts, by first arguing the need to recognize an 
empirical complementarity between authenticity and reliability. I then proceed to articulate our 
baseline notion of authority as a backdrop to the lat r analyses that will involve historically 
situated notion of the same.  
• Authenticity and reliability 
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Historically the notion of authenticity of documents stems from an institutional framework 
including categories and hierarchy of documents, sytems of evidence, and practices of 
validation (Fraenkel and Pontille 2003). Back in the ime of the Roman Empire, an act or 
document was deemed authentic or authenticated only if it followed some well-defined 
procedures, nearly ritual by some measures, regarding its confection and even its curation or 
custody.  The official and legal requirements in those times translate the belief that “authenticity 
is not an intrinsic character of documents but is accorded to them by the fact of their preservation 
in a designated place, a temple, public office, treasury, or archives” (Duranti 1989: 12). 
In the field of record-keeping systems, the concepts of reliability and authenticity may 
rigorously be distinguished. Authentication is only meant to address the form and materiality of 
the document itself as opposed to the assertions bei g made through its contents: “a record is 
authentic when it is the document that it claims to be. Proving a record’s authenticity does not 
make it more reliable than it was when created” (ibid., p. 7). Authentication here is meant to 
guarantee the integrity of the record or that of its relation to a master record through relevant 
standard procedures, which provides the authenticated copy with some authority. The authority 
of a document stemming from its officially or commonly recognized truth is its force, its efficacy 
– the enforceable quality or the truth it brings to bear on what it states or is meant to accomplish. 
On the other hand, a “record is considered reliable wh n it can be treated as a fact in itself, that 
is, as the entity of which it is evidence” (Duranti 1994: 6). There are a set of elaborated 
procedures to establish both authenticity and reliability of a record; in the field of record-keeping 
they are distinct and separate. 
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From identity standpoint, a record or a document canot be fully authoritative if it is not 
reliable, especially if one thinks about it from the perspective of what identity credentials are 
supposed to accomplish. Identity credentials need not to be only authentic in themselves, but it is 
vital they also correlates in a reliable way with the identity subject, i.e. the external entity whom 
they are supposed to identify. With this kind of documents which make assertions about who a 
person (or what an entity) is, the idea that those assertions may not be reliable would defeat the 
purpose of those documents. The customs officer at the border control, for instance, is not just 
concerned with making sure a passport is authentic as artifact, but also that its de facto bearer 
also is its de jure subject, i.e., the actual person represented in the passport, since the officer has 
to rely on the information included in the passport in order to determine what course of action is 
required about its holder. An authoritative identity credential requires both authenticity and 
reliability. Here authentication (procedure establishing authenticity) and reliability need to go 
hand in hand, and the former may not be fully conclusive unless it leads to the latter one way or 
the other. It is a demand that is proper to the nature of identity transactions. 
 When it comes to identity, the linking of the identity medium to its holder is an integral 
part of the authentication value proposition.20 Before the introduction of biometrics, having 
someone travel with someone else’s passport just becaus  they are vaguely resembling enough to 
claim roughly the same attributes, including photographical representation, is not a satisfying 
outcome for passport designers and issuing authorities – and yet that was objectively possible to 
an alarming extent in a not so remote past. As a matter of fact, that is part of the rationale to 
increase the collection and use of biometrical datafor the identification of travelers. As identity 
                                                 
20 This aspect of authentication may have been informal for centuries but it is less so with the verification of biometrics 
at each passage across international borders. We may call that authentication ex post, as opposed to the authentication 
performed upfront (ex ante) in order to establish the document. 
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becomes a central issue for a growing number of institutions and for a variety of reasons, notably 
security, the reliability of identity content becomes increasingly differentiated from and yet 
equally necessary to complement the authenticity of he artifact bearing that content, and 
biometrical data are used to address that. In the business of identity, closing the gap between 
authentication of artifacts and the reliability of facts is a requisite and not an option, and yet the 
way to do it has never been a given. If “[p]roving a record’s authenticity does not make it more 
reliable than it was when created,” then the question is: how do we make sure the identity record 
is reliable at the moment of creation? This is an everlasting challenge to identity authorities, as 
we will see in the historical cases investigated in th s dissertation. 
• Authority 
At societal level, the concept of authority21 often relates to the political and to public policy 
domain, two areas where it is prominently present. Whatever its applicable level, policy is one of 
the instruments by which authority carries out its function and empirically manifests itself as 
such. A policy is a set of norms, rules and decisions guiding the actions and behaviors of a group 
or population. To the extent that policies are exprssly formulated by policymakers they spell out 
rules and decisions, part of which may be based on unwritten but shared norms. Those explicit 
rules may in turn evolve and become ingrained as comm nly shared norms guiding the group’s 
behavior. In some ways, policy also defines the limits of possibility for change in applicable 
settings in that the goal of policy is to ensure regularity where there may otherwise be chaos or 
constant changes. The rules are defined and sanctioned by entities that have competence over the 
target population in the related subject matter. Such competence as well as the area (physical or 
                                                 
21 I am discussing here our current notion of authority from relevant instances where it may be located. This may 
prepare the discussion about authority where it still is to emerge (e.g., Internet) but I do not address that here. 
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abstract) where it applies may be referred to as juri diction; it certainly is expressed 
synonymously as authority in the matter at hand, thus e interchangeability of the expressions: 
‘to have jurisdiction’ and ‘to have authority.’  
Furthermore in political terms (as the past identity systems addressed in this dissertation 
very much involved political institutions) authority may be defined as the ability to enforce one’s 
will or decision over others without physical coercion, that is, the ability to carry out one’s will 
or decision effectively so as to oblige potential and ctual counterparts, stakeholders or 
constituents. It then relates to ideas of power and legitimacy. However, in spite of Max Weber 
(1978) who considers a distinctive feature of power to be the fact that it can be imposed onto 
others against their resistance, power is less and less expected to manifest itself as a brutal, 
‘naked power,’ making it empirically difficult sometimes to distinguish from authority. That is 
all the more ironic since arguably, back to the origins of the term during the Roman Empire, 
auctoritas – personal prestige as source of power – was precisely a constitutional innovation 
meant to (and once did) oppose imperium as blunt autocratic and military rule (Grant 1946). As a 
matter of fact, blunt power sometimes turns out to be an expedient way to secure authority, 
which would be lacking otherwise. Authority is legitimized power, or the basis of any legitimate 
power. It may also stem from a power accepted as necessary, or inevitable, by its customers or 
the people it is directed to, and possibly against. 
In order to explain why authority (or domination, i Weberian term) compels obedience, 
Weber (1919) identifies three types of authority (Blau 1963). The first reason for obeying lies in 
the traditions, the second in charisma of the exceptional man, and the third in formal rules based 
60 
 
 
 
 
on legal and bureaucratic rationality. Thus, Weber implies that there are three types of authority: 
the traditional, the charismatic and the legal authori y.  
It appears that there is a cultural element involved in the constitution of authority and that 
coercion and culture are the variables at the two extremes of the authority spectrum. Culture is 
more prominent with the traditional authority and appears less so with legal authority.22 The 
reverse is true regarding the salience of coercion. C ercion here includes not only force and 
physical constraint but any form of constraint that compels someone to comply even if they 
didn’t want to. In that sense, legal authority is very much enabled by the prospect of coercion 
(legal liability) although it also gets acculturated over time. Legal authority ensures enforcement 
and accountability, while cultural authority backing a certain range of social norms is the basis 
for social legitimacy and consensus. For a population to recognize any authority as such and let it 
take hold, there must be a cultural process of acceptance and appropriation of the premises, the 
foundational and legitimizing narratives, as well as the symbols of manifestation of that 
authority. At the very least, for authority to be effective in pursuing its purposes, its customers 
have to make sense, the right sense I might add, out of its claims. It must have been predicated 
based on a set of shared norms and, as much as possible, it  stakeholders must have a common 
understanding of its meaning, purpose, goals, and the collective good it could achieve.  
In addition to (or underneath) formally structured authority, there is also a notion of 
authority that seems to be missing from Weber, as a full category on its own right: one that 
relates to ideas of truth and belief, keeping in mid that there often exists an overlap between 
those two ideas. The authority has the last word when it comes to telling the right thing or the 
                                                 
22 Assuredly, legal practices also may eventually generate a culture, as well as culture may produce legal systems (the 
existence of customary law may be an indication of this.) 
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truth: hers is a word that the community or the constituents must resolve to and follow. This may 
be so because there is a belief system that prescrib  it, or because the said authority has proven 
herself knowledgeable and expert in that subject mat er nd is considered (believed?) to be the 
best positioned to know the truth in the matter. There is no authority if it is not recognized by 
others as such. 
In accordance to those nuances in the meaning of authority, there are two adjectives 
coming out of it, which are: authoritarian and authoritative. Authoritarian retains the brute power 
and coercive underpinnings of authority, at least as the concept has come to be understood. It 
expresses in Weberian terms the power that can be imposed onto others despite their dissent, a 
sense of authority stemming from an expedient power. On the other hand, in the face of what is 
authoritative, one obliges with no need of coercion. At the very l ast, while the adjective may 
not address the conditions in which the result is obtained, the latter (that which is said to be 
authoritative) is generally effective and accepted as reference. What is more, obliging in this 
sense is source of stability and predictability as one knows that virtually everyone else will be 
held to the same standards and by the same rules, wh reas there is a good deal of arbitrariness 
and thus unpredictability involved in being authoritarian. “In its central meaning the authoritative 
is what was made binding or reliable by an authority” (Raz 1990: 2, italics added). Ideally, 
authoritative assertions in relevant issue areas invite trust and (subjective) reliability: Does the 
endorsement by any particular entity give me assurance bout the validity of the statement? – 
Certainly, if I consider that entity to be authoritative in the matter. It follows that just as for the 
concept of identity itself, the concept of authoritativeness is contextual and therefore relational: 
an entity is only authoritative about something andvis-à-vis certain group of people.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
In total, the core concepts of this dissertation including identity, authentication and authoritative 
identity have been defined and elaborated on in this c apter, among other related concepts. In the 
modern world, the notion of individual identity for transactional purposes has come to focus on 
individual bodies while mediating and representing it in ways that have grown increasingly 
naturalistic as allowed by the technologies and techniques available. This might have contributed 
to the expectation that identity is unique. However, in conceptualizing the problem at stake in 
this inquiry, I have argued that identity is different from the actual individual of whom it is a 
mediated (re-)presentation. In that sense, one entity or ndividual may have more than one 
identity.    
Furthermore, I have articulated three indicators that jointly form the requirements for the 
realization of the central concept of authoritative id ntity mechanism. While one of the indicators 
may be said to be empirically self-evident whenever pr sent, the other two are not so and will 
have to be specifically dealt with as I proceed with analyzing the phenomenon and addressing 
the overall research question. In the next chapter I will focus on how this is going to be done 
while using this conceptual definition to formulate specific research questions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Approach and Method 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will address the methodological fr mework as well as the research design and 
strategy that have guided this investigation. I first lay out the foundations, starting with the 
philosophical approach to knowledge, and I elaborate on the ontology – relating to the basic 
conceptual and organizing element of social phenomea – and the epistemological commitments 
underlying this dissertation as an exercise of sociohistorical inquiry.  Finally, I address design 
issues and choices as well as the strategy that has been followed and procedures applied in order 
to carry out this investigation and address the resarch problem. 
3.2 Philosophy of knowledge: a critical view 
It so happens that interpretivism is sometimes – if not often – suspected to dismiss the objective 
world, as it is repeated that the opposing view of positivism posits and believes that there is a 
reality out there (Willis, Jost and Niklakanta 2007). I submit that such is not, in fact, the 
distinctive feature between the two paradigms. The critical question is: what can we know about 
the world out there? And then also how do we know it, considering that how we know something 
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depends on what that is. The fact of saying that from interpretivism standpoint reality is socially 
constructed is not a dismissal of the claim that there is an objective reality, but only a questioning 
stance as to how objective our knowledge of that reality may be. I will first argue that there is, or 
there must be, a world out there for constructivists (or tenets of interpretivism) as well, but it is 
not only out there; the observer is also part of it in various ways. As a consequence, the 
observer’s view is captured from a point that is in the world (Fig. 3-1); it literally depends on, 
and is structured by, a point of view in the sense of visual perspective. That point of view needs 
not to be a singular one; it can be constituted and framed by generally shared principles among a 
community of researchers and about the conditions of truth. Those sets of principles constitute 
what we would call general theories or paradigms. Those general theories articulate, in Kantian 
terms, the transcendental arguments for knowledge claims proper to a disciplinary field: they lay 
out the conditions of possibility of phenomena that are observable in any meaningful way within 
a given area of knowledge. 
For any given object of study, positivist procedures and claims would ideally lead to a 
perfect closure (Fig. 3-1 [a]). This means if a knowledge claim is true about an object by 
positivist standards, then there cannot be any other positivist procedure addressing the same 
question about the same phenomenon, which leads to a different knowledge outcome. 
Interpretivists are prepared to recognize the situated dimensions of their claims. The gap in Fig. 
3-1 [b] is the cleavage that makes possible, and where are figuratively lodged, alternate 
adjudications of knowledge claims about the same phenomena using interpretive procedures 
albeit through possibly different theoretical lenses. 
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Figure 3-1: Two Paradigms for knowing the Social World23 
  
a. Positivism graph:  
The closure of knowledge of the world 
b. Interpretivism graph:  
The defining gap of knowledge of the world in the 
world 
 
To use the lexical and conceptual repertoire of early system theorists, particularly of 
autopoiesis (Lettvin et al. 1959), the frog may well construct its own reality, but that does not 
mean the latter is completely unrelated to what lies b yond and before the frog, or that such 
construction does not in any way depend on the structu e of the external stimuli as its raw 
material. It only means that the only way the frog can ever “know” something about its 
environment is by using its own constructed image of it. However, the patterns of the world thus 
constructed are interrelated to the patterns of the world outside – its model – so much so that 
both remain consistent with one another through the frog’s actual experience of its environment. 
In other words, there is certain level of correlation between the world outside and what the frog 
perceives of it; the frog would construct a different image of the world if the world outside were 
a different one, or was experienced by it differently, which means the same. The fact that the 
frog is able continuously to interact with its environment, including other frogs, in an effective 
                                                 
23 The line represents the trajectory of knowledge accumulation in those two paradigms. 
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way (as demonstrated, e.g., by their sustained survival as species), tends to reinforce the idea that 
the reality each frog constructs has certain degree of consistency over time and also across 
different individual frogs – stated otherwise, that construction is shared by other frogs at least in 
meaningful parts.24 In sum, things being the way they are, what the frog constructs is not only its 
singular reality but he reality as far as frogs are concerned. Analytically speaking at least, and as 
a biological entity and a sensorial system, the human being may be conceived of as a frog at a 
higher level of complexity across the whole spectrum of the living (so far the highest level 
known of a specific form of life). Positivists aspire to uncover the regularities of the world 
outside, as we face it and by foreclosing the constitutive participation of the subject in the 
process, while interpretivists attempt to expose phnomena of the world in a way that recognizes 
and includes the different ways humans see them, that is, based on how they construct and 
understand the world and its processes altogether. Both paradigms have their legitimate bases 
whereby their claims are warranted and possibly conclusive. They generate different types of 
questions and do not apply, with equal pertinence, to the same sets of problems about the social 
world. 
Like the frog, the world as we see it (thus, the data it provides for scientific inquiry) 
always is already a construction, if only à la Kant. In the history of western (and particularly 
modern) philosophy, Kant noticeably accomplished with h s critical philosophy the tour de force 
of providing a comprehensive account of scientific knowledge as the result of both a rational and
a subjective procedure – or more precisely as an achievement of rationality by means of 
subjectivity. As a matter of fact, his reiteration f the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy 
consisted precisely in placing the human subject at the center of the whole universe of human 
                                                 
24 Translated to human beings, this is also the basis of inter-subjectivity upon which science is built.  
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experience, as rational being – not only in its cognitive and moral dimensions, but also in the 
world of the “beautiful and sublime,” as expressed in the Critique of Judgment regarding taste 
and aesthetics. In the master piece of his critical philosophy, Critique of Pure Reason (first 
published in 1781 followed by an augmented second edition in 1789,) while shedding the 
metaphysical dust that put him and the philosophical tradition in a dogmatic slumber, Kant found 
a way to articulate the possibility of knowledge beyond sheer empiricism by showing the a priori 
conditions under which subjectivity apprehends objects. 
Against Hume, Kant holds that there are necessary concepts that are not related to any 
sensory item (Pereboom 2009). Hume (to whom Kant once credited the wake-up call that pulled 
him out of a dogmatic slumber) objects to metaphysical a priori concepts as being empty ideas 
non-applicable to experience, for they do not relate to any object of experience as perceptions do. 
For Hume, perceptions are the only sensory items that are applicable to experience. His theory 
(associationism) is based on the relationships and the ordering of perceptions, and holds that 
legitimate knowledge derives from, and requires no other concept or mental item than, the 
association of perceptions. Ideas or mental items (e.g., causation) inferred from any source other 
than perceptions lack of any objective validity, meaning they are not applicable to the objects of 
human experience.25 
In response, Kant sought to articulate not an empirical but a transcendental justification 
for the use of a priori (metaphysical) concepts. His transcendental deduction argument consists 
of showing that, from a premise that is modest enough to be commonly shared among all 
reasonably rational participants to the discussion, such premise could not hold unless we assume 
                                                 
25 For a summary account of this debate, see the entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Pereboom (2009), also 
at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/ 
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certain concepts. Once we accept the necessity of a priori concepts also known as categories, the 
task is to understand their purpose and how they oprate in general.  Kant theorizes a mental 
processing of sheer perceptions by means of those categories before any human conscious effort 
to knowledge. Such process, which he calls synthesis, results in a priori  synthetic cognition that 
makes phenomena available in the first place for further inquiry and possible claims.  
Kant agrees with Hume and the empiricist view that causality, for instance, does not stem 
from any empirical object. But the mind strives to locate causal relationships because causality is 
one of the synthetic laws organizing the manifold an resulting from a priori cognition, which 
are deemed universal and necessary.26 The categories are tools that our mind a priori applies to 
perceptions in order to construct (through that cognitive processing) observable meaningful 
phenomena. The mind processes and structures the raw dat  into perceivable phenomena before 
any further investigation can take place. 
It should be emphasized that a priori cognition is meant to be universal and necessary, 
for the categories that enable it are innate within any rational human mind. They are the 
necessary and universal conditions of possibility of any further knowledge, which is why the 
most compelling examples Kant uses to illustrate synthetic a priori cognition are from 
mathematics. Nevertheless and without necessarily making of Kant the forefather of 
constructivism, his demonstration that the data is more than simple perceptions is in fact, in my 
view, the most solid foundation for that epistemological paradigm: if there is an a priori 
construction at the root of all manners of knowledg, it suddenly appears crystal clear that 
knowledge of the less deterministic social phenomena will require further conceptual 
                                                 
26 Mathematical entities chiefly are examples of a priori synthetic cognition used by Kant, the valid knowledge of which 
is not contingent upon relation with objects of experience. 
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construction owing to the fact that that knowledge is not expected to be as necessary and 
universal as the knowledge yielded by the a priori concepts of the mind or that of mathematical 
entities.  
The realm of social sciences (hardly developed during 18th century27) lies on the 
spectrum in between singular perceptions and universally necessary cognition; they only require 
a meso-level generalizability, beyond mere perceptions and short of the universality of the basic 
categories of human understanding. In sum, sociohistorical inquiry inevitably involves certain 
perspective from an observer’s lifeworld. It is however a perspective that can eventually be 
ascribed to a collection of observers as they have shared views on procedures of framing and 
making sense of the social phenomena. That way it is still possible to account for claims to 
knowledge in social sciences (even) using qualitative interpretive methods while recognizing that 
“from someone else’s point of view, our own effort can be criticized as untenable” (Hall 1999:  
9). After that philosophical framing regarding knowledge foundations in social science, I shall 
now turn to the specific area of sociohistorical inquiry. 
3.3 Approach to sociohistorical inquiry 
Broadly speaking the epistemology sustaining this tesis espouses the views developed by 
Charles Tilly, Margaret Somers, and John Hall, at the confluence of history and sociology, i.e. 
historical sociology. However, these views also apply to social sciences and disciplines 
concerned with large scale human phenomena the invest gative domain of which Hall (1999) 
                                                 
27 References to psychology and anthropology appear in Kant’s works but the former is tightly related to his philosophy 
of knowledge while the latter is as close as one can get to history. Those social sciences as we know them today were 
largely developed during the nineteenth century. 
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names sociohistorical inquiry.28 In the following subsections, I summarize the core ideas and 
relevant directions that have guided this dissertation.  
3.3.1 Ground assumptions 
These assumptions address both the ontological and epistemological commitments of this 
approach to research. As noted by Colin Hay broadly speaking, there are two approaches to 
ontology: 
The first, and more abstract, whether (and, if so, why) there exists something rather than nothing, and 
whether (and, if so, why) there exists one logically contingent actual world. The second sense of the term is 
concerned with the (specific) set of assumptions made about the nature, essence, and characteristics (n 
short, the reality) of an object or set of objects of analytical inquiry. (Hay 2006: 80) 
The first streak of ontology may clearly be recognized in the origins of western philosophy in 
Greece. It is basically the question of being – the ultimate essence of all forms of being – which 
philosophers had dealt with well before Aristotle and even before Socrates.29 However, the scope 
of the question for social sciences is understandably less broad: in this case ontology refers to the 
basic conceptual element of the logical structure of the social reality, along with any other 
ground assumptions required in order to make theoretically or analytically sense of the social 
data. In the realm of social science according to Charles Tilly,  
major ontological choices concern the sort of social entities whose coherent existence analysts can 
reasonably assume. Major alternatives include methodological individualism, phenomenological 
individualism, holism, and relational realism. (2006: 6) 
                                                 
28 Sociohistorical inquiry is “a broad domain … that encompasses social sciences, history, the humanities, and 
interdisciplinary enterprises such as historical sociology, feminist theory, cultural studies, critical theory, and the new 
historicism.” (Hall 1999: 6) 
29 See the fragments of Parmenides’s Poem in relation to the being at 
http://classweb.gmu.edu/rcherubi/ancient/poem4.htm 
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It clearly appears that the ontological choice in this dissertation is not any type of individualism, 
whether methodological or phenomenological, nor is its object about individual behavior. 
Furthermore, it would hardly qualify as holism in tha  I am not investigating a given society or 
community as a whole, nor am I even assuming the soci ty (any society) as a self-contained 
structure, evolving organically by itself or homogeneously. Here the social structures and 
processes are considered in relation to practices, techniques and technologies that ultimately 
permeate various social identities and boundaries, and do not define any particular one.  
This dissertation assumes that social outcomes are haped by institutions, transactions, 
interactions, mobilization and exchange of ideas as well as the co-variation and co-effectiveness 
of structure and agency, the results of which are never totally determined by any pre-defined 
rules. Critical events may open windows of opportunity to something never contemplated before. 
Agents may still develop new and even disruptive practices within existing structures or settings, 
although at any point they are as social beings already partly defined by those structures or 
settings. As a matter of fact, structures are also n utcome of agential participation. Those once-
new practices may evolve into more codified forms (rules) more and more enacted by a growing 
number of participants and become structures (institutions). The social is not merely the sum 
total of the individual parts. Obviously, individuals have their own purpose and motivations for 
doing what they do and individual behavior may be studied in autonomy. However when social 
scientists endeavor to capture and comprehend the outcome that results from the interactions 
taking place in a “relational setting,” (Somers 1994) they cannot, without further and careful 
elaborations and justifications (whether methodological or theoretical), make definitive and valid 
claims to knowledge at one level (e.g., collective) by simply inferring from findings at the other 
level (e.g., individual). It appears the above basic postulates fit with relational realism which 
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holds that “transactions, interactions, social ties, and conversations constitute the central stuff of 
social life” (Tilly 2008: 7).  
Margaret Somers reinforces the same idea in an attemp  to elaborate what she calls 
historical epistemology:  
a relational pragmatist ontology takes the basic unts of social analysis to be neither individual entities 
(agent, actor, person, firm) nor structural wholes (society, order, social structure) but the relational 
processes of interaction between and among identitis. (Somers 1998: 766-7) 
In a seminal paper revisiting Kuhn’s groundbreaking Structure of Scientific Revolutions and his 
epistemological legacy (as will be further developed in the next subsection), Somers 
distinguishes two realisms. Realism is the philosophical posture about knowledge which holds 
that it would not be possible to make sense of the world if certain ideas were not considered as 
real as sensorial or empirical objects, although they cannot be met in the empirical world, i.e., 
they are unobservable. Somers argues that there are two competing realist legacies out of Kuhn: 
the theoretical realism and the relational realism. Theoretical realism treats its general theories 
as formulations of the ontological truth: a valid epistemic statement or finding about any 
(empirical) phenomenon must be deducible from and verifiable by the theory. Relational realism 
considers a theory relying on unobservables (e.g., quarks or market forces) to be valid 
vicariously, in a sense, through its observable effcts. Theory is a generalization (however 
modest or broad) from the effects of a number of factors, even when those factors are not 
observable but only inferred as necessary to explain certain manifestations or outcomes. 
Where the two realisms differ … is that while theoretical realism attributes an ontological truth to the
theoretical phenomenon (e.g., the theory of electron or the theory of market equilibrium), relational realism 
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focuses on the relational effect of the phenomenon itself (e.g., the impact of the hypothesized electron on its 
environment or of the hypothesized market forces on an observable outcome.) (Somers 1998: 745) 
Understandably then, relational realism brings interrelations within the social setting into focus, 
with the view that, not unlike in a system, “institu ons within a society must co-vary with each 
other” (Somers 1994: 626). In this line of thought, society is not an abstract idea hypostasized as 
a definite material entity, constitutively and substantively fixed. Rather, it is a matrix or a 
bounded set of matrices of patterned relationships: society is a “relational setting” as Somers 
suggests, that is, “a pattern of relationships among institutions, public narratives, and social 
practices” (Somers 1994: 626). The concept of relation l setting enables transcending the 
dualism of modern theory towards a more combinatory or modular view of “numerous matrices 
of patterned relationships, social practices, and institutions mediated not by abstractions but by 
linkages of political power, social practices and public narratives” (Ibid. p. 634). In other words, 
a society is a large scale, multi-level and evolving social network of a sort, and as such it can be 
disaggregated in parts and reconfigured in new temporal and spatial relations; new entities and 
components may emerge as well from that combinatory of linkages and relations.  
In all, those relations, transactions and interactions are the basic structuring logic of the 
social data from the standpoint of relational realism. This idea in turn commands the 
epistemological justifications and methodological approaches of relational realism as a mode of 
knowing the social world. 
In keeping with Kuhn’s (1970) own contention with the oblivion of history in the 
constitution and discovery of scientific problems by the dominant epistemological frameworks of 
his time, Somers sets out to reclaim and articulate a historical epistemology as a forgotten branch 
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of that legacy.30 To that effect, we are reminded that the array of alternative or competing 
theories addressing a phenomenon or a problem is historically bound, as Kuhn shows. Facts that 
are relevant to scientific inquiry were once missed b fore they became even salient to the 
inquiring observation. Likewise, evidence once accepted is later on disconfirmed or dismissed 
due to the expansion of the theoretical field. That a question is warranted scientific attention is a 
matter of the temporal configuration of science, th status of knowledge at some point in time.  
A successful explanation, as Kuhn shows us, one intended to account for how and why scientific knowledge 
developed could not be constructed through logical deductive entailment under universal law but only 
through a causal historical narrative establishing causal chains and relational structures. A given thory not 
only has a history, but is a history – at each stage it bears the sedimentatio  nd residue of its previous 
history, of a series of encounters with confirming or anomalous evidence. (Somers 1998: 737)  
Historical epistemology is both pragmatic and relational: pragmatic because here theory 
is driven by problems and not only by general logical rules; relational to the extent that it 
accounts for actions and events situated in time and space using narrative discourse. While 
espousing the realism principle that justifies theorizing based upon unobservables, relational 
realism does not hold a theory to be a definite, a-t mporal truth about social phenomena or 
reality (as a universal necessary law would have it), which in fact would imply that a theory 
basically is eternally true as long as the rules of logic obtain. Instead relational realism considers 
and integrates the fact that any theory entailing those theoretical/unobservable entities (“such as 
states, markets, or social classes”) to be time-bound and subject to change, and as such the 
resulting theory is “historically provisional” (ibid.: 744). George and Bennett concur with that 
                                                 
30 Somers develops her argument in response to the positivist literature and research practice stemming from that same 
legacy, including from the historical sociology field, which paradoxically rejects history as anti-theoretical and anecdotal.  
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view and further recognize that, in this context, theory is not exclusively devoted to enabling 
prediction but also to explaining social phenomena a d patterns.  
The changing and reflective nature of social subjects makes social science theories more provisional and 
time-bound than those in the physical sciences, but does not prevent cumulative and progressive theorizing 
over long periods of time in the form of middle-range theories. Theoretical progress in the social sciences 
can consist of advances in puzzle-driven research programs, increasingly complete and convincing 
historical explanations, and theories that are stronger at explaining social behavior than at predicting it. 
Progress is not limited to the development of general theories or schools of thought with greater validity, 
scope, or predictive capability – as desirable as the e kinds of progress may be. (George and Bennett 2005: 
148-9) 
Commenting on Bruce Western, Somers adds that, instead of starting from theory, this approach 
generally gives priority to the substantive problem to lead to theoretical insights, making “strong 
use of substantive knowledge to guide assumptions” (1998: 773).  
3.3.2 Practices and discourses of inquiry 
John Hall (1999), also a proponent of pragmatic epist mology in the sociohistorical field, frames 
scientific research in terms of communities of practice of inquiry making claims to knowledge 
through different types of discourse. Those communities are assembled around a common set of 
research interests, assumptions and basic rules which structure their discourse whereby claims 
are made, contended, accepted or rejected by fellow members. Those rules and procedures  may 
be disputed by other groups of scientists, for as Hll recognizes, the actual practices of inquiry 
present alternative pathways to sociohistorical knowledge each one of which is “subject to the 
reflexive gaze of [the] other perspectives” (p. 19)as well as to their criticism.  
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The different practices of sociohistorical inquiry are studied through the types of 
discourse that they develop in the process of knowledge accumulation. Hall refers to them as 
“forms of discourse” or “formative discourses,” with the following clarification:  
I do not mean by “form” an entity having an autonomous existence. Rather, it is a zone where particular 
discursive precepts and strategies help “form” practice. (Hall 1999: 25)  
Another way of understanding forms of discourse in th s context is to conceptualize them as 
ideal type discourses, albeit initially resulting from research practices (which they in turn may 
inform as they become explicitly reflected upon, discursively articulated or further codified.) As 
suggested above, actual discursive practices are not of a single and pure form of discourse, but 
possibly hybrids. One form of discourse can drive the ordering logic in a given instance or 
practice of inquiry; it is then the dominant or orde ing formative discourse for that specific 
investigation or discursive practice. The same form f discourse may still be used in other 
practices of inquiry where it is subordinated to (or it supplements) a different ordering formative 
discourse. It is less a matter of exclusivity and homogeneity than a matter of the main, driving 
logic. Four such forms of discourse are identified as follows: 
• Value discourse provides the basis of reasons justifying the purpose, legitimizing 
methods and giving relevance to outcomes;  
• Narrative discourse emphasizes storytelling as form or part of the epistemic discourse 
itself; 
• Social theory-driven discourse helps identify relevant sociohistorical phenomena for 
inquiry; 
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• Discourse of explanation or interpretation helps formulate “proper strategies for 
offering and adjudicating among accounts that attemp  to make sense of 
sociohistorical phenomena.” (Hall 1999: 26)  
There are eight main practices of sociohistorical inqu ry – four generalizing and four 
particularizing – ordered by four forms of discourse. The four generalizing practices include 
universal history,31 theory application, analytic generalization and contrast-oriented comparison. 
The four particularizing practices include situational history, specific history, configurational 
history and historicism (Hall 1999). Each discourse is formative for one generalizing practice 
and one particularizing practice of inquiry.  Value discourse may be formative for universal 
history in building meta-theory of history as well as for situational history in order to understand 
contemporary situation; narrative discourse may be formative for theory application in order to 
explain cases as well as for specific history to enable the account of intrinsic phenomenon; social 
theory discourse may be formative for analytic generalization by enabling to test hypotheses by 
comparison as well as to configurational history by enabling the xtrinsic analysis of 
development; and lastly, explanation/interpretation discourse may be formative for contrast-
oriented comparison by accounting for unique aspects of process a  well as for historicism by 
identifying unique significance of events. For the purpose of illustration and also for their 
potential relevancy in this research, I only present in Table 3.1 the role of discourse for two 
                                                 
31 To define some of Hall’s terminology that may not be self-evident to the reader, universal history aims at a 
theoretically totalizing goal or tends to define its object (chiefly, the society) as a structural totality. Situational history 
focuses on “current historical conditions, their sources, and culturally significant alternative paths to development” (Hall 
1999: 183). Configurational history is when a specific history is shaped by a theoretical metanarrative whereby events 
that might appear otherwise unrelated become theoretically and meaningfully connected. It differs from specific history 
in that it seeks to theorize its object regardless of the deliberate purpose or intentions of the social actors involved, thus 
proceeding by “extrinsic analysis of development” of the process or phenomenon being studied. Historicism treats its 
object as unique and isolated, it “treats the origins, the genesis and unique character of specific sociohistorical 
phenomena in empiricist, self-referential, and seemingly anti-theoretical terms” (idem, p. 220). 
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particularizing and two generalizing practices of inquiry. Each discourse may still contribute to 
all the other practices of inquiry by playing a somewhat secondary role as illustrated in Table 3-1 
for the sample of practices represented. 
Value, narrative and explanation/interpretation discourses are all present in this 
dissertation in various measures, but the narrative discourse is the most pervasive across the 
board therefore, I will spend some time elaborating o  it. Whereas Hall seems to conceive of 
narrative merely as storytelling without further detail on its epistemic workings, Somers is much 
more specific about it. From her perspective, narrative is not just an instrument for representation 
but the discursive image of the ontological structure of the social world: “social life is itself 
storied and … narrative is an ontological condition of social life” (Somers 1994: 613-4). In other 
terms, narrative is the lingua franca for the accounts of social phenomena before any further 
procedure and more specialized “languages” apply. And yet, as one among several “languages” 
or forms of discourse, narrative has its own regular procedures for making truth propositions or 
claims.  
Narratives are networks of patterned relationships connected and configured over time and space, and in 
which meaning, causality, and truth are ascribed based on these temporal and spatial arrangements. 
(Somers 2008: 261) 
As elsewhere stated: “narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts) 
embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment” (Somers 1994: 616). Criteria by 
which narratives are evaluated as such pertain to the internal structure and arrangements, that is: 
the internal integrity of the discourse, the absence of narrative flaw or unaccounted gaps in the 
emplotment, and the ways actions, locations and sequences are woven together in a manner of  
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Table 3-1: Practices of inquiry and role of formative discourses. Examples of four (out of eight) generalizing a d 
particularizing practices of inquiry described by how formative discourses contribute to each, with the role of the 
discourse ordering each practice capitalized in the corresponding intersection cell (adapted from J. Hall 1999: 181 
and 206) 
 
Discourses 
VALUE NARRATIVE 
SOCIAL 
THEORY 
EXPLANATION/ 
INTERPRETATION 
P
ar
tic
ul
ar
iz
in
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
SITUATIONAL 
HISTORY 
UNDERSTAND 
CONTEMPORARY 
SITUATIONS 
Axis of past 
linkage to 
present 
Explicates 
contemporary 
forces 
Locates causes of 
present 
SPECIFIC HISTORY 
Grounded in 
“historical object” 
ACCOUNT OF 
INTRINSIC 
PHENOMENON 
Identifies general 
features by 
narrative parallels 
and “laws” 
Informs by “break 
points” 
CONFIGURATIONAL 
HISTORY 
Grounded in social 
theoretical 
configuration 
Focus of “break 
point” analysis 
EXTRINSIC 
ANALYSIS OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
Identifies 
“accidents” 
HISTORICISM 
Grounded in 
metaphysic of 
process 
Object of 
clarified 
chronology 
General process 
provided by 
metaphysic 
IDENTIFIES 
UNIQUE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF 
EVENTS 
G
en
er
al
iz
in
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
UNIVERSAL HISTORY 
METATHORY OF 
HISTORY 
Subsumes cases 
under 
sociological 
theory 
Derives theory 
from universal 
metatheory 
Defines need for 
theory revision 
THEORY 
APPLICATION 
Knowledge by case 
theorizations 
APPLIES 
THEORY TO 
EXPLAIN 
CASES 
Subsumes case 
variation via 
theory 
Incorporated in 
narrative via theory 
ANALYTIC 
GENERALIZATION 
Knowledge by 
“bounded 
generalization”  
Basis of 
analytical 
comparisons 
TESTS 
HYPOTHESES 
BY 
COMPARISON 
Controls or accounts 
for extraneous 
variation 
CONTRAST 
ORIENTED 
COMPARISON 
Knowledge by 
“rules of 
experience” 
Basis for 
developing 
contrasts 
Establishes foci of 
narratives 
ACCOUNTS FOR 
UNIQUE ASPECTS 
OF PROCESS 
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explanation of the process or phenomenon at hand. As a result and to the extent that the facts are 
as carefully and accurately documented as possible,  
the success or failure of truth claims embedded in narratives depends less on empirical verification and 
more on the logic and rhetorical persuasiveness of the narrative. (Somers 2008: 262)  
On the foundation of spatiotemporal linkages, two main features are characteristics of 
narrativity: “causal emplotment” in which those linkages are subsumed in meaningful storyline, 
and “selective appropriation” of the materials, e.g. vents and actions, that exhibit the plot 
(Somers 1994: 616-7).  Emplotment links separate instances and discrete elements in order to 
provide meaning. By linking events, places and time sequences, emplotment manifests a 
storyline. Causal emplotment is the justification why a storyline is chosen over possible others; it 
is what makes a narrative the explanatory account that it is. Actual events may fit in or upset 
causal emplotment, and in that sense the latter submits to the test of the former, and a plot may or 
may not hold. Plot constitutes “the logic and syntax of narrative” and “it is emplotment that 
permits us to distinguish between narrativity on the one hand, and chronicles and annales [sic], 
on the other” (ibid.). Because narratives are not chronicles or annals, the narrator (whether the 
social actor subject of research or the researcher) necessarily intervenes in the choices of 
elements to use as materials for weaving the plot. H wever, the internal integrity of the narrative 
produced based on a selective appropriation must also be able to stand the test against 
documented record of events. 
3.3.3 History and causal explanation 
History arguably plays a necessary role in any meaningful account of macrosocial phenomena, 
enabling to fully grasp the dynamics or mechanisms leading to the outcome. If anything, it brings 
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about a wider range of interrelations and ramifications, which might enhance the questions we 
ask and provide better insights into important aspects of the phenomenon at hand. As aptly 
summed up by Tilly: “History matters to social scienc  because history matters to social 
processes: when and where a social process unfolds affects how it unfolds” (2008: 3). He further 
argues that of all the logics of explanation used in social science, only mechanism-process 
accounts pertinently integrate history,  
because their explanatory program couples a search for mechanisms of very general scope with arguments 
that initial conditions, sequences, and combination of mechanisms concatenate into processes having 
explicable but variable overall outcomes. Mechanism-process accounts reject covering-law regularities for 
large structures such as international systems and for vast sequences such as democratization. (Tilly 2008: 
9, emphasis added) 
History enables us to exhibit sequences and mechanisms that make up for a process, from what 
may be considered, at least relatively, as initial conditions all the way to the outcome being 
studied. It uses narrative as the most effective technique to bring forth spatiotemporal linkages 
(Somers 1998). 
Hall suggests that recent attempts at diversifying the logics of explanation result from 
“dissatisfaction with the positivist model of scientific explanation, specifically, Carl Hampel’s 
covering-law approach and probabilistic revisions” (1999: 154). Reinforcing the same view, 
Somers reminds us that “[r]elational realism insists that ‘how’ questions of causality 
(processes/mechanisms) cannot be deduced either from invariant laws (constant 
conjunctions/relations)” or from the causal principles of a general theory (Somers 1998: 769). To 
be clear, mechanism-process questions of causality are inevitably addressed as “how” questions 
while law-like causality questions are simply addressed as “why” questions, that is, as logical 
82 
 
 
 
 
causality without the need to deal with the “thickness” of time32. Each one follows a different 
logic of discovery of causes. “The answer to a ‘how’ question ... demands explanatory and 
empirically contingent causal pathways” (Somers 1998: 769). The answer does not lie in discrete 
entities that can be manipulated in abstraction and independently by the researcher (such as in a 
controlled experiment for example) but in “the pathways of agential interaction” which are 
“contingent and empirically variable” (ibid. p. 768). 
There are fundamental reasons why the distinction shall be maintained between law-like 
causality and mechanism-based causality. First of all, the relational logic of causality does not 
stem from necessary and universal principles applicable to whole classes of phenomena. In 
sociohistorical inquiry there is no general and universal law of causality, neither is there any 
abstract and universal principle of causation. Thus t e need to look through the series of 
contingents events forming the social phenomena at h nd in order to get to a possible cause by 
establishing how it actually happened via how events unfolded. Causality is tightly dependent on 
the specifics of the process at hand, so the result is “contingent and indeterminate” vis-à-vis 
abstract rules of deduction. Furthermore:  
the adequacy of an explanatory structure depends upon why a question is asked: Different research aims 
yield different explanatory demands. Laws may be feasible for prediction, but only causal mechanisms 
accounting for variation and relational linkages can explain how and why something actually happened. 
(Somers 1998: 769)   
“How” questions call for a causal narrative, that is, a narrative exhibiting causal 
mechanisms. Explanation of why by how something happened requires fleshing out connective 
                                                 
32 Tilly has figuratively qualified as thin the notion of history that is merely a “transparent medium carrying along more 
substantial causes” and thick one that is “drenched with causes that inhere in sequence, accumulation, contingency, and 
proximity” (quoted in Somers 1998: 739). 
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mechanisms33 as opposed to predictive explanation that requires a general logic of deduction. 
While the latter operates by correlations of empirical (observable) indicators, connective 
mechanisms are not directly observable and measurable; it is the task of the researcher to find the 
linkages that will bring them forth or demonstrate th necessity of their existence. 
How do we exhibit cause? We tell a story, a causal narrative about the causal pathways by which one class 
of events is actually affected by another. (Somers 1998: 770) 
After this thorough exposition of the general research approach, I will now specifically 
describe the design and strategy used in this investigation. 
3.4 Research design and strategy 
Here I follow up on the rationale of the three-case qu stions already outlined in the general 
introduction in order to further detail research design choices and the strategy adopted as well as 
the procedures executed in the conduct of this inquiry.  
3.4.1 Design choices and case selection 
The core of this dissertation is organized around three case studies which I call big cases, as they 
may in turn contain small cases. As shown on Figure 3.1, those big cases include two (past) 
historical cases (Cases I and II) and one contemporary case (Case III). The design choice for 
those cases directly results from the rationale that I ve provided in the general introduction, 
which led to the formulation of three research question  instead of one exclusively based on the 
initial research problem. In other words, rather than limiting the investigation solely to the digital 
identity phenomenon, which still is an open and incomplete process, I seek reference points or at 
                                                 
33 Somers references James Coleman’s definition of mechanism as “meaningful connection between events as the basic 
tool of description and analysis” (1998: 726). 
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least some external points of comparison in order to nable as much as possible the elicitation of 
findings with a broader scope and significance. Once it became clear that efforts to address the 
Internet identity challenges are the subject matter which this investigation is primarily concerned 
with, along with the realization that those efforts were in the early stage of development, the 
decision was made to take a historical comparative ngle in order to investigate the problem – as 
it was clear then that we will probably learn more by broadening the scope than by focusing 
narrowly onto a phenomenon that had been little resarched from a social science perspective 
and which moreover was and still is evolving. 
The choice of a historical-comparative approach to investigate this research problem also 
comes within a “world-historical perspective” (McMichael 1990) in that the research addresses 
historical processes that have proven, or are likely, to have ramifications and significance at 
world level or for world history.  As a consequence and given the circumstances of the Internet 
identity problems and resolution efforts, this dissertation does not compare processes regarding 
the exact same object/credential across different gographic settings, within the same historical 
period, or at the same stage of its development-imple entation but in various locations. In other 
words, it cannot carry out a straightforward, a horizontal-linear comparison (of the same object) 
across different time-space settings such as, for instance, the passport in the UK, France and the 
USA, at a given period in time, or at a specific phase of passport development-implementation in 
those three countries. This would have provided for a straightforward comparison using the three 
case descriptions under the same framework, theoretical or otherwise, albeit in different 
empirical settings, but may not provide us with anyuseful insights to tackle the problem of 
digital identity. Rather, it might be more useful to focus on the process and time sequence of the 
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emergence – if not the first time when a relevant identity artif ct appeared as such in the history, 
at least the earliest stages of its development as documented. For instance, the traveler’s passport 
that is known worldwide today is the direct and ultimate descendant of the artifact that was for 
the first time called passport in late medieval Europe, well before the character of the tourist 
traveler appears on the world stage. In addition, one may even argue that while seals belonged to 
several civilizations millennia before the medieval Europe, the way their use developed by the 
12th century pre-formed the bureaucratic practices of the future European modern state whose 
model will be more or less forcibly exported around the world, especially since the 19th century. 
Clearly there has been nothing in the past that was ex ctly similar to the Internet, 
including its identity challenges. And since the Inter et is global in scope, there is no instance 
where the exact same problem has been resolved yet in a way that would enable controlled 
comparison – where all variables but one are similar – cross settings. Nevertheless, a 
comparative study is only pertinent if the phenomena compared are different to some extent 
while they can be categorized as similar by some asp ct . Therefore and based on the argument 
in the previous paragraph, it follows that the phenomenon of interest here overall must be 
defined more broadly in order to include such various bjects as digital identity credentials, 
passports and medieval seals.  How is that class of objects to be defined? The phenomenon of 
this thesis is defined to be the historical process of emergence of artifacts which individuals use 
to authenticate their identity, or to authoritatively and reliably represent themselves to others as 
one specific individual. From that standpoint, the primary goal of this thesis then is to discover or 
examine the conditions under which, as well as the paths through which, the different forms or 
instances of the phenomenon materialize as an outcome.   
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Contrary to Yin (2009) who, apparently focusing on organizational research, opposes 
case study and history, broader social sciences such as political science, international relations or 
historical sociology make allowance for historical se studies or building case studies using 
history (George and Bennett 2005; Hall 1999; Bennett and Elman 2006; Burawoy 1998). In 
Hall’s (1999) terms, the first two cases are specific histories and the third case is a situational 
history (Table 3-1). Specific history is focused and detailed on a given sociohistorical 
phenomenon, such as the medieval seal as identity mediu  and the historical development of the 
traveler’s passport. Another way of calling situational history may be borrowed from Foucaultian 
literature, i.e. “history of the present”34 (Roth 1981). Situational history is one that is 
contemporary to the researcher and may even be unfolding. In effect, Case III is an attempt to 
document history in the making regarding digital identity. 
Each one of the three cases belongs to a particularizing practice of inquiry, designed to 
provide, as much as possible, detailed and “comprehensive analyses of singular phenomena” 
(Hall 1999: 205). Overall, this dissertation follows an inductive reasoning, which is the same 
approach taken by theory-building case research. George and Bennett (2005: 111) emphasize 
that “theory development via case studies is primarily n inductive process.” They recognize six 
kinds of theory-building research objectives, one of which is heuristic.35 The main objective of 
this research is heuristic in that from the thorough investigation/description of the individual 
cases, I seek to uncover causal mechanisms and patterns, including elements of similarity and 
variance, among a class of phenomena. “Heuristic case studies inductively identify new 
                                                 
34 I shall insist that this simply is a borrowing, to be understood in plain terms and without the implication that 
Foucault’s method was necessarily a situational history. 
35 The other varieties of theory-building research objectives include atheoretical/configurative idiographic case studies 
(which might apply to the cases in this dissertation taken separately), disciplined configurative case studies, theory testing 
case studies, plausibility probes and “building block” studies of particular types or subtypes (pp. 75 and 76).  
 
 
 
variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths” (idem, p. 75). While every 
individual case does not draw on any theory, their accumulation is meant to enable some 
discovery about a class of phenomena.
 
Case I and Case II are conducted with the aim to get insights from the past identity 
mechanisms, especially regarding how they emerged as i entity systems and the process through 
which they became commonly accepted and used as reference identification mech
III documents ongoing efforts to build a digital identity framework, which are analyzed in light 
of the rich history of previous systems. 
this research, I will now further articulate the 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Research design 
 
After the above considerations of the overall design of 
rationale for case selection with some detail.
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Case III: Digital identity 
Case III was not a design choice because it responds to the original problem that 
prompted this research. I will just argue here about the ways in which the object of Case III 
fulfills the requirement of a world-historical level phenomenon in order to be potentially 
comparable to the object of the other two cases. The Internet is unique in its architecture as well 
as in number (at least the user does not perceive or experience the Internet as if there were many 
of it, which is probably part of the reason why we use the definite article to name it, not to 
mention the capital initial “I”). Related to the previous aspect is the fact that it has a global 
scope, in addition to being relatively young so that e challenges at hand are being addressed for 
the first time with that technology and in that space. The day the digital identity problem in the 
Internet will be successfully resolved somewhere in the world by technology alone or blending it 
with some institutional arrangements that are reason bly applicable to any Internet users across 
the world, that day a digital identity solution will be available for any stakeholder to implement 
anywhere in the world or in the global Internet, if they so choose.  Just like once the 
specifications and functions of the passport have been clearly defined and implemented by a 
number of pioneering countries, any country new to its adoption only needs to implement the 
existing specifications and all other related rules and requirements in order to join the community 
of countries where a valid passport is accepted for the purpose defined. Once a technically sound 
and reliable identity infrastructure is added to the Internet architecture in conditions that make it 
socially viable and resilient, then the Internet p r se can no longer be characterized as a place 
where it is impossible to ascertain the identity of the user at the other end of the communication 
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or transaction – and the problem that started off this inquiry will cease to be relevant as a 
research problem.  
Case I: Medieval seals 
In line with McLuhan’s periodization which I referrd to in the general introduction, we 
may argue that after the press, computer technology has brought about a new era regarding 
modes of writing and record creation (Bolter 1991, MacNeil 2000, and Duranti et al. 2002). 
Precisely, that point is further borne out by the very fact that present actors are confronted with 
the problem of creating identification capabilities applicable to computer records and networks. 
The mode of writing that looms at the other end of the spectrum is that of the manuscript culture. 
If we realize that identity media and artifacts have never been a given throughout all modes or 
technologies of writing and record creation, then one may intuitively sense the need to ask 
whether there ever was anything in the manuscript ea hat could parallel the challenge that the 
computer-script is now faced with. As it turns out, at some point over the long history of the 
handwriting civilization (and particularly in its abstract alphabet’s quarters), social actors also 
had to confront the challenge of enabling the representation of people’s identity within written 
records, thus the selection of the medieval episode of the phenomenon for this inquiry.36 In that 
sense, the seal case is what I might call a mirror case relative to the digital identity case. 
Case II: Passport and national ID card 
Convinced that a third case would be much more enrichi g for this investigation and its 
potential findings, a government-issued identity credential appears to be a pertinent choice of 
                                                 
36 I further explain at the beginning of the next chapter why I have chosen to focus on the medieval West for this 
instance of the phenomenon. 
90 
 
 
 
 
case for a number of reasons. First, the model of authoritative identity credential is found with 
the most common credentials issued by the government or the state apparatus, whether it is a 
passport, a national identity card or a driver’s license. They are the most widely used and 
accepted by potential stakeholders as a mechanism for authenticating the identity of individual 
users/holders without further communication or particular relationship between the verifier and 
the government issuer. The fact that stakeholders can rely upon those credentials without further, 
real-time assurance or confirmation from the issuer (and even without any prior relationship 
between them and the issuer) precisely makes it easier for the greatest number of parties to rely 
on them. This enables the use of these credentials to scale up significantly, which is part of the 
desiderata shared by many concerned technologists for online digital identity. As a matter of fact, 
government-issued identity credentials present the largest scale of use ever reached in history by 
any standard physical identity token. Particularly the passport has reached the status of a 
universal object with some dimension of interoperability enabling transit and transactions across 
national boundaries. As a result, the focus of Case II i  mainly on the passport.  
However, I further extend and complement the analysis of the process that led to the 
emergence of international-type passport by a small case of national identity card. There are two 
substantive reasons that motivate this choice: the first is that I have come to realize in the course 
of this investigation that the national ID card is the result of further differentiation of the passport 
mechanism, thus both the ID card and the modern passport represent two facets of the same 
phenomenon; the second is that, the previous observation notwithstanding, the history of the 
emergence of one of the earliest national ID cards enriches our insights into authoritative 
mechanisms of identity in the context of the modern state through the domestic process of 
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implementation and acceptance, since the passport has become a requirement only for 
international travelers and due to the near universal scope of that requirement, the concerned 
travelers do not have much choice as to whether to carry a passport or not. 
Addressing the specific research questions and causal mechanisms 
Building on the case description and analysis, I integrate the findings from the three cases 
into a framework of analytical explanation. As advised by George and Bennett (2005), it is 
desirable to transform “a purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into 
an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables” (p. 225) and/or “causal hypotheses” 
(p. 229). I outline the causal mechanisms in play as well as hypothesized relationships between 
various events integrated into a causal explanatory discourse. 
But before that, I first answer the specific research questions commanded by the 
definition of the concept of authoritative identity (credential) and its component indicators, that 
is, the requirements necessary for it to materialize as an outcome. In the previous chapter, the 
definition of the concept of authoritative identity s stem or credential has led me to isolate the 
following requirements:   
(1) the identity subjects depend on it to make and support identity assertions or claims;  
(2) other than the credential provider itself, counterparts in most identity transactions 
and communications accept it as proof of identity; and  
(3) it works satisfactorily enough so as (1) and (2) are routinely repeated. 
Presumably, by uncovering the causal mechanism that may have led to the first two 
requirements to be met – which will be the focus of the analysis – this will also enable an 
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explanation as to why the identity mechanisms in play might have been consistently relied upon, 
thus allow addressing the third requirement. Therefore I am going to focus on the first two 
requirements to formulate the specific research questions of this thesis, initially in generic terms 
as follows: 
1) How have individuals come to use these mechanisms a a means to authenticate their 
own identity in the public space? 
2) How have third party entities come to rely on these identity mechanisms as a solution for 
authenticating the identity of their individual counterpart in a transaction? 
Combining these questions with the series of general r search questions across three 
historical periods as generated in the general introduction (i.e. general research question and sub-
questions), that leads to formulating and organizing all the research questions as well as the 
general layout of the analytical pieces in this thesis as shown in Table 3-2. 
3.4.2 Data and analysis 
Before ending this chapter, I more specifically describe in the following the types and sources of 
data that have been brought under this investigation, as well as the analytical procedures used. 
Case I: Medieval seals 
• Literature/textual analysis  
Here history is the data, albeit through secondary sources – that is, history as reported by 
historians. As a matter of fact, that is what history exactly is: a record, written or oral, of the past 
events deemed of certain significance from the perspective of the narrator or reporter (rather than 
a comprehensive and exact view of events as they were unfolding at the time they did.)
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Table 3-2: Research questions and design 
General 
Question 
How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the 
public at large? 
 Historical Case I Historical Case II Historical Case III 
General Q 
sequencing 
In what circumstances did the challenge of 
reliably representing individual identity 
within written records emerge in the 
Middle Ages and how was it resolved? 
How did identity credentials issued by the 
national state historically emerge and 
become authoritative? 
How are social actors, events or processes 
leading to the possible emergence of 
authoritative digital identity credentials 
for Internet end users at large? 
Specific research questions 
Specific Q.1 
[I.1] How were individuals led to use that 
solution to authenticate their own identity? 
[II.1] How have individuals been led to 
use government identity documents as a 
means to authenticate their own identity? 
[III.1] How would Internet end users 
come to use digital credentials to 
authenticate their identity online?  
Specific Q.2 
[I.2] How did social actors come to rely on 
that solution for authenticating the identity 
of their individual counterpart in a 
transaction?  
[II.2] How have social actors come to 
accept government identity documents as 
a reliable way to authenticate the identity 
of their individual counterpart in a 
transaction?  
[III.2] How would independent third 
parties come to accept a given digital 
identity technology or credential as a 
reliable mechanism for authenticating the 
end user’s identity online?  
Causal mechanisms and pathways in the historical emergence of identification systems 
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As such, history is the accounts that historians give of the past, or of the present but through 
events or actions already past. To the extent that there are well established records of events and 
actions as well as widely documented narratives thereof within the medieval history field of 
study, the fundamentals of which are so far unchallenged relatively to the focus of this 
investigation, I use those accounts as material for this analysis.  
The two primary sources of this chapter’s material are found in Bedos-Rezak (2000) and 
Fraenkel (1992). These works have been based on origi al medieval archives and artifacts. In 
terms of the historical conditions surrounding those artifacts, the authors are consistent with one 
another as well as with any other historical accounts a d materials that I have come across 
regarding medieval seals and practices of documentary validation or related to their institutional 
context (not all of which are cited in this thesis.) Further literature has been harnessed in order to 
flesh out the medieval context from which we today are the most remote, as compared to any 
other historical context in this investigation. This is done in order to help the reader form a dense 
and fine enough picture of the sociohistorical environment where the phenomenon of interest is 
situated while providing him or her with a larger basis for the possible critique of my reading, 
interpretation and later use of the insights gained i  the course of this medieval study.   
The medieval chapter is at its core articulated around four investigative essays. The first 
one is a short essay expounding the sociopolitical structures that shape the medieval context in 
which seals emerged as a common identity token. The second investigative essay fleshes out the 
economic characteristics and interests of the organized medieval Church. The third essay details 
the domain and practice of documentary validation and the panoply of artifacts that were used to 
that effect, particularly the seal. The last investigative essay presents the legitimizing discourse 
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and rationale of social actors regarding the seal as identity token and articulates a critique of that 
discourse.  
The method applied in this chapter is plain literatu e or textual analysis as common in the 
humanities,37 but used here for social science purposes. This shift of purpose entails a major 
difference. The literary type of literature analysis generally focuses on a single author and draws 
its interpretations not only from the actual ideas and images explicitly deployed or referenced by 
the author in the material but also from a variety of clues and hints from the style to the lexical 
repertoire and other relevant dimensions and components of the textual artifact. Here, the 
material of the analysis includes a variety of authors and texts that are only related by the interest 
the textual contents may present to this inquiry. 
In practice, I have collected a stack of texts thatI have identified as relevant to 
investigate seals in the Middle Ages (see below for my initial reading entries to this literature). 
References on the final list of materials have been accumulated from intensively using the rich 
footnotes or endnotes as well as the bibliographies and references gathered from the initial core 
readings. This has been complemented by free searches of the Syracuse University Library’s 
collections, online bookstores such as Amazon.com as well as the Web in general (notably on 
Google Scholar and Google Books), using key words an  phrases. All of this was done 
iteratively until the different parts that may provide a coherent medieval tableau are in place.  
The analysis has consisted in reading and critically analyzing the stack of texts thus 
gathered about western medieval history, with the aim to outline that tableau as clearly as 
possible while bringing out, as much as possible, th  coherence of the whole from the presumed 
                                                 
37 This analytical method in other words pertains to hermeneutics. 
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standpoint of the historical actors involved. In the same time I point out challenges and possible 
inadequacies from our present research standpoint, and propose plausible interpretations that 
may close the gaps. Such interpretations are based on the cumulative understanding gained from 
the totality of the relevant literature and are guided by a rigorous, evidence-driven inference or 
reflection – such was, at least, the intention.  
Case II: Government ID  
In this case, I seek first and foremost to elicit the genesis and evolution of the passport 
from its origins to its rise as an international credential in the contemporary world. But rather 
than being fixated on the search of the origins for the sake of it, I particularly follow the 
evolution paths that led from the first document called passport and its function then to the near-
universal document we know today as an identity credential specifically for the purpose of 
traveling. Case II particularly qualifies as a process-tracing. Process-tracing is a within-case 
method that allows documenting in more or less fine detail (depending on the variety) a 
particular process, i.e. a phenomenon that has unfolded over a time sequence, and to make 
“inferences about causal mechanisms within the confines of a single case or a few cases” 
(Bennett and Elman 2006: 459).  
• Literature and documentary analysis  
Case II addresses the phenomenon of the historical advent of the passport in two parts: 
the early history – the genesis, in another word – and the latest part which has produced the 
passport as we know it today. Just like the seal in the previous chapter, the former is addressed 
through existing literature, as it has also been largely accounted for by historians. However, as 
we move closer to the present context, the latter part is mostly based on near-contemporary 
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archives and documents, referring to relevant proceedings of the League of Nations (between the 
two world wars) and, later on, the United Nations ad ICAO regarding the development of an 
international type of passport and its subsequent uniformization. In the main, those documents 
contain conference proceedings, expert committee reports and government feedback regarding a 
series of passport-related issues, guidelines and recommendations. The case description consists 
of a thorough reconstitution of the sequence of events, decisions and actions in order to trace the 
process of that emergence. 
George and Bennett (2005, chapter 10) distinguish four varieties of process-tracing: 
detailed narrative, use of causal hypotheses and some limited generalization, analytical causal 
explanation in theoretical forms, and more general xp anation which is the opposite of the first 
variety in that it is least detailed on the process. At this point, the documents are used to build a 
detailed narrative of the process of emergence of the international passport all the way to 
machine readable passports.  
As I mentioned above, Case II is complemented by a sm ll case on the development and 
early implementation of the French national identity card, which is drawn from a secondary 
contemporary source (a scholarly one that has thoroughly investigated historical reports and 
original materials on the topic). This addition has the opportune purpose to enlighten the 
investigation about the process of establishing a government-enabled identity schema 
domestically in the context of the modern state, and in conditions where citizens still have a 
leeway to choose whether to adopt it or not. Finally, I close the chapter with a more analytical 
piece on what I call identity primitives. In that section, I reflect on the so-called breeder 
documents and trace the process of emergence of ‘nationality’ as a legal concept and a formal 
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category in the institutionalization of the national state, which is also key to government 
authority to identify individuals. 
Case III: Digital identity 
For the investigation of this case, I will mainly use industry and government documents, 
complemented by interviews with a number of key individual participants and 
observation/reflection. 
• Observation  
This data source includes any background knowledge that has been gained prior or 
parallel to the active investigation period but without necessarily and explicitly using a particular 
data collection mechanism. The period of observation started in May 2006, which was the month 
I attended for the first time the semi-annual Interet Identity Workshop (IIW) in Mountain View, 
California only at its second iteration. It has been carried through subsequent meetings,38 but 
most importantly on discussion lists.39 The main list was launched by the IIW organizers. For the 
first phase of its existence, the list was a closed one. It became public when its management was 
transferred to the “Identity Commons” group in 2009. During the observation I was able to 
identify the actors in terms of the roles that they play and the place they occupy in the design 
community. In addition, information about every happenstance related to digital identity (e.g., 
relevant conferences, reports, other document releas s, notable developments or initiatives) most 
likely circulates at some point on this list, rather sooner than later.  
                                                 
38 The IIW 2006 took place on May 1 – 3, 2006 followed the next month by the Identity Mashup Conference at 
Harvard’s Berkman Center on June 19. I attended subsequent iterations of IIW and finally the Privacy Identity 
Innovation conference in 2010 (pii2010) in Seattle, Washington on August 17 – 19, 2010.  
39 The main list which I joined on April 30, 2006 (email on the record with the present author) was 
idworkshop@googlegroups.com. It became community@lists.idcommons.net from mid-2009. 
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• Documents and institutional records 
This part of the investigation expressly refers to the unfolding process in the United 
States, which is led by the industry joined later on by the government, directed towards enabling 
user-centered digital identity management within a trust framework for the cyberspace. The 
records created in the process, particularly documents that are deliberately released as part of the 
process, are given primacy above the interviews and anything else, as positive sources of data for 
this analysis. This aspect really needs to be strongly emphasized, as expectations of empirical 
research may pre-dispose the reader in favor of non-pre-mediated exercises of data collection40 
as being the first and most important ways of getting empirical data. That is not the case in this 
context. The reason for this is simple. This is not a behavioral research, and individual 
perspectives (as per the interviews) are only expert vi ws reflecting individuals’ experiences and 
sometimes opinions which are undoubtedly better informed than the random individual’s, but 
they are still individual perspectives. Whilst the documents are the outcomes of collective efforts 
and the results of negotiations which reflect the different points of equilibrium reached so far in 
the collective process and deliberations. It is already abundantly clear that digital identity is not 
going to happen by the feat of one company, let alone a small team of individuals like in a start-
up. It is at the very least an industry effort, which has just recently come to the realization that 
the involvement of government may be instrumental. The main materials I analyze in this 
chapter are the ones that document best these collective fforts, as their drafting involves main 
industry players and stakeholders – self-selected, an  interested enough to join the discussion – 
along with active individual participants and the government, and their contents reflect either the 
common (or at least the predominant) wisdom or agreement reached at that point, or a challenge 
                                                 
40 Meaning that it is expected that the data collection be mediated by tools designed by the researcher, but not (pre-
mediated) through written documents from other sources.   
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the whole industry has to reckon with. I have identified those documents through my 
participation in meetings, in mailing lists where reports and links to resources as well as 
progress, challenges and various issues are routinely shared and discussed. By all accounts, none 
of those materials referred to in this investigation went unnoticed by the industry or the design 
community, elements of which led or were involved (if only as commentator) in their 
preparation. They include industry white papers, protocol descriptions or specifications, vision 
papers, design principles, policy formulation, strategy papers, etc. mostly from both industry and 
government. 
• Interviews and individuals’ records  
This category of data only comes as a complement to the documentary data referred to 
above. The interviews have been conducted with indiv dual members of the digital identity 
community of practice by using a semi-structured interview protocol, with mostly open-ended 
questions (see Appendix B). It is important to note that this was not a survey and therefore the 
results of this exercise were not meant for aggregation round specific and common variables. 
This interview approach is also different from behavioral research interview in that the 
conversations carried out were as much a process of further educating the researcher about what 
the respondents know and are doing, as opposed to the ther type of interview where the 
respondents are truly subjects being studied. In effect, the interview was designed in order to 
check my own understanding of the process which was formed during the observation phase and 
from the documentary materials, to discuss further questions that I might have on important 
points or unresolved issues, and to make sure I becom  aware of anything of interest to this 
research, which I might have missed, given the fact that I could not attend all the meetings or be 
present at all the forums where these actors discuss these matters. That purpose in mind, I only 
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targeted a handful number of respondents who appear to have a substantial and sustained 
involvement with the ongoing efforts and based on the presumption (formed during the 
observation process) of the quality of information they might offer. In total sixteen interviews 
have been carried out with fourteen respondents out of twenty potential respondents contacted. I 
would further characterize them with regard to the selection criteria as follows. The respondents 
targeted or selected are individuals: 
 Due to whom I first learned about the very existence of this community because 
of something they have accomplished on digital identity account which got the word out; 
 Regarded as leading some relevant initiative within e community; 
 Who are contributing to drafting specifications or are actually building pieces of 
software for identity management in the Internet, or have been involved in previously noted 
efforts at identity management systems; 
 Who have given regular conference presentations on some aspect of online/digital 
identity management, as a result of being involved in some digital identity-related business 
whether through the technical or via the entrepreneurship avenue; 
 Referred to by another respondent at the end of our interview conversation as 
being someone worth talking to about those question;  
 Holding a prominent identity-related position in a corporation, a foundation or an 
industry association that has a stake and is involved in the building efforts of a digital identity 
infrastructure;  
 Holding a position in a government agency or department with the responsibility 
to work with the private industry on these efforts, or having some experience with government 
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protocols and policies regarding digital identity credentials of public employees and 
government’s contractors. 
Obviously, the above categories may overlap but anyone of the respondents belongs to (at least) 
one or more of them. 
While the protocol lays out the main questions I needed to discuss with members of the 
expert and practice community for further clarificat on on aspects that are relevant for my 
investigation, the conduct of the interview was flexible enough to adapt to the expertise or 
experience profile of each interviewee: different questions may have been developed further with 
different interviewees while some questions may even have been left out when it became 
obvious that a particular interviewee was not in positi n to give a cogent or well-informed 
answer (or that within the time allocated, the research will gain much more in spending more 
time on some of the questions and less or not at all on some others, with a given interviewee.) In 
addition, the interview protocol went through two iterations with improved questions after the 
earlier interviews (Appendix B). 
By individuals’ records, I am referring to sources such as participants’ web logs, recorded 
presentations or other identifiable materials of theirs which are publicly on the record. In the 
course of this investigation, I have used a number of these sources for complement of 
information, in order to update myself with the latest news on digital identity, or even as tutorial 
about some of the technologies. 
Finally in closing, I would draw the reader’s attenio  to the fact that it is not the 
assumption of this inquiry that there is a linear history linking successive large scale systems for 
individuals’ identification across ages, nor is it the intent to reconstitute a teleological narrative 
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eventually revealing digital identity systems as an inevitable or necessary denouement of an 
evolution. While I agree that “the more history we understand, the more we understand the 
present” (Abell 2004: 299), this research perspectiv  acknowledges that no matter how valuable 
it might be to know about past experiences, “the past is only contingently related to the future” 
(Wendt 2001). I do not share a deterministic assumption to history. Involved in retrospective 
research, the researcher (chiefly the historian) reads and seeks to understand the past inevitably 
in light of the present. As Tilly (1975) claims, and has, to some extent, shown with his co-
authors, historical outcomes may once have been the least likely. In the face of the proportions 
and importance that writing has taken in the rise and expansion of sovereign authority as well as 
in the increase of private transactions over centuries, any past event that might have prefigured or 
enabled that outcome, no matter in how tiny ways, becomes significant once we are faced with 
such consequential outcome, even if it wasn’t so at the ime of occurrence of that past event. The 
goal in this research is rather to understand the logic, the driving forces and the mechanisms-
processes that led each historically distinct system to come about and take the shape it took – or 
is taking – while gaining further insights into interactions between identity management systems 
and society. Perhaps in the end – at least I would hope so, – the various insights gained from 
each system and era may integrate into a coherent framework with some heuristic value. 
3.5 Conclusion 
I this chapter, I have provided a view of the research paradigm framing this investigation, from 
the relevant philosophical perspective on knowledge to its basic assumptions and constitutive 
commitments. I have highlighted the main models of explanation and forms of discourse at work 
in this dissertation. Next, I have also articulated the rationale for designing this inquiry around 
three big cases before I set forth the material or data that has been analyzed and the way it has 
104 
 
 
 
been so. After this set of preliminaries laying outthe conceptual framework and epistemological 
foundations on which this scholarly endeavor is built, it is now time to launch the investigation 
properly speaking with the analysis of the social phenomena at hand as manifested through 
medieval seals, modern government ID and contemporary digital identity technologies. I shall 
start with the identity medium of the Middle Ages.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Seals and Identity in the Medieval West 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Writing is a technology that has historically occurred to humanity. Both its emergence and its 
evolution have spanned dozens of thousands of years, if one considers the earliest rock and cave 
engravings, drawings and paintings such as those in Lascaux caves in southwestern France or in 
the so-called “Apollo 11” cave in southwestern Namibia. In effect, to the extent that those 
drawings are physical forms of verbal expression, they are the earliest forms of writing. The 
drawings of the Tassili N’Ajjer Mountains in southeast Algeria as source of information about 
changes in patterns of animal migrations, climate and human inhabitation are evidence of that.41 
It has been a very long way from the most rudimentary marks and from those prehistoric 
drawings to Sumerian cuneiform script to alphabets and other surviving systems of graphemes.42 
However, the evolution of that technology called writing has not been only that of scripts and 
other signs representing human languages; it has also been the evolution of the material media by 
                                                 
41 For Apollo 11, see the Metropolitan Museum Web page http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/apol/hd_apol.htm; 
Lascaux: http://www.lascaux.culture.fr/#/fr/00.xml; and the Tassili n’Ajjer: the UNESCO Web page dedicated to the 
conservation of the World Heritage sites: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/179 
42 “There are other systems such as logographies [sic], in which each character represents a word, morpheme, or 
semantic unit, and syllabaries, in which each character represents a syllable.” Entry: Alphabet in http://en.wikipedia.org 
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and through which writing is done. While they may be related at some high level, those two 
evolutions are separate phenomena. For instance, presently we still use the same scripts as many 
generations before us while the material media for writing – inscribing or transcribing language – 
are radically different as compared to just two or three generations before.     
 As writing tools and techniques evolved to become more and more sophisticated or 
complex, so grew their capacity to support an increasing share of the human experience and 
activities. While available forms of writing technology are used to support more and more 
human activities, evidence suggests that a particular challenge emerges inevitably. That 
challenge is about reliably linking human beings to written artifacts, for this would enable further 
use of writing, in turn furthering human and social activities. This first stage of this investigation 
deals with that challenge in the early manuscript culture of medieval Europe. Its point of 
departure is provided by a historical account focusing on medieval documentary artifacts and 
record-making practices. Bedos-Rezak (2000) observe f om historical archives that the number 
of sealed charters dating after the turn of the first millennium (A.D.) significantly increased and 
that proved to be the beginning of a pattern.  
In the decades following the year 1000, the number of charters produced and preserved in the northern 
France increased by several order of magnitude, setting off a trend toward written documentation that w s 
never reversed. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1505) 
In effect, the observed phenomenon of sealed charter was part of a larger context of increasing 
use and dissemination of written records across Europe, particularly official documents including 
deeds, titles, acts, diplomas and the like, as people increasingly recorded material transactions, 
land gifts, land tenure, etc. The penetration of written records in various social processes only 
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grew deeper and larger over the centuries since then, enabling the emergence of more complex 
social relations and even that of western modernity (Weber 1978). 
 The above mentioned transactions have significant long-term consequences. Their 
outcome affects parties’ rights and may even effect the transfer of full propriety rights. If we are 
brought to believe that the content and status of written documents may significantly affect the 
actual distribution of those and other rights in the society then clearly, the need to record those 
transactions presents a case with this paramount question: how does one link human actors (in 
fact any kind of agents that can manipulate any meaningful aspect of the type of record at hand) 
to the written document, accurately and reliably represent them within the parameters of this 
writing technology? In what circumstances did the challenge of reliably representing 
individual identity within written records emerge in the Middle Ages and how was it resolved? 
According to Bedos-Rezak (2000) the answer to that question ultimately lies in a sign-object, the 
seal.   
The solution achieved centered on the seal, a sign-object standing in, substituting, for its owner or user, and 
conceived and created so as to produce a duplicate pres nce, a presence not actual but nonetheless real. (p. 
1505) 
[S]eals were successful as objects denoting both identity and authority. They produced identity as a 
foundation for documentary authorship, authority, and, ultimately, authentication. (p. 1531) 
However, we are still to grasp the mechanism and the rationale that led to such outcome, 
which is the object of this chapter. Furthermore, th  above answer may invite more questions. 
The kind of transactions we are dealing with here was not totally new to the humanity, even in 
the medieval west. And yet, they were dealt with differently before then. Why did it become so 
important at a particular point in time to record transactions? Something must have changed or 
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surfaced in this social context which would lead stakeholders to engage in these new practices in 
their time.  
Eleventh and twelfth-century lay elites came to be the subjects of representation in the explicit sense that, 
in situation requiring authority and commitment, they evolved from immediately present agents to 
represented actors. Persons absent in time or placewere substituted by seals, which operated as altern t s 
for those who were absent, acting in their place. It is intriguing that personal identity came to be signified 
just as people began to project their authority and ccountability beyond their own actual, empirical 
presence. It was as if absence were required for the question of identity even to become conceivable. (p. 
1490) 
The whole of this chapter is devoted to exploring the broader historical, cultural and 
institutional contexts where those changes occurred with specific practices enabling documentary 
authority. I first outline the institutional profile of that era in the region at hand. This leads to 
recognizing the power of the Roman Catholic Church at the time as well as the antecedents of 
that power beyond spiritual concerns, both in the political arena and in the economic domain. I 
then delve into the documentary practices produced by that institutional environment whereby 
the conceptions about signs and their efficacy are put to practice in the manipulation of 
documents to convey agency and authority. From that well-documented context I will finally co-
interpret, following but also extending Bedos-Rezak, the antecedents and assumptions as well as 
the implications of the seals emerging as a commonly reliable marker of identity. But first of all, 
let me clarify the basis for choosing the medieval west as a starting point.   
4.2 Why the Medieval West? 
While in the Middle Ages individuals, families and corporations may indifferently possess a 
crest, a coat of arms or a seal, seals have come over time to be used only by constituted corporate 
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bodies (as is the case today in most parts of the world) rather than by physical/natural 
individuals. Along with crests and coats of arms, the figure represented on the seal is part of 
those emblems that constitute the object of heraldry – whether as the art of blazoning those 
armorial bearings and emblems or as their domain of study.43 From our contemporary 
experience, we can see that seals bear the representation of an emblem symbolizing an agential 
entity. They are printed on letterhead and other official documents as a symbol of officialdom or 
authority. By affixing its seal to an item or exhibiting it in certain circumstances, a corporate 
entity conveys its authority together with the said item or asserts it over said circumstances. A 
material replica of a seal may also be hanged to a desk or a lectern dressed to host an official 
representative (e.g., the seal of the President of the United States when he signs a bill or delivers 
a speech). Any official representation of a seal is meant to be an accurate replica of the original 
and official seal – a master seal of a sort historically referred to as the “great seal of…” – so that 
it carries the highest force as an instrument of assertion and authentication of officialdom.44 
Chiefly among all bodies corporate, the national stte as a whole has a standard seal just as it has 
a national flag, both forming probably the most know  emblems of a republic or a nation. 
National state seals may be observed on documents such a  government-issued traveler’s 
passports or visas. Its embossed design may be replicated on a writing surface by printing, 
impress, watermark or other reproduction techniques. While various branches of any given 
republic or various departments of the state apparatus may have their own seals, the seal of the 
                                                 
43 To be more specific, the science of seals is called sigillography (from Latin: sigillum,) or sphragistics (from the Greek 
word) but to the extent that the coat of arms for an entity that has one is more often than not the same as the symbol 
represented on the seal, heraldry and sigillography overlap in some ways. Another way of saying it is that seals are 
relevant to heraldry more as figurative objects while they are relevant to sigillography more as material cultural objects.  
44 The great seal of the United States is in custody of the State Department while in France and most francophone 
countries it is in custody of the Justice Department (or Attorney General). Historically, the workshop that crafts the 
official seals has been the same to be in charge of official coins whether as money currency or other official medallions 
of various sorts (notably, medallions of official awards from the military to the arts), which can only be replicated under 
the appropriate authorization and with extremely accurate techniques.  
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national state as a whole supersedes in authority those other seals, just as the state authority and 
jurisdiction does its departments’. 
Now that we have recognized the contemporary existence and use of seals, “Where do 
seals come from?” one might ask. For a dissertation starting with the examination of medieval 
seals and claiming to shed a light on the way tokens have been used to represent identity in 
general, it may be necessary to make explicit a few basic facts regarding the above question in 
order to avoid unwarranted or false assumptions. I do not mean to suggest that seals originated in 
medieval Europe or that it was there that they were first used to represent an entity or even to be 
affixed to a record artifact. Certainly not, and nor is this the claim of any medievalist historian-
sigillographer. Not only the use of seals has been evidenced in different civilizations, but there 
also appears to be a significant overlap between usages across different cultural settings.  
Originating alongside if not actually preceding theinvention of writing, sealing remained, in most 
civilizations, a valuable mechanism for marking and protecting ownership, signing commitment, 
designating identity, representing authority, and authenticating documents…. Mesopotamian and biblical 
texts, Platonic and Aristotelian treatises, patristic and early medieval commentaries all incorporate the 
imagery of seals as a conceptual tool. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1511)  
Fraenkel (1992) is less ambiguous about whether seals preceded the invention of scripts, and 
suggests that at their origin, seals were not at all rel ted to writing and that they were previously 
used to lock a closed space or a container.45 Seals appeared in a variety of civilizations and 
cultures around the world and across the ages (Smith 2002; Sun 2004; and Collon 2006). They 
were used in ancient China to represent dynasties and their authority (Sun 2004). Even long 
before that, they were used to support ownership-related claims and for accountancy purposes 
                                                 
45 Citing Tassin and Toustain’s Nouveau Traité de la Diplomatique (Fraenkel 1992: note 2, p. 292) she writes: “In 
Mesopotamia, seals as pre-existing writing were first used to close a space or container.” (This author’s translation) 
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(Collon 2006). As far back as archeological artifacs can show, seals were at least contemporary 
to the earliest meaningful and durable marks that humans have made on solid surfaces. 
Man has always sought to make his mark – to show that he was here by carving his name on a tree or at the 
top of the Pyramids, to show that certain piece of pr perty belonged to him or came from him, to indicate 
his authority. The rubber stamps of officialdom, the sealing-wax and lead seals of custom and excise or 
post-office, the royal or state seals attached to important documents have their origins in the carved amulets 
used by Prehistoric man. (Collon 2006: 5) 
Admittedly, writing one’s name is only a very recent a d rather sophisticated practice in human 
history. But the fact is this: the technique that consists of carving signs, symbols or figures in a 
solid material and then pressing such tool upon a soft surface in order to leave those marks, 
invariably and repetitively, for deliberate purposes and specific meanings is at least as old as the 
oldest systems of writing known to date.  
Sumerian tablets, the oldest written materials found so far, date back to the 4th
millennium before this era, and so do the oldest seals known. Both were found in the region 
known as the Mesopotamia, that is, an area irrigated by the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, 
covering the contemporary Iraq and eastern Syria. Those earliest records show characters of a 
cuneiform script (nail-shaped) developed from the Sumerian pictographs. The characters were 
inscribed by means of a stylus on damp clay tablets, r portedly much more resistant than the 
papyrus, the parchment or wood tablets, which were used at later periods (Collon, 2006). Apart 
from a cuneiform script, impressions of drawing have been found on those tablets and a variety 
of other supports dating from the same period. As it turned out, those drawings came from the 
impress of cylinders – mostly in lead – that had been carved with shapes and figures distinctively 
representing familiar objects and situations. Those cylinders are a different form of seal. The 
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images impressed by cylinder seals show a variety of scenes reflecting various functions and 
aspects of daily life, evidencing ways in which thesociety was organized. By their cylindrical 
shape, those seals are markedly different from the seal-die or seal-stamp that we have come to 
know from a more recent past, which are flat and therefore are straightforwardly pressed on wax 
or a writing surface. 
 Cylinder seals were rolled across the tablets and on lumps of clay used to seal vessels, consignments of 
goods and the door latches of storerooms, so that it could be ascertained whether or not the contents had 
been tampered with. (Collon, 2006: 13) 
Even in the medieval west, seals did not at first operate as sign of validation but rather and 
simply as a sign of sheer affirmation of the king’s prerogative, as a sign of kingship, “an 
apparatus of the office of kingship” from Merovingian to Carolingian kings46 (Bedos-Rezak 
2000: 1512). In other words in the medieval west, seals were first used by rulers in order to 
convey the authority attached to their functions and therefore, to their decisions, and later to the 
documents that recorded those decisions.  
From the seventh century onward, seal impressions had been affixed to royal documents exclusively, by a 
chancellor who had custody of the royal seal and was responsible for the production and the validation of 
royal diplomas. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1512) 
As we will see throughout this chapter, it is much later, between the 11th and 12th centuries, that 
the notion and the practice of sealing documents as a way to authenticate both the written record 
of a transaction and the identity of the actors involved in the said transaction spread among the 
populace.  
                                                 
46 The Frank and later French ruling dynasties include: Merovingians from around mid-5th century to 751, the 
Carolingians from 751 to 987, and the Capetians from 888 to 1498 all branches included. (Kibler and Zinn 1995: xi-xii) 
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Therefore, contrary to later identity tokens I investigate in this thesis, seals were not 
invented in the setting under consideration here. In the context of this thesis, I am focusing on 
the medieval west for a number of reasons.  Aside the opportunistic and cultural reason of having 
easier access to European historical records and studie , there also is a logical (and retrospective) 
reason for this focus. In our contemporary experience, we have to give credit to the national state 
(as will be shown in the next chapter) for having achieved the epitome of what I have termed 
authoritative identity credential. It is reasonable to presume that despite possible historical shifts, 
there might be a certain level of continuity or connection (possibly cultural, logical or otherwise: 
see, e.g., section 4.7 in this chapter) between, on the one hand, the said national state which 
begun to emerge at least from the 16th century, and even more clearly so in the 18th and, on the 
other hand, medieval experiences of sociopolitical structures, including competing sovereigns 
and claimants for a number of valued resources, which ave shaped the conditions of emergence 
of such state (Tilly 1975; Sassen 2006, and for more cultural aspects Kantorowicz 1951 and 
1955).  
Furthermore, in the course of my investigation I have come across evidence that, 
preceding the printing culture, the manuscript culture confronted in its own context basically the 
same problem as that which 21st century actors are confronting about digital records and 
transactions: how is a person to be effectively represented through the record medium and 
technology at hand?  
As a consequence, I can see three factors converging in support to a medieval case:  
1) When writing technology, at its manuscript age, b gan to spread through the west like 
never before since the disintegration of the Roman Empire, and to be used increasingly to 
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support transactions among ordinary people, the exprts in that technology were concerned with 
the question of representing identity while using the said technology;  
2) As a result a practice of using an “identity system” existed before the modern state, in 
the very geographical and cultural context where such state emerged; and 
3) Last but not least, that practice was accompanied by a discourse explaining the views 
of the actors, indeed the makers of that system, as to how such system was to be reliable for 
achieving its objective to effectively represent and convey the identity of the human person.  
Therefore, I have determined that there were enough s pporting arguments for a medieval case 
that fits the research question this thesis is concerned with.  
Obviously, it is much better from a scientific standpoint to draw any generalizing 
framework from the study of two or three historical ses than from only one. Furthermore, the 
two cases represent two distinct eras: one is the era of manuscript technology and the beginning 
of the generalization of written records, and the other represents more the era of printing, an era 
of a mechanized technology of writing. Even if the m chanization aspect was not present from 
the beginning at the emergence of passports, it will be so by the time the “passport technology” 
was matured enough to be universalized. Still the biggest novelty in this second era is an 
institutional one, that is, the formation of the national state. 
Following this clarifying preliminary regarding the assumptions that have guided the 
choice of this case or its framing, I will start the case itself by describing next the basic 
institutional and historical contours of the environment where the phenomenon of interest 
occurred. 
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4.3 Socio-political structures and the Investiture Controversy 
Studying medieval history uncovers three basic forms of political organization: feudalism, the 
church and the empire (Sassen 2006). Let us examine the context provided by those institutions, 
particularly regarding the buildup to the changes that will occur at the turn of the millennium.  
4.3.1 Feudalism 
Feudalism is a regime of social organization where the main form of propriety consists of fiefs, 
that is, estate properties temporarily used for a fee by a person or a group of people who are not 
the landowners. More concretely in the medieval Europe where this regime was prevalent, 
feudalism is characterized by a particular landholding system where a peasant is granted the use 
of a piece of land in return for rendering homage, fealty, or some service or good. The landowner 
was the lord and the person or group of people exploiting the land were his vassals. Most often in 
addition to their allegiance, they paid their fee in kind, which in this case meant a portion of the 
land produce. De facto, the lord commits to their protection and security at least within the 
boundaries of his properties. The authority or rather e power of lords was central to the 
structure of the medieval society, even more than tt of the king against whom they competed 
for resources (Tilly 1975). Lords had property rights over lands that they either conquered or 
inherited from a long lineage and where they lived or maintained some activity. They exercised 
their privileges and prerogatives over the people living on their lands and possibly some 
influence in the surrounding areas. In return they assumed the responsibility of ensuring the 
safety of the area.  
Military obligations added to landholding obligations to form the main two dependent 
variables of the feudal order, that is, of the feudal system of authority and rights (Sassen 2006: 
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chapter 2, citing Bloch’s 1961 Feudal Society). By military obligations, the powerful provided 
protection while the weaker offered military service whenever necessary. While one’s 
geographical position may be a differentiating factor with regard to what resources and 
particularly whose protection (a vital resource at the time) one could enjoy, land was a collection 
of estate properties and not at all a unified notion of collective territory. Less than the spatial 
position by itself, the linkages generated by that system of exchange in obligations and services 
completely defined the resources (including rights) available to people:  
…inclusion in the feudal order was not defined by ph sical location, nor did territory determine identity 
and loyalty. An individual’s or group’s specific obligations and rights depended on position in a system of 
personal ties, not location in a particular area even when those personal ties might be concentrated in that 
locality. (Sassen 2006: 35) 
 As a consequence, there were no territorial borders to political authority or institutions 
per se; authority was rather based on allegiance of lasses of people to rulers of various scopes: 
the pope, emperors/kings or lords. Obviously those people lived in certain areas, but what 
defined their rights and obligations with regard to the sovereign (kings or pope) was not because 
they lived on a territory that was a priori delineated as the exclusive territorial domain of one 
particular sovereign. That absence of territorial fixity led to what Sassen (2006: 32-33) calls 
“multiple crisscrossing jurisdictions” with mutual “territorial insertions.” In other words, there 
was a more or less well defined area where people identifying themselves as Franks lived, and as 
such they were part of the Frankish kingdom ruled by the king of Franks; and there were 
territories known as German lands from where people not only shared significant cultural 
features but also their allegiance to the same sovereign. However, people sharing affiliation and 
allegiance to the same sovereign did not necessarily live on contiguous lands forming one 
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territory, and the papacy, for example, was still ab e to exercise sovereign authority on some 
institutions and some people within the same areas. Likewise, the Frankish or the German rulers 
could do the same outside the areas regularly inhabted y Franks and by German folks. It was 
personal ties, affiliations and allegiances that defined the borders of sovereign authority.47  
During the 8th century and in that context of weak territoriality in political government, a 
new and large institution of sovereignty started emerging in the shadow of the defunct Roman 
Empire. It takes two forms: the Roman Catholic Churc  and Holy Roman Empire. 
4.3.2 The Church and the Empire 
The Holy Roman Empire indirectly originated from the treaties established between the Frankish 
king Pepin III (r. 751 to 768) and Pope Stephen II (r. 752 – 757). In effect, following the help 
Pepin received from the previous pope (Zachary) in his accession to the Frankish throne, he was 
given the opportunity to return the favor a few years l ter when Stephen’s papacy was threatened 
by the Lombards in Italy. In the immediate, those treaties on the one hand contributed to 
legitimize the Carolingians while, on the other, they propelled the papacy as a regional political 
power instead of being confined to Italian local politics. After defeating the Lombard king, Pepin 
retroceded the lands conquered to the papacy, whilst 
Stephen granted Pepin the title of ‘patrician of the Romans,’ thus investing him with an imperial office and 
commencing a process which will culminate in the establishment of an empire in the west less than half a 
century later. (Powell 2004: 505) 
                                                 
47 This is not to say territorial sovereignty was only discovered by the modern national state, as history is not a linear 
progress. In note 4 on page 33, Sassen (2006) observes: “Early discussions of territorial questions pertained to Greek 
city-states, to Roman cities, and then to medieval Italian cities such as Florence, Pisa, Genoa, Milan, and Venice. The 
territoriality of these city-states also entailed sovereignty. Theirs was a territorial sovereignty whereas the sovereignty of 
kings rested on allegiance of individuals and organized bodies, not territory.” 
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In effect, that process will reach its peak with Charlemagne who ruled the Frankish kingdom 
from 768 to his death in 814. His coronation by Pope Leo III in 800 formalized the birth of the 
Holy Roman Empire by making him the Emperor of the Romans. This set in stone the alliance 
initiated by Pepin, Charlemagne’s father, between wstern European secular rulers and the 
papacy. These developments set off a trend of increasing entanglement between ecclesiastical 
and secular authorities and functions. Kings of the Latin west came to be considered no less than 
“heavenly kings” and seen like an eminent category of priest in this feudal environment 
dominated by networks of personal ties, as we saw previously.  
Therefore, governmental order comprised an intricate and ever-changing pattern of personal loyalties, 
generally secured by property given in fee tenure. The intended result of fee tenure was to establish mutual 
obligations, in which, however, the recipient of the benefice was beholden to the giver for the duration of 
the tenure. The bargain was commonly sealed by a ritu l through which the giver “invested” the recipient 
with the fee.  (Morrison 2004: 530) 
Originating from the Carolingian era, a benefice was “a grant of land that the kings made 
to their counts to hold as long as the counts held office” (Bouchard 1995: 109) and more 
generally, it refers to any estate property that is temporary conceded to anyone in return of some 
services. In that sense, it is a concept that is practically synonymous with fief, at the difference 
that generally benefice involved not a peasant but a person of status.   
In that period of its expansion, the Church will be confronted to this reality of the 
feudalism order, and will find itself somehow captive of that institution for a while.  In the first 
couple of centuries of the project of a Holy Roman Empire, it will be a challenge to clearly 
define the institutional boundaries between the religious and the secular orders, even more so in 
this medieval context of fiefdom.  
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Ecclesiastical and secular affairs were closely intertwined; bishops were endowed with comital rights, 
including secular jurisdiction; and the predominant form of property consisted of fiefs, in the hands of both 
the spiritual and the secular nobility. (Blumenthal 2004: 219) 
As a matter of fact, many of the feudal lords or other laymen were abbots, bishops or 
archbishops appointed by monarchs. Their authority was equally related to God, regardless of 
their source of appointment. God was believed to be the ultimate and the highest authority as 
well as source of any earthly authority. In effect on behalf of God, authority was managed on 
earth not only by the pope through the government of the Roman Catholic Church but also by the 
rulers of an empire that was deemed holy. The ambiguities between clerical and the secular 
spheres of authority and functions led to situations f quid pro quo involving transactions of land 
and ecclesiastical offices for the purpose of shoring up the power of the secular rulers and the 
political ambitions of lords and other members of the nobility (Morrison 2004). The investiture 
transaction that Morrison alludes to in the quote above did involve monarchs appointing lords in 
ecclesiastic offices with a “package” of estate rights – or benefice – in order to secure political 
allegiance and loyalty, blurring the lines between two domains of government.  
Ultimately, once by virtue of the Holy Roman Empire secular rulers became chief 
soldiers of God – commanders in chief on behalf of G d, one might say, – their realm became de 
facto that of the church and their subjects potentially an army of believers. In effect, kings raised 
armies to fight battles in the name of the Catholic fa th. Inevitably, the question was soon to arise 
as to who, between the secular rulers – particularly the “Holy Roman Emperor” – and the pope, 
must have pre-eminence over the other. If the politica  realm is also the earthly realm of God, 
which one between those two primi inter pares would actually be the prime minister of God, the 
one that ultimately would have the privilege of theexclusive audience of God, taking his 
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instructions first hand in order to command the earthly order? That was ultimately the issue at 
stake in the investiture controversy. Starting circa 1049 with the pontificate of Pope Leo IX (r. 
1049 – 1054) it will progressively put an end to three centuries of harmony between the papacy 
and secular rulers (Morrison 2004). What probably was a latent conflict of authority between 
secular rulers and the papacy began to manifest in the open. 
The Investiture Controversy (ca. 1049 – 1122) 
The investiture controversy was a series of disputes that lasted about a century. The gist 
of the conflict was a competition between secular rulers and the papacy on matters of the church 
government. It wasn’t completely new to the 11th century but reached then a defining point for 
the political order in the medieval west.   
Secular and ecclesiastic governments actively competed for the right to appoint and oversee clerics and 
Church administrators between the ninth and the twelfth centuries. Despite attempts by some earlier popes, 
such as Nicolas I (856 - 867), to overturn the practice of lay secular investiture, the papacy was unable to 
enforce its “independence” until the twelfth century, when Pope Gregory VII successfully wrested from the 
secular monarchs the authority to appoint bishops. (Ekelund et al. 1996: 18) 
Particularly, the so-called investiture controversy started off by a dispute between Rome 
and German monarchs over the authority to appoint the clergy as well as “the right of a king or 
emperor (a layman) to bestow the symbols of clerical office on abbots and bishops” (Morrison 
2004: 530). It is telling that a dispute over such stake of power had to be settled with arguments 
about signs and symbols, which had ramifications I shall return to in more detail. For now the 
debate was about material signs of power, that is, it was political.  
They [secular princes] also used emblems of spiritual office – such as the bishop’s ring, symbolizing his 
spiritual marriage with his church; and the crosier representing the rule of souls. Church law had long 
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forbidden the sale of ecclesiastical office as the crime (or heresy) of simony. Beginning with the pontificate 
of Pope Leo IX (r. 1049 – 1054), the constitutional and ceremonial aspects of lay investiture came undr 
attack. (Morrison 2004: 530) 
According to Morrison it was the symptom of a profound social change from a tribal to a feudal 
organization of the society, at a time where money was not yet the main currency of exchange 
but “other commodities, including the use of property and prerogatives, such as the 
administration of justice.” (Idem) 
In the same time, let us take note that by the years 1000, the church was already facing 
internal dissensions regarding its “moral and disciplinary failings” (ibid.) as well as a growing 
movement for reform. This will lead to the growth of monastic orders and monasteries across 
Europe (Ekelund et al. 1996: chapter 3). The reform movement still grew louder leading to the 
divestiture of Pope Gregory VI in 1046 with the help of the Emperor Henry III (r. 1039 – 1056).  
The controversy will subsequently have important episodes in France and England as 
well. It resulted in secular and ecclesiastical rulers – particularly Pope Gregory VII and King 
Henry IV – claiming supremacy over and deposing one a other, at least by synodal decrees. In 
addition, Gregory excommunicated Henry.  
In 1076 and 1080, Pope Gregory VII deposed and excommunicated Henry IV, the son and successor of the 
Emperor Henry III, over the question of royal investiture of bishops and abbots; this episode, too, reflects 
the assertion of leadership in the Christian world by the reformed papacy. When Henry IV capitulated at 
Matilda’s fortress of Canossa in 1077, theocratic kingship as it had been known in the early Middle Ages 
came to an end. (Blumenthal 2004: 220) 
From the late 11th century, the papacy grew stronger: obedience to the authority of the 
pope became a dogma; the papal bureaucracy (the curia) grew in size and more centralized; the 
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financial base was consolidated in a more effective structure; the canon law became the object of 
academic attention and systematic study.  The power f the papacy reached its paroxysm towards 
the end of the twelfth century with the pope Innocent III (r. 1198 – 1216). The papacy regained 
prominence on the international stage reaching out to its eastern counterpart, the Byzantine 
church, with concrete propositions to support crusade  against its enemies, in an effort to resume 
amicable relationship with Constantinople.  
“…Innocent III… formulated the canonical thesis that imperial dignity originated in and depended on the 
papacy… The Fourth Lateran Council, an ecumenical coun il held in 1215, was the high point of 
Innocent’s pontificate, and of the standing of the papacy in the medieval Latin west. Constantinople had 
been occupied by crusaders in 1204, and a healing of the schism with the Greek Orthodox church could be 
hoped for. One of the Lateran decrees formulated th doctrine of transubstantiation with regard to the 
eucharist. Another sacrament addressed by this legilation was penance: the Council imposed on all 
Christians confession at least once a year before Easter in preparation for communion.” (Blumenthal 2004: 
220) 
At the same time as the obligation of penance, appered the possibility of exemption in form of 
“indulgences;” these allowed the faithful to be liberated of such obligation against payments. The 
Church put in place a number of other policies or regulations that reinforced its financial base 
while making it the largest single owner of valuable estate properties including monasteries and 
cathedrals (see the next section, 4.4). 
  In the competing claims that the Church and secular r lers made against each other, the 
Church appeared at first to get the upper hand despite the period of instability facing both parties.  
 This assertion that kings were accountable to popes for their official conduct marked the beginning of a 
long and stormy contest for dominance between church and state. (Morrison 2004: 531) 
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However, this conflict did in some ways force these institutions to clarify their governance 
structures and lay the groundwork for transformative changes in political governance of the 
western Europe. 
Pope Nicholas II decreed that future popes should be elected by the College of Cardinals from among their 
own number. … after 1059 the Church and the papacy rapidly gained autonomy. (Ekelund et al. 1996: 22) 
Furthermore, the constitutional principle of the right of resistance came to be applied to popes as well as to 
kings. While popes used deposition and excommunication s weapons against kings in the investiture 
conflict, kings retaliated with the same weapons against popes and indeed promoted the elections of two 
antipopes. The papacy was indisputably an electoral office. (Morrison 2004)  
In some (unintended) ways the investiture controversy, promoted ideas of legitimate 
representation and political accountability. It made room for intermediary bodies to expand their 
role as counterweight to popes and kings. The role of the council and the College of Cardinals 
grew in prominence and as a way to curb papal autocracy.  
Thus in the church, as well as in the secular rule, th  investiture conflict resulted in the formulation of ideas 
of constitutional and representative government. (Idem, p. 531) 
On the other hand and in ways that were more ambiguous to “democratic” ideals, the weakening 
of the kingship, particularly in Germany, strengthened the power of lords while a free peasantry 
gradually evolved towards a predominant system of serfdom.    
The new configuration of sovereignty will not have territorial fixity up until late Middle 
Ages with the progressive emergence of the national state. However, it may be argued that both 
the Church and the Empire set in motion a process that will lead at least to a project of 
centralized authority which will then require a clear and consolidated territorial base, not the 
least because there were many rivals to compete for the (universal) center, or at least one 
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sovereign center. So much so that the transaction costs ould have been too high and perhaps 
unbearable to try and maintain a unique, imperial-universal center that will govern everybody 
else as opposed to having multiple centers in order to reduce frictions amongst otherwise 
competing potential sovereigns in one and the same space. The political alliance and tensions 
between the Church and secular rulers fundamentally shaped that evolution.  
4.4 The Church as an economic organization 
In this section I consider the Roman Catholic Churc through an economic lens. In that I take 
guidance from two sources involving partially the same authors. First, the main source is the 
book published in 1996 by five authors, Ekelund, Hebert, Tollison, Anderson and Davidson 
titled Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm. In that book, they analyze the 
Church as a corporation – a multidivisional firm – with different branches and field offices, 
which is headquartered in Rome for most of its history. Second, I use the chapter sixteen of the 
Oxford Handbook of Economics of Religion, authored by Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison and 
published in 2011. Here the authors qualify the Churc  both “as an economic and political firm” 
(p. 306). However, they fall short of providing any further macro-analytical insights (pursuant of 
the ‘political economy’ label claimed in the chapter title) in comparison to what they already 
provide in the book, which is purported to be a micro-analysis of the medieval Church as one 
particular organization – focusing mostly on its inner workings. I will be using a shorthand 
citation format in this particular section referencing only the publication year (either 1996 or 
2011) and adding the page number after a colon when I quote or want to point to a particular 
passage. 
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Well before secular governments, the medieval Church leveraged and built on the juristic 
legacy of the Roman Empire to establish a system of law and courts. In the meantime, secular 
monarchs only sought to resort to God and the Christ as the legitimate basis for their allegedly 
hereditary authority and then to ensure the acceptance of that narrative through the submission of 
the local warlords, with the support of armed forces if necessary. In that sense, as a “kind of 
surrogate government, the Church provided a number of social and public goods to medieval 
society” (1996: 25). The canon law was central to the public service provision aspects among the 
different functions of the Church. Canon law is a corpus of rules made up of the compilation of 
decretal letters (decisions and directives issued by the pope), as well as their commentaries and 
exegeses which are part of the jurisprudence. The eccl siastic courts operated at the diocese level 
under the jurisdiction of bishops. 
Regardless of the motives of the Church, the actual operation of canon law helped provide a consistent 
system of property rights’ enforcement at a time when governments were unable to supply similar public 
services in some areas. (1996: 77) 
 Furthermore, the Church certainly had political clout and was a significant political 
player. This state of affairs was the outcome of both the three centuries of alliance and co-
optation between the papacy and the Carolingian dynast  since the late 8th century in their 
project to establish the Holy Roman Empire, and paradoxically the end of that alliance. 
Following the formal end of the investiture controversy, which was marked by the Emperor’s 
concession of the authority claimed by the Church to make clerical appointments (Concordat of 
Worms in 1122), 
the pope emerged as the supreme judicial and legislative authority in western Europe. From the twelfth 
century on, all matters pertaining to the ownership, use, and disposal of church properties came under his 
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authority. All testamentary cases were adjudicable in Rome, meaning that in the long run, the pope 
determined the allocation of most property rights in Europe. Henceforth, bishops (who served as heads of 
regional franchises) were subject to papal approval before assuming their duties, and all monastic orders 
and new monasteries likewise required papal approval. (1996: 18) 
Among the factors that might have tipped the balance i  favor of the papacy at that 
particular time while previous efforts to keep the Church government from secular interference 
resolved in failure, Ekerlund et al. (1996: 18-19) see elements of economic relevance. First the 
means of communications, including transportation by land routes and waterways, improved 
substantially (compared to the period of previous attempts to secure papal independence from 
secular rulers), decreasing travel time and the cost of centralized control of the church. Second, 
the subsequent development of trade and towns at the turn of the millennium weakened the 
power of European monarchies over local warlords and emerging bourgeoisie, particularly when 
it comes to protecting Church assets and personnel.  The third factor is particularly important to 
note as it refers to the economic strength of the church itself, in significant part due to the central 
role it played in the life of the faithful.  
Over the many centuries of its existence, the Church steadily accumulated property, so that by the eleventh 
century it owned, directly or indirectly between 30 and 40 percent of the cultivated land in western Europe. 
Predatory attempts to gain control or possession of this property by local or central governments increased 
during the tenth and the eleventh centuries. … By the twelfth century, considerable movable wealth had 
also accumulated in Church coffers, mainly due to Church-encouraged bequests made by the faithful who 
believed that transfers of wealth to the Church upon their death would ease their way to heaven. (1996: 1 ) 
    
The Church had to ensure that such important and still growing wealth was protected. The fourth 
and last economical motivation was that the Church sought to protect itself and its wealth against 
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the threat of anarchy rising in Italy due to local po itics by shoring up its central authority vis-à-
vis secular governments. 
Once secured against its political contenders – both locally in Italy and regionally in 
Europe – the Church could fully project itself across the West as an autonomous, well-structured 
and transnational organization as no other, with consistently the same universal purpose. Despite 
its status as a monopoly in the market of religions however, the medieval Church was structured 
as a rather nimble organization just as might be a global corporation or firm in this twenty-first 
century.  
It consisted of a confederated group of cooperating branches that shared common theological premises and 
goals. (1996: 29) 
It organized itself in a sophisticated manner that centralized long-term, strategic policy (in the Vatic n) but 
decentralized authority over day-to-day decision-making (in dioceses and parishes). (2011:307)   
As such autonomous entity with its own purpose, the medieval Church behaved like any 
other economic organization protecting and maximizing its self-interest. Ekelund et al. portray 
the Church as an economic monopoly whose product or service is the salvation of the soul in the 
afterlife, or “assurances of eternal salvation” (1996: 60). This is not to say that the raison d’être 
of the church was to make profit on any product or service, but only an acknowledgement shared 
among economists that while some behaviors or even some institutions may have not been 
economically motivated in their origins, they still may be fulfilling several objectives at the same 
time (1996: 4). As a matter of fact, the areas of competence claimed by the Church’s court 
system are clearly related to its institutional interests. 
Throughout Europe generally, and in twelfth century England particularly, ecclesiastic courts claimed 
jurisdiction over (1) all civil and criminal cases involving clerics, including disputes over Church pro erty; 
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(2) all matrimonial cases; (3) all testamentary issues; (4) certain infringement of doctrine perpetratd by 
nonclerics (heresy, sacrilege, sorcery, usury, defamation, fornication, homosexuality, adultery, defacment 
or destruction of religious property, assault against clerics); and (5) issues involving contracts, property, 
and perjury (violation of a sacred oath). (1996: 63) 
To the extent that the Church as one single organization and body of rules succeeded to 
penetrate the medieval society and to set up structures in order to uphold its rules, it had the 
potential to play a crucial political role. This in turn also enabled it to protect and maximize its 
particular interests as provider of private goods – and a monopolistic one at that. Virtually every 
single individual stood to deal with the Church as the provider of the necessary guidance and 
services for the salvation of their soul, that is, he attainment of eternal life after death. In that 
regard, “the clergy provided a vital kind of ‘brokerage’ service for the faithful.” (1996: 26) 
Most people in medieval Christendom accepted the fact that the Church of Rome had a major influence 
over the disposition of their immortal souls – in other words, whether they went to heaven or hell. This 
belief is crucial to understanding the medieval Churc  as an economic organization. By virtue of this fact
the Church was the monopoly provider of pure credence good. The credibility of Church courts, the 
validity of canon law, the acceptance of the Church as divinely sanctioned arbiter of earthly disputes and 
the ultimate trust in the Church’s various commercial ommitments, all derived from the credibility of the 
religious doctrines promulgated by the Church of Rome. (Idem) 
The particularity of credence good is that the customer lacks of the knowledge or resources 
required in order to assess upfront the actual quality of the good. Generally in such case, 
reputation is the main determinant of the quality of the good as it derives from customers’ 
satisfaction through their actual experience not with the product but with its provider, or lack 
thereof. In effect, no customer can offer testimony after experiencing eternal salvation. Therefore 
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in this particular case, credence is accorded out of faith, that is, deliberately free from any 
evidence or burden of proof regarding the ultimate eff ctiveness of the Church’s services. 
With the papacy securing the authority to appoint or oversee the appointment of Church 
officers in all the locales where it was implanted, the channels of revenue flows from 
downstream agents to the corporate Church were now clearly in place and under good control.  
The economic weight and financial size of the Churc will keep growing from then on. All 
proceeds generated by ecclesiastic courts (fines and court fees) as well as the tithes levied 
directly benefited to the diocese. However, part of all diocesan revenues made it to Rome in the 
form of the franchise fees (manners of tax imposed on the local clergy) every diocese and 
monastery owed to the papacy (1996: 70). Not only dioceses and parishes, but also monasteries 
were treated as franchises and had to pay franchise fee  to the corporate Church (1996: 36). 
Clearly, the Church was also an economic power. 
 As a corporate entity in the medieval economy, the C urch controlled enormous wealth. Its sources of 
revenue included tithes, land rents, donations, bequests, fees charged for judicial services, proceeds from 
the sale of indulgences, and income derived from the monastic production and marketing of agriculture 
produce. Bishops themselves often owned large estates. The pope was the ruler of a major portion of Italy 
known as the Papal States, deriving revenue from his subjects in the same fashion as other secular rulers. 
Periodically, the Church succeeded in securing direct t ansfers of (secular) governmental tax revenues, 
particularly for the ostensible purpose of funding the Crusades. The Church also controlled most of the 
liquid capital in the West, and with the exception of Byzantium in the early Middle Ages, its annual income 
greatly exceeded the annual revenues of any government in Europe. (1996: 33-4) 
In addition to the revenues mentioned above there are various fines, service tax for archbishops, 
census on monastic properties and penance. The tithes paid by parishioners mainly served to 
sustain the local priests. The sacrament of penance mbiguously served both as a remedial and as 
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a (mild or symbolic) punishment. It prescribed the sinner to accomplish a number of ritualistic 
procedure or practical actions. It was possible to arrange for a payment of fines when one could 
not carry out the penance due to some practical impediments. From 10th century onward, it 
became a common practice to substitute the original, non-pecuniary form of penance with a 
monetary fine, each prescribed penance having a specific quivalent in money amount. Bequests, 
tithes and other (non-testamentary) donations of estat  property are the major sources of revenue. 
The faithful made donations at various occasions, including for services rendered by local 
churches and clerics. 
The two major forms of donation were bequests and tithes. Of these, the bequest was the largest source f 
income. Through testamentary means the Church became the single largest landowner in western Europe 
during the Middle Ages. The importance of bequests to he Church is affirmed by the explicit allocation f 
Church resources to administering testamentary law, as such testamentary cases constituted the bulk of 
litigation administered by ecclesiastic courts. (1996: 35) 
And the not so faithful – at least judging by their failure to behave well by the Church’s 
standards – still ended up making donations as a way of repentance.   
A major source of the donations of land to the medieval Church derived from excommunicants seeking 
absolution at death. Partly from such gifts the Churc  became the largest single landowner in Europe by the 
thirteenth century, owning as much as one-third of the land in the West. (1996: 70-71)  
In fact, as surprising as that may be, excommunication was not used mostly in cases of 
disagreement with the Church doctrines or matters of faith, stricto sensu. This may be that 
conflicts regarding an article of faith were more like y to be faced with accusations of heresy 
than anything else (see infra). Instead, failing to meet payment and/or contractu l obligations or 
any other form of perjury mainly constituted the ground for excommunication. 
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By far the most common transgression leading to excmmunication, however, was for nonpayment of debt-
--and not even debt owed to the Church. (1996: 67) 
Any such failure qualifies as a perjury. Before the11th century any fraudulent business with the 
Church constituted a perjury. Since the latter halfof the 11th century with the Gregorian reforms 
however, the term progressively came to mean a failure to honor a contract, particularly a debt. 
The fact is: contracting or the “signing” of contracts was carried out during a ceremony that 
involved sealing the agreement under oath taken over some sacred item. Contracting was erected 
into a sacred commitment. 
In the Middle Ages a contract was almost always based on a mutual oath between the participants, sworn 
on some sacred object (e.g., the Scripture or a sacred relic). Thus, a typical contract included a sacred oath 
that was sinful to break. (1996: 65)   
Excommunication was probably the most profitable of the deterrent tools that the Church 
had in its enforcement arsenal. Excommunication did not only isolate one from the Church but 
also from other social resources. The excommunicate (or xcommunicant) loses what we would 
call his citizen’s rights: harm could be done to thse in that position without the benefit of a legal 
recourse in court and anyone who was caught associating with them in any way (even for help) 
was exposed to the same threats. Their heirs may bear th  burden of the ostracism, especially if 
the excommunicate still owed the Church some payment (Ekelund et al. 1996: 68ff). As a 
powerful deterrent, Ekelund et al. argue that it helped the Church maintain its market power. In 
the same time, it was a profitable source of income should anyone fail to comply with the rules 
that are sanctioned with excommunication.  
As the “big stick” in its enforcement apparatus, excommunication played an important role in the 
generation of revenue. It was a legal sanction the pope could impose against the clergy for nonpayment of 
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taxes. Not even abbots and bishops were exempt. Default in payment of the census, a tax levied against 
monastic property could result in excommunication of all members. An archbishop who failed to pay their 
visitation tax or service tax (servitia) on time could be excommunicated. (1996: 70) 
 Apart from excommunication, the Church safeguarded and even consolidated its market 
power by accusing of heresy anyone within its boundaries who would challenge or make 
competing claims about its views or teachings. When t  accused heretics were sentenced to jail 
or to the stake, the Church was most likely to confiscate their wealth. At a global level outside its 
boundaries, crusades or military expeditions were the solutions the Church resorted to in order to 
keep a competing religion such as Islam at bay. 
I have mentioned above the organizational structure of the Church which reminds us of a 
model applicable to contemporary transnational or gl bal corporations. The comparison doesn’t 
stop there. Just like in a modern firm, there was an incentive-disincentive system in place so as to 
protect the Church against inefficient and rent-seeking behaviors, and to secure its assets and 
reputation. In order to reward managerial behavior that “increases the value of the firm, and to 
discourage shirking and other forms of malfeasance” (1996: 31), the papacy used residual-
claimant arrangements comparable to what is practiced in modern firms (whereby beneficiaries 
receive additional and variable streams of income or perquisites).  
In particular, rather than place its cleric-managers on salary, the medieval Church assigned them temporary 
rights to portions of revenue flows from common-pool assets under their supervision. This was the caseof 
particularly all the clerics outside the papal bureaucracy. Such residuals were termed “benefices,” in the 
vernacular of the medieval Church, and they constituted a major element of internal control against 
malfeasance. (1996: 31-32) 
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In the hierarchical environment of the Church, the pope supervised payment of benefices to 
bishops, while the latter supervised the benefices of priests in their diocese. The camera was the 
papal treasury helping with the collection of Church’s revenues. Initially dedicated to the 
intendance of the pope’s household, the camera grew to become a highly organized structure 
serving as treasury, bank and “as a court of law – with civil and criminal jurisdiction over papal 
debtors and all matters affecting papal finance” (1996: 34). It had field agents, known as legates 
and nuncios, in charge of enforcing the payment of rents and taxes and transferring them back to 
their headquarters in Rome (1996: 36). As such, the camera ensured that payments are made 
appropriately through audits which it outsourced to other private parties and bankers. 
Among different guises of malfeasance, the sin of simony received particular attention 
from the Church authorities. The simony consists of charging for sacraments and Church 
services or, more gravely, selling Church offices such as the positions of bishop and abbot (more 
rarely archbishop). Professional simony is distingushed from proprietary simony (based on the 
terminology proposed by Rodes in his 1977 Ecclesiastical Administration in Medieval England: 
see Ekelund et al. 1996: 32). 
Professional simony regarded only clerical services, that is, any service that clerics were 
expected to perform or render to the faithful as part of their duties as Church officers. This form 
of simony was tolerated within certain limits. Particularly, there was a price cap on the allowed 
fees and a prohibition from withholding services, chiefly the administering of sacraments, in 
order to enforce the payment of tithes or of any fees for other services. In sum, a diocese or a 
parish could advertise capped prices and expect payments for a range of services they provided 
to the faithful but they could not, or at least should not, deny any service on the basis of non-
payment for whatever services or non-payment of any t xes. To the extent that the prohibition to 
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withhold services for payment did not necessary imply that fees were to be waved – certainly not 
that debts or consumed credit could be canceled – for customers who did not pay what they 
owed, this was much likely to create situations where the church (the parish) might need to keep 
credit records or the record of any unpaid dues.  
The proprietary simony was apparently the most troublesome for the Church.  
This practice involved the purchase and sale of all m nner of Church assets, including land, offices, r lics, 
and consecrated vessels. … it was a pure drain on Church resources, in short, theft of Church propriety. 
Some cases involved simple theft, such as the sale of  blessed relic on the open market. Other cases were
more complicated, such as the sale of a presiding bishop of his holy office to a noncleric. (1996: 32-3)    
This form of malfeasance was the most dreadful for the Church as it can substantially undermine 
the Church’s assets especially when the clergy itself engaged in that depredation. For that reason 
it was severely punished with heavy penalties and excommunication. Even the change from 
married clergy to priestly celibacy had an economic argument to it, as in early medieval Church 
benefices were inherited by the family and, possibly with them, misappropriated Church assets. 
Celibacy presented the advantage of maintaining the cost of monitoring for proprietary simony 
as heirs were no longer.  
 It was in that context of the ascendance of the Church as both a political and an 
economical force that the other transformations we are particularly interested in here took place. 
This sheds a light on some of the reasons that led to the multiplication of charters and diplomas 
in the records of the medieval Church. Before I get to the discourse and the rationale developed 
by the “chancery-scholars” as Bedos-Rezak calls them – at once churchmen, schoolmen and 
chancery staff – I am going to focus on those material lements such as documents and seals as 
well as the graphical signs that shaped their practice. 
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4.5 Documents, Signs and their Authority  
Before discussing signs as well as their importance, functions and uses, let us define some basic 
terms in this context. Charters and diplomas are documents that assign or transfer rights. In this 
medieval context they were mostly used to record estat  transactions, that is, land granting with 
full property rights or in tenure. However, they may also be about financial grant (e.g., awarded 
by a sovereign for some particular reason or just as a favor), recognition of debt, license or letters 
patent, etc.  The term “diploma” comes from the fact that they generally came in the form of 
folded paper or, more precisely, parchment. Before diploma came to mean essentially a 
certificate of a particular level of educational achievement, they simply were certificates of some 
right(s) or status issued by the king. Both diplomas and charters are particular deeds. A deed is a 
writing executed under seal, or a signed and witnessed formal legal document, which is issued to 
effect a transfer of property, or to create a legal obligation or contract. In the Middle Ages, royal 
chancellors as well as notaries were generally responsible for drafting those documents and 
affixing all required elements to make them authentic, which was required for them to be given 
the value intended. In that process, those scribes made annotations and marks using some 
conventional but very uncommon writing called Tironian notes. They are so called because they 
have been attributed to Marcus Tullius Tiro who was Cicero’s scribe.48 He reputedly created that 
shorthand script for the purpose of transcribing full speeches as the orator spoke. It was then 
used by medieval scribes to make notes that are legible only to a few professionals in the process 
of authenticating documents. 
As the investiture controversy would indicate, sign are of a crucial importance in the 
medieval thought and practice. Perhaps because of the importance and omnipresence of religion, 
                                                 
48 See “Tironian Notes” entry in the Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org 
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particularly in the political as well as in the intellectual life – a religion that teaches that the 
ultimate good commanding everything else rests beyond this physical world – it appears that 
every bit of the visible world was seen as the sign of something else which is not visible. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that there is something of a power at stake to try and be a master in 
signs, be it in their manipulation or in their conceptualization and definition. This will again 
manifest itself in the course of this section and the next. Here I am going to expound the western 
medieval basics when it comes to making or manipulating records, literally empowering 
documents to convey agency, carry institutional value and have an impact in the society. It is 
within that “ecosystem” of signs that we will have to understand the operational mode of seals as 
markers of identity and authority.   
4.5.1 Authority and its apparatus of signs 
Writing requires the use of a script which is a system of signs. Still within the same linguistic 
and cultural setting, there may be different categori s of signs, some of which not intended for 
verbal expression even though they may have meaning or represent some value. For instance 
beyond the literal content of a document, non-lingustic signs may add a layer of meaning or 
provide the document as a whole with some intended eff ct. In the early medieval manuscript 
culture when writing was still an ability only shared by the literate few, nonlinguistic signs were 
highly visible in written records and record-making (or record creation) was accompanied with 
some ceremony. This may have been necessary for the literate to convey to a not-so-literate 
audience the right sense of gravity that should be attached to the intent and meaning of the 
document within the cultural framework of writing that was only emerging then.        
In that emerging practice of making and signing reco ds of personal transactions, the 
emphasis was on the physical presence of the parties nd their participation in establishing and 
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executing the document (see the contract signing ceremony I refer to in section 4.4). The fact of 
recording transactions in writing (instead of oral ceremonies only, as it had used to be previously 
the case) may at this point be read as a complementary “security” measure taken by the main 
beneficiaries of those transactions, the desire to ensure some permanence by creating an 
objectively retrievable memory of the actual transaction. I stop short of calling such written 
record a piece of evidence, because it appears that this merely was the beginning of a transition 
that will lead eventually to ascribing higher evidentiary force to written information and 
testimony over their oral form which had previously been favored. At the time of the Roman 
Empire up to relatively late in the Middle Ages (roughly 14th century) oral testimony was the 
ultimate way of establishing evidence in judicial proceedings (Clanchy 1983; MacNeil 2000). In 
the 11th and 12th century notably, the written record of transactions was still conditioned by the 
oral culture. Otherwise put, there was not yet an autonomous evidentiary regime of writing; the 
written word was mostly an appendix to the oral performance of commitment or transaction. As 
a consequence, in case of challenge or litigation, it was not the written record that most 
decisively determines the outcome, but rather oral testimonies and direct negotiations of a sort.  
This framework rested on the primacy of empirical presence in the assertion of authority; it construed 
power to emanate from character, to be the effluence of personality. Thus, when gifts of land were 
contested and resolved by charter, as often happened, such disputes were not settled by considering the 
parties as donors and recipients, and by applying legal rules appropriate to these categories, but rather by an 
agreement through which the status and self-esteem of both parties as particular individuals might be saved 
and a social relationship between them created or renewed. Behavior was remembered and inscribed in the 
form of statements about particular persons and their actions. The attention was to individual will and 
responsibility, to a personal examination of the impl cations of one's actions, which were understood as 
involving, beside terrestrial and social consequences, merits capable of saving (or losing) one's soulin the 
afterlife. In short, the legal realm conjured up by the charters was equated with the realms of ethics and 
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theology. The “subjective” and “personal” in the law, far from diminishing legal authority, in fact 
constituted it. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1509) 
The belief system as well as the culture imparted by churchmen led to think and to trust 
that God was “the most reliable traditional agency” (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1507) and as such, his 
authority was the best guaranty possible for taking a y assurance on the future, or for ensuring 
validity, effectiveness and permanence to any human commitments, especially but not only those 
made in a procedure intended for the salvation of one’s soul. Just as the Holy Scripture holds the 
terms and promises of the alliance and commitment btween the Christ and the Church, likewise 
writing down the intention and act of donation in a charter (and then swearing it on a sacred 
object) was an opportunity to achieve or approximate the same level of sacredness as the 
Scripture for the benefit of the donor. This however had to be done with the appropriate signs 
and rituals. 
Documentary writing derived much of its power from a visible affinity with Holy Scripture, an affinity 
established both by graphic logic and by liturgical manipulation. Graphic logic involved such methods as 
the inscription of a Chrismon, a Trinitarian invocation, the use of Latin, biblical preambles (arenga), and 
divine maledictions and threats of excommunications against anyone who might challenge the gift being 
recorded. Liturgical manipulations included the charters’ production by priestly scribes and their placement 
in altars or in Gospels. A manuscript charter was kindred to Scripture and, as such, was a space of sacred 
and secure inscription. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1507, emphasis added) 
Still regarding the provisions of the charters and the efforts of their designers to secure the 
commitment being made, Fraenkel (1992), too, notes th  ame features. A variety of signs 
referring to God transformed the concerned documents into a sacred space whereby the persons 
involved in the matter being settled within them were warned of the risks and penalties that any 
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perjury would entail. There were clauses that made explicit threats, spelling out the possible 
punishments in the temporal as well as the eternal realms. 
… chartres et diplômes visent à s’instituer comme espaces sacrés privilégiés, archives de la voix de Dieu. 
Ce constat résulte de l’examen des clauses dites comminatoires qui comportent les menaces proférées à 
l’encontre des violateurs éventuels de l’acte. Ces m naces, fréquentes dans les actes jusqu'à 1150, sont de 
deux sortes : menaces de peines temporelles, le plus souvent d’amendes, et menaces de peines spirituelles 
telles que l’anathème et l’excommunication, énoncées selon les formules empruntées aux épitaphes gravées 
sur les marbres funéraires menaçant les profanateurs d  sépultures, lieux sacres par excellence. (Fraenkel 
1992:69)   
I suggest the following translation: 
… it is the aim that charters and diplomas be instituted as privileged sacred spaces, archives of the voic  of 
God. This observation results from the examination of the clauses known as comminatory which include 
threats made against potential violators of the deed. Those threats, frequently found in deeds up until 1150, 
are of two sorts: menaces of temporal penalties, mot often fines, and menaces of spiritual penalties such as 
anathema and excommunication, stated in formulas that were borrowed from engraved epitaphs on 
gravestones threatening the profaners of sepulchers, sacred places par excellence.   
Clearly, signing a deed or a contract in those conditions for a Christian went hand in hand 
with taking an oath on the Scripture or other sacred object, which probably had much more 
weight in the 11th century Europe than we can imagine today a millennium later. In addition 
these latest two authors confirm what we saw in the previous section, to wit, that failure to honor 
such contractual commitments thus sealed qualified as a perjury and put one at risk of 
excommunication. By all accounts, the name of God was intended and understood to increase the 
power of any deed – securing efficacy, permanence ad assurance, – and it was believed and 
expected that the most reliable source of guaranty for any contract was God, as afterlife salvation 
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was the most powerful incentive for compliance: there was no better protection to any business 
than the one that comes from God. 
In official deeds the signaling of God was encompassing, and certainly ubiquitous. The 
signs referring to God were scattered in the body part as well as the protocolary parts (header and 
footer) of the document. Fraenkel (1992: 59) distingu shes two types of signs referencing God:  
1) the verbal and explicit references (e.g., “In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti” 
and quotes from the Scriptures), and  
2) the coded, semiotic or iconic marks.  
The latter may be pictographic, ideographic, symbolic r otherwise, the only constant and 
constraint being to refer to God or the Christ. The central theme for those nonverbal marks was 
the cross, which was represented through various Chri tic signs and monograms including the 
plain cross manually signed and the chrismon.49  
Apart from God, the king and scribes are the other important players intervening in the 
enablement of documentary agency and authority. God is the ultimate source of authority, the 
“absolute referent,” as Fraenkel puts it. The king is the highest wielder of that authority in his 
realm, at least regarding secular matters (the popemay be seen as another wielder regarding 
matters of the Church.) And last, scribes – first the royal chancellor and the referendary,50 later 
followed by the notary – are the agents tasked withgiving the proper form to the documentary 
                                                 
49 The sign of the chrismon is made up of the Greek letters chi and rho, the first two letters of the name “Christ” 
transcribed in Greek, superimposed one on top of the other. The corresponding entry in the Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org) signals that the term is a portmanteau word derived from the Latin phrase “Christi 
Monogramma.”  
50 At http://dictionary.reference.com/ it reads that a referendary is, among other things:  “An officer who delivered the 
royal answer to petitions” or “Formerly, an officer of state charged with the duty of procuring and dispatching diplomas 
and decrees.” 
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expression of authority. The capability for any writing to enact some change in the social and 
physical world, to assign or transfer rights, requires the participation of all those three entities in 
one form or another (Fraenkel 1992). In addition to the signs of God, official documents 
included the king’s monogram and seal, subscriptions51 or endorsement formulas, Tironian notes, 
autograph signatures or other signing marks. Those wer the vectors used by scribes to manifest 
the value and authority of royal charters and diplomas, and in so doing, to validate them. 
The king’s scriptoria officers (royal scribes) attending to the manipulation and inscription 
of those signs in the process of establishing official documents as early as the 5th century 
included the chancellor, the referendary, the chamberlain (the officer or steward who managed 
the household of the king), plus lower-level scribes as relevant. The most salient figure in the 
king’s scriptoria is the chancellor who generally was the keeper of the official royal seal and 
oversaw the production of the royal documents by the ot er scribes. The position of chancellor 
historically evolved up to being an influential member or even the top officer in the king’s 
cabinet; with Philip the Fair (r. 1285 – 1314) he ranked, in the hierarchy, next after princes 
(Fraenckel 1992: 27).  
 The church used notaries as early as the 4th century. Bishoprics, parishes and monasteries 
had their own. They were mostly clerics or church clerks, and will serve later on as notaries 
public when literacy was still limited in the rest of the society. In effect, outside the church, 
notaries reappeared in the 12th century with the resurgence of the Roman law in the secular 
domain. For nearly two centuries (14th and 15th), there will be an ambiguous coexistence of 
                                                 
51 I shall draw the reader’s attention here about possible ambivalence of this term in this context. In this whole chapter 
and in reference to medieval deeds, I will be using the term “subscription” as a translation from French (souscription). 
However, instead of “subscribe,” it may be useful to think of “underwrite” as the verbal form of what it means (which 
indeed is the literal meaning.) That said, I’m not quite prepared to subscribe to, much less to underwrite, a decision to 
equate ‘writing a subscription’ in this medieval context to ‘underwrite’ in our contemporary context, as the latter may 
have legal meanings and implications I am not aware of. 
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apostolic and royal notaries. Such ambiguity was otherwise entertained by the fact that in royal 
courts across Europe, starting with the early Capeti n kings,52 the royal chapel clerks were the 
ones that were in charge of establishing diplomas. It resulted from that a tradition of linking the 
royal chanceries to royal chapels and by extension to the ecclesiae in general. In France 
particularly, two dates marked the emergence of notaries: in 1302 Philip the Fair retained the 
right to establish notaries, as an attempt to regulate entry in that profession, and at the end of the 
15th century Charles VIII took an ordinance in order to ensure that lay people deal with notaries 
appointed by secular rulers as opposed to apostolic n taries (Fraenckel 1992: 28-29).     
 Charters and diplomas – those specimens of official deeds – had a precise organization 
and distribution of signs in the space of the parchment, following a general protocol as well as 
protocols that were specific to every chancery. Thegeneral protocol follows a tri-partition 
organization of the document: the body where the specific transaction was described lies 
between the opening and the closing protocolary parts. 
Tout acte solennel, en effet, est doublement marqué par le protocole : en son début, il s’agit du protocole 
initial comportant invocation, subscription53 [sic], nom, titre, qualité de celui au nom duquel l’acte est 
rédigé, adresse, salut ; à la fin, il s’agit du protocole final composé de la date, l’« appréciation » ou 
formule pieuse, les signes de validation, souscriptions et sceaux. Le texte, encadré par ces deux protocoles, 
contient préambules, notification, exposés, dispositif (objet de l’acte) et clauses finales. (Fraenkel 1992 : 
39)  
In translation: 
                                                 
52 See supra, note 40.  
53 This word as spelled out here being nonexistent in French to the best of my knowledge, I will presume based on the 
context that this is a typo where the author meant to write, and maybe actually wrote on her manuscript: “suscription,” 
(without the ‘b’) which in French is the opposite of “souscription” although the former is very formal and rarely used. 
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Every solemn (highly official) deed, in effect, bears the mark of two protocols: in its beginning, there is the 
initial protocol comprising invocation, superscription, name, title, quality of the person on behalf of whom 
the deed is written, address, salutation; at the closing, there is the final protocol made up of the date, the 
“appreciation” or pious formula, the signs of validtion, subscriptions and seals. The text, framed by those 
two protocols, includes preambles, notice, exposés, the provision (the object of the deed) and final cl uses.   
Beyond that, every notary or chancery was able to apply, at a more detailed level, its own 
specific protocols made up of particular signs and graphical style. In effect every scribe 
(chancellor or notary) had ways of interspersing the documents with cryptic signs and writing so 
as to render them authenticable, that is, difficult to forge. It appears that in those illegible notes, 
the scribes replicated sometimes in different scripts (e.g., Tironian or Greek) certain specific 
elements of the current deed, including names of participants and producers of the actual 
document, etc. With a technique like this, what appears to be a signature, thus a replicable sign 
of validation, may in fact incorporate some variable parts which only the author or an expert 
could determine. One may argue that this is a space that accommodates the development of 
private as well as privatory54 scripts or ways of writing.  
Every seal has a matrix (also known as the seal die) which is the original cast of the seal 
image into a solid object such as, for instance, a ring. The waxen seals are (the inverse) replicas 
produced by pressing the matrix upon wax or any other soft matter, serving to validate or to 
authenticate – to attest or bear witness to the truthfulness and authority of – the content of deeds 
and other official documents. The seal matrix of a se l owner was considered as a relic and was 
buried with him. Only the waxen seals survived the seal owner along with the artifacts they were 
appended to, and so did the validity they conferred to those artifacts.  
                                                 
54 In the juridical sense of depriving others from understanding and using those scripts. In that, those notes operated as 
cyphers and such ad-hoc scripts were instances of cryptography.  I shall mention that Fraenkel (1992: 47) does suggest 
the notion of private writing. 
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Throughout the Middle Ages there had been different types of seal. The king’s official 
seal was considered the earthly sign of supreme authority. As such, it was regarded with 
reverence.  
In early Frankish times, under the Merovingian kings (sixth to mid-eighth centuries), the royal seal affixed 
to diplomas did not function as a means of documentary validation. Its use imitated the usage of the 
Byzantine imperial chancery; to seal a document was, for the Merovingian kings, to behave as a ruler. The
seal was a sign of the king, the only person who could issue documents thus marked. This linkage between 
documentary seal usage and royal status was maintained upon the ascension of the Carolingians (751); 
royal seals came to operate as an apparatus of the fic  of the kingship. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1512)   
The seal went with the title; it was the proper sign of the person who was de jure the head of a 
kingship. The royal seal was not even used when a non-royal nobleman assumed the function 
and acted in lieu of the king. Bedos-Rezak also notes that a ruler’s seal followed him even if the 
territory he was ruling over changed, which happened with Charlemagne’s empire in the 9th
century. In other words, while an attribute or a token of kingship, the seal was also strictly 
personal, i.e. attached to a particular royal person. The stable identity of a seal only included the 
name of the ruler and his title (king or emperor). A ruler’s seal matrices will be altered only if 
there is a change of status as per one of those two at ributes. (Idem)  
Over time, seals became more differentiated and the king had different kinds of seals. 
The most official seal came to be known as the “great s al of the Realm”55 – that is, the seal of 
the highest officialdom as far as the kingdom was concerned. Going forward, the great seal of the 
realm will be the one expressing the will or the manifestation of the king as king in every 
                                                 
55 While today the ‘great seal of the realm’ is known as the great seal of the United Kingdom, that phrase would be the 
adequate translation for the highest official seal of any kingdom, as in the Middle Ages there were several of them apart 
from the UK. Note that non-kingdom states do also have their great seal (which is not referred to as ‘of the realm’). 
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respect, imparting the highest authority of kingship to any circumstances or procedure where it is 
exhibited. 
The king had other seals, some of which were reservd for his personal communications. 
Fraenkel suggests that Saint Louis (r. 1226 – 1270) introduced the use of personal or non-official 
seals by a king and that further differentiation occurred with Philip the Fair (r. 1285 – 1314). 
With him, a kind of seals was reserved for the king’s personal and confidential communications 
(“seals of secrecy”) while there was yet another sort of seal for communications of financial 
interest. In any case, a differentiation occurred at th t period between the great seal which is 
unique and what probably was a variety of privy seals ( s opposed to a single one) used to stamp 
documents of less importance, or less official. One should take note that the use of non-official 
seals by the king for personal communications concurs to some extent with the use of seals by 
the commoner as identity token. In effect, non-royal individuals also privately used seals before 
the 11th century, generally in order to materially represent themselves or authenticate their 
identity in correspondence papers and not for validation or authentication of documents per se. 
For the latter, one might have used the services of a handful number of clerics exercising 
independently from the king as notaries and using identifying seals, among other procedures, in 
order to authenticate deeds (Bedos-Rezak 2000; Fraenkel 1992). 
A partir du VIIe  siècle, le fait que seuls les rois usent de l’anne u à signer pour authentifier les diplôme et 
chartes indique qu’entre les lettres privées et les actes juridiques une différence s’instaure. Les nombreux 
anneaux à signer découverts dans les cimetières merovingiens prouvent que leur usage s’est maintenu chez
les particuliers, mais en se limitant aux écrits épi tolaires. L’identification du scripteur, source du message, 
et l’authentification d’un acte juridique deviennent deux notions formellement distinctes. Le roi seul 
maintient, par son sceau, cette coïncidence des fonctions, et il faut attendre le XIe  siècle pour que les 
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particuliers retrouvent l’usage juridique des sceaux dont l’importance va s’accroitre comme jamais avant 
qu’ils ne disparaissent définitivement à l’époque moderne (Fraenkel 1992 : 83). 
This would translate as follows. 
The fact that from the 7th century onward, only kings use the signing ring (or sealing ring) for the 
authentication of diplomas and charters indicates that a distinction occurs between private letters and legal 
deeds. The many signing rings found in Merovingian cemeteries show that private individuals also used 
them but only for their personal correspondence. Th identification of the writer, source of the message, 
and the authentication of a legal document became two formally distinct notions. Only the king maintains, 
by his seal, the equation of those two functions, ad one has to wait until the 11th century for private 
individuals to start using seals for legal purposes. Such uses will keep growing like never before until they 
completely disappear in the modern era.        
All seals were not meant for authentication, not even the royal seal which in the early 
medieval times was, as I already mentioned, a pure manifestation and affirmation of kingship 
even when affixed to a document. 
In fact, when late twelfth-century canon lawyers began to reflect on documentary validation, they assigned 
the power of authentication only to the sigillum authenticum, the authentic seal. The meaning of authentic 
here does not derive from a concern about counterfeits but from the desire to establish the capacity for 
authentic seals to confer full validity on documents devoid of witnesses. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1513-4) 
Who then had the authority to use the authentic seal? Bedos-Rezak does not indicate a possible 
answer. In the Studies in Medieval Legal Thought by Gaines Post (1954), we find some hints for 
answering this question. Once the secular realm, too (after the Church), started embracing the 
legacy of the Roman law from late 12th and during the 13th century, a number of structures in the 
medieval society stood to become subjects by law, or legal agents. The legal notion of 
corporation developed during that time so as to enabl   collective of individuals to have legal 
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autonomy and agency – in other words, the status of legal person, as subject of rights and 
obligations just like individuals (natural persons). Of particular interest initially was the question 
as to whether such collectives can be represented by an individual agent (namely, a procurator in 
the context of legal proceedings) acting on behalf of all individual members, so that any legal 
outcome deriving from the action of the agent would be legally binding for every one of them. 
Corporations had the authority to establish their own rules and regulations, and admission is 
subject to the incoming member pledging obedience of those rules while the corporation in 
return commits to seek justice for its members. Corporations in that sense were also known as 
universitas, probably because the earliest one to be recognized by the papacy was a group of 
teachers and apprentices called the “masters at Paris” and will come to be known as the 
University of Paris. 
In the first half of the thirteenth century the master  in the schools at Paris won measurably in a struggle for 
corporate freedom from the direct control of the cathedral chapter and the bishop. (Post 1964: 27) 
  In order to sue or stand a trial, a corporation will need to appoint a representative in the 
role of procurator (as opposed to having all the individual members petitioning and suing.) It is 
interesting that in this medieval society, the possibility of appointing a procurator or any agent, 
for that matter, was seen as dependent on the possession of a seal.  
Could the masters have appointed procurators …, could they have acted as a legal corporation, when they 
had no seal…? The procurator of a corporation, in presenting petitions and appearing in courts as plaintiff, 
must show a mandate from his dominus [i.e. the principal], and the mandate was valid only if drawn up by 
a public notary, or if sealed with an authentic seal. (Idem, p. 50-51) 
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It was in that context of the legal status and privileges for corporations that the authentic seal 
came to be defined as a specific means of documentary validation, in the possession of a limited 
number of actors. 
Who could possess a sigillum authenticum? Petrus Hispanus held that a universitas could have one. 
Trancred, his contemporary, names chapters, prelates ( bbots, archdeacons, provosts), secular princes, and 
judges delegates as having authentic seals, while the Chancery Ordinances of the time of Innocent III 
recognize the seals (…) of kings and nobles, of archbishops, bishops, deans, archdeacons, and other 
persons of this kind. (Idem, p. 52) 
Bedos-Rezak also signals that her sources (see note 69, p. 1514) imply that an authentic 
seal is predicated on its publicity and familiarity for the target audience. 
By the late thirteenth century, when jurists attempted to provide the authentic seal with a broader 
sociopolitical conception, they insisted that for a seal to function as an authenticating device it must be well 
known. Even when finally producing such imprecise and relative definitions, jurists did not conceal the fact 
that viewpoints in the matter of seal validation differed widely; they recognized that the meanings and 
agency of seals depended on local custom. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1514) 
Alternately, again, documents could otherwise be validated through a notary in presence of 
witnesses.  
In this sub-section I have reviewed the basics and general practices of formatting 
documents by the use of a variety of signs and according to specific protocols in order to achieve 
some effect in the world. Among all those documentary signs and protocols, there is a particular 
class of signs which are meant to represent individuals and as such they, too, are identity signs in 
their own way. The following will describe practices of naming people and then signing one’s 
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name or simply representing an individual in written r cords by an abstract sign starting from the 
chrismon to the king’s monogram to the symbolic cross and to signing actual names. 
4.5.2 Names and autograph signature 
A change occurred over time in the use of the chrismon for signing deeds. Towards the middle of 
the 10th century, deed subscriptions (the manuscript endorsements at the bottom of the 
document) were particularly abundant in Tironian notes: they generally opened with the 
chrismon sign, followed by a transliteration of thesignatory’s proper name from the Latin to the 
Greek script, and then a series of Tironian signs making a statement about or in the name of God 
and ending with the sign that denotes the formula: “H s subscribed.” A stylized cross sign is 
sometimes added discretely (Fraenkel 1992: 102). However, the chrismon progressively subsided 
from the king’s superscriptions and subscriptions of deeds where it used to feature right in front 
of the king’s name (generally the first character).  From the 11th century onward it was 
progressively replaced by the king’s adorned initials or monogram and then by his armorial 
bearings by the 14th century. At that point, the chrismon only survived in deeds established by 
ecclesiastic notaries who still had the quasi-monoply of administering last wills as a prerogative 
function of the Church (Fraenkel 1992: 73; Ekelund 1996: 63). The substitution of the Christ’s 
monogram by the king’s monogram is also indicative of a more profound change in the medieval 
culture, that is, the evolution in the genealogical conceptions of identity, from a period where 
people generally only had a single name and would rea ily claim their (af-)filiation with Christ – 
as an invisible, default family name – to an era where a household name, literally speaking, was 
emerging as patronym to be added to the first name of every individual.  
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The Romans legally prescribed and routinely used a system of three names – the so-
called tria nomina (Wilson 1998: 4f.) – while their official record included additional name tags 
reflecting affiliations that were deemed significant u der the Roman sociopolitical order. 
Roman citizens were officially registered in this [three-name] style [e.g., Marcus Tullius Cicero], together 
with the all-important filiation indicating their fathers and even grandfathers or great-grandfathers, and the 
tribe or voting district to which they belonged. SoCicero’s full official name was Marcus Tullius Marci 
filius Cornelia Cicero, Marcus being also his father’s name and Cornelia his tribe. (Wilson 1998: 4) 
That practice subsided after the end of the Empire, and the early medieval custom was to 
name people with a unique name, a role largely to be filled by the baptismal name as a growing 
Christianity widened its coverage and deepened its penetration of the western medieval society. 
This became even more systematic across the board by the 9th century when Latin progressively 
replaced the vernacular languages of the different p oples that formed the European population 
(Fraenkel 1992: 101). Then the practice changed progressively with the adding of nicknames and 
surnames, as the population grew and more and more pe ple borne the same names from the 
limited repertoire of Latin names.  It became a common practice for both rulers and regular 
people to add qualifying supplements to their name: e.g., Carolus Martellus (Charles Martel or 
literally, Charles the Hammer); Carolus Magnus (Charlemagne or Charles the Great); Pepin the 
Short, Philip the Fair, John Smith, etc. The trend will never be reversed with the steady 
demographic growth, particularly from the 11th century onward when a second name became 
common practice. As a consequence, the practice settl d on adopting a family name which was 
then appended to the name every family member has been individually assigned (Fraenkel 1992: 
98ff.; Wilson 1998: chapters 7 and 8). Initially, the handling of first names suggests a 
classification scheme. The family was a specific group of individuals all wearing the common 
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label of the group, that is, the family name, and each family had a pool of names or sub-labels to 
assign to every new individual member.56 
In the generalized practice of authenticating deed, the objective of the signature was to 
stamp or affix a personal sign, which came to mean the handwriting of one’s name. According to 
Fraenkel, the western medieval practice of hand writing the endorsement statement “I have 
subscribed” (subscripsi) as well as the notion of signature evolved out of R man practices for 
recording particular deeds, namely last wills.  Forone, a Roman citizen recording his last will or 
any other relevant deed would, along with his witnesses, write his name followed by the formula 
“subscripsi” as a way of validation. For another, deeds were rcorded in a diptych, which is a set 
of two bound wax tablets, with one copy of the recod utside and another one inside. The 
committing party(ies) in the deed as well as their witnesses will then press their signing ring, 
followed by the formula “signum of X” where X is the name of the corresponding signatory. The 
set of tablets was then sealed at the opposite edge to th  bind edge. Obviously, the quality of the 
signatory individual – whether witness or principal – was explicitly stated in the document.  
As the parchment superseded wax tablets and became more commonly used as writing 
surface, signing or making one’s mark on a document also evolved. First, the seal of the source 
or signatory of a written material was imprinted in wax and then attached to the scroll of 
parchment via a lace or in some other fashion. The evolution of the writing surface material from 
parchment to paper (in combination with other factors such as the increasing popularization of 
writing and the trend towards the simplification of procedures) probably contributed to the 
fading of the medieval seal as a signing and validating instrument for written records. However 
                                                 
56 In France, the principle of hereditary transmission of patronym or family name became regularized during the 1789 
revolution (Fraenkel 1992: 98). 
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the autograph signature emerged more directly out of notarial practices. Scribes or notaries in 
charge of producing and validating official documents made a number of handwriting notes on 
the said documents, including some signs illegible to others, albeit meaningful to themselves as 
we saw previously. When the seal appended to a document broke, this voided the validity of the 
said document. Only the close examination of the notary’s notes and proper signs included in the 
document could provide the evidence of its authenticity, warranting the reissuance of another 
sealed copy of the initial document. Therefore official documents bore the handwriting signature 
of royal officers or notaries public who validated them. This, which was a general practice, was 
made compulsory by the 14th century (Fraenkel 1992: 93f.) Finally, I might add that the 
onomastic evolution, that is, the change in naming formats with more than one name, to the 
extent that it was expected to increase the granularity of names as possible identifiers, must also 
have reinforced the idea that an individual’s autograph could be distinguished from others’. 
Generally though, individuals who could not write, not even their name, while it was required of 
them to sign a document were given the possibility, throughout all those phases of the evolution 
of signing, to simply draw a manual sign which was the cross by default.  
As written records progressively gained higher evidntiary status in courts of law, the 
autograph signature due to its indexical nature emerged as more probative than simply written 
name. A name, said or written, does not by itself imply any certainty as to whether its referent 
exists in substance or not: a name can be a fiction, that is, it may be referring to a fictional 
character. It is the signature, not the name, which provides the assurance that there was an actual 
being who performed the act of signing in which resid  the enforceability of any contractual 
document. “The signature ‘proves’ the name” and as such it is a demonstrative sign (Fraenkel 
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1992: 110). The autograph signature is not like any other written word, including a name, but the 
result of an act that only a particular individual was supposed to have made.  
Elle [la signature] est formée d’un mot, le nom propre, d’un geste, celui du scripteur qui autographie son 
nom, et d’une chose désignée, le scripteur lui-même qui, en signant, présente son propre nom mais effectue 
en même temps une sorte d’autoprésentation. […] 
Le geste de la signature est, au moment de son inscription, pure ostension. Il est spectacle 
éphémère de l’adéquation entre son signe et son référent, de la coexistence du scripteur à son inscription. Il 
incarne l’idéal recherché en vain par les logiciens. (Fraenkel 1992: 112)  
To translate: 
It [the signature] is made of a word, the proper name; of a gesture, that of the “scripter” (the writing 
individual) who autographs his name; and of a designee, the scripter himself who, by signing, presents his 
own name as well as himself. …
The signature gesture at the time of signing is pure manifestation. It is the ephemeral spectacle of 
the adequacy between sign and referent, of the coexistence of the “in-scripter” with his inscription. It 
incarnates the ideal sought in vain by logicians.      
Referring to a problem confronted by logician philosophers such as Russell and 
Wittgenstein with regard to the value of an assertion made about a character that is designated by 
her proper name versus by a demonstrative pronoun in said assertion, and taking into account the 
fact that a proper name can designate a fictional ch racter, Fraenkel sheds a light in similar terms 
on the difference between proper names and signature. In other words, signature has at least the 
same pragmatic, indexical and probative value as the demonstrative pronoun, both in comparison 
to a written name which does not prove the existence of an actual individual bearing that name.  
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What makes the case of the medieval seal appealing from the outset is that the social 
actors involved in practice with sealing deeds not only clearly spelled out their rationale in using 
seals as identity tokens but they even sought to articulate that practice within their own 
conceptual frameworks and belief system. Now in closing this large loop encompassing the 
institutional contexts of authority, identity and signs, and just before I conclude this case about 
the medieval seal, I propose to outline and analyze in the next section the gist of their reasoning. 
4.6 Seal-identity: A semiotic analysis and challenges 
As we saw in the previous section, in addition to private use of seals in correspondence, non-
royal, lay people across Europe caught up on the practice of sealing both official and private 
deeds by the 11th century. Clerics were chiefly involved in establishing those documents where 
the use of seals in official capacity clearly shifted from royal prerogative and authority to 
commoners – while not only the notion of validating something but also that of specifically 
representing someone were maintained in both contexts. Seals were used to represent identity 
within a document in the process of authenticating the latter. Subsequently, the identity therein 
represented was deemed authenticated. As this practice expanded, those churchmen strived to 
articulate a discourse in order to both justify and e sure, within their thought and belief systems, 
the effectiveness of the emerging and generalizing use of seals in the society at large. I am now 
going to expound the thrust of that discourse following Bedos-Rezak (2002) who has offered 
thereof an extensive reading. 
As I stated before, the medieval artifacts in question are charters and diplomas dating 
from 11th and 12th centuries. Most of them were records of transaction granting tenure or a 
transfer of propriety rights over land, generally abeit not exclusively as a donation to the 
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Church. In most of these transactions then, the ecclesiastical parties were not only recipients and 
beneficiaries of the donations but they were also in charge of the production and the custody of 
related records. Understandably, they were keen not just on securing the transaction, but also on 
protecting the rights they gained as receivers against ny possible future challenges. Those 
clergymen were heads of schools or teaching in cathedral chapters, and as the literate minority 
(compared to the society at large) they often staffed and directed the chanceries, including royal 
ones. As such, they had enough authority to set the standard for record-making/-creation or 
documentary back-up procedures, if not for what counts as documentary evidence of transaction. 
As we previously discussed, the investiture controve sy will set off a crisis of multiple episodes 
and facets, not the least of which implicated the conceptualization of signs and their efficacy or 
power. The challenge for the schoolmen was then to fashion a doctrine (or theory) of signs that 
could accommodate their practice as well as a number of fundamental beliefs. 
If signs were brought up in a controversy that was about prerogatives and functions of 
authority it was because the prevailing worldview at the time implied that signs were 
instrumental, even decisive, in the enactment of authority. By mobilizing the tenets of that 
worldview, the controversy also opened the doors for various implications beyond politics, 
possibly including revisiting the foundations if not f r a re-alignment, at least for clarifying their 
coherence with the pragmatic consequences they were supposed to lead to. While it might have 
been prompted by a political contest, the debate had t eoretical impacts in semiotics, linguistics 
and sacramental theology. 
The whole issue may be thus summed up: What is in a sign? How does a sign signify? 
What kind of efficacy can be attributed to a sign, a d what operations does that require? 
Politically (and here I separate theology from religion which can be political), what authority and 
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legitimacy can one draw from signs, especially materi l signs? For let us remember that the 
controversy opposing two sides was about the authority t  appoint and invest bishops and abbots 
with the powers of ecclesiastical officialdom. The papacy then claimed that in and by themselves 
signs, including material signs, signify nothing and therefore they have no force as such. 
The papal party believed that the symbols of ecclesiastical office, the ring and the crozier, possessed no 
intrinsic capacity to cause any effect but that the valid possession and application of them effectively and 
irrevocably established an ecclesiastic’s right to both office and its associated power. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 
1492) 
According to that position, the value and virtues of igns come from a covenant that also defines 
the proper procedure whereby they can channel those attributes. The two competing positions 
were driven by equally competing theories of signs with metaphysical assumptions and 
theological ramifications. On the one hand, the view was held that material symbols and, by 
extension, signs in general derive their meaning from a common agreement among users; on the 
other hand there was the belief that signs, particularly symbols, have an inherent value and 
meaning.     
Because for the actors involved, as was generally the case in this era, God is the ultimate 
source of authority, any attempt to conceptualize the 
efficacy/authority/value/meaning/signification at work in signs must cohere with the related 
views regarding the manifestations and signs of the invisible God. In fact in the Middle Ages, it 
is the latter views which determine any theory or dctrine of signs in general. When it came to 
conceptualizing signs, the following relationships were of paramount interest to these 
schoolmen:  
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between language and reality, between Eucharist and real presence, between Trinity and the related 
subjects of person, image and resemblance, and between riting and authority. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1498)  
Ideally, a satisfying concept, theory or doctrine of sign should coherently be able to account for 
those relationships.  
On the other hand, not only should the understanding of how signs operate provide 
humans with a grasp on the foundations of the possibility of making any sense at all through 
discourse (referentiality of language), but it should also clarify how the written word may 
compensate for the authority that is presumably lost in the absence of the speaker. While 
medieval Christendom knew of writings by lay authors from the past (e.g., Greek philosophers) 
writing was still seen either as something of a special status in keeping with the sacredness of the 
Scripture, or something that in any case required a special expertise which was only held by a 
few. By all account we are dealing with a period where the practice of writing represented only a 
very small part of people’s life and daily business. By the 11th century, it still required a shift for 
the technology of writing to become part of people’s business.       
The authority of written documents, in a fundamental shift, moved away from immediate dependency on 
God and the supranatural, coming increasingly to derive from and depend on human persons. At issue in 
this shift was a need to project the authority and ccountability of human beings beyond their natural, 
empirical presence, so as to impart to charters a level of permanence previously expected only from God. 
(Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1505)  
However deep the shift was to be, the cultural foundations were not to be shattered. Any 
principle of explanation regarding the way signs operate, in writing or otherwise, must still 
accommodate fundamental notions and beliefs of the day into its frame. At the core of that frame 
of thought and that belief system were matters of God, such as the Eucharist and the Trinity. Any 
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discourse on signs was confronted with questions about presence and representation, person and 
personhood, incarnation and identity, image and resemblance, as related to those notions either at 
the foreground or in the background.  
What then was the predominant conception of signs available at that time, the one used as 
reference? The dominant paradigm of signification tur ed around an Augustinian dualism. In 
Book 2 of De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine distinguishes two categories of signs: natural signs 
(signa naturalia) and human-made signs such as language and money (signa data.) The first 
ones have necessary causal relationship with their ref ent while the second ones only receive an 
arbitrarily given signification (Table 4-1). Under the Augustinian dualism, any sign that does not 
occur naturally but is created by humans may have meaning only by convention. Human-made 
signs (including seals, words, etc.) only imperfectly refer to their objects which are ideational 
things. Because ideational referents fully comprise their own reality of which human-made signs 
are no more than attempts at material representatio, the former hold more reality than the latter. 
At the same time, one needs to bridge the gap between signifier (sign, word) and signified 
(referent) in order to make communication possible – in order to make sense, truly. 
 
Category of sign Referent Relationship to referent 
Signa naturalia  (Natural signs) Material things Necessary & causal 
Signa data (Human-made signs) Ideational (more real than 
their sign) 
Conventional 
Table 4-1. : Classification of signs by Augustine 
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The Augustinian solution for connecting word and thing … is communion with pure presence, that is, 
incarnation… In Augustinian theology, the incarnation of the Logos became a model that, while still 
limiting linguistic expression, promoted sacramental signification through presence. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 
1499)  
To the extent that words are not the incarnation of the ideational things that they are meant to 
express, human language is flawed or at least limited in bringing up full signification. On the 
other hand, there are signs that are the thing itself a  in the model of incarnation, signs that are, in 
relation to their referent, “communion with pure presence.” Sacraments constitute a model within 
this framework. In effect, sacraments, chiefly the Eucharist, involve a particular class of signs 
that actualize the presence of their referent. While leaving all non-natural, human-made signs 
helplessly imperfect in terms of their ability to mean something real, the Augustinian view 
opened up the possibility that signs may be more than just media, indeed they may be the 
embodiment of their referent, even if for now that possibility is only actualized in sacred signs. 
Such was the backdrop against which the revived debate about signs took place throughout the 
period of the investiture controversy. 
 Now the Augustinian dualism signa naturalia vs. signa data (with its appendix of 
sacramental signs that realize the pure presence of their referent) is doubled with another 
opposition stemming from language signs: universals vs. particulars. Universals are general 
categories labeling qualities that are common to a class of individuals and generally empirical 
entities. The latter are called particulars. For example “human” is a universal shared by 
particulars (individual instances of human being) such as Aristotle, Abelard, Augustine, you the 
present reader, and I the author of these lines. During the second half of the 11th century, two 
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schools of thought opposed each other on the question as to whether universals existed, the 
extent to which they are a reality. They are called nominalism and realism. 
 
 Universals Referents 
Nominalism Non-existence  Other words  
(human mental constructs) 
Realism Existence Ideational formations in God’s mind  
(templates of empirical things) 
Augustinians Existence Ideational formations in God’s mind 
(immanence & participation of universals 
in particulars) 
Abelard Non-existence  Concepts or images of things  
(mode of signification in human thought 
processes) 
Table 4-2: Perspectives on universals 
As one of the most renowned dialectics scholar of the time, Roscelin of Compiegne 
reputedly originated the system of ideas that will be known as nominalism. Nominalists held 
that universals have no reality whatsoever – neither objectively, nor subjectively. They are 
mental constructs (with corresponding verbal forms) and they make sense only because they are 
derived from the experience of empirical and particular entities. The antithesis to nominalism, 
particularly on that point, is realism. Realists contended that universals exist outside the human 
mind albeit not in the empirical world. In effect according to realists, universals exist in God’s 
mind. As such, they are a-temporal and immutable, serving as source and template for spatio-
temporal things (Table 4-2).  
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Nominalists tended to think that names are arbitrary human conventions. Realists, their 
opponents, held that if properly used, different names designate different things or persons – the 
latter distinct from one another by different sets of properties although they may share a common 
nature which is expressed through universals. For nomi alists such as Roscelin, the referents of 
universals are merely other words denoting general mental constructs of the human mind, but no 
empirical reality. For realists and Augustinians on the opposite side, though referents of 
universals are nowhere to be found in the objective world, they do exist independently of the 
human mind: they are divine ideas, immutable ideation l formations in God’s mind serving as 
template for their corresponding particulars in the spatio-temporal world. However, instead of a 
strict dualism between word and thing as Augustine appeared to posit six centuries earlier, his 
11th-century followers sought to nuance that with his teory of ontological immanence and 
participation. 
This theory argued that things guided the properties of signs, that, inhering in the spatio-temporal re lm, 
universals created similarities among objects. To be sure, participation in the transcendent was not a matter 
of identicality but only of resemblance; only God, uniquely, possessed true identicality. (Bedos-Rezak 
2000: 1500, emphasis added)  
According to that stance, universals are inherent to empirical reality as they impart to 
related particulars their commonalities which bring them under the same universal category. In 
other words, particulars can only be particulars of a universal, which defines them as elements of 
the same grouping. Universals may not exist separately in the empirical world, but they are real 
by virtue of the fact that particulars can be meaningfully clustered into categories defined as 
universals. The fact that the very notion of particular is predicated on that of universal implies 
the reality of the latter. The reality of universals is defined by the traits of resemblance that 
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qualify a set of particulars as individual instances of a given universal. Universals have reality 
because particulars of the same universal resemble that universal, which in turn enables us to see 
the resemblance between those particulars (from that same universal.) With that “neo-
Augustinian” take, so to speak, the operative concept for the relationship between sign and 
referent, signifier and signified, is no longer “identicality” or sameness, but resemblance. This is 
what I would call the first shift in this re-litigation of the question of signs post-millennium. With 
that perspective, a stark dichotomy requiring identicali y as condition of truth or reality was no 
longer needed between what is in God’s mind and what is out there in the world. Rather the 
status of reality became a matter of ontological participation predicated on the degree of 
resemblance with divine ideas. 
Considering that the Augustinian position is a variant of realism, Peter Abelard will 
formulate a third position at a distance from both nominalists and realists while still retaining the 
(nominalist) view that nothing exists but particulars and the (realist) notion that a collection of 
particulars may share a common nature. But for Abelard, the resemblance between particulars is 
not good enough basis to claim or justify the existence of universals 
Disagreeing with both his teacher Roscelin and with Augustine and his followers, Abelard denied the 
existence of anything that is not a particular. While retaining the notion that the common nature inherent in 
things of the same species made them similar, he argued that such similarity fell short of constituting them 
as universals. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1500) 
It appears that in what I call here the neo-Augustinian stance (or the resemblance 
stance57) the mode of signification proceeds from the word  the underlying human perception 
matching, as an image, either the thing in the spatiotemporal world or its ideational template in 
                                                 
57 A simpler way to refer to the theory of ontological immanence and participation. 
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God’s mind. In other words, the only progress achieved since Augustine was to move from signs 
as incarnation (pure presence or communion), if they w re to reliably mean anything substantive, 
to signs as image of the referent (resemblance or likeness). In that context, the novelty of 
Abelard was to say that words take their meaning from the way the human mind operates with 
concepts. For Abelard, words – and particularly universals – are concepts, not images as by 
reflection of physical things on the mirror of the uman mind. For Abelard, the human mind does 
create likening copies or images of things, but the meaning of a word is not the image of its 
object; it does not stem from the mental image of its object matching that object itself, or from 
matching that word as an image with its object outside the human mind. The meaning of word 
derives from the thought processes applicable to those images that the mind initially forms of 
things in the world – the human perception, that is. Therefore, thoughts and understanding 
proceed from the way the human mind operates with those images within it, not from the 
accuracy of the images themselves in relation to presumed models outside the human mind 
(whether in the nature or in God’s minds.)   
For Abelard, words were universals, concepts of things, not images of things. Yet words functioned by 
means of images deriving their meaning, not from the things themselves but from the mode of signification 
at work in the human mind. Abelard held that the mind creates at will images or copies for configuring 
absent things. These images are the proper objects of thought and understanding, which thus operate on a
likeness that the mind creates. This likeness has neither substantial reality nor the underpinning by 
transcendent universal that, for Augustinians, accounted for the similarity between things… By pointing 
out that thoughts and understanding are not the sam as their objects, Abelard … located the act of 
understanding in the mind as the active inventor of universal concepts... (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1500-01) 
As I suggested earlier, in this specific cultural setting this debate about signs could not 
but be framed within parameters of sacramental theology. In effect, while on its face the debate 
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first appeared to be about linguistic signs, doctrinal questions of Trinity (personhood) and 
Eucharist (presence) were being settled at the sametime. We may recall from the section 4.3.2 
regarding the Church and the Empire that it was the Fourth Lateran Council of 121558 that 
defined the doctrine of transubstantiation pertaining to the Eucharist (Blumenthal 2004). 
Protagonists in this debate also authored texts where t y articulated their views, one of which is 
Abelard’s treatise about the Unity and Trinity of God titled the Christian Theology.  
The conundrum with the question of Trinity is the logical difficulty to equate ‘One’ with 
‘Three,’ in other words, to assert unity not just as the union of many but as actual “oneness” of 
many: one God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit all at the same time. The emphasis put by 
nominalists on the individual as opposed to universals made it difficult to articulate the divine 
unity of the Trinitarian entities, unless these are only three different utterances about one and the 
same entity. And yet, implying that they are not different to begin with does not really address 
the problem but rather suppress it – which, according to Bedos-Rezak, led to Roscelin being 
accused as a “dialectical heretic” and having to explain himself about the Trinity at the Council 
of Soissons in 1092. As one might expect, a discussion about the correspondence between signs 
(signifier) and referent (signified), which involved sacramental signs, questions of the 
incarnation of God (or the “incarnation of the word,” to borrow a title from Anselm of 
Canterbury) and of the Trinity, eventually requires or leads to clarifying notions of identity and 
personhood59 – of  Christ, initially. With the third path taken by Abelard vis-à-vis realists and 
nominalists, comes a different understanding of incar ation. 
                                                 
58 That is a few decades after this exchange between Abelard, Roscelin of Compiègne, Berengar of Tours retrospectively, 
Anselm of Bec (a.k.a Anselm of Canterbury), and others. 
59 Bedos-Rezak notes that the term “persona” as related to personhood emerged from that 12th century debate about the 
Trinity, and the theologian Richard of St. Victor contributed substantially to its definition and dissemination (p. 1505).  
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The incarnation of God was no longer to be elucidate  by an image, as had happened when the notion of 
God as the original and of Christ as living image made it possible to see them as one and the same God, 
though not the same person. Rather the image was now held to be the realization of form in matter and 
came to be understood as an actual incarnation. Images were promoted to quasi-personal beings. The 
language of analogy seeped into the language of ontlogy: “to be like” became “to be part of.” (Bedos-
Rezak 2000: 1502-03; emphasis added) 
Here, I would argue, intervenes a second shift. The first one, as we might recall, went 
from Augustinian incarnation as pure presence of (or communion with) the referent to 
resemblance with divine ideas. At work in that sense of incarnation was the notion of image as a 
replica of an original model, the notion of sign as a reflection of its referent. Now the second 
shift goes from resemblance to incarnation yet again, but of a different kind: that of a form into a 
matter. In the face of the challenges encountered with using the previous framework to account 
for the unity of the Trinity, the notion of image as operative concept for understanding the 
incarnation (and by extension the unity of the Trinity) shifted toward image as “realization of 
form in matter,” or as Bedos-Rezak puts it, “actual incarnation.” 
Addressing the issue of the Trinity in his Theologia Christiana, Abelard distinguishes 
among different ways of identity – and thus, of diference as well – by at least five dimensions. 
According to him, identity may occur by essence andnumber, by property, by definition, by 
likeness, or by immutability (McCallum 1976: 75). Two entities may be identical in essence and 
number and yet differ by their proper character or function. Abelard applies that framework to 
the Trinity of God: Father, Son and Holy Spirit are designations referring to attributes of the 
divine substance – such as “omnipotent, and wise and good to the highest point” (Abelard via 
McCallum 1976: 46). 
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To confess these three Persons in the divinity, namely, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is to admit the divine 
Power, generating; the divine Wisdom, begotten; and the divine Goodness, proceeding. When these three 
things are stated, the perfection of the Highest Good is defined. (Idem) 
By confessing a unique God as three persons, the Christian faith “affirms a single identity of 
unity, except as pertains to the discrete attributes of the three persons…” The latter are “diverse 
in respect of their proper functions” (idem, p. 70) by which they are defined as Father, as Son 
and as Holy Spirit. God is one and the same entity bu  three persons by proper character. 
The proper function of the Father is that He exists of Himself and eternally begets or has begotten th co-
eternal Son. The proper function of the Son is to be, or to have been, eternally begotten of the Father. The 
proper Function of the Holy Spirit is that He proceeds from Father to Son. (Abelard via McCallum 1976: 
70) 
In these discussions about Christian sacraments, Abelard along with a number of his 
fellow schoolmen resorted to the metaphor of seal, a material sign, in order to make their point 
clearer with regard to signs and signification. This resulted in a series of analogies that might 
have helped with the comprehension of the most debatable term of the analogy if, and only if, the 
second term of the analogy was established without question. However, as we will see later, the 
heuristic of the analogy is limited when its two terms remain challenging to the audience to 
comprehend. For the time being, let us consider what Abelard says about seal components and 
their relationship.    
We can predicate of the wax that it is the image, and of the image that it is the wax. Nonetheless, it is also 
true to say that the waxen image is from the wax. But the wax is not from the waxen image. The wax itself 
is, however, the material of the image. The waxen image is not the material either of the wax or of itself. 
(Abelard via McCallum 1976: 85) 
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The species is the same as the genus, as a man is the same as an ‘animal,’ or a waxen image is the same as 
wax. The waxen image is from wax as man is from anim l. I mean that in so far as it is a wax image, it 
must be wax, just as in so far as a man is a man, he must be animal. But the contrary is not true. (Abelard 
via McCallum 1976: 86)     
Abelard considers conceptually similar the relation between Godly Father and Son, between wax 
and waxen image, and between species and genus. The Son comes out of the Father just like the 
waxen image comes out of the wax, and like species proceed from a genus. Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit are three property-based variations of the same substance of God. In other words, 
Abelard conceives of the relationships within the Trinity, between God on the one hand and (at 
least conceptually) on the other hand Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as similar to the relationship 
between a genus and its related species.  The overall point of Abelard’s conceptual framework is 
that two identical things are not necessarily so in a monolithic way; they may be identical in 
some respect while different in some other, identical on a level while differing on another. I must 
say however that his explanation of likeness among the five manners of identity between two 
things is so broad that one may suggest that it encompasses the other four manners: if anything is 
identical to any other thing in any way, wouldn’t tha  be enough to say the two things are alike in 
some way?  
Likeness in identity may be seen where things differ n essence and number, but are similar in some 
respect. Species resemble their genera; individuals their species; anything which in some respect falls in 
line with another is like it. (Abelard via McCallum 1976: 76) 
 Complementing this analysis of the Trinity, are commentaries on a relevant passage of 
the Scripture. These exhibit the importance of analogy in the operation at work in this medieval 
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notion of identity as per the use of seals in charters. Using analogy, this notion emphasizes the 
difference from a genealogical notion of identity: “to be like” vs. “to be (part of)” something.   
Commentaries on Genesis 1:26 (God made man in his image and likeness) from the School of Laon, from 
Abelard, and from the canons of St. Victor contemplated just how human beings might be said to be “in the 
image and likeness of God” when they have no common pr perty with God. Using the seal metaphor, the 
commentators determined that the human soul in God’s image is different from the Son who is in God’s 
image, in proportion to the difference between the king’s image on a seal and the king’s generated image in 
his son [emphasis added]. Only the engendered image (the Son), which shares properties and is 
consubstantial to its model, may be equal to it: only the Son is the image of God. The created image (Man), 
on the other hand, bears only an analogy to its model: the human being is in the image of God. (Bedos-
Rezak 2000: 1525) 
The Son being the image of God entails that he is engendered or begotten of God and is 
consubstantial to him. The human being in the image of God only entails that he carries God’s 
image within him, imprinted on his soul (as the king’s image imprinted on a seal). As a creature, 
but not begotten, of God the human being may well be “in the image and likeness” of God, but 
he does not share the same divine substance. To paraphr se the sentence emphasized (italics) in 
the quote above, the likeness/resemblance of the eng ndered image with its model (or referent) is 
different from the likeness/resemblance between that model and its created image (Fig. 4-1). In 
both cases there is a relationship of likeness, but the difference is that the likeness of the begotten 
entity is reinforced by it being consubstantial and commensurate to its model or referent while 
the created entity is not. This analogy of proportion, as I might call it, exhibits simultaneously 
the divergence of those two relations while showing the parallel between God and Human taken 
in turn as referent.  
 
 
Fig. 4-1: Relation of the referent to engendered or created image
In other words, the identity implied in 
(emphasis added) applicable to the human 
the five dimensions of identity distinguished by Abelard, 
Genesis and the commentaries suggest tha
essence and number; 2) there is identity by 
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perspective of clarifying the mode of signification f seals which enables identification of the 
seal owner. Evidence of that may be seen in the fact th t in fig. 4-1 there is no necessary relation 
between the king’s son and the imprint of the king’s seal – certainly not a relation that could 
parallel the one between God’s Son and the human being. A complement to this metaphor is 
needed, and we find it in the following. 
Abelard and the School of Laon were concerned, however, to reconcile transcendence and immanence, and 
so insisted on the presence of God within the begott n Son, and through the Son, within the created human 
being as well. Here again, Abelard and the Laon scholars resorted to another seal metaphor, this time 
involving the die, its image, and its imprint. God is the seal’s inherent material (the substance of its die or 
matrix); the Son is the figure of God’s substance, th  image of God engraved in the matrix, which in turn 
imprints itself on the human soul (reason, heart, memory), enabling that soul to be configured as the Son. In 
this sense, the human being is created as an image, imprinted through the medium of divine substance but 
sharing no substantial affinity with it, unlike the Son, whose image is consubstantially figured of divine 
substance. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1525) 
Now the analogy is more complete and symmetrical (Fig. 4-2). The relation of likeness between 
God and the human being is not direct but is made to transit through the divine substance of his 
Son in whom his image is defined (as begotten of God, the Son both combines the substance of 
God and the outlines of his image.) In other words, the human is in the image and likeness of 
God only by virtue of the imprint of God he has received on his soul through the Son. I propose 
to sum up the whole of these analogical linkages in one diagram (Fig. 4-3). The top series of 
linkages is the model pattern. The bottom one is the series of relations that is being explained, 
that is, the identity at play in the human use of seal . The process that takes place in those two 
patterns is captured in the two-fold sequence in the middle. In this three-step flow, Abelard and 
Laon scholars presuppose that a seal’s matrix (second instance) proceeds from an “inherent 
 
 
material” or a “substance” (first instance) and then r plicates itself through the imprint it leaves 
on wax (third instance.) This duplicates the divine process that underlines the creation of the 
human in the image and likeness of God. 
 
Fig. 4-2: Revised relation of the referent to engendered or created image
God is present within the human person through 
human person is present in the related waxen seals. T
image and likeness of God (the “absolute reference”), likewise a human’s waxen seal is in his 
image and likeness. In the former, God is the referent and in the latter, the human person is. 
This scheme raised a number of questions. To start with the broader ones which I cannot 
address on behalf of medieval scholars: Are humans to be considered identity tokens of God, as 
waxen seals are supposed to be of humans? Are their actions to be accounted to God 
what conditions, if at all? Clearly, humans have an autonomous agency, based on the fact that 
they enjoy the faculty of free will, which is not the case of a seal, a 
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171 
 
-matrix the 
 
– and under 
172 
 
 
 
while humans can make decisions, move around by themselves and act, seals have no effect 
whatsoever unless someone uses or exhibits them with some intent and in a specific context.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4-3: God, humans and seal analogy sequences 
Let us pause for a while and evaluate the implications of this framework. Our priority 
here is to figure out the identity relation between the human seal owner and the seal die or 
matrix, leveraging the external perspective offered by the divine analogy. From a Christian 
doctrinal standpoint, the discourse about the first triad (God – His Son – Human soul) is 
acceptable as an article of faith or as a postulate of a system of thought. From discourse analysis 
standpoint, it does not matter if we think a discurively constructed phenomenon is not rational 
in itself as long as it is possible to provide an intelligible account of whatever it is purported by 
the speaker(s) to be – and here Abelard has done most of the job beforehand. The question is: to 
what extent does the analogy helps us understand, if at all, the way identity operates between a 
seal and its owner?  
We have learned that it is by and in the Son that te divine substance takes figure, which 
is then impressed upon human soul. If we should replicate that pattern for the seal triad, there 
Seal-matrix Waxen seal Human 
Son God Human 
Divine Substance figured 
Matrix engraved image 
Divine Substance 
Seal owner’s substance 
Imprint on human soul 
Imprint on wax 
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should also be an essential identity between the human substance of the seal owner and the 
substance of his seal-matrix. This analogy seems to require that somehow the human person be 
the “inherent material” of the seal matrix even though the object ‘seal-matrix’ is not of flesh as 
human beings.  While this whole arrangement (fig. 4-2 and fig. 4-3) suggests such essential 
connection between the human person and his seal-matrix, it appears that the specific terms of 
the operation that relation requires for it to be comparable to the relation between God and his 
Son is left unspecified. Any possible response to that concern shall start with the following 
clarifying points.  
First, I shall recall that as we saw above Bedos-Rezak argues that Abelard’s intervention 
in the debate about signs resulted in the image becoming part of its referent by materializing its 
form, therefore the signifier appears to be the incar ation of the signified in that sense (not in the 
Augustinian’s). Secondly, within his proposed framework of identity and in the context of the 
Trinity, Abelard articulated the unity of Father and Son through the identity of their divine 
substance. This does not mean that the first instance of the two triads in analogy (God & Human) 
and their second instance (Son & Seal-matrix) are of the same matter in the plain sense of the 
term. The fact that God has assumed humanly body throug  the Son does not imply that Father is 
also of a human substance or that the divine substance is of flesh and blood. Substance is 
different from matter (even though Bedos-Rezak calls it “inherent material” as well.) There are 
two basic variants for the definition of substance60. First, substance (sub-stantia) here is 
understood in classic philosophy since Aristotle as the ontological substratum in any given thing, 
which does not change across time or space; the notion f what makes that thing what it is 
                                                 
60 There is more with further elaboration but these basic two are the most relevant to this historical and conceptual 
context. One may learn more on this by referring to the entries “Aristotle’s Metaphysics” and “Substance” in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/ (next two citations) 
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independently of any variations of qualities, modes or attributes. As a consequence it is not the 
physical and perishable/changeable appearance of a thing or a human. The second basic variant 
is that a substance is a composite of form and matter, both of which every individual thing is 
made of (Cohen 2009 and Robinson 2009).  
Now to resume the discussion of Abelard’s analogies: Is it or is it not necessary that the 
seal-matrix be consubstantial to human person as the Son is to God? If so how is this supposed to 
happen? Is there a common substance to humans and se ls, and if any, what is that supposed to 
be? What does the engendering of a seal matrix from hu an beings consist of? Or did Abelard 
mean to parallel two different modes of identity: ess nce and number on the one hand and 
likeness on the other? After all, “in the image and likeness of God” were the biblical terms that 
led to this analogy. While this may not be the most straightforward solution in the sense of the 
symmetry that might be expected from an explanatory analogy, nothing prevents that from being 
the case. The fact is we have no evidence of that in the literature, neither can we find any clear 
basis there to infer this. Should we then just take the analogy literally and replace each term by 
the corresponding counterpart? Alas, as the saying goes, comparison is not reason. In this case, 
comparing something that is to be explained to something else that is rationally inexplicable does 
not bring much light.  
Perhaps the specific resolution of any of the above questions did not really matter for 
these medieval exegetes, for it was already so embedded in their culture that seals do represent 
the identity of their users that the rest may have just been simple rationalization. For the 
literature does not dwell over whether and how human y be of the same substance, “in 
essence and number,” as a seal matrix. Abelard and his companions do not seem to question or 
want to explain further the rules that govern the human process of “becoming a seal matrix.” 
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Abelard implies that by analogy – from the biblical use of the term “image” to characterize the 
resemblance between God and the human – but does not tell us exactly how – other than by 
composing that analogy with his explanation of the Trinity. After all, he and his peers did not set 
out to explain identity by the way seals operated but identity as it operates within the Trinity. The 
seal metaphor was a given, which was used to help understand the Trinity, not the other way 
round.61 Precisely, by so doing, this doctrinal undertaking sheds a light back onto the metaphor. 
If nothing else, the fact that these medieval schoolmen had to resort to an analogy with seals in 
order to explain a topic as important for them as the Trinity show that the seal as identity token 
was either self-evident or taken for granted based on the most common beliefs.  
In the context of the Trinity which is overarching when it comes to the identity of the 
three persons of God, Abelard clearly stated, more than once, that the divine substance in the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is identical “in essence and number,” (McCallum 1976: 76 
and passim). While he also states that “man and animal” are identical in essence and number 
(idem, p. 75 ff.), in his subsequent analogy with seal Abelard never spells out directly that the 
human individual and his seal die (matrix) are identical in essence and number, nor does he 
explicitly claim that they have the same substance (and again, nor does he specifically explain 
how the substance of one gets transformed into the substance of the other, or how there might be 
another notion of substance that they share – as humans and seals are not of the same substance, 
a priori.) 
                                                 
61 Furthermore, Abelard clearly warns us about the potential limitations of his analogies with regard to his own objective: 
“Men use words to describe created things that they understand, and to make their own intelligence clear through them. 
Man can do this: but he cannot adequately describe in terms God and ineffable goodness. Everything, then, which is said 
of God is spoken by transferences of language and parable-like codes. By means of similitudes we get partial guidance 
and are enabled to conjecture rather than to grasp that unspeakable majesty.” (McCallum 1976: 74, italics added)  
 
 
Fig. 4
At the core of this whole assemblage is a belief system that comprises two levels. First, 
there are dogmas which are discrete propositions or statements enunciating rules or the Church 
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Because of this the boundary line may be fuzzy betwe n rational and theoretical argumentation 
on the one hand and the doctrinal and ideological one on the other hand. Generally however, the 
behavioral features of proponents and supporters ar mo e prominently those of believers and 
followers at the center (dogmas) and progressively less so toward the periphery (rational 
discourse).  
Following are the different possible options for reading the three-node parallel flow 
above, using either the language of incarnation (form and matter) or the language of identity of 
substance.  
1) God is (the equivalent of) the form of the divine icarnated in the Son. Likewise, 
and by virtue of the analogy, the seal owner is a form relatively to the seal, which then gets 
realized in the matter of the seal die (matrix). The problem here is that there is no philosophy or 
theory, not even in the 12th century, to support the idea that the individual instance of human 
being is a simple form devoid of substance. At the very most, one may argue that while the seal 
owner is not a form per se, it behaves like a form relative to the seal in that he is the referent 
originating this sequence. 
2) Father and Son are identical by the divine substance. To the extent that the latter 
is begotten of the former, one must understand that the Son receives the divine substance from 
the Father by way of that engendering. How is the seal-matrix begotten of the seal owner? How 
does it take on the substance of the latter? This is really a camera obscura which is only given a 
label such as “incarnation” based on the model of the analogy without clarifying the actual 
mechanism itself. However, since neither the seal owner nor the seal matrix are divine entities, it 
is legitimate to think that one should be able to describe the mechanism substantially linking 
those two empirical entities, which would be the human counterpart to divine incarnation. 
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Fig. 4-5:  System of belief and rational discourse in the medieval West: 
dogmas, doctrines and rational arguments. 
 
3) Alternately, instead of claiming that the seal owner is a form or form-like, one 
may argue that the human seal owner is just as the first instance of materialization of his form 
(which, in its posited pure state, would be a separate entity.) In the process of representing 
himself through appropriate symbols and figures in a seal die, the seal owner invests the latter 
with his substance or that there is transference of his substance to the seal die, which then 
becomes another materialization of that owner’s form. Then the notion of transubstantiation 
surreptitiously enters the framework (fig. 4-6). Although this has nothing directly to do with the 
Trinity, the rationalization of the discourse concerning seals may be represented here in the 
shape of a triangle.  
Dogmas (1)
Doctrines (2)
Rational argumentation (3)
 
 
Fig. 4-6: Model of the propositions and issue 
 
To the extent hat substance is a complex of form and matter, and to the extent that 
incarnation is conceived of as the realization of a form in a matter, the embodiment of the seal 
owner is a first substance and the seal matrix a second substance deriving from the 
individual form. And to the extent that the seal matrix proceeds from the seal owner
the latter is transferred from its first instance substance in the aspect of human embodiment to its 
second instance substance in the asp
phenomenon of transubstantiation takes place, and
human to his seal matrix and then to his waxen seals
Incarnation as “realization of form in matter” and transubstantiation have the same type of 
outcome, which is a complete substance of form and matter. The difference between them is the 
itinerary: one gets to the outcome directly from a pure form while the other one transits by a 
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distinct complete substance before reaching the finale one. Here I take the term of 
transubstantiation not in the sense of the sacrament but literally as can be derived from the 
Aristotelian language. There also is another significant difference between the literal meaning of 
the term here and its doctrinal meaning in the medieval Church: here a material object is used to 
produce another material object; there the same matrial object remains but takes on the 
substance of another entity.  
In the cultural and historical setting of the medieval Church, the exemplar for this process 
or phenomenon of conversion between substances is the sacrament of the Eucharist conceived of 
as “being in, and of itself, what it represents” (Bedos-Rezak, p. 1499). That during the 
consecration the Eucharist altogether becomes the body and the blood of Christ, which it is 
meant to represent, was not to be considered merely as a metaphor, but the result of an actual 
transubstantiation.62 
According to the theory of transubstantiatio, the substance of the bread and wine, or more precisely, the 
substantial form as distinct from the material substratum of the bread and wine, undergoes a transformation 
or formal conversion and becomes, in the consecration, the true body and blood of Christ. The 
transformation, however, is only a transformation of substance, not of the incidental properties or accidents 
of the bread and wine. The appearance of bread and wine therefore remains. (Muller 1985: 305-6)  
Hildebert of Tours (c. 1055–1133) also known as Hildebert of Lavardin is reputed to have been 
the first to use the term “transubstantiation” in Christian theology.63 As far as the papacy’s 
                                                 
62 Although the institutional Church will back away from that term centuries later, in part due to opposition against the 
blatant intellectualism of the Latin Scholasticism favoring this language of 13th century Aristotelianism. The reception of 
most of Aristotle in the Middle Ages spanned from 9th century, with an amount of distrust partly due to the fact that 
some of his works were transmitted to the West through Arabic translation, to mid-13th century when it became more 
openly accepted or even prevalent among schoolmen. “… but the elaboration of the doctrine [of transubstantiation] was 
not achieved till after the acceptance of the Aristotelian metaphysics later in the 13th cent., when it founds its classic 
formulation in the teaching of St Thomas Aquinas.” (Cross and Livingstone 2005: 1648) 
63 See “Transubstantiation” in the Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
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official documents are concerned, the term occurred for the first time in the proceedings of the 
Fourth Lateran Council64 of 1215 which can be consulted on a non-Vatican Web site dedicated 
to papal encyclicals. 
His [Jesus Christ’s] body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of 
bread and wine, the bread and wine having been changed in substance [or transubstantiated], by God’s 
power, into his body and blood …65 [Italics added] 
As it turns out, Abelard uses the seal metaphor, again, in order to illustrate the process of 
the Eucharist. The matter of the wax and that of the waxen image (with the imprint of the seal) 
are the same – “in essence and number” – and yet the two things, wax and waxen image, are 
different because the former is only the plain materi l which can be figured differently, or can 
take in different forms, resulting in different images or “identities.” Likewise, the Host and 
Christ may well be two different things (in different matters) but they become the same 
substance as the form of Christ infuses the Host and t kes its material aspect. Just like Christ is 
present in the Host, the seal owner is present (through the seal matrix) in the waxen seal. In the 
end, it is not surprising that the physical device of seal being also used as a conceptual device to 
help comprehend Catholic sacraments, its understanding becomes caught up in theologico-
metaphysical terms that speak very little to the materi l processes of the seal becoming an 
identity token. 
Within the identity framework laid out by Abelard himself, either seal image is to be 
understood as identical to the seal owner and the analogy with the godly persons of Father and 
                                                 
64 Innocent III himself proposed the seventy-one decrees on the agenda, all of which were adopted by the Council. The 
first of those decrees also known as constitutions formulated the new “Confession of Faith” which included statement 
about the belief in the Trinity of God (very much in Abelardian terms) as well as the next quote below (within the body 
text).  
65 See http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum12-2.htm#Confession. The editorial contexts are specified at the 
end of the introduction along with references to the codices that have been taken into account.  
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Son is not symmetrical (meaning, as shown in fig. 4-2, the two relationships are not strictly 
identical unless the identity of substance between human and seal die is addressed), thus it is 
limited in its heuristic, or the analogy is meant to be symmetrical in which case the solution of 
incarnation by realization of a form in a matter need be complemented by the hypothesis of 
transubstantiation. Part of the discrepancy is that the figure of the seal matrix is not created or 
assigned by God. Its production or association withthe seal owner/user mainly depends on the 
latter himself posing as the referent, one who has t e substance of an individual human being. 
Therefore the analogies identified from Abelard would suggest one of the following: i) the 
philosophy of substance as the incarnation of the form in a matter also explains the mechanism 
by which Christ (Son) is an incarnation of God (Father), which in his time would have probably 
earned him a place next to Roscelin as a dialectical heretic; ii) a transubstantiation intervenes 
from the seal owner/user to the seal matrix since the unity of the Trinity requires that Father and 
Son be of the same divine substance; or iii) the form f the human substance of the seal 
owner/user gets captured some other way in the matrix figure during the casting process or in the 
seal imprint during the signing/sealing ceremony. There is no evidence to support the latter 
hypothesis despite numerous descriptions of sealed documents from the period this thesis is 
focused on. From the remaining two, the hypothesis of transubstantiation seems to me more 
plausible (Fig. 4-6), taking into account the ascendance of that concept at the time, than the first 
hypothesis which would have most certainly provoked at the very least some serious controversy 
in Abelard’s own institution, that is, the Church.    
In the end, whatever happens to substance, the seal was believed by 12th century to be an 
instance of the individual seal owner, or at least the person using the seal to represent himself in 
the process of recording a transaction or communicati g t distance. The seal was used to 
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produce replicas of a graphic representation the sealer identifies with. Seal owners called that 
their image and the public generally accepted those waxen replicas as standing for the 
individuals themselves, in a sense that lies between symbolism and incarnation (basically, by any 
other matter but flesh.)    
Seals were signs that encoded the concept of medieval identity as replicable resemblance. (Bedos-Rezak 
2000: 1533) 
In the charters themselves, authors refer to their seal as their own image, imago noster, which reveals that 
seals and their depictions incorporated elements meaningful to self-representation. (Idem, pp. 1528-29) 
In a more philosophical language, the presence gained through that kind of incarnation 
may be characterized as ontological similarity, to paraphrase Bedos-Rezak, between the sign 
(seal) and referent (seal owner). In other words, ba ed on their broader institutional context 
shaped by their belief system and enacted in the ceremonies surrounding sealing, people believed 
that a seal could capture and convey something of their inner being. At least both the seal and the 
seal owner partake in that same being.  
The Eucharist debate produced the idea that reality was capable of being perceived through an iconic 
convention. In such a cultural crucible, the sign became representative less because of its relationship to a 
conceptual ideal than for its capacity to embody its referent’s ontological characteristics. In semiotics 
terms, the represented object (the signified) becam  constitutive part of the sign (the signifier), because 
for the sign to stand for its object, the sign had to incorporate a representation of that object; it was the 
expression of that incorporated representation that came to be seen as the sign’s meaning. (Bedos-Rezak 
2000: 1503, italics added) 
This is a significant shift whereby, while God still remains the absolute reference, he is no longer 
standing right in the middle of the sense-making process of all signs; whereby not just God or the 
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king can be truly represented with signs but all humans as well. The medieval society then was 
trying to find a way to legitimize in their own worldview the idea that a human person could be 
represented as identical through a sign, a token. They found that legitimacy in a narrative that is 
commensurable and agreeable (literally) with their system of belief and thought. The 
referentiality exhibited in the triad God-Son-Human was the perfect model for that. This 
represents a shift from transcendence where truth and signs’ meaning only originated from the 
God above to immanence where humans are also enabled to b  the actual authors of the meaning 
of signs, indeed (themselves) to be the authoritative meaning of signs they identify with through 
certain protocols.  
 Seals and sealing also display a number of features hat are determinant of the way seals 
were understood in practice. First, just as it was believed that a human carries the imprint of God 
in his soul, a seal must carry by any means possible the imprint of the sealer in its matter. A 
number of concrete features were included in the act of sealing, as if to shore up (or compensate) 
the too abstract notions of form, matter, incarnation, substance and the ontological resemblance 
they are supposed to enact. In effect, this search fo  a material anchoring was manifested by 
leaving in the waxen seal the sealer’s “toothmarks, fingerprints, bits of hair or beard” (Bedos-
Rezak 2000: 1527) plus possibly a variety of items representing the piece of land being given, 
such as a clod of earth or a stick (Fraenkel 1992: 67), all elements appended to the charter.   
The seal, thereby participating in an existential relation with the sealer it represented, became an efficacious 
sign, a power. Thus was the seal enabled to confer on the document its own authority, transforming the
document into a monument, which is the name by which sealed charters came to be known during the 
twelfth century. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1527) 
185 
 
 
 
There are probably several reasons why those documents w re called monuments, some of which 
may be linguistic, social or cultural, etc. However, one reason that appears to me to be highly 
plausible is the fact that seals were considered as relics and their matrices were most of the time 
buried with their owner. If that was so then the place waxen seals are meant to remain, that is, 
where they were originally affixed, is also a sort of mausoleum where the memory of past 
decisions and wills are kept.   
Secondly, while one may claim in theory that the seal encapsulates the ontological 
characteristics of the sealer, the relation of the graphical representation to that ontology is not 
simple to establish. Setting aside the fact that what t e moderns may call “realistic 
representation” wouldn’t probably make sense then, as one might expect, a seal the size of a coin 
or a medallion was most probably not enough room for 12th century technology to realistically 
and uniquely represent every single individual involved in a relevant transaction, assuming their 
ontological characteristics (whatever that meant) individually vary. In themselves, the seal 
images were not individualizing; their identifying logic was not based on realistic representation 
of the individual seal owner.  
Realistic physiognomy was not privileged; emblems of function and symbols of kinship were. Kings were 
shown in royal garb and posture, nobles as warriors, and bishop in episcopal array. Heraldry, from the mid-
twelfth century onward, served as an iconographic retoric that expressed the identity of a kindred in 
relation to other groups, to its own land, and to its separate sub-branches. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1529)
The elements of the seal graphism (heraldry as system of emblems) may well have just been one 
category of attributes among others. The ritualistic aspect of sealing, including of course the 
witnesses, would have been another category of information which the identification process is 
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predicated on. In addition to written signs, the concrete marks of bodily parts and other natural 
elements affixed with the waxen seal may also have played the same role.  
The stylization imposed by the materiality of the di converged with cultural constructs 
of social stratification and roles, forming a constrained language of iconographic representation. 
This transformed the seal into a stereotype – both as simplified (but not necessarily disparaging) 
social perception of groups of people and as a printing technique.    
The graphic logic of seals established a crucial distinction between the individual of flesh and character and 
the individual as an impersonation of social roles specified by codes. The particular living individual of 
earlier oral ceremonies came to be increasingly abstr cted as an incarnation of a particular social group. 
Formulas of identity on seals predicated the notion of i dividuals as archetypes. (Idem, p. 1531) 
Formulaic icons thus suspended individual referentiality, conferring on seals the status of a system. The
text of the legend particularized a given seal, giving it the status of instance. Thus seal graphism generated 
personal identity through a grammar that articulated the organizing principles of society. In this way, 
personal identity was defined and produced as an instance of social order, and thus produced itself as the 
verifier of the system it substantiated. (Idem, p. 1529) 
Consequently, both the framing of seals as a variation of ontological materialization of 
the seal owner and the graphical economy of the cramped space of the die have meaningful 
practical implications. The latter implies that there only is room for signs that are the most 
significant to frame identity in the society. The former implies that whatever is (culturally) 
determined to be relevant in the identity graphic is de facto elevated to ontological status 
(meaning it is ascribed to the unchangeable nature of the person’s being.) That tension between 
ontology and culture shaped authoritative identity around the practice of sealing at the turn of the 
first millennium A.D.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
Historically in the context of the medieval west, seals first and foremost served to capture, 
convey or manifest authority. In that sense, a material was said to be authenticated or authentic 
by the mere fact that it borne the actual seal of the appropriate authority that either is the 
enunciator of what the document states or is backing it up. That authority in the secular realm 
was first the king and whomever the king allowed to seal and authenticate charters and diplomas 
on his behalf. In this context, authority as ascribed to, and conveyed through, the document 
essentially meant that what is written is good for enforcement or has force of law. And the seal 
was both evidence and a determinant of that authority and its force. However, it can actually be 
such determinant only if it is recognizable as the manifestation or expression of an actual entity 
that is known to be the legitimate or de facto entity to wield that authority or to be entitled to 
make decisions over the matter at hand. Only when t official author is recognized or identified 
– as the subject originating the discourse – then t proper efficacy will be ascribed to the 
discourse based on his actual authority as reputed.  Authentication in that sense implies first 
some process of identification, if only an implicit one. The same logic ran through the early use 
of seals in personal communications by non-rulers and will by the 12th century be given an 
official status through an apparatus of authentication of private deeds where seals were 
recognized and used to authenticate the parties’ idntity. 
By the 12th century, individuals from all strata of the medieval society were using seals as 
identity tokens in their personal and transactional records. The thorough analysis of the literature 
has led to the following explanation of how seals, from unique signs of authority, became 
authoritative identity tokens in both practice and discourse. To the extent that people participate 
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in a culture that is used to recognizing a sign as the sign of authority embodied in a person, even 
if that person is surrounded by a royal apparatus; to the extent that the main implication of 
having that sign appended to written words is that t ose words shall be given the same value as if 
they were uttered in person by that person (e.g., the king who, in absentia, is effectively 
recognized as the king precisely thanks to his “sign” appended to the written document); then the 
idea might emerge that outside bodily presence, any person could be recognized, or make 
themselves recognizable through a seal. Therefore individuals (the few literate) started using 
seals in personal correspondence in order to claim and evidence authorship of the written word, 
that is, to self-authenticate as the actual subject expressing and meaning the words therein. 
Obviously personal letters do not a priori have the purpose to enforce any decision or provision 
regarding any other party; they are not generally meant to have any legal implications. As a 
result they need not to be ascribed any further authority than the “authority” of authorship as can 
be self-authenticated.  
Then the Church as the reference authority that defined the standards of documentary 
validation (as well as a central participant in estate transactions) also adopted the practice of 
sealing transactions. In the same time, churchmen and chancery scholars involved in that practice 
discursively articulated its conceptual foundations a d rationale. The discourse proceeded from 
doctrinal stances on sacramental signs, particularly in relation to the Trinity and the Eucharist, to 
conceptualization of signs in general and their mode f signification, involving related concepts 
such as personhood, image, sameness, resemblance, incarnation as realization of form in matter, 
and transubstantiation or change of substance. It sustained the general belief that images, 
symbols or any signs may be an inherent part of an actual entity which it materializes otherwise. 
That discourse and endorsement legitimized across the board (including in the eyes of other 
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potential parties to similar transactions) the practice of creating and sealing records of contracts, 
transactions of goods or decisions transferring rights where natural individuals were in effect 
materialized by the seal, a sign-object bearing their symbols or image.  Hence, seals durably 
became a common instrument to represent and authenticat  individual human beings in official 
and private deeds in order to assume related roles and responsibility and to ensure proper 
attribution and accountability. 
Either way, one basic function of the seal is to convey the following message: “this (the 
‘ego’ that is source of the enunciation) is such particular person (as designated by the seal) 
speaking and making the statements herein and thesewill be accounted to him as meant by and 
in their contents” – no more, no less. Whatever that person writes, which he had the “right” to 
command or dispose of, will be considered as effectiv  as if he had said it in person. Such 
conceptualizing enables to encapsulate both the personal use of seals as identity token and their 
official use for authentication.  
Seals as identity tokens largely remained however mostly the prerogative of the identity 
subjects (the individuals) to define or choose. They w re self-assigned as well as self-asserted. 
Seals were only known to be associated to their authors by people who were exposed to them in 
their social contexts or have some relationship to them. Their scope and force of projection 
extended only as far as go the prior knowledge or assumptions held by their target or potential 
audience. They are less helpful as identity token outside of their context of repute. Therefore, 
seals hardly resolve the question of the identificaon of an individual spotted among a crowd of 
anonyms.  
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A medieval postscript: Institutional consequences 
This postscript to the medieval part of this investigation is intended to indicate not all but a few 
institutional changes brought about by the tumultuous period of the Investiture Controversy and 
its aftermath. The choice of highlighting these changes is guided by the notion that the national 
state and its apparatus did not suddenly emerge from a blank slate (or a t bula rasa) thanks to the 
18th century revolutions – not only political but also intellectual such as the Enlightenment. The 
retained following changes relate to the constitution of the state as a corporation and as a national 
territorial unit later on. A few fundamental ideas and practices developed from the late 12th
century to the 14th century, which will enable the constitution of the national state (Canning 
1988) and much later the very notion of nationality. As we know, there is no more defining 
attribute for the modern state than its national boundaries, and no more justifying attribute than 
that of nationality for the national state to claim the authority to identify all citizens on “its” 
territory. Without getting too deep into the intricacies of theological and juristic exegeses, it is 
perhaps worth noting that there is a whole body of scholarly works that trace and analyze those 
transfers and lineages between the two spheres under the title of “political theology,” including 
authors such as Ernst Kantorowicz and Pierre Legendre66. 
In the wake of the Controversy, a number of institutional changes began to take place. 
Starting in the 13th century, European princes engaged in a process of transfers of the Church 
authority concepts and attributes to their own reign and institutions. It appears as if the 
Controversy not only ignited a power struggle between the religious and the secular order, but it 
                                                 
66 Among other works, the latter is the author of a monograph non-available in English, but whose title and subtitle may 
be translated as: “The Political Desire of God: Study on the assemblages of the state and the law” (Legendre 1988). 
Legendre also calls his approach “dogmatic anthropology” or rather, the anthropology of institutional dogmas as he 
studies human (western) society through the lens of the founding values (dogmas) of its defining institutions through its 
legal history and across the genealogy of contemporary institutions. 
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set in motion a process of reciprocal assimilation between the two spheres by the end of the 12th 
century. On the one hand, the church focused a great deal of its attention on the legal and 
political dimensions of its organizational structure, on the other hand secular rulers began to shift 
from a Christ-based kingship to a law-based kingship by riding the wave of the revival occurring 
in Roman Law studies. Kings sought to harness the contribution of a number of genius jurists, 
emerging from the 13th and the 14th centuries, in order to perpetuate their attributes as absolute 
and sacred rulers. In the following, I shall pinpoint a few main themes around which those 
developments crystallized. 
Absolutism and the principle of sovereignty: judge of all but judged by none 
Monarchs, probably learning their lessons from the Controversy, resolved not to rely on 
the established Church as basis for their legitimacy. Instead they turned to the apparent success 
of the Roman law as an instrument of government, and then invested the law with such 
solemnity and gravitas that match the Church’s own as they had experienced.  
This legalism began in the twelfth century when the king’s quasi-sacerdotal character no longer was 
legitimized exclusively as an effluence of unction and altar, but as an effluence of the gravity of Roman 
Law which styled judges acerdotes iustitiae, “Priests of Justice.” (Kantorowicz 1955: 72) 
In effect, while taking some distance from the institutional Church, secular princes gladly tapped 
into the latter’s symbolic and discursive resources in order to try and build an alternate order of 
legitimacy. Notably, they retained the symbols of high-priesthood and elevated judges and 
lawyers to a rank that assimilates them to ecclesiastical ministers of Justice,67 or at the very least, 
priests of the law. Kantorowicz identifies King James I of the kingdoms of England and Scotland 
(r. 1603 – 1625) as an outcome of that process, who was the personification of “pontifical 
                                                 
67 As Kantorowicz (1955: 72) reminds us that at the time ‘Justice’ stood for ‘Government’ or ‘State.’  
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monarchy” in his assertion of the absolute state as part of the “mysteries of state” exercised by 
the monarch and which shall not be questioned. It is o herwise considered a sacrilege to 
challenge what the king calls, “my Prerogative or mystery of State” (Kantorowicz 1955: 68 f.)  
 Concurrent to the absolutist view, the supreme commander in the realm came to be 
defined with variant formulations of the same principle, from 14th century Baldus’s statement 
“ruler because he rules others and is ruled by none” to 17th century Salmasius’s “He is a king in 
the proper sense of the word, who judges all and is judged by none” (Kantorowicz 1955: 75 f.) 
Those statements were not foreign to the universal jurisdiction previously claimed by the papacy, 
particularly Popes Gregory VII and Boniface VIII, itself connected, according to Kantorowicz, to 
the first epistle to Corinthians 2, 15.68 (Idem) 
Corporation 
 One of the most significant conceptual transfers and institutional transformations that 
occurred at the time relates to the concept of “c rpus mysticum.” The phrase corpus mysticum 
was a hardly secularized echo to the Pauline concept of Corpus Christi.    
Whereas the concept of the church as the corpus Christi goes back to St. Paul (I Cor., 12, 12), the term 
corpus mysticum has no biblical tradition. … Corpus mysticum first appeared in Carolingian times, and it 
then refers not at all to the church, or to the oneness and unity of the Christian society, but to the Eucharist. 
It designated the consecrated host, the mystical body of Christ. This, with a few exceptions, remained the 
official meaning of corpus mysticum until the middle of the twelfth century, that is, until well after the 
                                                 
68 “The spiritual person judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one.” (English Standard Version 2001) at 
http://biblos.com 
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dispute about transubstantiation which is connected with the name of Berengar of Tours.69 (Kantorowicz 
1951: 484)   
There are two separate storylines here: the first one which is as old as the Roman 
Catholic Church consists in representing the living Church, meaning the collective of Christian 
believers, as the body of Christ (Corpus Christi); the other one underlines the mystical 
dimension of the so-called “real presence” of the body of Christ in the Eucharistic host (Corpus 
mysticum). During the hundred-year Investiture Controversy and its debates about signs, there 
was a tension between, on the one hand, those like Ber ngar “who tended to spiritualize and 
mystify the Sacrament of the Altar” and, on the other and, those driving the institutional Church 
“to stress most emphatically not the spiritual or mystical but the real presence of the human 
Christ in the Eucharist” (idem). One advocated for the restrain of rational explanation and for 
considering the Eucharist as one of the legitimate mysteries of faith; the other obstinately sought 
to rationalize the mystery of this sacrament through the Aristotel-ish concept of 
transubstantiation. As part of a push back against the mysticism party, the Church resorted to 
alternate phrases. 
The Sacrament now was termed the corpus verum or corpus naturale, or simply the corpus Christi, the 
name under which also the feast of Corpus Christi was instituted in the Western Church, in 1264. That is to 
say, the Pauline term originally designating the Christian church, now began to designate the host, whereas 
the notion corpus mysticum, hitherto used to describe the host, was gradually tr nsferred, after 1150, to the 
church as an organized body. It was finally through Pope Boniface VIII [r. 1294 – 1303] and the bull Unam 
sanctam that the doctrine of the church as “one mystical body the head of which is Christ” (unum corpus 
mysticum cuius caput Christus) was defined and dogmatized. (Idem, p. 484-5) 
                                                 
69 I am adding here the biblical passage referenced, 1 Cor. 12, 12: “For just as the body is one and has many members, 
and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ.” (English Standard Version 2001). 
One may also take note of 12, 27 in the same Corinthians book: “Now you are the body of Christ, and each one of you 
is a part of it.” (New International Version 1984) all retrieved at http://www.biblos.com 
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Along with the issue of absolutism (sovereign and uiversal jurisdiction) the question of corpus 
mysticum defines a field where the reciprocal assimilation I refer to earlier plays out most 
clearly, as related changes went on in parallel from both sides. The Church began to find itself in 
the position of counterpart to the emerging political structures, that is, as “body politic or a 
political organism on one level with the secular bodies politic which by that time began to assert 
themselves as self-sufficient communities” (idem, p. 485). Being a conceptual category based on 
mystical thought, the notion of corporation became a powerful tool for the legal rationalization 
of the world of social aggregates or collectives.  
While the lofty idea of the church as corpus mysticum cuius caput Christus filled itself with secular 
corporational and legal contents, the secular state, striving after its own exaltation and quasi-religious 
glorification, itself adopted the term “body mystical” and used it for its own justification and its own 
ends… The lawyers began to distinguish five or more c rpora mystica – village, city and province, realm 
and universe. Baldus defined the populus not simply as the individuals of a community, but as “men 
assembled into one mystical body” (hominum collectio in unum corpus mysticum). And in England as well 
as in France the terms corpus politicum and corpus mysticum were used, without clear distinction, to 
designate the people and the state. (Kantorowicz 1951: 486) 
Once it took off from its roots in the theological sphere, the construction of the legal 
concept of corporation as applicable to the state proceeds with a number of metaphors, starting 
with a moral and political marriage between the king a d the realm, between the prince and the 
republic. That metaphor became prominent in the legal discourse about kingship during the 16th 
century. According to Kantorowicz these references originated from the Commentaries of 
Justinian Codex by the Neapolitan jurist Lucas de Penna (ca. 1320 – ca. 1390). 
There is contracted a moral and political marriage between the prince and the respublica. 
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Also, just as there is contracted a spiritual and divine marriage between a church and its prelate, so is
there contracted a temporal and terrestrial marriage between the Prince and the State. (Lucas de Penna via 
Kantorowicz 1955: 78) 
This legal thought will progressively become institutionalized through a number of practices, 
notably the coronation rituals where in the 16th century symbols of the king’s authority will be 
integrated in a wedding narrative. 
On the accession of Henry II of France, in 1547, there was introduced into the French Coronation Order a 
rubric before and after the bestowal of the ring, saying that by this ring “the king solemnly married his
realm,”… (idem, p. 76) 
This metaphor of marriage builds on a long-running theme whereby the bishop is thought 
of to be married to his see or the Christ to the Churc , on the basis of Ephesians 5, 25.70 A 
variation of the same idea was originally expressed by St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage (3rd 
century) and quoted during the 12th century in the Gratian’s Decretum as follows: “The Bishop is 
in the Church, and the Church in the Bishop” (idem, p. 79).71 The transference of this as a 
metaphor into the secular realm will generate a discursive evolution that clearly comes off from 
the following quotes (Kantorowicz 1955: 78 ff. and passim) which I have selected and lined up 
in a roughly chronological order.  
1. “The Bishop is in the Church, and the Church in the Bishop.” (St. Cyprian and Gratian’s Decretum) 
                                                 
70 “Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her,”… See also Eph. 5, 23 (the part 
that states: “…as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior.”) and 5, 30 (“because we are 
members of his body.”) From the English Standard Version (2001) of the Bible available at http://www.biblos.com 
71 Another variation of a biblical verse at John 14, 10: “Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in 
me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority, but the Father who dwells in me does his works.” 
(Idem) 
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2. Two are the bodies of Christ: the human material body which he assumed from the Virgin, and the 
spiritual collegiate body, the college of the Church. (Teaching of 12th century Simon of Tournai, 
among others, p. 90) 
3. “Also, just as the church is in the prelate and the prelate in the church…, so is the Prince in the 
respublica, and the respublica in the Prince.” (Adaptation of St. Cyprian to secular sphere by Lucas de 
Penna; other 14th and 15th century jurists will do the same.) 
4. “And just as men are joined together spiritually in the spiritual body, the head of which is Christ …, so 
are men joined together morally and politically in the respublica, which is a body the head of which is 
the Prince.” (Lucas de Penna, quoted p. 81) 
5. “The king in his body politic is incorporated with his subjects, and they with him.” (Saying attributed 
to English Crown jurists under Queen Elizabeth) 
6. The king is “a body corporate in a body natural, and  body natural in a body corporate.” (Sir Francis 
Bacon: 1561 – 1626) 
7. “The king, as a King, never dies.” (English jurists of the 16th century) 
8. “The King never dies.” (End 16th century France) 
The above quotes comprise a dual thematic: one thematic dimension that is of union 
(between a head and a body) and the other dimension is one of duality (of a mortal body and a 
non-mortal body.) The latter came to be known as the doctrine of the king’s “two bodies” – 
albeit in one individual – in the juristic discourse of the late Tudor period, toward the end of the 
16th century. It was believed that behind any individual king, rests the virtue that makes him 
kingly – the source of his dignity of kinghood. This is known as the Dignitas of rulers, which 
justify that the king “never dies,” even if the particular individual holding that office at some 
point in time may die as any human.   
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The commentaries and works of Lucas de Penna were instrumental in that development 
toward the state as a corporation in legal sense.72 With that notion, the state was set to become 
increasingly a collective political entity rather than the realm over which reigns the will of one 
absolute sovereign. As a result of a progressive judicialization of the concept of corpus 
mysticum, the realm or the respublica is now discursively articulated as a body politic, he head 
and the members of which are the king and his subjects, respectively – what Kantorowicz (1951: 
483) calls the “organological concept of the state.” The doctrinal developments brought about by 
the revival of the study of the Roman law in the 13th century reached their full expression by the 
middle of the century when 
the great lawyer-pope Innocent IV [r. 1243 – 1254] introduced or elaborated the notion of the persona ficta, 
the fictitious or (as we would call it) juristic person, that abstraction of any aggregate of man – corporation, 
community, or dignity – without which modern society could not easily exist. (Kantorowicz 1951: 486)  
This brings to completion a series of conceptual innovations that will fully enable the legal 
codification of any business involving a collective of people and institutions as one. 
The Patria and the Fisc: rediscovering the fatherland 
Another transference operated by secular rulers was that of an antique notion which had 
disappeared from the medieval secular politics so far – the notion of patria – following a pattern 
set out by the crusades as wars in the defense of the Holy Land. Kantorowicz argues that the 
ancient saying “pro patria mori”  which celebrates in the Greek and Roman antiquity the capital 
sacrifice of a man in the battlefield for his community or his fatherland was not referenced in the 
                                                 
72 The corporational dimension, starting from the view of the church as corpus Christi and leading to the organological 
concept of the state, is illustrated (and somewhat evidenced) by the frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan (published in 
1651) by Abraham Bosse. The etching represents the bust of a giant overhanging the valley and the realm, wearing a 
crown and holding in one hand a sword and in the other a crosier. A closer look reveals that the torso and arms of the 
giant are composed of hundreds of human beings (see “Leviathan” at http://en.wikipedia.org). 
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political discourse of early Middle Ages dominated by the personalization of authority. Before 
the end of the 12th century, knights and warlords could sacrifice their life for the person of the 
sovereign, not for a notion such as “the eternal” France or Spain or any other land.  
As we have seen, personal ties and allegiances preceded the physical space and were 
overarching in the structuring of the political one i  most of the Middle Ages. At the turn of the 
first millennium they were central to the medieval po itical institutions, much more than formal 
territorial boundaries, and they will remain so for about the following three centuries. The 
medieval Christian notion of patria is one that was defined in Augustinian terms as a heavenly 
land – the “City of God” or patria aeterna, which in that context was the only one worth dying 
for (while pagans and miscreants from Athena to Rome were consumed with the vanity of dying 
for an earthly piece of land.) During the 13th century, that will begin to change. That change will 
be driven by two related factors: the need to levy a tax to fund non-religious wars and the 
justification of such wars. 
The feudal aids which were due on three occasions – ransom for the feudal lord, knighting of his eldest son, 
dowry of his eldest daughter – were personal lordly taxes which had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
country, nation, or patria in either an ancient or a modern sense. (Kantorowicz 1951: 477-8)    
Kantorowicz identifies the emergence of a fourth type of tax at the end of the 13th century, which 
is more related to one of the functions for which the modern state will later claim monopoly. 
Citing Joseph Strayer’s 1949 opuscule titled “Defense of the Realm and Royal Power in France,” 
Kantorowicz reminds us that in the 12th century, Louis VI of France facing an imminent attack 
from his neighbor across the Rhine made gifts to the church in order to secure divine favors and 
protection. The king 
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went to St. Denis, took the Oriflamme from the altar, offered prayers pro defensione regni, and made grants 
to the abbey dedicated to St. Denis, the patron saint of France and the dynasty. That is to say, “for the 
defense of the realm” divine help was needed, and it was secured by giving to the church. At the end of the 
thirteenth century, however, the proportions were definitely reversed. Pro defensione regni the king no 
longer gave; he took. He imposed a tax to meet the em rgency of the realm, and pro necessitate regni he 
imposed the tax also on the church. (Kantorowicz 1951: 478)     
Not only did this new tax follow the patterns of the crusading taxes but the secular rulers 
adopted the same rhetoric used by the medieval church in the framing and the justification of the 
crusades. The secular rulers figured that if the papacy was able to frame the crusades as 
defensive wars for the protection of the Holy Land, they themselves should be able to apply the 
same to the “native fatherland” as well. This even went to the extreme where some of the clergy 
assimilated France to the Holy Land in the bellicose enterprise of Philip IV (Kantorowicz 1951: 
483).That is how the term patria, with its ancient, “patriotic” bend, re-emerged in the medieval 
political context and will subsequently be reclaimed as the defining, territorial substratum in the 
construction of the national state. 
 The theme of the union of a head and a body and the metaphor of the political and moral 
marriage between the Prince and the state elaborated on by Lucas de Penna (as we saw earlier) 
actually emerged while he was discussing issues of land propriety and the fisc (idem, p. 78). This 
theme will then be used by 16th century French lawyers to frame the relationship of the sovereign 
to the demesne. As patrimonial estate, the domain is now being interpreted to be the dowry of the 
state in the marriage of the king to the realm (Kantorowicz 1955: 71), with statements such as 
this: 
the king’s power over the domain and the fisc was only that which a husband had over the dowry of his 
wife: “The domain is the dowry inseparable from thepublic state.” (Kantorowicz 1955: 77) 
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It used to be said the domain belongs to the fisc as well as to God and as a consequence any 
piece of land that did not have declared property rights was by default owned by the fisc and 
God. The notion of an association between God and the fisc appears as early as St. Augustine 
who refers to the fiscus of Christus. Then later in response to questions regarding the opulence of 
the Church, particularly the papacy during the time of Pope John XXII (r. 1316 – 1334), 
arguments were made about the Christ having a fisc and therefore the legitimacy of the Church 
to own property (idem, p. 84 f.)  
Starting from late 13th century however, legal theorists will take their cues out of the 
Gratian’s Decretum where it is inscribed that “What is not received by Christus, is exacted by the 
Fiscus” (idem, p. 84). By the 15th century, this statement became like a proverb. 
In 1441, in a law suit tried before the Court of the Exchequer, John Paston, then a Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas …dropped quite casually a strange remark: “What is not snatched by Christus, is snatched 
by the Fiscus.” (Kantorowicz 1955: 83) 
The perpetuity of the two institutions, the ecclesiae and the fiscus, was emphasized as a 
significant common feature in this legal thinking, which commanded “the inalienability of both 
ecclesiastical and fiscal property” (idem, p. 85). Furthermore, the ubiquity and omnipresence of 
the fisc endows it with a godly nature, in the eye of some jurists such as Baldus. To that extent 
and particularly based on its perpetuity, lawyers considered that “the fisc never dies” just like the 
ecclesiae and the king. 
With the metaphors of marriage and dowry, the king emerges more distinctly as the head 
of a household. While it may be true that “what is not received by Christus, is exacted by the 
Fiscus,” the domain now falls under the responsibility of the fisc only, which Baldus calls “the 
soul of the state” (idem, p. 86) due to its immortality, and as such it no longer belongs to God but 
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to the king (this was to be expected due precisely to the distance secular rulers had started taking 
vis-à-vis the Church as a power.) The latter may use the patrimonial estate as a landowner but he 
is also expected to exercise a duty of care over it.  
He [Lucas de Penna] interpreted the fisc as the dowry f the respublica, and maintained that the husband 
was entitled only to use, but not to alienate, the property of his wife. He further paralleled the vows, 
exchanged by groom and bride at their marriage, to the oaths, taken by kings at their coronation and by 
bishops at their ordination, by which both promise not to alienate property belonging to the fisc and to the 
church respectively. (Kantorowicz 1955: 82-83) 
 These legal – both discursive and practical – assemblages of authority and institutions 
coming straight from the medieval church will shape th  circumstances from which the national 
state progressively will emerge. Meanwhile at the term of that process of reciprocal assimilation 
between the church and the state, both institutions eventually took on something of the other one. 
The reverse side of the application of theological language to secular institutions was, on the one had, that 
the fisc and the state machinery eventually did become godlike, whereas, on the other hand, God and Christ 
were demoted to mere symbols of legal fiction in order to expound the ubiquity and eternity of the fictitious 
person called Fisc. (Idem, p. 87) 
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CHAPTER 5 
The National State and Government ID 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I am going to analyze the historical accounts of the origins and evolution of the 
government-issued traveler’s passport up to its international stabilization as both a travel 
document and an identity credential. This is done with a view to addressing the following 
question: How did identity credentials issued by the national state historically emerge and 
become authoritative? Starting with the early occurrences of identity records in the medieval 
west and practice of letter of safe-conduct, the narrative moves through the emergence of the 
notion of passport as a way of authorizing and documenting movements, then to its international 
standardization. Then I pay a close attention to the premises and related documentary practices 
which the reliability of the international passport itself is based on. In the process we will see 
how the formation of the modern state became intertwined with the emergence of the nation as 
formative of a quality or attribute of individuals, in other words, the emergence of the concept of 
nationality. I argue that nationality is the locus of a reciprocal process whereby the state 
“naturalizes” itself as a nation while (the) people ar  ascribed to the institution of the state. The 
transition towards the territory as the ultimate basis and one of the primary determinants of the 
authority to define the configuration of obligations and rights, in opposition to personal ties as 
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we previously saw in the early feudalism, also signifies that impersonal procedures had to be put 
in place to reflect and sustain a similar mode of affiliation. This requires objective facts such as, 
for instance, ‘place of birth’ or ‘place of residenc ,’ which may lead an individual to different 
identity pathways with different institutional configurations. Lastly, the history of the passport 
thus sketched is supplemented by a case study of the emergence of the French national identity 
card with a view to adding a national perspective to an international standardization process both 
towards the similar outcome of establishing an authoritative identity credential.  
5.2 Emergence of Written Identity and the Passport 
A basic way people may identify a person to other people who are unfamiliar with the target 
individual is through description. And as we may imagine, oral descriptions must have been the 
most common way before the adoption of writing as technique of administration and more 
importantly the expansion of literacy in the society at large. Descriptions may be offered by 
anyone who just saw even once the individual being looked for. The development of towns 
following that of trade in the 13th century most likely increased the mobility of populations as 
compared to the earlier medieval peasantry and fiefom. As more and more people gained the 
capability to move at further and further distances,73 wouldn’t there be a need for potential 
counterparts to be able to ascertain their identity in order to avoid deception and frauds? 
Identification requires that there is enough information available in a context so that the subject 
to be identified would most likely be the unique one matching that information. Outside any 
standard format enabling that achievement, descriptions of individuals in a free format, whether 
oral or in written, would have to get longer and longer, adding more traits in order to refine their 
                                                 
73 We saw in the medieval chapter that the Church itself developed as a transnational organization thanks to the 
improvements of transportation and communication infrastructures at that time. 
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granularity and increase their specificity, thus the likelihood of accurate identification. That is 
what eventually happened. 
Detailed descriptions began appearing only slowly in very late fourteenth-century and early fifteenth-
century texts” (Groebner 2007: 75).  
It was then a common practice to associate a person to some categories or attributes on 
the basis of their appearance and visual cues. Clothes were still treated as identity attributes, just
as any bodily signs or marks.  
These descriptions of outward appearance blur the distinction between clothes and bodies. It was the 
outward appearance that made the person. (Groebner 2007: 76)  
Not only were the styles available to any given individual not so many or diverse but 
furthermore, clothes were an apparatus and an indication of the class orders. As such it was not 
unusual for clothing to be “regulated by municipal and territorial dress codes” (Ibid.).  
Written records then improved identification procedures in some ways: they provided a 
stable reference point, and could be consulted or retrieved at a later time; they were less 
dependent on any particular individuals, in local or transient contexts, at every instance of use; 
and fairly accurate copies could also be made to keep or displace.  
A standardized system of identification and recognitio  (...) is distinguished therefore both by the stability 
and replicability of its operations and by their relative invisibility, in contrast to older more public regimes 
that were sustained by the distinctively clothed anmarked body and by individual face-to-face encounters. 
And (...) this new system of identity documents represented the addition of official authentication and 
verification to recognition alone. This was a crucial development in a society of increasing size, mobility, 
and anonymity, and it was also part of an older and much broader movement toward a culture of 
documentary proofs in official and judicial transactions. (Caplan 2001: 50-51) 
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With that, identity was set to become a document and an entry in a register, that is, more 
about recording and record keeping, which in the same time increases the potential geographical 
reach of its effects, with the desire and the expectation to be able to control the corresponding 
social space and maintain order.  
These identification documents gave rise to a new fiction: the surveillance and ordering of a chaotic world 
by a nearly total administration mean to enable identification via record keeping. (Groebner 2007: 12) 
With regard to ascertaining individuals’ identity, however, written records quickly raised 
problems, too. The standardization involved in individual identity systems includes some 
paradox, given the fact that a system cannot account f r the evolving subjective identity of the 
individual (unless subjective traits can be captured in impersonal terms, as commonly 
understandable attributes, and updated fairly regularly.) As Caplan (2001: 51) points out,  
in virtually any systematics of identification, everyone is not only ‘himself’ but also potentially the 
embodiment of a type, and in an important respect the history of identification is a history not so much of 
individuality as of categories and their indicators.  
Thus, to establish identity, which relies on uniqueness, the system designers have to capture the 
individual through general categories while making sure (or hoping) that the pieces of 
information they collect on each individual in relation to those categories, bundled together, 
provide a precise enough picture pointing to that ex ct individual, not anyone else. By providing 
or documenting for each individual the specific value of each one of those general types, identity 
systems, it seems, rely on the triangulation of those categories documented in order to 
authenticate the presence or agency of each individual concerned, that is, literally, of each and 
every given body. As Beatrice Fraenkel aptly puts it,  
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One ends by granting that identity is at the same ti hat which distinguishes an individual from others 
and that which assimilates him to others. (Fraenkel 1992: 197, transl. J. Caplan in Caplan and Tortpey 
2001: 51)   
As we saw in the chapter on medieval seals, identity artifacts or records have not always 
been in the custody of a central authority. Even before the Renaissance portraits (ages before the 
photograph), laypeople of all status owned seals, and v rious insignia (a few others could add 
coats of arms,) along with some form of related family records, all of which were considered 
reliable identity tokens, at least in the local context of direct knowledge and social reputation. 
However, the increasing institutionalization of social structures and authority required some 
collective and legitimate entities to safeguard the validity of the identity processes and data. The 
earliest registers started doing just that on behalf of social and political institutions of the time:  
compiling indexes and administering registers served highly specific political interests: to affirm the 
judicial power of institutions and individuals striving to fashion tools to bolster their own legitimacy. 
(Groebner 2007: 72)  
The late Middle Ages bequeathed to the following eras the practice of compiling lists of 
names to be associated to a series of persons, in two instances. The first one was related to the 
Church’s rite of confession. “The oldest indexes of names were religious,” Groebner writes 
(2007: 69). In 1215 the Roman Catholic Church required that all believers fulfill the duty of 
confession at least once a year so that they can reeive the Holy Communion. In order to monitor 
the observance of that provision, parishes maintained records and issued a document as a proof 
that a believer completed his or her duty. The second instance, related to the same religious 
authority, was the legal domain which was, as we saw, in the hands of ecclesiastical courts. The 
oldest records of criminal proceedings, establishing a list of offenders and the charges against 
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them, go back to mid thirteenth century (Groebner 2007). Emulating the metaphor of the “Book 
of Life” meant to contain the names of the redeemed, the Inquisition also recorded the names of 
heretics as a counterpart. Later during the same century, municipal registers were created 
primarily to enable courts authority to identify and sentence the right individuals while keeping 
records of decisions and outcomes.  
The practice of listing and registering went on increasing and expanding to new domains. 
That was the case of the tax registers, with the example of “the famous Catasto” in 1427 
Florence. “In the 1440s, cities north of the Alps compiled, mostly in situations of armed conflict 
new and ambitious population tallies” (Groebner 2007: 77). Efforts were then made to count all 
the inhabitants of the city at one point in time, as opposed to a headcount of citizens or male head 
of households only. Registers were also established for specific categories or subsets of the 
population – e.g., “groups below the threshold of citizen’s rights,” including transient 
populations -- who were then “required to swear an o th attesting their acknowledgment of 
municipal authorities and were registered by name.” (Ibid.) 
At the time, only some categories of personnel, such as diplomats, royal envoys or 
messengers, and merchants, were issued letters of safe conduct or introduction letters for their 
trips. However as the history of Europe moved into ts modern phase, the practice was soon to 
evolve from a privilege to an obligation. As a document of passage, bearing the proper 
credentials to be checked at borders before granting access to a different territorial jurisdiction or 
another authority, the precursor of the passport was designed to authenticate both the travelers 
and their goods. It will then evolve into the passport or the laissez-passer, focusing uniquely on 
human individuals.  
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The practices of register (listing) and safe-conduct or any travel document came together 
to effect that change. First, the management of military contingents relied on the use of registers 
as needed to monitor the population of subcontractos and mercenaries and their claims of 
service completion and payment. Outside the privileged categories that previously were issued 
letters of safe-conduct, military was one profession that early started carrying identity-related 
papers, as a way to address the problem of desertion or soldiers leaving their duty station and 
returning on their own initiative. “In 1462, Louis XI issued regulations that required all soldiers 
on leave to carry a document made out by their superior, bearing their name and confirming their 
proper discharge” (Groebner 2007: 174).   
Second, before the fifteenth century the profession of courier was one that both enabled 
and harnessed the mobility of written records.  
A delivered document and its bearer authorized and authenticated each other. From the late fourteenth 
century on, envoys and couriers played a particular role in this development. They were required to swear 
an official oath, were bound to a strict code of professional discretion and secrecy, and were recorded by 
name in special envoy registers. (Groebner 2007: 172)  
Later in June 1464, the king of France Louis XI issued an order that is considered a landmark in 
the genesis and development of the passport. That order was meant to redefine and regulate the 
royal messaging system, and required that identity papers known as passeports be issued and 
handed to the couriers in sealed envelopes. Along their itinerary and at the border checks 
between provinces or relevant regions, the royal postmaster was required to check, stamp, and 
then resealed the documents with the proper official se ls.  
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On arrival at their destination, couriers had to submit their passes so that they could be forwarded to the 
central passport office, where they were deposited in the registre de passeports, ensuring that every 
courier’s journey could be retraced after the fact. (Groebner 2007: 171)  
Finally, the new regulatory regime of messengers apparently proved satisfying enough 
for the practice to be extended to the public and any moving human subjects. From the 1460s, a 
traveler needed not to be a royal envoy or a diplomat to bear a passport. In fact, the new system 
was so successful that it spread to the neighboring Italy and Germanic countries where it was 
adopted, as Groebner (2007) notes, with the exact transliteration of the French term passeport 
into passaporti, passzettel and bassborten, all meaning literally: ‘go through the door’ or 
‘passing the gate’ (in modern French, the term ‘port’  also means the same in English, as in 
‘airport’ or ‘port’ of entry to a country.)  
The notion of passport emerged with the obligation for anyone away from their 
residential location to bear travel papers that can ide tify them. In the same time, we know that 
“identity papers (…) have raised the issue of reproduction and authenticity – that is, of verifiable 
resemblance – ever since they were introduced” (Groebner 2007: 12). In effect, those papers also 
became a powerful focus of interest for pilgrims, merchants and all sorts of travelers, giving rise 
to the proliferation of “doppelgängers” and doubles. The history of identity documents is also 
one of metamorphoses, not the least of which is the initial authoritative act of transforming a 
person into whatever the documents attest, provided that they carry the proper signs:  
These documents transform whoever could produce a sealed letter as proof of personal identity into 
whomever and whatever the document ‘certified.’ (Groebner 2007: 171)  
The passport will face the exact same dilemma as, before it 
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all written forms for registering identification (lists, wanted circulars, descriptions) (…): what was 
committed to writing was immutable, whereas the person described continued to change, not least throug 
the process of registration itself: once a person's description was out in a search warrant, that person had to 
change.  (Groebner 2007: 90)  
The reasoning may not be the same for passports as for some lists which were not related 
to incrimination, but the result was roughly the same in many cases where if the person did not 
have to change, the document did. From the perspective of the population of subjects (or users, 
shall we say today) identity documents were nothing more than the token for a right, or the 
realization of an aspiration -- the right to move around freely, as much as possible, without 
hassle. There was not much relevance to the holder wh ther the information in the documents 
actually refers to him or not, as long as the agents of authority might think so. As Terence Cave 
(1988: 245) puts it: “The recognition sign is a synecdoche. Without this synecdochic sêmeion, 
difference cannot be resolved into identity; the token proclaims as unique an individual which 
cannot on its own sufficiently make good its uniqueness.” In many instances, it was the authority 
that had an interest in establishing that uniqueness while the subjects were comfortable with 
keeping their profile blurred in the eyes of the authority. The institution then risks becoming its 
own dupe, and always has to manage that risk in every effort of identification. Moving 
identification from a live but varying description f persons based on immediate experience to a 
depiction that is immutable but mediated through representation in and by a document, subjects 
of flesh and bones were in a sense ready to become subj cts of papers – as long as the papers 
bear the proper signs, – whereas the intent was to have the papers bear witness of “who” the 
former were, in the first place.  
This (…) is the function of the identity document: it is the portable token of an originary act of bureaucratic 
recognition of the 'authentic object' --an 'accurate description' of the bearer recognized and signed by an 
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accredited official, and available for repeated acts of probative ratification. The experience of self-sameness 
is thus never unmediated, either subjectively or objectively; it operates through a system of signs and 
recognitions that intrudes alterity into the heart of identity. (Caplan 2001: 51) 
It quickly became clear that just recording and regist ring could not suffice to address the 
possibility (and the fact) of a discrepancy between the documents and the actual person. As 
Groebner (2007: 91, italics added) clearly points out, the question becomes: “how then could 
individuals be identified, named, and denoted reliably and authoritatively beyond written 
registration?” The above mentioned dilemma leading to this persisting paradox of written 
records invited to devise mechanisms of authentication, hat is, to secure processes of recognition 
enabling a strong “act of probative ratification.”  For those records could defeat the purpose of 
the identity document which apparently was predicated on the unwarranted expectation that each 
person will hold on to their legitimate papers and, equally unrealistic, that the information 
included will be singular enough to pass muster as proof of uniqueness for only one person, in 
other words, to serve as basis for the accurate recognition of the intended subject. Early 
administrative practices acknowledged the same challenge: 
“Late medieval bureaucracies authenticated the legal documents they composed and duplicated by using 
the scribe’s token or colophon. In its simplest form, the token consisted of the scribe’s signature. Th  
colophon could also include graphic signs, anagrams, or puzzles, or even more protracted messages, as with 
the anonymous fifteenth-century Florentine copyist who added his motto ‘Omnium rerum vicissitudo est’ -- 
'all things are subject to change' -- to the words he had copied.” (Groebner 2007: 90)  
The issue could only amplify with a generalization of identification documents such as 
the passport. In the meantime, different reasons threa ened the very existence of the passport. 
Even when all citizens and other subjects were requi d to carry identification papers, their 
meaning still differed depending on the social status of the bearer: for some, it was still a mark of 
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privilege that gave them the right of passage (quite literally, a laissez-passer) while for others it 
was an instrument of subjugation and control as well as a source of harassment. At that point, it 
was obvious that the French revolution could only get rid of that instrument of domination of the 
people by the most powerful. However, the revolutionaries will quickly learn the virtues of 
identity papers for maintaining social order, and thus their appeal to whoever turns out to be in 
the seat of the prince.  
“By the late eighteenth century, the regime of identification and the identity papers it enforced had come to 
symbolize an arbitrary and bureaucratic coercive state: the French revolutionaries of 1789 abolished t 
detested royal passport of 1623 and 1669 and proclaimed every citizen’s right to come and go as he or she 
pleased. Their enthusiasm, however, was short-lived. With the republic under threat, new and stricter 
passport legislation was enacted already in 1792. With the establishment of the “état-civil” on September 
20, 1792, a person was no longer registered in the local parish registers under church jurisdiction, but y a 
state registration system subject to central administrat on.” (Groebner 2007: 228)  
Furthermore, new legislations put into effect in 1794 and 1803 forbid to change one’s 
name as assigned and recorded at birth, at risk of harsh sentences. Gérard Noiriel (1993), French 
historian, argues that the birth of the état-civil on September 20, 1792, was also that of 
centralized administrative registration, identificat on, and modern citizenship (see also: Noiriel 
2001 for a translation in abridged version). It is remarkable that since the high Middle Ages, 
when priests were in charge of the civil registration, only information about Catholics had been 
entered in the registers, which were treated as an appendix to religious prescriptions and rituals. 
It became clear, though, that it was necessary to register everybody at least for the purpose of 
civil order, and consequently, that it would be self-d feating to continue to exclude categories 
such as Jews and Protestants, or any other for that matter. So shortly before the French 
revolution,  
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an edict of 1787 authorized non-Catholics to affirm their civil status to the local judge or priest. Even 
before the Revolution, the secularization of civil status was widely considered to be crucial to the ord r and 
welfare of society. (Noiriel 2001: 29)  
This clearly indicates that as far as identification is concerned, the figure of the citizen – 
an individual by and with civil status – then took ver the figure of the believer, and a shift 
occurred from the religious claim to define boundaries and identities to the political one. This 
preluded the rising profile of the civil status and nineteenth century’s flourishing municipal 
administration as the secular successor of the medieval officium or ministerium ecclesiasticum 
(Wolter 1997) and the embryo of the bureaucratic modern state. 
5.3 Expansion of the modern passport 
In this section, I provide a view of the situation that prevailed in most of the 19th century Europe 
and at the beginning of the 20th century, characterized by heterogeneity of passport policies or 
lack thereof. Then I reconstitute the processes and decisions that led to an internationally 
recognized type of passport.   
5.3.1 Multiple passport policies 
During the nineteenth century, the adoption of the passport was still sketchy; in fact it was a 
rather minor phenomenon at the world scale. At the tim , the granting of a passport was not 
necessarily predicated on citizenship or nationality – as the rise of the nation-state to political 
pre-eminence in terms of individual allegiance leads to the overlapping of both these terms. 
Martin Lloyd describes in his book The Passport: The history of man’s most travelled document 
how an attempt of assassination on the person of the Emperor Napoleon III on January 14, 1858 
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in front of Paris Opera set in motion a number of events that will impact the ways passports were 
issued going forward. 
 The individual identified as having committed that assassination attempt was Count 
Felice Orsini, an Italian – or more precisely a Piedmontese – revolutionary fighting for the 
unification of Italy. He escaped prison and fled to England (via Switzerland) from where he will 
enter France with a British passport. Here is how the author describes the passport of the time: 
The passport of the day was not the neat modern booklet complete with photograph and description with 
which we are now familiar. It was most likely to bea single sheet of paper, headed by a coat of arms nd 
printed with an ornamental script requesting in florid language that the owner be allowed to pass 
unhindered in the name of the monarch or state. It would be issued to any applicant who was able to 
provide an acceptable reference and the requisite fee. The ‘Passport System’, as it was referred to inhe 
nineteenth century, has as many detractors as promoters. 
In Britain, the system was generally reviled by the public. They resented the bureaucracy involved in 
acquiring a passport, even though it was usually issued within twenty-four hours, and they resented th 
affront to thir dignity in holding a document whose v ry existence implied that the bona fides of an English 
gentleman could ever be put in doubt  (Lloyd 2003: 6)  
While England did not require passport for entry to its territory, unfortunately for English people 
they most likely have to carry one while traveling to continental Europe because their main 
neighbors across the Channel did. While France already had a detailed set of identification 
requirements and a complex bureaucratic infrastructu e74 for checking the passport of foreigners 
arriving in its ports, the English passport would include for the description of the bearer as little 
information as ‘British Subject’ or ‘English Gentleman.’ Other particularities of the British 
                                                 
74 As we saw earlier in section 4.1, this is inherited from a long practice dating before the 1789 Revolution. 
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passport was that it was expensive (by comparison foreign passports were generally free of 
charge) and it required to “either know the Foreign Secretary personally, know someone who did 
or have a recommendation from a banking house of repute” (idem, p. 10). 
 In preparation for his travel to France, Orsini applied for passport to the Sardinian 
Consulate General in London – the jurisdiction of which he depended on due to his place of birth 
in the Principality of Piedmont then part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. His application was 
declined due to fears related to his revolutionary recent past, although the travel destination he 
provided was on the territory of Sardinia his home country.   
A modern day traveller would be scandalised to be refused a passport by his own country, especially if the 
passport were intended to permit him to return home to visit his family. No doubt Orsini was incommoded 
but this was not the only route to a passport. Strange as it may seem, it was quite legal for any person to go 
to the French or Belgian consulate and obtain one of their passports for travel. The applicant did noteed to 
be a national of the respective country. (Idem, p. 10) 
 Eventually, Orsini arranged for a British passport in the name of one of his accomplices who 
was a British Subject – a passport which ironically was signed by then (at the time of the 
assassination attempt) Prime Minister Lord Palmerston as it turned he was the Foreign Secretary 
at the date of issuance of that passport. This incident led to an uproar between the two countries, 
with on the one hand French people pointing the finger to England for harboring “terrorists” (as 
we would have probably said today) and letting them run loose with travel documents, and on 
the other hand the English upset that France is trying to tell them how to run their country. 
On 5 February 1858, the French government announced that it was ceasing immediately the arrangement 
whereby it issued passports to British subjects. The Earl of Clarendon, the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, indicated that he welcomed this move and wished other countries would follow suit. Two 
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days earlier he had enlarged the group of people who could recommend an applicant for a Foreign Office 
passport to include mayors, chief magistrates and justices of the peace. This measure was necessary to 
absorb the greater demand expected from the increase in the number of applicants. (Lloyd 2003: 16-17) 
On the diplomatic front, nothing was resolved despite the Prime Minister’s effort: 
Palmerston’s efforts at conciliation were almost doomed to failure from the start by the differing 
administrative backgrounds of the two countries. The French people were accustomed to having to prove 
their identity upon demand and could not understand how such dangerous exiles and conspirators could be 
allowed to walk the streets freely unless there were some tacit indulgence on the part of the British 
government. (Idem, p. 19)   
In addition however, France also suspended a passport waiver measure that was previously in 
place in order to facilitate visits between the coastal towns on both sides of the Channel: Dover 
and Folkestone on Britain’s side and Calais and Boulogne on France’s side.  The result was 
enough chaotic for the Prime Minister to attempt to pass a Conspiracy to Murder bill, hoping to 
appease France by making such conspiracy punishable as a crime and not as a simple demeanor 
like any other conspiracy for minor things. In the end, the attempt came under heavy criticism. 
The Conspiracy to murder bill was defeated … on 19 February 1858, as a consequence, Palmerston’s 
government was forced to resign, which it did on the 22nd. As a result of the Thomas Allsop passport used 
in the assassination attempt, the protocol for issuing a passport was permanently changed: there was never 
to be a return to the situation where one state could issue a passport that claimed the authority to identify 
the holder as a national of another state. No longer could an Englishman travel on a legally issued Belgian 
or French passport. (Lloyd 2003: 22-23)      
  By the end of the nineteenth century due to the industrial development, the subsequent 
progress in transportation (railroad particularly) and the resulting acceleration of population 
movements, most of the passport laws were relaxed and p ssport requirement were not strictly 
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enforced. The prevailing situation has come to be known as “the laissez faire era in international 
migration” (Torpey 2000: 112).75 However, as is always the case at times of unrest o  
violence/war, the means of controlling who’s who and who goes where reappeared prominently 
at the top of government concerns when the First World War broke out in 1914. France, Britain, 
Germany and Italy, all took new measures more or less adapted at their particular context but 
with two shared goals: tighten for security reasons the control of foreigner populations on their 
soil while in many cases making sure of the availabil ty of nationals of appropriate age range for 
the war efforts.    
 In France, two decrees taken in April 1917 required foreigners above the age of fifteen to 
carry identity cards. Germany enacted and extended to all foreigners certain “emergency clauses 
of the liberal 1867 law” implementing by July 1914 what was supposed to be temporary passport 
restrictions for embarking from and disembarking in Germany. The British government was 
authorized to take the same type of restrictions by the 1914 Alien Restriction Act. While non-
explicitly on any passport requirements… 
…the law put the onus of proving that a person is not an alien on that person, making documentary 
evidence of one’s nationality largely unavoidable, particularly if one did not look or sound ‘British.’ It also 
provided for the possibility of requiring aliens to live, or of prohibiting them from living, in certain areas, 
and of registering with the authorities their place of domicile, change of abode, or movement within te 
UK. (Torpey 2000: 112) 
  At implementation and as the war progressed, identity documentation requirements grew 
more and more detailed. Germany required that the passport include: 
                                                 
75 Unless otherwise indicated, the remainder of this section draws on Torpey (2000).  
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a personal description, photograph, and signature of the bearer, along with an official certification that the 
“bearer is actually the person represented in the photograph.” (Idem, p. 113) 
The visa requirement went from all foreign entering the German territory to all people, national 
or foreigner, entering or leaving the territory by mid-1916.  
An … order detailed, with stereotypically German precision, by and to who German passports could be 
issued, the information they were to include, a standard passport form, the acceptable form of a foreign 
passport (which was supposed to conform to all the crit ria of a German passport, including photograph, 
etc.), the form of a personal identity document (Personalausweis) acceptable in place of a passport, and the 
terms and conditions for the issuance of visas, depending on whether these were for exit from, entry into, or 
transit through German territory. (Idem, p. 113) 
Italy having been a regular supplier of workforce to more industrialized countries, the 
first move in terms of controlling migration flows was to void all the identity documents in 
circulation and issue new ones under new policies. On August 6, 1914 a decree made it illegal 
for certain segment of the population susceptible of military service to leave the country. Given 
the social background of the population of conscripts and in the fear that they may find more 
incentives in fleeing the country, the government made the passport requirements harder for 
Italians intending to cross the borders outbound. Passport and visa requirements were also 
enacted for foreigners entering the kingdom. 
The severe law went on to require foreigners to present themselves to public security officials within 
twenty-four hours of their arrival to explain the circumstances of their sojourn in Italy, as well as any 
military obligations which they might owe to the state of which they were nationals. A copy of this written 
declaration was to be sent to district officials reponsible for public security; the declarants received a 
certificate attesting that they have fulfilled the requirements of the law. The papers necessary for moving 
around within Italy as foreigner began to multiply. In addition the law made residents of Italy part of the 
219 
 
 
 
apparatus for keeping watch over foreigners. Anyone, citizen or foreigner, sheltering a foreigner had to 
submit to police officials a list of such persons within five days of their arrival, and within twenty-four 
hours to inform those officials of their departure and ‘the direction they have taken.’ In an indication of the 
growing reliance on modern technology to control movement, the Italians, like the Germans, demanded that 
such passports include a photograph and a signature uth nticated by the issuing authority. (Torpey 2000: 
114-5)       
 As for the Italian citizens themselves, passports requirements only got more stringent as 
the war went on. In 1916, the government suspended issuing passport at all while nationals were 
required to show their passport for both leaving and e tering the kingdom. Even internal 
passports, the policy of which was previously provided for in a public security law of 1889, were 
reenacted in August 1916 by a government order. 
In the United States,76 the same pattern manifested itself starting with an executive order 
of December 15, 1915 requiring a passport before leaving the country. The Congress also 
attempted to make new laws restricting or barring from entry some categories of foreigners. On 
May 22, 1918 the Congress took a law that provided statutory basis for the earlier executive 
order giving the President the power to restrict departure from and entry into the US by 
foreigners.  
In all those countries these measures taken in time of war were meant to be temporary 
and to expire with the exceptional circumstances that commanded them. However, history shows 
that most of them were kept in place after the war, renewed with a June 1919 order in Germany, 
the 1920 Aliens Order in the UK, a decree of May 1920 in Italy. For instance, quoting from the 
UK’s provisions, Torpey writes: 
                                                 
76 In addition to Torpey (2000) who covers the history of passport in most countries where there was one by the 19th 
century, see also Craig Robertson (2010) for a more detailed account specifically focusing on the United States 
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Henceforward, anyone entering or leaving the UK wasrequired to have ‘either a valid passport furnished 
with a photograph of himself or some other document satisfactorily establishing his national status and
identity.’ The passport became the backbone of the system of documentary substantiation used to register 
and keep watch over the movements of aliens in the UK. As in Italy during the war, foreigners in the UK 
were now subject to extensive reporting and documentary requirements, and keepers of inns in which aliens 
might happen to stay were drawn into the apparatus of surveillance over foreigners. The Order also 
mandated the maintenance of a ‘central register of aliens’ under the direction of the Secretary of State. 
(Torpey 2000: 116)    
In the US, too, the Congress updated the 1918 Act the following year by dropping any reference 
to war time and the requirements for leaving the country – while maintaining them for entry. 
5.3.2 Towards a uniform passport worldwide 
While every one of the countries reported in the previous section required a passport for entering 
their territory, including Germany even requiring a specific passport format, provision was 
generally made for alternate solutions – such as “some other document satisfactorily establishing 
[the applicant’s] national status and identity.” There was no conscious effort to harmonize 
passport requirements and formats between countries.  
Between the two World Wars (the League of Nations) 
The earliest attempt at international guidelines for passport occurred with the 
“Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities and Through Tickets” convened by the League 
of Nations in Paris from the 15th to the 21st of October 1920 and focusing on international travel 
issues. In the early 20th century, the common way of long-distance transportati n was the 
railway. The first paragraph of the 1920 Conference resolution makes it clear that railway was 
the transportation infrastructure to keep in mind when it came to regulating about passports and 
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visas as the Committee set out to examine “the methods necessary to facilitate international 
passenger traffic by rail” (League of Nations, 1920: 3). And while doing so, the Committee still 
expressed hope for a return to the pre-War period, lifting all travel-related restrictions enacted 
during wartime. Meanwhile, the Conference made recommendations and provided guidelines 
with regard to travel procedures and documents as applic ble to the international passenger and 
customs. In the main, the propositions of the conference include, among other items, the 
following:  
- Universal uniformity of format for the ordinary passenger passport referred to as 
“international-type passport” (to be distinguished from diplomatic passport left to each country 
to define.) 
- Validity term is either per single journey or two years; 
- Passport fee was not to be considered a tax, and both passports and visas should be issued 
on non-discriminatory basis regarding the nationality of the applicant and the destination country 
(paragraphs 3 and 8). This provision of the article 3 r lated to the nationality of the applicant 
suggests that in the eye of the drafters of the resolution, a government could issue a passport to 
nationals of any country, if it chooses to. In addition, the issuance of visas shouldn’t discriminate 
between the port of entry into or exit from the country issuing the visa (para. 8). 
- It abolishes the exit visa for all non-nationals, and establishes the validity term of a visa 
to the validity of the passport for single-journey passport or to one year; 
- It set a price cap for the entry visa fee to 10 gold francs, while it is 1 gold franc for a 
transit visa. (para. 8 and 11). In general the resolution recommended the application of a 
principle of “equality, reciprocity [between countries for the privileges and rates availed to each 
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other’s nationals], the abolition of individual reductions and total exemptions” regarding passport 
and visa fees. (p. 7, para. 11; see also para. 8). 
The description of the booklet format of the passport is provided in the first annex to the 
resolution. The passport shall contain 32 pages, it reads. The first four pages will include 
information about the issuing country (name and coat of rms) as well as the passport details 
(e.g., passport number, expiration date and countries of validity), the potential number of 
travelers to whom the passport is issued (possibly adding spouse and children to the primary 
holder), their personal information and description, including nationality and photograph(s), etc. 
All of this must be written in two languages: French and the national language of the issuing 
country. The remaining twenty-eight pages are for afixing visas and recording extension of 
validity period, as provided for in the resolution. At issuance, the passport is stamped and signed 
both by its holder and the issuing authority. The dimensions of the document are indicated to be 
“15 ½ x 10 ½ cm.” 
The 1920 resolution also defined the categories of personnel to be granted diplomatic 
passport. These concerned members of government includi g the officials of Foreign Office, the 
President and Vice-President of legislative bodies, diplomatic and consular officials, all with 
their families, plus Cabinet couriers and government envoys in official mission to other 
governments or public international organizations, and “the high dignitaries of the household of a 
Head of States” (League of Nations 1920: 19).   
Twenty-two governments were represented at the 1920Conference. All but three (China, 
Japan and Uruguay) were European countries’. The Secretary-General of the League forwarded 
the resolution to member states and a number of other countries, inviting them to provide 
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feedback as to their position on the recommended measur s and where they stand with regard to 
their implementation if relevant. Some thirty governments replied to this inquiry. Canada, India, 
New Zealand, Siam, South Africa and Venezuela were the non-European countries and non-
participants in the 1920 Conference that replied (League of Nations 1922: 5). Most countries had 
implemented some of the measures or were willing to do so; others invoked reciprocity as a 
requirement for implementing relevant measures; yet a f w others (particularly in Eastern 
Europe) “indicated that at the time it was too difficult to make any substantial modifications to 
their existing regimes” (Turack 1968: 232-3).   
Regarding the equality between nationals and non-nationals in the issuance of passports 
by a given government, the paragraph 3 about the “Fe to be collected,” specifically stated: 
The fee charged shall not be of a fiscal character and will be collected without any discrimination betw en 
countries for which the passport is issued, and with absolute equality as between “nationals” and “non-
nationals” in the event of a passport being issued by a Government to persons other than its “nationals.” 
(League of Nations 1922: 4)  
The policy of the British Empire in that regard informed that of the Commonwealth Government 
overall, which Australia formulated as follows in its feedback response. 
In regard to the question of the issue of passports t  “non-nationals,” the Commonwealth Government 
proposes to follow the principles adopted by the British Government and not in any circumstances to issue 
passports to persons other than () British subjects; (b) persons the protection of whose interests abroad 
have been entrusted to His Majesty’s Government or the Commonwealth Government by a mandate of the 
League of Nations; and (c) bona fide natives of British Protectorates and British-protected States. (League 
of Nations 1922: 8) 
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Table 5-1: Early international conferences addressing passport issues (including the number of participating 
governments or countries). 
Dates, Place Event Other details 
15 – 21 October 1920, 
Paris 
Conference on Passports, 
Customs Formalities and 
Through Tickets 
Conference of Experts, a.k.a. First Passport 
Conference 
22 Governments 
16 January 1922, Graz Graz Conference: on the 
recommendations of the 1920 
Conference 
Succession States (to Habsburg Monarchy) 
including Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania 
and Yugoslavia. 
5 Governments 
15 May 1924, Rome International Conference of 
Emigration and Immigration 
46 Governments 
12 – 18 May 1926, 
Geneva 
Passport Conference Second Passport Conference 
38 Governments 
2 September 1927 Third General Conference on 
Communications and Transit  
 
June 1929, Geneva European Conference on 
Cards for Emigrants in Transit 
Convened by the League of Nations 
Agreement to abolish transit visas for emigrants 
1944, Chicago Conference on safety and 
viability of International 
Travel 
Birth of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) as an NGO. 
54 Countries 
21 August – 5 September 
1963, Rome 
Conference on International 
Travel and Tourism 
United Nations,  
87 Governments 
1968 Creation of ICAO’s Advisory 
Panel 
Task: Passport Standardizing activities  
1978 Release of the optical 
character recognition standard  
Outcome of the Advisory Panel enabling to 
automatically obtain traveler information from the 
passport.  
1984 Technical Advisory Group on 
Machine Readable Travel 
Documents (TAG/MRTD) 
Standing committee 
Sources: League of Nations’ archives at http://www.indiana.edu/~league/conferencedata.htm, League of 
Nations (1920, 1922 and 1925a), ICAO (http://www.icao.int/pages/foundation-of-icao.aspx and 
http://www2.icao.int/en/atb/Document%20Tranfer/SGM/Passport_concept.htm) and Turack (1968). 
 
Among the other respondents (and to mention only the members or likely members of the 
Commonwealth among them), New Zealand aligned itself with the same Commonwealth policy 
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verbatim but not Canada which stated nothing about the non-discrimination clause concerning 
the nationality of the passport applicant, while thUnion of South Africa contented itself with 
declaring that it issued passports only to British subjects. The British Empire itself wrote that 
they agreed on that para. 3 of the resolution but… 
At the same time, the British Government would point ut that it assumes that in principle a passport 
should constitute a definite official proof of the nationality of its holder, and, for this reason, while 
accepting the resolution, it does not intend to issue passports to persons other than … (League of Nations 
1922: 14) 
And it went on to state the exact policy spelled out by Australia above. As a general trend, 
governments have had tendency to reservations regardin  issuing passports to non-nationals77 
even though the League itself appeared to presume that a passport was not a nationality 
credential. As an alternative they may however issue a different type of document to aliens with 
no consular attach within a given country or with no documented nationality, such as the “Permit 
to leave Australia” in the case of that country or an “Emergency certificate” for South Africa.  
On that particular question, one noted recommendation of the International Conference of 
Emigration and Immigration in Rome in 1924 (Table 5-1) was to call on all states to develop and 
agree on a specific format of “identity book” intended for immigrants (Turack 1968: 234-5). An 
ad hoc committee of experts set up in the preparatory process towards the Second Passport 
Conference in 1926 (League of Nations 1926) collected a status report from many countries as to 
                                                 
77 That option has never been formally foreclosed and appears to be left to the discretion of each government which 
might therefore exercise its prerogative to issue a passport to whomever. One may note that there are institutions other 
than national governments issuing passports such as the ‘Laissez-Passer’ of the United Nations or the travel documents 
that it may provide to refugees (see infra, note 70). Anecdotal evidence might also show that governments may provide a 
passport to a foreign individual as a prerogative or because of an exceptional situation (for instance, a prominent political 
dissident who is being denied a passport by his or her national government while they have a life-threatening health issue 
that could not be treated inside their country.)  
226 
 
 
 
where they stood regarding their implementation of the 1920 conference outcomes (League of 
Nations 1925a), and studied among other relevant issues the proposals of the Rome conference 
of 1924, particularly the “identity book” proposal (League of Nations 1925b). Those experts 
supported the latter recommendation. 
The experts felt that an identity book, based on the model attached to their report would prove of a greater 
assistance to the emigrant than a passport, and woul  be indispensable to the emigrant in his own interests 
particularly with respect to: (a) easy and certain proof of his identity; (b) assistance to consuls; (c) facilities 
for establishing a domicile in the country of immigration; (d) drawing-up of official documents for the 
emigrant and his family such as birth certificates, a marriage certificate and a death certificate; (e) entering 
into labor and other contracts; (f) participation in social insurance and workmen’s compensation for 
accidents; and (g) traveling facilities. One might say that a passport could render the same result, however, 
in their experience the experts preferred to endorse the identity book concept rather than the passport for 
emigrants. (Turack 1968: 235) 
However, the conference did not agree with the experts and shut down the idea of an identity 
book for immigrants as a responsibility for the immigration country to take. For the trouble does 
not all stop with issuing a card or a booklet, or a passport for that matter; it also includes 
requesting and verifying the quality of all appropriate information necessary to establish identity 
as well as any reasonable steps needed to protect against forgery and other forms of abuse. 
Furthermore, the German delegation drew the attention of the Conference to the case of 
persons without nationality, which was to be distinguished from that of refugees78. As a follow-
up to that proposal, the expert committee was charged to study the question and prepare it for a 
                                                 
78 This proposal was concerned with part of the immigrant population in time of peace, while refugees are a result of a 
state of conflict or insecurity and as such they are dealt with by the League issuing them a particular passport known as 
the Nansen Passport. See “Nansen Passport” at 
http://cultureandcommunication.org/deadmedia/index.php/Nansen_Passport 
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future conference. This in effect was one of the agnda items of the Third General Conference on 
Communications and Transit on 2 September 1927. Eventually, the question of “persons without 
nationality” evolved into that of “persons without national passports” (ibid., p. 239). The 
difference is that the ensuing measures will also apply to persons who, while they have a known 
nationality, could not for some reasons get a passport from their government. The Conference 
adopted to that effect four recommendations as present d by the expert committee in their report 
(League of Nations 1927). The type of document adopted in these recommendations is called 
“Identity and Traveling Document” and will present a few more differences in its format by 
comparison to the passport. The holder of such document was by default allowed to return to the 
country of their usual residence which can extend, renew or discontinue the said document.  
On the fourth page of the identity and travelling document beneath the statement mentioning those 
countries for which the document is valid, a statement would appear to indicate that the bearer was 
authorized to return to the issuing country during the validity of the document. States adopting the 
recommendations will accept the document as valid for the journey with or without the return clause and 
will notify the Secretariat of the League of its inte tion to do so. (Turack 1968: 240) 
If need be however (e.g., expiration during visit and difficulty to get renewal from the original 
issuing country), it was also possible for the visited country to issue another identity and 
traveling document to the same individual. The validity period of the document was set to six 
months. Finally, the recommendations made it clear th t they were not intended to supersede 
existing regulations with regard to immigrants – neither by creating new rights for the 
immigrants nor by imposing new duties on the immigration countries. 
In 1928, two inquiries were launched in order to asses  the action taken by governments 
with regard to the 1926 Passport Conference and the 1927 General Conference on 
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Communications and Transit, respectively (League of Nations 1929a and 1929b). The first 
inquiry reveals a general consensus among the thirty-one governments that replied to the survey 
on the latest recommendations. From the thirty governm nts that replied to the second inquiry, 
all but one (Latvia) recognized the Identity and Travelling Document. Half of them either 
already issued it or was prepared to do so. For the est, either they had an equivalent solution 
already in place for immigrants without national passport or they did not encounter the need so 
far (Turack 1968: 241).  
There are a number of recurrent themes in most of these early international conferences 
discussing passports. First of all, it should be noted that passports were not intended to be an 
internationally-valid version of a national ID card. As shown by the feedback provided by 
governments I mentioned earlier, they tended to see it that way or to relate to passport as a 
privilege reserved to their nationals. However, it is clear that the drafters of the relevant 
recommendations and resolutions, who are in a sense the designers of the international-type 
passport thought otherwise. That is probably the reason why nationality has always been one of 
the basic data entries describing the passport holder (indicating that this information is not 
presumed based on the issuing government) and also why, when the need arose, “a passport was 
accepted as only prima facie proof of nationality and not a conclusive proof of this status” (ibid., 
p. 232). The phrasing of the relevant resolutions always and probably intentionally left open the 
possibility for governments to issue a passport to non-nationals if they chose to, particularly 
those living within their territorial borders. The non-discriminatory principle as per the 
paragraphs 3 and 8 of the 1920’s resolution precisely m ans that if a country chooses or feels 
compelled to issue a passport to a non-national, then e conditions (fee and other requirements) 
must be the same as for nationals.  
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Second, emphasis regularly appears to be put on “democratizing” access to passports. 
The price caps for passport and visa fee as well as the principle of non-discrimination between 
applicants were recommended in that spirit. In fact, it was explicitly and repeatedly stated in the 
different resolutions that the passport fee should not be given a fiscal character (or treated as a 
tax) and should only cover the cost of producing it. Furthermore, the passport conferences called 
several time for decentralizing the government servic  of issuing passports in order to lessen the 
burden of applicants who otherwise might incur far greater cost due to domestic traveling for the 
purposes of attending to government inquiry as part of the application process, which then would 
be inevitable for many.   
Apparently, it was standard practice in most countries to interview passport applicants for the purpose f 
establishing positive identity and obtaining answers to supplemental questions regarding their proposed 
trip. (Turack 1968: 234) 
Third, one may be struck by the persisting recurrence, right from the first conference in 
1920, of the hope to return to the pre-1914 situation when traveling and international border 
crossing required no passport as a standard practice. Over these early years of the 
internationalization of the passport question, thisseemed to have been the prevailing view of the 
League’s officials and successive expert committees involved in preparing the relevant 
conferences and drafting the materials for the proceedings. To such extent that at its Sixth 
General Assembly, the League recommended that  
steps be taken towards suppressing the passport regime to the widest extent possible, in order to mitigate 
the disadvantages and expenses perpetuated by that system. (Ibid., p. 236)  
Just as in the 1922 feedback regarding the resolution of the first Passport Conference, the 
League’s member states then reiterated during the process of the 1926 conference that the current 
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situation did not warrant suppressing the passport requirement for international travel altogether 
(ibid., p. 236 and 238). Clearly since then, that position was never to be discontinued as the 
default standard and expectation for international travel among the League’s members, and 
exemption from passport has become possible only in cases of bilateral or regional integration 
arrangements. 
Instead, and this is the fourth salient theme, the early Passport Conferences repeatedly 
expressed support for bilateral and multilateral agreements intended to suppress passport 
requirement reciprocally between neighboring countries or within blocks of countries. As a 
result, the number of these agreements has increased over the years since then between various 
countries and in different regions of the world. Examples include the agreements between 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Monaco and the Netherlands; between Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden; between Canada, Mexico and the United States79; etc. (ibid., p. 
242) 
The last pattern I shall draw attention to is the way the Organization operated with its 
membership moving the passport question forward. The relevant bodies of the League prepared 
the different measures to be examined and adopted by an appropriate conference as a set of non-
binding recommendations. Then these were forwarded to individual governments by the 
Secretariat General of the international organization with a view to eliciting their position both in 
principle and in practice against said recommendations as benchmarks. This was a coordination 
scheme marked by cycles of propositions and feedback, over the repetition of which a set of 
common (and maybe best) practices emerged as standard. International norms related to 
                                                 
79 Please note that some of these arrangements might have changed or gone through some variation over time, as the 
conjuncture and security concerns of countries changed. 
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passports were thus set through this iterative or cyclical coordination loop of proposed 
resolutions and feedback.  
After the Second World War (the United Nations) 
  In the wake of WWII and the creation of the United Nations was created in 1945 and the 
Economic and Social Council overseeing the Transport and Communications Commission 
became the body in charge of passport matters within the UN. A committee of experts set up by 
the Council and tasked to prepare a world conference o  passports and borders formalities 
reported back in 1947 (United Nations 1947a) with the  
recognition that the pre-1914 conditions simply did not exist at the time to warrant a return to the no-
passport-for-travel concept. However, it was felt that on a limited basis the suppression of passports was 
feasible, and the Committee of Experts encouraged bilateral and multilateral agreement along these lins. 
Full support was given to the use of the international-type of passport recommended by the 1920 and 1926
Passport Conferences or an improved version thereof as long as it incorporated the international-type 
characteristics. The aim, in this context, was to achieve a universally recognized type of document which 
would defy any unauthorized alterations, contain a suitable description of the bearer and a clearer definition 
of his national status. (Turack 1968: 244) 
 A survey initiated after this report was released p rmitted to gather information about 
countries’ current practices and position with regad to the implementation of the experts’ 
recommendations. Feedback that had been provided over the next few years (United Nations 
1947b, 1948, 1949 and 1951) showed a growing compliance to the current passport guidelines, 
while the trend of bi- and multilateral agreements regarding passport (and, for that matter, visa) 
waiver kept growing. In those cases, “each State would accept and recognize identity cards or 
tourist cards as a suitable travel document” (Turack 1968: 245). Eventually, the United Nations 
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Conference on International Travel and Tourism was held in Rome from 21 August to 5 
September 1963.   
On the subject of passports, the Conference found the most suitable international travel document to be the 
passport, and therefore could not find it feasible to recommend its abolition on a world-wide basis. 
Nevertheless, all governments were invited to examine their passport laws and regulations periodically with 
a view to minimizing the requirements for issue of the passport which would be compatible to their natio l 
interests and security. (Idem, p. 247) 
Another report will be requested of the Secretary-General surveying member states about their 
acceptance and implementation of the conference recommendations (United Nations 1963). The 
report of the survey was delivered to the Economic and Social Council in January 1966 (United 
Nations 1966), showing that while the international guidelines were still largely and increasingly 
accepted and agreements made for enabling traveling without passport within various regions 
were in progress, the standardization of the passport as such remained a challenge.80 
While the UN directly took over the question of thepassport and its continuous 
international standardization process, another organization that will later play a crucial role in 
that regard was being set up. As the war wound down and before the UN was even inaugurated, 
representatives of 55 nations convened in Chicago in 1944 in order to initiate regulatory 
requirements and control mechanisms aiming at the en ancement and maintenance of the safety, 
efficiency, and commercial viability of international air travel. As a consequence, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a non-governmental agency was set up to 
                                                 
80 Passport fees also were still an issue but right from their first feedback in 1922 with the League, several governments 
notes that this was a national policy question (League of Nations 1922). 
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serve as organizational home for those international cooperative efforts.81 Two decades later, 
ICAO became a prominent structure actively leading the international process of standardization 
of passenger travel documents. In 1968 notably, the organization established an advisory panel 
which was charged with the responsibility of standardizing passports in order to make them 
machine readable. (Stanton, Chango and Owens, 2007) 
In 1978, the Advisory Panel set up by ICAO in order to address standardization of the 
passport released their optical character recognition enabling to obtain essential traveler 
information from the passport document. The advisory panel expired after completion of its 
mandate and was replaced in 1986 by a standing committee called the Technical Advisory Group 
on Machine Readable Travel Documents, abbreviated as TAG/MRTD. More and more 
governments were issuing Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) by the early 1990’s based on 
technical specifications that were set forth in the document ICAO Doc 9303.82 The concept of 
“one passport, one person” emerged around the same period following the release of the standard 
for MRPs in the late 1980’s, starting a transition t wards the total suppression of the family 
passport and basically of any collective passport. 
Since the start of the internationalization of the passport with the League of Nations, 
collective and family passports had been promoted by the successive international organizations 
and bodies in charge of the question and throughout t eir recommendations. In 1969, the latest of 
those organizations, ICAO, included in Annex 9 – “Facilitation” – of the Chicago Convention83 a 
recommendation for states not to require a separate passport for a child of age 16 or younger 
                                                 
81 See “Strategic Objectives of ICAO,” available in the Specifications and Guidance Material (SGM) section on the 
ICAO’s website at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/strategic_objectives.htm (as of March 2012) 
82 See http://www.icao.int/Security/mrtd/Pages/Document9303.aspx 
83 See http://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/Pages/Annex9.aspx 
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when accompanied by a parent or legal guardian as long as the child is designated and 
appropriately described in the passport. The inclusion of such children and the spouse 
(presumably the wife) in one passport issued to the head of household (generally presumed to be 
the husband) as the primary bearer defined the family passport. Prior to the eighties, the family 
passport thus defined was the norm for a married woman (except when widowed, in which case 
she was considered head of household) and for duly accompanied children 16 or younger. In 
fact, requiring separate passports for those individuals was clearly perceived negatively in the 
relevant international policy arenas at least until as ate as in the 1960’s when the passport 
requirement overall was still considered in those venues as a necessary evil. 
The practice of some States requiring children under 16 years of age to possess an individual passport for 
entry to its country was emphatically discouraged if the child was entering in the company of a parent or 
guardian and was adequately described in the passport of such accompanying adult. (Turack, p. 247) 
Following a period of the promotion of the notion of single identity passport, it became in 
1997 a requirement for states to issue separate passport  to spouses.84 A survey undertaken by 
ICAO showed both the challenge of standardizing the passport in the face of the variety of state 
practices regarding the number of persons that may be designated in one passport and the 
necessity to move away from the family passport in order to achieve the goal of machine 
readability for all passports: “The standard format specified for machine readable passports 
contemplates only one person per document” (idem, note 74). In this regard, the requirement of a 
single identity passport will grow stronger with the introduction of biometrics in the passport at 
the next stage in the standardization process of the passport. Furthermore, other supporting 
factors towards the realization of “one passport, one person” concept included the rights of the 
                                                 
84 See “Specifications and Guidance Material (SGM) Section: ‘One Passport, One Person’ Concept” at 
http://www2.icao.int/en/atb/Document%20Tranfer/SGM/Passport_concept.htm 
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child, notably his or her “nationality and identity rights” from birth, and the duty of the state to 
respect those rights as well as the need to protect children against abduction, particularly, which 
was a real risk in international traveling (idem, note 74).   
The preceding sections have gone over the history of passport throughout its development 
until it became a widely recognizable and acceptable rtifact that is used both as travel document 
and as identity credential. As we could see, actual people – the individual users – had little to 
contribute, even indirectly to that history and theprocess I have just traced. As the opportunity 
presents itself, I will analyze in the next section an additional case of the national identity card, 
again tracing the process of its emergence and acceptance by the populations and stakeholders. 
5.4 National ID Card: the French experience 
There is a case to be made for the relevance of national identity documents in this context. First 
of all, we might need to remember that the early pass orts did not emerge in a historical and 
political context where notions of national territoy and boundaries were politically as significant 
as today. Initially the passport was designed to track people’s movements or to control whether 
someone was in a place they were not supposed to be. And to the extent that there was no 
international framework for its use, the passport was first an instrument of domestic interest and 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, as the international relevance of passports appears, so comes the need 
to differentiate between internal and international passports. Lastly, I would argue that in the 
countries where a national identity card exists, the value of their passport for identification 
purposes is only as good as the bureaucratic infrastructure and procedures they put in place for 
their national identity card system.  
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 The question of a national identity card has to be framed in the context of the emergence 
of the police as the main arm of the national state in charge of public order and law enforcement 
on the national territory and from a domestic standpoint. As such the police had to develop its 
capacity to know the people and to process information about them, through a process of 
rationalization and increasing efficiency using written records, figures, graphs, maps, etc. In fact 
a core component of police work is to build a knowledge base about the people within its 
jurisdiction and their physical environment. In a country such as France, the national identity 
card was a central achievement and a primordial instrument of that endeavor. However, except 
under the Vichy regime during WWII, French people wre never legally forced to carry or even 
possess the national ID card. And yet, this became most widely the custom. How did France get 
there? In the following, I use Pierre Piazza’s 2004 non-translated monograph titled Histoire de la 
Carte Nationale d’Identité [History of the national identity card] in order to begin to address that 
question.  
Before the development and growth of urban centers and the subsequent demographic 
mobility and pressure on those centers, the social rder could be characterized as a world of 
“interconnaissance,” in Piazza’s word (2004: 24), meaning a world of inter-knowledge85 
marked by traditional community, family and neighborhood relations, within the boundaries of 
which everybody knew everybody. The police administration itself was part of that culture and 
operated on the basis of direct knowledge, visual memory and recognition of suspect populations 
in general (Piazza 2004: 32, 64, 74 ff.), as well as oral communication in order to establish 
“testimonial proof” (idem, p. 83). Under that law enforcement regime of direct surveillance, the 
police directly knew the subjects with a criminal record or reputedly dangerous, and kept an eye 
                                                 
85 Or “intercognition” provided that one understands –cognition here as in ‘recognition.’  
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– a human eye, so to speak – on them in their effort to maintain order in the public space. In that 
environment, “the testimony, the renown or the mere physical appearances constitute sufficient 
guaranties for establishing or revealing the identity of individuals.”86 Those conditions did not 
require of them to elaborate an objective identification process that is systematic and codified. 
The material and social changes brought about by the above mentioned developments, as well as 
progress in transportations, made that direct surveillance approach unpractical. It then became a 
necessity for the police to resort to third-party refe ences for establishing identity, reputation and
respectability of a person as the population grew and the size of communities expanded. 
5.4.1 Worker booklet and internal passport 
Throughout the 19th century, it increasingly became a requirement and a common 
practice for people to use documents in order to support procedures and transactions involving 
specific information about them. Until WWI, a multiplicity of documents emerged as a result, 
which people could use to demonstrate or to substantia e assertions about who they were. Those 
documents differed by their format, their primary pur ose, and their source. They include the 
internal passport, the worker booklet, the military booklet, the family booklet, the hunting 
permit, the birth certificate, and a variety of other certificates issued by local authorities such as 
the mayor or district police offices. Even certificates of membership issued by private 
associations were used as identity documents. 
A partir du début du XXe siècle, d’autres types de papiers sont de plus en plus employés par les citoyens 
pour décliner leur identité. Il s’agit de cartes, comprenant une photographie de leur titulaire, que les 
                                                 
86 Translated by the present author from « … le témoignage, la renommée ou bien les seules apparences physiques 
constituent des garanties suffisantes afin d’établir ou de révéler l’identité des individus. » (Piazza 2004: 26) 
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Compagnies de Chemins de fer établissent pour leursusagers ou que les organismes privés, comme les 
associations d’étudiants, délivrent à leurs adhérents. (Piazza 2004: 125) 
That is, in translation: 
From the start of the 20th century onward, other types of papers are more and more used by citizens to 
disclose their identity. These are cards including a photograph of the bearer, which the Railroads 
Companies set up for their users or private organisms uch as student associations issue to their members. 
Of particular interest among those documents are the internal passport and the worker 
booklet. The origin of the worker booklet goes back in 1749 when it was first established by an 
edict, and then abolished in 1791 before it was reetablished again under the Consulate (1799 – 
1804). In this latter occurrence, it was compulsory f  the worker to carry the booklet while 
initially it was kept by the employers as a token for the workers to fulfill their contractual 
obligations. In effect, a law dating in June 22, 1854 required that the booklet remain in the 
possession of the worker and served as an internal passport. (Idem, p. 34)   
According to Piazza, the first attempt at legislating about identity documents as a 
requirement for traveling domestically occurred on February 1st, 1789 (art. 17) whereby any 
individual traveling outside the area of the usual residency was required to carry internal passport 
(idem, p. 33). That provision will subsequently be complemented by two laws in the spring of 
1792 and then on October 2, 1795. To some extent, the in ernal passport played the role of a 
police certificate for one’s good standing in respect to the law. It became so much so that by 
1822 the police were authorized to refuse to issue uch passport to anyone whose morality they 
doubted. And by 1850, a circular of the Interior minister enabled the police to detain anyone who 
failed to present this passport up to twenty days any time they determined such measure 
necessary in the interest of public order. Also, any worker who was controlled without the 
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worker booklet was equated with a vagabond and as such, could be imprisoned for 3 to 6 months 
(p. 35). 
 Conscious of significant fraud rates – or that there are enough loopholes in the system so 
as to defeat its utility as a means to intercept those who might have a motivation to escape the 
vigilance of law enforcement – authorities required that identity papers be issued only after 
hearing the testimony of two witnesses known to the police, at least by their place of abode. 
Those witnesses came to be known as authorized or licensed witnesses (“patented witnesses,”87 
literally.) Concerns about fraud got to a point where central authorities instructed local ones not 
to issue identity documents to anyone they did not k w personally (p. 82). In 1858 already, 
authorities demanded mayors and relevant local agencies that no identity paper be issued but to 
the applicant in person. The situation reached a point where it appeared as if even law 
enforcement could not rely on the identity papers – which they themselves required people to 
carry – to prove anything about their holders. 
By mid-century, both the worker booklet and the inter al passport were required to be 
stamped with visas which were more effective to keep track of the movements of their holders. 
While roaming around within the country, internal pssport holders were required to report at 
specific places and collect a visa (just like the royal courier in the 15th century.) Workers moving 
from one district area of the country to another wee r quired to carry their worker booklet from 
their origin district as a prerequisite. In April 1831 the prefecture of police in Paris took an 
ordinance requiring workers to report to the prefecture for a visa when on their way out at the 
end of a shift at the plant. (Idem, p. 36) 
                                                 
87 I have not found any explicit or official regulatory provision for this category of witness-reference; it appears as if it 
were up to the police officers whether they find acceptable the witness presented.  
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The internal passport and the worker booklet were dvised with a view to public order 
and morality; they mostly served as a proof of honorability for people who were often away from 
their usual residence areas and, as a result, away from people who could vouch for them. Those 
documents were basically, and to some extent, social credentials of trustworthiness or 
respectability. In addition to the multiplicity of documents, it is noteworthy that a document such 
as the internal passport was not granted from one surce of government agency but by different 
authorities, from the central government to the loca  police station (Piazza 2004: 125, quoting 
Gérard Noiriel). Towards the end of the 19th century both the internal passport and the worker 
booklet faded away, with the latter being formally bolished by law in July 1890. (Idem, p. 39) 
5.4.2 Functions of the NIC 
Interest in some form of identity card emerged with the 20th century, but not directly in 
terms of a national identity card. It was only progressively that the notion of an identity card for 
nationals became clear after efforts to implement identity cards for particular purposes or groups 
of people. In the name of protecting the society, that is, the national community as a whole, the 
following populations were targeted in the official discourse for justifying identification 
requirement, in chronological as well as logical order: 
1. “Dangerous” people: Above all else, the first motiva on and first line of justification for 
the state apparatus to want to know the people within its boundaries is the existence of 
“dangerous” ones and subsequently the need to protect public order and the good society 
from their nuisance and malfeasance. These “dangerous” people are variably spelled out 
as evil doers, criminals, ex-convicts, delinquents, recidivists, undesirables, vagabonds, 
crooks, thieves, etc. (p. 63 and passim) 
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2. Nomads: these are people without a fixed residency or away from their usual place of 
abode. They are generally treated as foreigners, which t en seems to include anyone 
away from their home place, or unsettled, even if they were born on the national soil. 
Over the heads of these nomads always hangs the suspicion of some threat (in that sense, 
they are close to category 1 above). They include vagrants, peddlers as well as “gipsy,” 
“Romany,” or “bohemian” transient populations. (Passim) 
3. Foreigners in general, understood simply as non-natio ls. 
4. Nationals: this is the last category of people exprssly targeted, as a positive subject of 
identification, in the discourse of legitimation as well as in the experience of developing 
an identity scheme for the populations under the control of the national state.  
• “Dangerous” people 
The project of identification in the national context has been from the beginning a 
security project. As such, protection against risk and danger was the first frame of justification. 
An identification tool was meant first to detect the potentially dangerous people and to stop the 
ones that have already committed a crime or an offense from reiterating it. The nature or level of 
danger that is being targeted in this discourse is not always clear, but it appears to include a 
danger coming from people who are not very familiar and have ways that are at odd with the rest 
of the society so much so that they trigger suspicion as an obvious source of disruption.  
In the process of identification, there are statements made by the identity subject (name, 
age, etc.), and there are details that are provided by external observation. The description usually 
given by the law enforcement agents includes color f the eye, shape of nose, size of the mouth, 
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etc. Unfortunately these vary from observer to observer even among police agents, and unless 
there is some feature out of the ordinary, they do not always help accurately establish identity. 
In 1879, Alphonse Bertillon (1853–1914) who was a French law enforcement officer 
particularly intent on tracking down alleged recidiv sts and on deterring ex-convicts from 
becoming ones proposed his anthropometric methods of identification based on the reading and 
measurement of certain parts of the body. This method was particularly targeted to recidivist 
offenders and criminals. Tested in 1883, the use of anthropometry methods also known as 
“bertillonnage”  became a requirement in 1888 applicable to any suspect.   
Bertillon strives to standardize anthropometric description, weeding out subjective 
judgments and any particularism in the method. The qualities or marks to be documented as well 
as their variability are definite and thus predictable. Their transcription must also be done 
through a standard format using well defined and uniform abbreviations so as to be understood 
by all law enforcements agents. This codification of the body then creates the conditions which 
will make it possible for a process of recognition t  take place even in a first-time encounter with 
the authority.  
Avec le bertillonnage, le corps physique disparaît et réapparaît sous la forme d’une identité objectivée 
ramenée à un ensemble de critères écrits et graphiques logiquement élaborés. Le passage de la figuration à 
la métrique devient alors possible : les signes sont résumés en un code verbal puis numérique. Le « portrait 
parlé »  apparaît comme l’aboutissement d’un tel processus. Il consiste en une description morphologique 
exacte du visage d’après une étude analytique de ces trois éléments principaux : front, nez et oreille droite. 
Les résultats obtenus lors de ces observations sont cotés selon des données chiffrées et abrégées pour 
obtenir des formules courtes. (Piazza 2004: 104-5) 
In translation: 
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With bertillonnage, the physical body disappears and reappears in the form of an objectified identity that 
boils down to a set of logically elaborated written and graphical criteria. The transition from figuration to 
metrics then becomes possible: the signs are summarized in a verbal then numerical code. The “spoken 
portrait” appears to be the outcome of such process. It consists of an exact morphological description of the 
face based on an analytical study of these three elements: forehead, nose and right ear. The results obtained 
with those observations are quoted [or coded] in numerical and abbreviated data in order to provide short 
formulas. 
Even when the photography was introduced in the mid-19th century, the law enforcement 
parties only saw the opportunity to look for physiogn mic patterns that (based on phrenology 
theses of the time) they believed were the distinct signs of the deviants. The photography also 
was adapted to the same analytical approach and policing needs following a specific protocol so 
as to both standardize the way of taking a headshot (constant distance between the camera and 
the subject, specific angles, etc.) and enable the reading of distinctive signs. (Idem, p. 108) 
First meant to target serial offenders or criminals, the bertillonnage was eventually used 
with any arrested suspect. Any individual suspect tha he police get their hands on automatically 
generates an anthropometric file, contributing to what Piazza calls the “memory of state” 
(Alphonse Bertillon, see Piazza 2004: 99, note 133). 
Pour chaque individu mensuré est établie une fiche anthropométrique. Elle comprend certaines de ses 
dimensions corporelles, sa photographie de face et d profil, un relevé de ses marques particulières et la 
description de son visage selon un procédé analytique précis. (Piazza 2004: 98) 
In translation: 
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An anthropometric index card is established for every individual measured. It includes some of his body 
dimensions, his photograph from side and front views, a listing of his distinctive marks and the description 
of his face following a precise analytic procedure.         
This method gave confidence to the promoters of law enforcement that once a person’s identity 
has been documented, that person has no way to allege a different identity any more, hence the 
assurance that recidivists will have no escape. It appears as if the anthropometric/ID card was a 
sample of the body in quantified measurements, as such the model body, and only it, will always 
match the sample.   
The application of the bertillonnage method was the first systematic approach to 
identification departing from the traditional methods of eye-recognition of appearances. From 
then on the police focused most of its attention on c llecting and measuring the individualizing 
characteristics of the body as well as on possible physical abnormalities. Maybe for the first time 
in this odyssey of individual identification, there was the sense that biographical information 
may not be all that important; the body can be objectiv ly measured and tracked. In the eyes of 
the police however, it appeared even better to link the two sets of information, civil status (life 
events) and anthropometry, in order to be able to de ect impersonators misappropriating 
biographical data.  Just like for the photography, rules and standards are put in place for the 
anthropometric measurement procedures, including the instruments used (mainly, the height 
gauge and calipers). Interestingly enough, with this instrumentation of the procedures of 
identification, the interactions between police and suspects for the purposes of identification 
became dispassionate, less of a personal engagement of the suspects. Henceforth, the job of the 
police in this matter became similar to the exercis of a scientific expertise.  
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While anthropometry studies and measures body partsor organs, dactyloscopy does 
fingertip patterns. It was in 1858 (more than twenty years before anthropometry) that the first 
large-scale implementation of dactyloscopy occurred in the British colonial administration of 
Bengal in India (idem, p. 90). The potential of fingerprint materials for juridical evidence drew 
further attention and research. Two noticeable examples of this include Francis Galton’s 
attempts, from 1888 to 1891, at a mathematical model that would enhance the method as well as 
the effective use of fingerprints for identification. Also in 1891 Juan Vucetich, a practitioner, law 
enforcement professional in charge of an identification bureau in the Buenos Aires area, came up 
with a classification scheme for all fingertip patterns in four categories. Subsequently, police 
departments from several countries signed a convention a  a scientific congress in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1905 whereby they commit to using fingerprint techniques and enabling exchange of data so 
as to achieve a comprehensive identification of all individuals deemed dangerous in their region. 
(Idem, p. 97)  
As early as 1910, the effectiveness of fingerprints enhanced by Vucetich’s method 
superseded Bertillon’s anthropometry in police departments and in parlors of criminal justice 
across the continents. Clearly, compared to dactyloscopy which only requires one imprint of a 
thumb to begin to show results, the bertillonnage method was markedly intrusive, requiring the 
examination and physical measurement of different parts of the body – the face, the skull, the 
hands and the arms, etc. – and as a result, it obviously was more costly to manage. Furthermore, 
while most anthropometric data are not stable during a lifecycle, at least not before twenty years 
of age (Piazza 2004: 92), both the potential number of different dactyloscopic patterns across 
population and the degree of stability of every individual’s patterns throughout a lifecycle are 
practically infinite.        
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… parce qu’ils forment des indices immutables, d’une absolue spécificité et d’une grande variété, les 
dessins digitaux apparaissent comme des signes d’identité inscrits à même le corps, aussi significatifs que 
ceux définis et relevés par le bertiillonnage. En effet, ils possèdent une fixité et une invariabilité qui, pour 
chaque individu, demeurent depuis le sixième mois de a vie fœtal jusqu’à sa mort. Seule la putréfaction 
d’un cadavre et la destruction du derme qui s’ensuit semblent interdire leur lecture. Mais ni l’usure 
physiologique de la peau ni les frottements, brûlures ou coupures ne peuvent véritablement provoquer le r 
altération définitive. Même si certaines similitudes sont susceptibles d’être relevées entre des empreintes 
différentes, il existe toujours des points caractéristiques qui permettent de les distinguer et de ne pas les 
confondre. Leur grande diversité rend presque improbable le fait d’en trouver deux d’un modèle identique. 
(Piazza 2004 : 91)       
In translation:  
… because they are immutable signs, of an absolute specificity and a wide variety, the drawings of the
fingertip seem to be identity signs inscribed on the surface of the body, which are as significant as tho e 
defined and measured by the bertillonnage. In effect, they possess a fixity and an invariability which for 
every individual last from the sixth month of his fetal life up to his death. Only the putrefaction of a corpse 
and the subsequent destruction of the dermis seem to prevent their legibility. But neither the physiological 
wearing of the skin nor the frictions, burns and cuts can really cause their definite alteration. Even if some 
similarities may be observed between two different fingerprints, there always are characteristic points that 
allow distinguishing and not confusing them. Their wide diversity makes it almost impossible to encounter 
two of the same pattern. 
  While techniques such as anthropometry and dactyloscopy are initially deemed useful 
and actually used to fight against recidivist “dangerous people,” no such fight for security would 
be considered effective from its proponents’ standpoint until they find a way to anticipate and 
prevent the danger, in the first place. It appears that the primary source of danger in this socio-
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historical context was believed potentially to be peo le who have no meaningful and long-
running attach to the place where their actions (and possibly misdeeds) may however take place. 
• Nomads and Foreigners 
People who left their locale of origin or reputed place of abode are commonly held in 
suspicion just as foreigners, in the usual sense, are. Mobility in general, and the fact that the 
mobile person does not have local community ties, is basis for suspicion for one thing or another. 
Chief among that category of people are the ones moving to the main cities, notably Paris, 
without any attachment there. 
Elle [la police] s’intéresse aussi de près aux habitudes et parcours des provinciaux nouvellement arrivés en 
ville qui, parce qu’ils s’éloignent de leur milieu de vie habituel, de leur famille ou de leur voisinage 
deviennent suspects. (Piazza 2004 : 31) 
In other words: 
They [the police] also take close interest in the habits and itinerary of people newly arriving in the city from 
the provinces and whom, because they get far away from the usual environment where they live, from their 
family or from their neighborhood, become suspects. 
These presumptions apply obviously to those people coming from even farther, including 
foreigners understood as non-nationals. 
During the last third of the 19th century, the principles of nationality as a right are defined 
(see section 5.5.2 infra). In June 1889, the law articulates the rules relative to nationality as a 
juridical relation attaching every individual to one state (p. 40). A few months earlier, on October 
2, 1888 a decree was issued requiring all foreigners to declare their identity and nationality to the 
mayor office at their place of residence. These provisi ns will be confirmed and extended by law 
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in 1893 (pp. 41-42). However, declaring one’s identity and nationality without any documentary 
evidence eventually defeats the purpose of the law. Therefore, the declarant will be required to 
provide supporting materials, and maybe more importantly the declarant will then be provided 
with a document evidencing that he is in good standing with regard to the relevant legal 
provisions. In cases where there is no documentary precedent but only evidence of a different 
nature, this first document issued by the hosting state (in this case France) will therefore serve as 
a documentary origin for the subject, i.e., his firt biographical document, for want of their actual 
“certificate of origin,” to paraphrase Charles Ducler  then “Président du Conseil,” that is, head 
of the government in a 1882 speech at the House of Representatives. (Pizza 2004: 61)  
At the beginning of the 20th century, the thrust of the debate around identification was 
about repressing or suppressing vagrancy and begging, which was presumed to be mainly by 
foreigners and nomad people, with lawmakers calling for the establishment of some 
identification booklet or card for non-nationals. A legislation enacted on July 16, 1912 instituted 
the anthropometric booklets for nomads (idem, p. 104 and 113 f.) That booklet was considered 
“truly as a circulation and stay title” where local and territorial authorities shall affix the visas 
necessary to justify the presence of the bearer at the location he finds himself by the time of 
verification (idem, p. 112). Eventually, the resulting law of July 1912 did not address vagrancy 
or begging but instead required nomads thirteen of age or older to carry an anthropometric 
booklet or else. The booklet included the civil status information (name, birth date and place, 
apparent age, profession, etc.) all ten fingerprints, the anthropometric measurements as well as 
full-face and side view photographs (idem, p. 114). A summary sheet is created at every station 
where the nomads are checked and issued a visa, recording the declared itinerary. This so-called 
“mobile leaf” or “mobile sheet” is stored in a registry used for information exchange between 
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law enforcement agencies. Soon enough, nomads constantly had to justify their schedule or 
presence in a certain place, at some point, and they had the obligation to be able to prove their 
identity. In that regard, having an expired booklet was considered exactly the same as not being 
documented at all and was handled by law enforcement as o less, i.e., as an illicit case of 
vagabondage.  
Modalities of an anthropometric/ID card were still in the workings when the war is 
declared in 1914. Then all foreigners are required to carry a passport with them. The justification 
put forward was based on “the general mistrust of foreigners, the fight against spying, desertion, 
enemy [conspiring] maneuvers, rationing of food supply” (quoting Egidio Reale, Piazza 2004: 
120, see note 198). Five years after its launch (1912) the anthropometric booklet for nomads was 
then extended to foreigners. Based on two bills introduced in the National Assembly in 
December 1916 and in January 1917, the Minister of Interior signed a decree on April 2, 1917 
mandating all foreigners fifteen of age or older to have an identity card (idem, p. 121). The 1916 
bill provided for severe fines and even prison sentence (up to seven months of jail time) for a 
person controlled without an identity card. It was al o at the heart of the WWI turmoil that 
policymakers start weighing the idea of an identity card for national as well.  
• Nationals 
How is nationality proven, or rather, how does one practically discover the nationality of 
a person with a reasonable level of confidence in the context of the 19th century Europe? Either 
informally and culturally by observing that the subject looks, speaks, and behaves like a fairly 
regular person from that place (and culture); plus, if the subject can demonstrate ties to a local 
community or social group, this might be accepted as sufficient proof when there is no or little 
documentary precedent. Or alternately through an institutional record that indicates or implies 
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one way or another that the person is from the place in question. Among those records, an 
official document declaring birth is probably the most valuable for the purpose of nationality. 
Most foreigners on French soil could not provide a valid birth certificate, or chose not to for 
various reasons including, understandably, resistance to control. Even if a person could exhibit a 
birth record from a different country, by the end of the 19th century there were only three 
countries which had a convention with France for the exchange of birth certificates. For people 
who may be considered nationals, failing to be in position to show a birth record, there are other 
documents such as the internal passport, the worker booklet, the military booklet, the family 
booklet, the hunting permit, and a variety of other c rtificates issued by local authorities such as 
the mayor or district police offices. While the latter documents do not directly establish 
nationality, they may demonstrate long-standing community ties enough to grant naturalization. 
Apart from security justifications to the project of identification, a new line of reasons 
emerged by the end of the 19th century. In the 1880’s, concerns started arising about protecting 
the domestic labor market as well as emerging social benefits or rights. Between 1893 and 1913 
a streak of laws aiming at providing medical assistance to nationals as well as specific protection 
to various social groups stated nationality as prerequisite (p. 41). Monitoring foreigners and 
barring them from accessing privileges reserved to nationals, thus having to make sure that 
foreigners do not abusively claim nationality, requires as a practical matter to put in place a 
system allowing to accurately identify the nationals.  
In order to be able to identify some people as foreign rs, so that they don’t take 
advantage of rights which only nationals are eligibe for, in an international context where there 
was no consistent ways of issuing identity papers to citizens in most countries and no framework 
to exchange citizens’ identity information between countries, one is faced with two options 
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mainly. The first will resemble something like this: shut down hermetically all the borders and 
declare everyone inside the country eligible for the status of national except if proven otherwise 
(and anyone who opts out from the concerned nationality will be deemed declaring himself as a 
foreign national and will be considered as such goin  forward.) The other option will require that 
the country that is keen on verifying foreigners’ identity just provides its nationals with a 
credential they can carry with them and use to prove their nationality; in that case then, anyone 
who is not in position to show their credential will be considered a non-national and therefore not 
eligible for the claim at hand. The reader probably realizes that between those two options, there 
is only one that is sane, and more practical and cost-effective to implement. The French 
government did, too.  
The first attempt at establishing a “reference model” of identity card, as Piazza aptly 
labels it, intervenes in 1916 with the police prefect of Paris prohibiting police services from 
recognizing any other card that does not conform to the reference model at the basis of the card 
issued by police authorities to any citizen who applies for it. Furthermore private associations 
issuing membership/ID cards must conform to this new standard in its material as well as in its 
content format, if they want their members’ cards to be officially recognized as valid ID. 
The question of a national ID card emerged on lawmakers’ agenda in 1916, too. In the 
aftermath of WWI, in 1920, the Interior Minister called for stopping the issuance of passports 
since border controls was not going to be as effectiv  as they were during the war and proposed 
to replace them by photo IDs instead so that police can still track the “bad guys” inside the 
country. After the war, the question was debated again in 1921. The police chief in Paris put in 
circulation an identity card for the voluntary adopti n of residents in Paris and the department of 
Seine. 
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In September 1921, another circular from the prefect establishes that the current reference 
model was simply going to be, from then on, the only ID card officially recognized for any 
national residing in Paris and within the Seine (geographical) department. The subsequent 
acceptance was rather quick: the government department of post and telegraphs adopted it for all 
transactions, including financial ones and mail discharges, with the post offices; it was 
compulsory for enrollment in schools and access to exams in the covered areas; the local Bar 
Association took it upon itself to demand that their members request theirs; and other 
professional associations facilitated the procedure for their members who were willing to apply 
for one.  
Cover page “IDENTITY CARD issued by the Prefectural 
Administration to French citizens” 
Page 1: French Republic; Prefecture of __ ; Identity card 
Page 2:  Prefecture of__ ; Serial number; Photograph 
Surname, First name, Date of birth, Place of birth, 
Department, Address; Description (height, hair, 
moustache, eyes, nose, general shape of the face, 
skin tone); Particular marks  
Page 3 Fingerprint; Signature; Place; Date; The Prefect 
(stamp and signature) 
Page 4 Change of address; Visa by police station 
Table 5-2: Contents of the prefectural identity card as per th  decree of August 1935, based on the original 
reproduction of the Model number 4 by Piazza (2004: 132) 
On August 8, 1935 an inter-ministerial decree provided for the regulations of movements 
of French nationals as well as foreigners, the use of passports in war time, and the establishment 
of an identity card under the jurisdiction of prefectures (p. 124). In 1937, the Interior Minister 
proposed to adopt one and the same card model for al nationals by extending nationally the 
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Paris-Seine ID card model (p. 131). However, by the tim  the war broke out, only a non-
obligatory, prefecture-issued identity card was in circulation starting in September 1939 (Table 
5-2). At that point the following credentials were still accepted for the purpose of official identity 
verification: “cards issued by town or city councils, the Post, Telephone and Telegraphs identity 
card, the veteran card, professional identity cards for itinerant salespersons or still pension books 
or booklets issued by the Ministry of Finances and Pensions.” (p. 148)   
Following is a description of the procedure for applying and being issued the prefectural 
identity card. 
Les commissariats reçoivent les demandes de cartes d’id ntité de Français. Afin de vérifier l’état civil et de 
constater le domicile du demandeur, ils se font remettre différent documents : livret de famille, livret 
militaire, quittance de loyer… En se référant aux indications qu’ils contiennent, les policiers remplissent le 
bulletin de demande de sa carte sur lequel ils établissent rigoureusement son signalement. Sur ce bulltin et 
sur la carte elle-même, ils collent les deux photographies qui leur sont remises en s’assurant de leur 
conformité aux règles déterminées par le préfet de police : dimension de quatre centimètres sur quatre 
centimètres, de face et sans chapeau, la tête devant avoir environ deux centimètres de hauteur. C’est sur ces 
pièces qu’ils font également apposer à l’individu son empreinte digitale en veillant à ce que la phalange 
entière de l’index de sa main gauche y soit impérativement appliquée à plat pour laisser une trace lisible. La 
carte et le bulletin de demande qui y correspond sot ensuite envoyés à la préfecture de Paris. Un service y 
a spécialement été créé. Après avoir effectué une enquête aux sommiers judiciaires, il remplit 
soigneusement les rubriques de la carte à partir des informations consignées dans le bulletin de demande. 
Ce dernier fait l’objet d’un classement dans ses archives alors que la carte, définitivement établie, est 
réexpédiée au commissariat où son titulaire peut la retirer. (Piazza 2004: 159)        
In translation: 
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Police stations receive the applications for identity cards of French. In order to verify the civil status and to 
check the place of residency of the applicant, theycollect various documents: family booklet, military 
booklet, receipts of rent payment… Referring to the information they contained, the police officers fill out 
his card application form on which they rigorously draw up his description. On this form and on the card 
itself, they stick the two photographs they have colle ted while making sure they conform to the rules s t 
up by the police prefect: four by four centimeters in dimension, full-face and no hat, the head having to take 
about two centimeters in height. It is on those documents that they also have the individual affix his 
fingerprints making sure that the entire phalanx of the left-hand index finger is imperatively pressed flat 
thereto so as to leave a legible trace. The card and the corresponding application form are then sent to the 
prefecture of Paris. A department has been specially reated. After running a criminal background check, it 
carefully fills out the fields on the card based on the information recorded on the application form. The 
latter is classified in the archives whilst the card, definitely established, is dispatched back to the police 
station where its holder can collect it. 
While recognition grows around this single credential as reference, efforts are made to 
counter forgery both by using materials that would make it harder to forge (paper, ink) and by 
improving procedures such as having the official stmp and signature overlap the photograph. In 
1921, the archiving of card requests was notably improved by assigning a sequence number to 
every application which appeared both on the application form and then on the card itself. This 
basically enabled the police to have a database mad up of the duplicates (in terms of 
information content) of all identity cards issued.  
5.4.3 Challenges and limitations 
LINKING VITAL RECORDS TO THEIR HUMAN SUBJECT: The original documents serving as basis to 
warrant the issuance of an identity card to an individual include military booklet, marriage or 
family booklet, birth certificate, voter card, bills or receipts, attestation or affidavit of residence 
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address by one’s janitor of one’s, and even passport (du ing the first third of the 20th century.) 
The family booklet was established shortly before the 20th century (around 1887). It was a 
reliable source of birth and family information but it didn’t provide a reliable way of ascertaining 
the identity of the bearer. But none of those documents provides evidence linking to the actual 
person they relate to. The challenge remained to ensur  that the subject referred to in a 
fundamental biographical record is designated or described in a way that allows correlating with 
his or her actual embodiment so as to discover whether the person who presents that record is or 
not its legitimate holder, that is, the designee. There was no further elaborate verification other 
than resorting to that which the new card was supposed to get rid of, that is, …oral testimony 
through the two witnesses who will vouch for the applicant – “two serious and honorable 
persons” as Piazza describes them (p. 160). 
ORAL WITNESSES: The only solution that was found to address the above issue was to 
resort to oral witnesses who will vouch for the identity subject. However, the basis for relying on 
the quality of their testimony is left to be desired. Piazza (p. 143) reports news stories circulating 
at the time, characterized by a corrosive sarcasm regarding the practice of authorized witnesses. 
One scenario depicts a procedure at the town hall or the police station where the agent in charge 
requires the customer to bring in the two witnesses as usual in order to “identify his signature.” 
The author of the piece claims that even when the customer is escorted by a university professor 
and a member of lawyers association who are willing to testify for him, the agent rejects that 
alternative and demands the so-called “patented witnesses.” Eventually, the customer would go 
out and recruit random witnesses among the neighborhood janitors and bar customers, none of 
whom he ever met before, and they would be accepted as valid witnesses by the administration. 
Apparently the licensed witness character enabled th  emergence of a whole new business for a 
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group of people. Another newspaper article deplores th  growing business of the coalman and 
the wine dealer around the corner of the police office, whom, for a small fee, would stand as 
such witnesses and orally certify the identity of an individual they had never heard of before the 
minute they cash in their fee (p. 161-62). Applicants may benefit from a witness waiver only if 
they were personally known by the head of the police station. 
ARCHIVING: Furthermore, there were challenges even to checking a person’s “civil status” 
record which includes her birth data. Revolts, fire, flood and other calamities destroyed entire 
archives of birth registries for millions of people (including then living ones) in the late 19th 
century in Paris and suburbs (p. 76). Many people were unable to provide the birth information 
or document, and even when they did the law enforcement agencies were unable to look up their 
registries for matches. The classification schemes were as basic as, in the case of the capital for 
instance, by district number only (for a total of twenty districts in Paris intra muros) while within 
every district repository the registries just piled up in no particular order. Sufficed that someone 
did not know their birth district and furthermore tha  they had a name shared by a few dozens of 
other people, the search becomes simply unpractical. As a result, the registries were not much 
consulted by law enforcement and people could rathe easily get away with not disclosing their 
birth information (whether they did not know it or they decided for whatever reason not to 
disclose it) or even making false statements. To make things worse, an article of the civil code 
made it possible for anyone with very basic biographical information about a person to request 
and to obtain the full statement of the civil status or a copy of the act of birth pertaining to that 
individual. All the while, death events were not even recorded or documented. As a result, 
anyone may be using perfectly legit birth record of a dead or of another living person who is not 
even aware of it (Piazza 2004: 76 f.)  
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  MAINTAINING THE LINK WITH LEGAL IDENTITY OVER TIME: One thing leading to the other, the 
proponents of the prefectural ID card faced also the thorny question of ensuring that the 
documented identity actually is the legal identity of the subject. This goes beyond the challenges 
posed by the basic information/documents required in order to build an identity credential to 
include the question of change of identity over time. This question is two-fold: apart from the 
fingerprints, the body of the person whose identity the card is meant to represent may change 
over time, hence the concern about how often the card should be renewed. While lawmakers 
proposed validity periods ranging from one to three y ars for the prefectural identity card, the 
Prefecture of Paris did not specify any validity period in its 1921 experiment. This led to another 
round of sarcasm in a newspaper, stating that the card was a patent or certificate of eternal youth 
(as in ‘fountain of youth’) and noting that if the only guidance is that the card should be renewed 
every time the description of the subject changes, it should then be renewed every day, for 
people don’t lose their hair or their teeth all at once but by bits every day. Some extrinsic 
information about the subject, nationality for instance, may also change over time, and this may 
even be of a greater concern. As far as documentary evidence is concerned, nationality generally 
is only assumed for many people based on record of antecedents such as military service, 
participation in past votes, etc. which they may present. While a certificate of birth makes an 
even stronger case with regard to the nationality, as of 1917 lawmakers were still concerned that 
they had no way of knowing whether a person born on the national soil has, in the meantime, 
deliberately opted out in favor of a different nationality or not. All those issues hindered the 
capacity of the state to operationalize in form of a material credential the legal identity of citizens 
and to claim the monopoly of issuing authoritative id ntity credentials. As a result, all businesses 
relying on a secure identification were to be better off to take any supplementary steps they 
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might have found necessary in order to verify identity or attribute claims as relevant to their 
business. 
 POPULATION PERCEPTION: The notion that a government-issued identity credential might 
also be a token of honesty and respectability was undercurrent in the identity card discussions at 
least since late 19th century. In 1883 as we saw earlier, an amendment was presented at the 
House of Representatives which sought to achieve two things. On the one hand, it requires all 
delinquents who were sentenced to at least one year of j il time to carry with them an identity 
card that would include an abstract of their police/criminal record as well as their anthropometric 
data. On the other hand, honest nationals were invited to request the same card. While 
presumably for the latter, the area for the summary of criminal record was expected to be empty, 
the 1916-proposed card also allowed including elements such as testimonials from one’s boss or 
supervisor, awards and honors received for one’s achievements, any record showing one’s 
sacrifices for defending the nation, as well as one’s status regarding tax revenue, military 
obligations, etc. (p. 145). While the multiplicity of available identification means and alternate 
practices may partly explain the slow adoption ratefor the new card, the negative perception of 
the card due to the initial conditions of its definition reinforced people’s reluctance. Initially 
designed as the anthropometric card intended for evildoers and dangerous offenders, its nature 
and subsequent stigma as a tool of criminal justice was not lost on the honest people.  
5.4.4 Seeking national consent 
According to Piazza, newspapers favorably echoed – to say the least – suggestions by a number 
of officials to establish a form of national identification instrument. Even citizens, too, put pen to 
paper and addressed support letters to government officials or to their representatives (pp. 139-
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40). A bill to that effect was on the legislature’s agenda by January 1934, and a political 
assassination of a visiting sovereign on French soil by foreigners using forged passports was, it 
seems, all what was missing for the government to move to the next phase. That precisely 
occurred in October that year. In effect, the assassination of the king Alexander I of Yugoslavia 
in Marseille revived the identity card debate against the backdrop of fear of a possible armed 
conflict. 
Le 9 octobre 1934, l’attentat perpétré à Marseille par des Oustachis croates munis de faux passeports 
provoque la mort du roi Alexandre Ier de Yougoslavie et du ministre des Affaires étrangères Louis Barthou. 
… Nombreux sont ceux qui se prononcent alors en faveur de la mise en place d’un titre d’identité 
permettant aux autorités de connaitre avec davantage de précision non seulement la véritable identité des 
non-nationaux mais aussi celle de chacun des membres de la population. (Piazza 2004: 138-9) 
This translates as follows: 
On October 9, 1934 the assassination attempt perpetrated in Marseille by Oustachis Croats carrying fake 
passports causes the death of the king Alexander I of Yugoslavia and of the Foreign Affairs Minister Louis 
Barthou. … Many then take party in favor of establishing an identity title enabling authorities to know with 
further precision not only the true identity of non-nationals but also that of every member of the population. 
In this episode of the debate, voices from the police suggested that the identity card be 
required for any contract, whether public or private, notarial acts, wedding and so forth (p. 141). 
One of the officials in the following discussion among government agencies noted that the 
voluntary nature of a government-issued ID only makes it useful for people who might need it in 
their interactions and transactions with various institutions. It will become useful to law 
enforcement only if it is an obligation for all to acquire that ID card. In fact, he insisted, the 
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conditions should be created such that any individual who did not have a card becomes d  facto a 
suspect. (p. 138) 
The government has engaged in a “strategy of consent” ince 1916 involving press 
campaign, in order to get French people’s buy-in. Among policymakers and legal experts, there 
was a shared realization that incentives and benefits should be made clear to citizens. Going 
forward, the advantages that the card could bring to citizens were highlighted. With the new 
communication strategy, it was no longer about control (negative) but rather for the people to be 
able (positive) to substantiate their identity information whenever they need to and wherever 
required. Furthermore – and this can probably be appreciated only against the backdrop of police 
methods at the time – the card was presented and even perceived as a mark of respectability (p. 
141), the tool that enables one to be spared further police’s unwelcome interest and hassle. 
Antoine Borrel, a Member of Parliament and proponent of one of the 1916 identity card bills, is 
quoted for saying: 
Dans quantité de circonstances de la vie publique et d  la vie privée (à la poste, à la caisse d’épargne, dans 
les banques, dans les mairies, les consulats, les commissariats de police, aux caisses publiques) on se voit 
réclamer des pièces d’identité dont la nature et lenombre varient avec l’exigence des fonctionnaires ou 
employés (enveloppes, cartes d’électeurs, actes de l’état civil, livret de mariage, etc.) ; avant de se présenter 
dans l’un de ces bureaux, il est impossible de savoir quelle pièce sera exigée, – d’où des démarches 
multiples, des pertes de temps. Quant aux femmes, aux mineurs, aux reformés, ils sont souvent dans 
l’impossibilité absolue de justifier valablement de leur identité. (Piazza 2004: 142)   
Translated, this gives: 
In number of circumstances of public and private lif  (at the post office, at the savings bank, in the banking, 
at the town halls, the consulates, the police stations, at the public funds offices) one is met with ID 
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requirements the nature and the number of which vary with the demands of the functionaries and 
employees (envelops, voter cards, civil status acts, marriage booklet, etc.); it is impossible to know which 
documents will be required before showing up at one f those offices – hence multiple procedures, wastes 
of time. As to women, minors, people declared unfit for service, they often are absolutely unable to validly 
justify their identity. 
In addition to favorable newspaper editorials, lawmakers, law enforcers and lawyers take it 
particularly at heart to explain all the advantages that an identity card might bring its holder, 
more specifically all the inconveniences or nuisances it might spare honest citizens. In 1921, a 
lawyer writes: 
Actuellement, on ne peut plus rien faire dans la vie sans avoir de papiers, et pour peu qu’on se déplace, i  
en faut une véritable bibliothèque. La carte d’identité les résumerait tous. (Piazza 2004: 142)  
In translation: 
Currently, one can accomplish nothing in life without having papers [identity documents], and should one 
travel the slightest bit, it will have to take a whole library. The identity card would sum them all up. 
In a sort of counterfactuals – forecasting counterfactuals, I might add – all proponents describe 
the hassle that could be experienced in this contemplated near future if one does not have the 
new identity card, which people would avoid by requsting theirs. The cost of not having it 
would be so great that everybody will want to have it. Even if someone who applied for the card 
happens not to carry it while they are controlled, the fact of being able orally to provide details 
that enable law enforcement to correlate with an entry i  their registries (the related application 
file kept with the police) could mean immediate release as opposed to being taken to the police 
station for several hours until conditions are met for clearance.  
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One particular nuisance that seems to elicit consensus against it is the practice of 
“authorized witnesses.” While most of the other advantages may appear to be not only 
hypothetical but conceptual (‘preventing from what might happen if…’), people dealing with 
public institutions generally experienced (as we saw above) the obligation to bring in two people, 
who are acceptable or recognizable by the administration’s agents, in order to endorse or confirm 
their identity claims or attributes. Having a uniform or a reference ID card would have the 
advantage of limiting the need to present witnesses only once, for such card would be accepted 
as reliable by itself in further instances of identity control.  
 Finally, the sponsors of the 1916 bill88 also included a few incentives in their bill. The 
allowance made for the record of professional references, awards and national service 
achievements probably were also incentives for the people concerned. Cardholders were given 
priority for jobs in the public as well as in the private sectors and were eligible for various 
government subsidies. For a citizen in possession of the identity card and whose domiciliation 
can be verified, one incentive consists of a provisi nal release if the person is involved in an 
offense that could legally qualify for up to two years in jail (p. 144). In sum, the proposed card 
would raise the threshold of police suspicion for the citizens who would have it, as anyone who 
takes the necessary steps to get one is de facto presumed clean or at least forthcoming with the 
law.  
We may infer from reading Pierre Piazza (p. 14) that ere are three sets of reasons why 
French people came to accept to request and carry with them a national identity card (NIC) 
without being formally coerced by the state apparatus. 
                                                 
88 These include Representatives Maurice Ajam, Jean Puech and Félix Bouffandeau. 
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• The people might have felt a sense of gratification and self-worth (impression of 
recognition of their singular existence by the authori y) with the opportunity to reclaim or 
revive their connectedness with regard to a human community, at the time where the rise 
of the modern state had seemed to dismantle the traditional relationships of individuals in 
a community. 
• They might have considered the NIC as a practical solution to prove or 
demonstrate their quality of French nationals in an increasingly complex context where 
nationality (especially when documented) emerges as the overarching condition that can 
guarantee some stability to one’s relationship with, and inclusion in, the prevailing 
structure of human community. 
• A variety of measures  that public authorities took in order to incentivize people 
to get their NIC and carry it with a sense of pride, and use it as their preferred proof of 
identity in most of their transactions, namely with the state agencies.   
After diving into the history of the passport augmented with this particular historical case 
of the French ID card, I will close this chapter by analyzing the core basic notions that enable the 
state to issue these credentials.   
5.5 Identity Primitives: A sociohistorical analysis and challenges 
I call identity primitives (or identity primitive credentials), the last pieces of evidence left when 
one seeks to get at the bottom of the pre-requisites of any identity credentials – in this context 
particularly, those issued by the national state such as the passport and the national ID card. I 
first address the question of “breeder documents” as an ambiguous label which seems to be 
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based on a metaphor rather than on a clear concept. Chief of the so-called breeder documents is 
the birth certificate; I subsequently discuss this credential. Then in the second part of the section 
I address the concept of nationality in order to shw that it is a legal construct that has a recent 
history with social and cultural layers. Both birth and nationality certificates are identity 
primitives that provide the authoritative basis for the national-state to issue its proper identity 
credentials. 
5.5.1 Breeder documents 
While the phrase ‘breeder documents’ is used to refer to those basic documents such as birth 
certificate generally required to issue other identity credentials, the usage as well as the 
definition I have found at a number of sources apper to link this phrase to the notion of fraud. 
For instance, the Oxford Dictionaries Online states that a breeder document is “a document, 
genuine or fraudulent, that can serve as a basis to obtain other identification documents or 
benefits fraudulently.”89 The fact is there is nothing in the term “breeder” itself suggesting that 
negativity, all the contrary. I concord with John Mercer90 who contends that: 
the basic process of identification starts with know , personal data which may be used to create additional 
documents that confer additional privileges on their b arer. Thus, earlier documents ‘breed’ subsequent 
documents.  
Perhaps that ambiguity of the phrase comes from the fact that the documents might be breeding 
other documents as much as they might be breeding some kind of people – both meanings being 
                                                 
89 At http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/breeder+document  
90  “Breeder Documents: The keys to identity.” Keesing Journal of Document and Identity. Issue 29, 2009 (p.14). Retrieved at 
http://www.naphsis.org/NAPHSIS/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001179/breeder_documents_the_keys_to_i
dentity.pdf 
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totally in line with the spirit of the metaphor. I suggest the ambiguity could be resolved by 
resorting to a more conceptual construct such as “ident ty primitives” or “primitive credentials.”  
Declaring the birth of a newborn is the act par excellence of the bureaucratic birth, the 
baptismal moment of a citizen’s lifecycle in the realm of the bureaucratic state. That act yields 
the very first document that testifies to the being of an individual in the eye of the public office 
or authority. In the United States that document, the chief of all identity primitives, is called 
Certificate of Live Birth.91 The format of that document is under the control of the public 
authority, as well as the information required to be documented. It universally includes the name 
and the sex of the newborn, the place and the date of birth, the names of the parents, plus most 
probably the person making the declaration and the authority recording it, and possibly the time 
of birth and other information as required by the format of reference.   
Apart from the sex of the newborn, all the attributes on a birth certificate are social or 
cultural artifacts, in a sense that their value depends on some cultural worldview or social 
arrangements. That includes even the calendar, as we know the Chinese calendar, to mention but 
an example, is different from the Gregorian (or western) calendar which only dates back in the 
16th century. The name may well be the primary identifier people use to relate to one another, but 
that does not mean names have always been stable as we know them today. They follow 
different rules and take various forms in different societies and at different periods in history. 
Before becoming stable institutional identifiers, names were once left to local social and cultural 
practices alone, without specific standard format or a system to record them. Contrary to the 
view of names as standardized and legally-sanctioned identifiers, Caplan (2001) reminds us that 
                                                 
91 Also called birth certificate, it is the first of life records including the marriage license and the death certificate. The 
terms used in French are « Acte de naissance » or « Extrait de naissance. » 
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historians (Lefebvre-Taillard 1990; Wilson 1998) have well documented the practices of names 
in the West over the centuries, showing that it is not so much the initial purpose of names to 
serve as strong and precise (thus legally reliable nd regulated) identifiers than it is the law that 
has made them so for its own purpose.  
It is not simply the identificatory precision of the name that makes it into a legal object, but also the law 
itself that demands and imposes this precision, and to that extent creates the name as a means of 
identification. The legal seizure of the personal name in Europe is a recent and highly uneven development 
that follows centuries of stabilization by usage and custom alone. (Caplan 2001: 54)  
As I already mentioned in the previous chapter, the practice went from the three-part 
name in the Western Roman Empire (Wilson 1998) to the single name, mostly baptismal name, 
in the Christendom, before it was doubled by a second, then in some places today (e.g., middle 
name in the US) a third, name.  
From about the eleventh century, a second name or surname began to be added, as a kind of adjective 
modifying and extending the limited stock of baptismal names. Surnames are normally distinguished by 
genealogists and historians into four or five categories according to types, that is, filiation (patronymic), 
place of origin (locative), object (toponymic), occupation, and sobriquet; but the process and pace by which 
surnames became heritable and hence more stable as family names is not always easy to reconstruct. 
(Caplan 2001: 54-55)  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the stabilization around the patronym has introduced a 
greater dimension of historicity in the individual identity, beyond the events within the 
individual’s life. One suspects that this “genealogical identity” (Caplan 2001) had been a 
characteristic part of naming practices in societies and times where writing as a mode of record 
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was not common and that the increasing scope and complexity of social interactions over time 
led to the need to rationalize those practices and subsequent standardization.  
The information provided in a birth certificate flows from the bottom to the top, from 
private citizens to the state apparatus. The flow ges the other way around when it comes to 
nationality. The national state bestows that attribu e on the individual – the very attribute that is 
at the core of the state becoming one of the most authoritative identity providers. In the 
following sub-section, I account for the historical genesis of the notion of nationality and its 
tensions.    
5.5.2 Nationality or the paradoxical modernity of the state 
The philosophy of Enlightenment has been recognized to be one of the defining sources as well 
as manifestations of modernity (Harvey 1990) not only in the “Republic of Letters” but also in 
the actual political republic which has been redefined by eighteenth century revolutions such as 
the French 1789’s. Many thinkers from that century such as Hume, Kant, Diderot or 
Montesquieu, sought to assert the preeminence of reason and culture over tradition and nature. In 
effect, even social contract theories were the expression of the individual freedom to make 
reasoned choice to join (or not to join) a polity outside any determinism imposed by God or 
nature. However, the paradox I point to here is that t e political institution of the state actually 
followed a reverse course of modernity. At the same ti  that democracy rightfully requires the 
state to bring people back in the business of governm nt, the state apparatus had to espouse the 
people (nation) for quite a different reason, at lest at face value. The fact is that it was as if in
order to do that, the people had to be cast as a natural entity.  
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The territorialization of the (modern) state as formalized by the Treaty of Westphalia was 
followed by a process of naturalization, a process of reciprocal identification between the state 
and the nation. The Westphalian sovereignty may well have created the formal delineation of the 
nation-state, but only the notion of nationality will g ve it its ultimate content as well as it will 
make the nation-state real in the life of its indivi ual members. Before nationality became the 
operative (legal) category that can then justify the legal distribution of certain privileges and 
exclusions, it established an organic link between th  state and the nation. Here I draw on the 
historical genesis of the concept conducted by Noiriel (1995) to argue that nationality is the 
conceptual device that enabled the state to be effective in claiming the authority to know and 
identify “its” people.   
The idea of nationality was ambiguous in its origins, with a conceptual tension leading to 
a dual development that still carries the sequels of that ambivalence. On the one hand, a literally 
spiritual conception hinting at a mystical and someti s mythological notion of the nationality 
of a given people as a race or an ethnic group, and on the other hand an integrated community 
that represents a progress over the multiplicity and the particularism of races or ethnic groups. In 
any case, both alternatives seem to be predicated on the notion of race, whether to praise or to 
transcend it. 
Despite the antecedence of the terms ‘nation’ (substantive) and ‘national’ (adjective), the 
other substantive indicating a quality – nationality – only appeared much later and started off 
timidly as a neologism in a 1807 novel by Madame de Staël, a writer that personifies on more 
than one account the cultural exchanges, antagonisms and ambiguities between the French and 
the German imaginary, literary, and conceptual worlds (Noiriel 1995). Subsequently, the 
semantic related to the term was at the core of an 1810 publication of Deutsches Volksthum by 
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Friedrich Jahn. Considered as a forbearer of the German ethnography (Volkskunde,) Jahn coined 
the term Volksthum92 [sic], which will later (1825) be translated to French as nationalité, 
although the latter was at that point already rendere  in German by a different term 
(“Nationalität,”  a lexical construction based on the French word.) In other words, for one French 
term there were now two German equivalents to express the notion of nationality.      
In any case, the two terms, nationalité and Volkstum, conceptually overlap to the extent 
that they both capture the sense of nationality as the spirit or the character of the people, that 
which gives a people its personality and common idet ty perceived as immutable. However, 
there is more left in the French concept, or at least there has been a struggle over the meaning of 
the idea of nationality, staking out a less racialized notion. According to Noiriel (1995), the lack 
of that ambiguity in the lexical choice of Volkstum for nationality precipitated the “essentialist” 
drift that occurred with that concept in Germany.  
In addition to a few French historians such as Jules Michelet (as early as 1833) and 
Augustin Thierry (in 1840), Noiriel notes that the term was mostly used by French-language 
writers most versed in, or involved with, German culture, notably the Romanticist writers such as 
Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Flaubert, and George Sand, etc. However, the term remained 
ambiguous not only because of its novelty but in particular given the polysemy of the concept of 
‘nation’ itself. Noiriel (1995: 10 and 13) registers phrasal uses including “Frank nationality” 
(Augustin Thierry,) “feudal nationality” (Edgar Quinet,) “provincial nationalities” (Michelet) 
and even “the principle of work nationality” (Proudhon) going as far as proclaiming that freedom 
of enterprise, mercantilism and capitalism destroy he nationalities as well as the working class.   
                                                 
92 The German term for nation being the same as for the people: Volk. Noiriel’s piece includes two different 
orthographies of this word as can be seen here in the next paragraph, thus the mention “[sic].” 
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In debates following the 1789 revolution, the oppositi n of views stemming from 
aristocratic conservatism on the one hand and from liberalism on the other brought the 
politicization of the notion of nationality to a height. Aristocracy originally opposed the notion of 
nationality seen as standardizing (creating a uniform people and culture) in favor of the notion of 
race as lineage, for then their supremacy could obviously be justified on the basis of their 
connection with the line of the conquerors (Frank) as opposed to the descent of the vanquished 
people (Gaul). In other words, they tended to see natio ality through the prism of ethnic warfare. 
On the other hand, liberals tended to praise the rise of a nation as a process of unification (hence, 
disappearance) of classes and other subcategories of less value in their view. Furthermore, while 
most liberals argued for “national unity”93 as a progressive prospect already in process of 
realization, a few of them (notably Augustin Thierry) preferred to read the Revolution as a 
revenge of the Gaul over the Frank, countering aristocrats by means of their own martial 
repertoire. 
The term nationality gained currency in the era of the July Monarchy started with the 
revolution of 1830 in France whereby a conservative monarchy led by a representative of the 
House of Bourbon (Charles X) was overthrown by a more liberal branch of the kingly line 
known as the House of Orleans. Replacing one constitutional monarchy with another one more 
popular, Louis-Philippe called himself the ‘King of the French’ as opposed to ‘King of France’ 
which was the traditional designation, putting the emphasis on the people and popular 
sovereignty. His rule will in turn be overthrown in the Revolution of 1848 that led to the Second 
Republic. 
                                                 
93 Noiriel (1995: 11) notes that for the first time the term “nationality” was used to designate the French people as a 
whole in a History authored by Francois Guizot in 1828. He conducted his research using a database of more than 3300 
works of French literature from the 16th to the 20th century. 
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In the meantime during the second half of the 19th century Paris became a hub for, and 
the capital of, various groups of migrants from around Europe leading to a 
translation/transliteration of the world into several European languages but also to a political turn 
in its concept. The notion of free association around a common interest appears to override the 
racial or cultural dimension in the definition of nationality offered by Leconte de Lisle: from a 
linkage pertaining to cultural, ethnic and racial identity of a given social group, nationality had 
evolved to become the political expression of the people, of the sovereignty of the people.  
During the July Monarchy, the term ‘nationality’ was used by the officers of the Interior 
Ministry, dealing with the increase of European migration and exile to France. Willing to grant 
social services and aid to the exiles while keeping up with the need to keep track of the 
expenditures and manage costs, the French government required the administration in 1833 to 
maintain the list of individuals receiving aid by documenting their place of birth and 
“nationality.” However, that usage was a practical one that was yet to be legally defined. 
In 1848, the French administration started using “nationality” as a homologous term first 
applied to populations of foreigners in France, andthen used interchangeably with “the quality of 
[people being] French.” This was particularly noted during the census of 1851 with regard to the 
conditions required to vote as well as the need to ge  accurate statistics on the demographics of 
the population. The first law on and of a “French nationality” dated in 1889. Before then and 
since the practical use of the term at the government’s Interior department, other usages were 
recorded including by lawyers in cases of private lw or civil/common law (jurisprudence) 
litigations involving parties of different countries. Noiriel (1995: 16) provides the time line of 
notable legislations that make mention of any notion of nationality (Table 5-3). 
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Table 5-3: Time line of French legislations related to nationality between the Revolution and the Second Empire 
Date Legislation 
1790 Law providing for the requirements to fulfill in order to be “reputed French.” 
1791 Constitution addressing the attribution of “quality of citizen.” 
1793 Constitution spelling out the requirements for the exercise of “citizen rights.” 
1795 Records refer to a “political state of citizens.” 
1851 Civil Code: on conditions for obtaining or losing the “quality of (being) French” as opposed to 
the “quality of foreigner/alien.” 
1867 Law where the terms ‘French’ and ‘citizen’ appear in juxtaposition on the question of 
eligibility to “all the privileges of the French citizen.”94  
Based on Noiriel (1995) in French language. The texts above are not a direct translation of the original author but a 
rendition that is meant to be accurate. The words in quotation marks are a translation of terms occurring in the 
legislation referenced. 
 
Thus, the legal appropriation and definition of theconcept of nationality only began in 
the late decades of the 19th century, particularly in the context of international law. At that point, 
the left-wing forces that introduced the concept of nationality began to take their distance from it 
in favor of a universalist trend, notably based on the fellowship of workers wherever they were 
born, resided or worked, while conservatists grew fi rce advocates of (French) nationality by 
way of national particularism. The tables turned, but not quite symmetrically. 
From the above historical recall, we can clearly see that the notion and category of 
nationality was the outcome of a cultural and histor cal process. And yet, the national state 
                                                 
94 The French version literally reads: “To enjoy all the rights of the French citizen.” According to Noiriel, the encounter 
of those two words (‘French’ and ‘citizen’) side by side is indicative of the fact that the juridical codification and 
distinction of the related two concepts had not yet occurred at the time. 
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practices of identification of people cannot be understood without it. It is only through that 
constructed category that the citizen clearly becomes affiliated to the state body and apparatus de 
jure. With such concept, national-states frame their relationship with people, making some of 
them the people and the rest of the world foreigners to the state for each particular state. The 
only attribute the central/national government is really authoritative to assert about the citizen is 
his or her nationality, which despite its fuzzy sociocultural origins the state has made into a legal 
category. That affiliation by nationality is the matrix from which all other relationships between 
the individual and the state flow, as do all rights and privileges granted or recognized by the 
state. In a sense, the emergence of the concept of nati nality is a process of naturalization of the 
state as well as a process of judicialization of the people: it is the locus where a people is 
somehow wedded to that historical form of political institution – the result of which wedding is 
literally the nation-state – and by so doing the state apparatus takes on a hum n content. 
Moreover, by the very existence/creation of that category and by that wedding, the state acquires 
the transformative virtue to recognize some people born in certain condition as nationals and, 
otherwise, to naturalize some of the rest so that they become nationals. Once this conceptual 
infrastructure of institutional and legal fictions has been put in place, it is only a matter of time 
for a series of documentary practices to flourish, feeding into the newly formalized affiliation 
between citizens and the state.  It is also only a matter of opportunity for some of those 
documentary practices to generalize or be standardized across all nation-states. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
We have seen that the state ability and authority to identify its citizens has been a 
historical process. Its early manifestations emerged under certain specific conditions several 
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centuries ago, at a time when the boundaries of the nation were not that clearly defined as will be 
the case for the modern state. The origins of the pass ort (the modern traveler’s passport as well 
as its precursor trail of identity papers) clearly shows two distinctive tracks in the practices of 
identification, one with a positive frame and the other with a negative one; in other words there is 
the “good” and there is the “bad.” The bad (relating to the control impulse) included the practices 
of listing names and creating records about the “unwanted” (e.g., the nomadic people who do not 
dwell at a regular place or the already convicted) as well as the “wanted” who was sought after 
with an arrest warrant. The good (relating to diplomatic correspondence) included the practice of 
safe-conduct and letter of introduction. 
The present configuration and scope of the authority exercised through passports is the 
outcome of a process that has developed over a number of decades starting at the end of the 19th 
century. Particularly, several countries led the initiative in the wake of WWI towards an 
international-type passport through a process that has extensively been traced in this chapter.  
Overall, it can be said that the passport system has been successful at a grand scale; there has 
never been anything more universal and more effectiv  in terms of identity credentials and 
system, at least for its primary purpose of regulating people’s movements across international 
borders.  
Authoritative identity artifacts issued by the national state are built on basic credentials 
that I have termed identity primitives: they include birth certificate and certificate of nationality. 
The former symbolizes the inaugural sign of existence i  the realm of state bureaucracy; as 
formal as it may be today, the latter is the outcome of a highly contingent, sociocultural process. 
Nationality is the central category that enables and organizes the modern state’s universal 
capability to act as authority for individuals’ identity. First, after claiming and securing territorial 
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sovereignty, the state managed to enact and formalize  strong affiliation with the people living 
in the territory thus claimed through the concept of nationality. By the end 19th century, this 
concept allowed tightly coupling the state to a nation, whether actual or ideally posited, and vice-
versa, a process which I have termed the naturalization of the state. Secondly, nationality then 
became a core attribute framing the relationship of the individual to the authority of the state, 
including the authority to assign an identity to nationals while providing them with new rights 
and privileges.  
Now that I have completed the two (past) historical cases, there remains the third case 
about digital identity. But before I tackle it, I shall pause and draw together the main analytical 
insights from the previous cases as to outline a framework that could the guide the analysis of the 
last case study. This will be the task of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Building Digital Identity Infrastructure 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As we enter a new period in the history of record creation technologies, one where the activity of 
writing and creating records is further mediated through a more complex device than previously 
used, such as the computer, it is no surprise based on the outcomes of preceding analyses that the 
question of identity within the new type of record is raised once again. While the main players 
that drive innovations in computer technology might have been aware of this challenge in their 
respective business, it has been less than a decade that an apparent consensus has emerged across 
the industry on the need for a collective effort to develop and build the bases for solutions that 
could work for all participants and activities that rely on computer-created records and Internet-
enabled transactions. It is probably too early in the process to expect that these efforts have 
reached a final state where we could clearly see and investigate the critical differences and 
novelties brought about by this new record creation and transmission technology. However, 
enough discourse has been produced and activities carried out in order for us to discern the 
directions things are going and perhaps to offer rel vant and critical analysis if necessary so as to 
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make the process more deliberate at all (or as many as possible) levels of consequences that can 
be anticipated from a socially-oriented inquiry such as this one. With that in mind, the ultimate 
goal of this case will be to address the following question:   
How are social actors, events or processes leading to the possible emergence of authoritative 
digital identity credentials for Internet end users at large?  
The materials that provide the data needed to describ  the different parts of the case are 
found in a series of documents drafted and made publicly available by institutional (private 
companies and government) as well as individual actors participating in the relevant design 
efforts. Complementarily, I have conducted interviews with individual participants in an attempt 
to collect further and up-to-date information about the ongoing endeavor they are involved in, to 
fill possible gaps found as a result of consulting he available documents, and also to consolidate 
useful background information this investigation might have needed to clarify in order to pursue 
its arguments.95 
As a result of this hybrid data gathering approach nd regarding particularly the role of 
human individuals as data sources, some of the data is from public record in which case the 
source or author is named when the data is quoted or specifically referenced. These include 
conference presentations, blogs, written/published materials and any subsequent email exchange 
I might have had related to those publicized materils from identifiable authors. On the other 
hand, the second category of data that has been collected from interviews has been de-identified 
as generally advisable from data collection best practice in human subject research. As a 
consequence some of the quotes (from public record) are associated with the actual name of their 
                                                 
95 See relevant paragraphs in chapter 3, section 3.4 regarding the different data sources, and Appendix B for the 
interview protocols. 
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author while some others (from interview) are not, even when the same individual has provided 
information in both data categories.    
To start investigating and studying this case, I first seek to gather a good understanding of 
what digital identity entails and provide an overviw of the contexts and rationale that shape the 
efforts to create specific technology solutions for the problem of identity on the Internet. I then 
present a number of said solutions that have been proposed so far in terms of specific designs 
and/or implementations. After, I consider the broader efforts to institutionalize those 
technologies by assembling a number of public-private partnership mechanisms and frameworks 
intended, among other things, to foster consumer trust. I proceed to pinpoint a number of 
challenges standing in the ways of those processes and the ultimate widespread adoption of the 
technologies. Finally, I integrate the insights gained from this examination to the framework that 
has been outlined from the previous historical cases. 
6.2 Emergence of digital identity 
In this section, I do not intend to establish a comprehensive, much less a definite history of digital 
identity or the manifestation of whatever may qualify as pertaining to it. The focus of this chapter 
being what has been called identity 2.0 (the most recent developments of identification protocols 
through the Internet emphasizing the user and usability), I will start in this section by offering 
bellow an expose and a discussion of the notion of digital identity in that context. I will then trace 
the timeline of the evolving notion and practices related to digital identity in the industry and as 
technological innovations emerge.  
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6.2.1 What is in a digital identity? 
To begin, I shall attempt to outline the conceptual antecedents of the notion of identity that is 
implied in the context of digital technology. To tha  end, I refer both to available public records 
and the interview data.  
By 2006, a cross-section of Open Source and proprietary software industry actors 
undertook in a broad online collaboration with all interested stakeholders the effort to lay out the 
basic concepts for a digital identity framework. The Identity Gang, as they then called 
themselves, developed a lexicon in order to ensure that participants and all stakeholders use (and 
understand) the same language while discussing digital dentity. From that lexicon provided on 
the group website,96 it reads: 
Digital Identity: A digital representation of a set of Claims ade by one Party about itself or another 
Digital Subject. 
That basic definition is consolidated by a set of comments: 
Comment1: A Digital Identity is just one set of Claims about a Digital Subject. For any given Digital 
Subject there will typically exist many Digital Identities.  
Comment2: A Digital Identity can be created on the fly when a particular identity transaction is desired, or 
persisted [sic] in a data store to provide a referenceable representation. 
Comment3: A Digital Identity may contain Claims made by multiple Claimants. 
Comment4: A Digital Identity may be signed by a Digital Identity Provider to provide assurance to a 
Relying Party. 
                                                 
96 Then at http://identitygang.org/moin.cgi/Lexicon, the Lexicon is now found at http://wiki.idcommons.net/Lexicon. 
Terms that are underlined in the following two block-quotes are in the source material HTML links that direct to the 
definition of those terms. It shall be the convention in this chapter that all quotes from materials treated as sources of 
data in this investigation will be in italics; any terms in italics in the original materials will be underlined here instead, 
unless otherwise specified (as I just did about the HTML links.) 
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It is notable that ‘digital identity’ here is considered merely as a set of claims, i.e. one or 
more properties, attributes or facts that can be ass rted about some entity (a digital subject), 
which may help determine its status vis-à-vis certain rights, privileges or capabilities. Any set of 
claims is not meant to be necessarily self-sufficient for zeroing on a single entity as the unique 
subject of said claims. The objective is first and foremost to determine whether the claims are 
warranted with regard to the subject at hand. In other words, the substantive value of the link 
between claims and the subject those claims are mad about is more important than the 
uniqueness of said subject (although it remains necessary that no subject can unwarrantedly 
make and be granted claims, but this doesn’t requir uniqueness as the same set of claims may be 
warranted in the case of several subjects.) Further comments posted by participants in the 
discussion read as follows. 
Uniqueness is not an essential element of the concept of ‘identity’ as used in this Lexicon. As used hre, 
‘identity’ as a means to distinguish things is not essential; it is only secondary or anecdotal.   
What's being developed here is a set of definitions that you may find diverge from certain common and/or 
historical usages of the word and concept of ‘identity.’ While in some common uses and contexts ‘identty’ 
is assumed to imply some form of uniqueness, in this Lexicon a Digital Identity basically boils down to 
nothing more than one or more properties of a Digital Subject. In this context, you can think of ‘Digital 
Identity’ as simply being metadata – data describing a subject. In this Lexicon what ‘identity’ does is not 
what most people in the world would consider as “identifying” a subject. What is intended by “identity” 
here is what people would normally consider to be a ‘description’ of a subject. Of course, in some contexts, 
a description (Digital Identity) may be specific enough that it can only apply to a single subject within that 
context. In that case, the description would ‘identify’ he subject. [posted by Bob Wyman]97 
                                                 
97 In this block quote, the tags or annotations in square brackets are from the source of the quote, referencing the names 
by which members of the group signed in and edited this collective work. 
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Outside of the limited worldview of accountability, ‘identity’ is widely used to mean ‘stuff about you’ that 
has nothing to do with uniqueness. Terms like ‘cultura  identity’ and ‘national identity’ are what come to 
mind for many people when considering ‘identity.’ One’s identity comes via the groups one ‘identifies 
with’; this is the opposite of uniqueness. [posted by RL “Bob”] 
Digital identity is basically a relation between a digital entity and a set of properties on 
the basis of which relevant assertions or claims can be made in the environment at hand. The 
question then, according to the Identity Gang, is not whether the attributes included are specific 
(or individualistic) enough to single out the entity, but whether they accurately describe the 
entity in the current context. From that broader pers ctive, digital identity is anything (role, 
function, proper attribute, or other characteristic, et .) that can be said to be “true” or accurate 
about a given digital subject in a specific context. If Digital Identity as a concept comes with any 
claim, it is not much to enable, ultimately, the spcific identification of the whole of the digital 
subject, but to allow for the assertion or discovery of the characterizations of a subject which are 
necessary to check before certain procedure can be completed or in order to make the 
determination as to what are the appropriate rules applicable to it. This notably enables granting 
authorizations based on rules about the claimant (as known through its attributes) and the 
resource or procedure being pursued. 
The interview data also abounds in the direction of the claim being the central construct 
of digital identity. 
Identity is a set of claims. Authentication is a decision that is made by examining a set of claims... thinking 
about what is in them and who’s made them. The natural person is not necessarily revealed by a digital 
identity. Minimum disclosure reveals only what need to be revealed in order to get a transaction done. 
[Res_G, 2011] 
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More obvious in the digital realm than in the physical world is the fact that checking identity is 
for the purpose of allowing a transaction or a communication to proceed. In such contexts, what 
is at stake is not the accuracy of the objective representation and sufficient referencing of the 
whole of an entity, but the accuracy of a characterization of it (of a statement about it), which 
enables to decide whether a given procedure or transaction is permitted and may be carried out. 
This is predicated on the ability to assess claims as to whether they are right or wrong, warranted 
or unwarranted, true or false, legit or not. Users are making a claim whenever they’re trying to 
assert that they control a given digital representation, and then that a digital representation which 
they control should provide them with access to, with the right to move around, or with the 
ownership rights altogether over a given resource, etc. In a number of digital transactions, self-
asserted claims may be sufficient. 
The question in any given case is: what are we trying to assert? That may not need as high level of 
confidence as people may assume. [R s_D, 2009] 
For transactions that required verified claims however, claims will be issued by an entity that is 
the relevant authority for that particular claim (or the attribute implied.) 
Claims … are often about authorization: you’re looking for the information in order to decide whether to 
do a transaction or not. [Res_A, 2009] 
… the relying party decides whether to believe [th claims issued by a given entity] or not. 
Trust proceeds from the relying party. The relying party decides what’s true, and he evaluates who is 
saying what about whom to decide whether to grant access. [Res_G, 2011] 
We already knew that the question ‘who are you?’ is not as much transparent as it may 
look at first, and answering it not as simple, for there is no one single and definite answer. Now it 
is even less transparent in the digital and networked-computer world. Given the overlay of 
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computer networks required with digital technology, one more layer of complexity adds to the 
way identity is defined and handled: the issue no longer is just about identifying humans among 
other humans by assigning them documentary credentials that include their individual 
descriptions. It also and before anything else is about identifying, or at least qualifying or 
labeling, data among data, that is to say, bits among bits, in a technological context where every 
piece of information is encoded in a binary format. Arguably in those conditions, the question 
‘Who are you?’ potentially means a different question in different contexts.  
Depending on the context of interactions between th person asking and the person being asked and maybe 
a third party who wanna know, you get a different question. (Res_H, 2011) 
Different plausible answers may provide different levels of satisfaction or not at all, 
depending on what is relevant for the context at hand. According to this expert, a lot of 
assumptions are made about what it means to be a person. For him, digital technology leads us to 
re-examine our notion of identity, including its social, legal and other components, which define 
a variety of dimensions (and notions) regarding what a person is. 
With digital identity you have to ask yourself what is identity? What is it you’re actually asserting when you 
make a claim about someone’s identity? ... Are you saying this person is that person? What are the claims 
you’re making about that person, and what are the claims they’re making about themselves? Is that really 
[Mr. X]? What does that actually mean? What it means is: 
Is this person the same person who has this bank account? 
Is this person the same person who lives at this address? 
Is this person the same person who has this DNA sequence? 
Is this person the same person who is the father of these children? 
Is this person the same person who just logged in to this website? [Res_H, 2011] 
 
 
In a keynote address delivered at th
as 
just an umbrella term that encompasses a lot of different concepts in technology that have been pursued for 
many decades. The most important ones are authentication and data sharing.
Particularly in the Internet environment, those two conceptual pillars are related and yet they are 
very distinct and need to be distinguished.
Authentication is all about ‘who are you?’ and in the online world, that’s not just who are you as human 
but possibly also who is this computer process, who is this application, sme kind of notion of identity or 
identifiers, in particular. That question of ‘who are you?’ turns out to be quite complex in its own right 
because there’s no single answer to that; you may have different
your identity in different spheres of activity… The other part 
So, most of that is about personal information. …, more generally we refer to that as identity
information. It may be de-identified but it may still relate to you as individual, so it’s identity
[Brands_2010] 
Figure 6
 
 
                                                 
98 Research Symposium: “Developing a Tru
Security Institute (IPSI) at the University of Toronto, May 12, 2010. See 
http://hosting.epresence.tv/KMDI/1/watch/748.aspx
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In the remainder of this section, I analytically elaborate on this important distinction 
proposed by Brands above, echoing the conceptual interpretations I myself suggested earlier99. 
To some extent, the above formulation – saying that authentication applies to ‘who you are’ 
(identity) as opposed to ‘what you are’ for data sharing – may mislead into thinking that t ere is 
identity on the one hand and data on the other. That would not be accurate, for obviously what is 
authenticated (‘who you are’) in this context is also data. In fact, the contrast here is between the 
authentication of data on the one hand and the sharing of the data on the other (Fig. 7-2). In that 
sense, the authentication mechanism applies to the amount of data which, once authenticated, 
will allow the discovery or assertion of an identity, i.e. of a known entity – as per the 
authenticated data and whatever defines an entity i the context at hand. Sharing applies to any 
data; but the sharing is more meaningful when applied to data that can be linked to an identity 
(“identity-related” data,) when the provenance and ttributions of the data are known.  
There’s a whole bunch of transactions, if you don’t k ow who made the transactions the data is less 
sensitive. You may be able, just based on the knowledge of the transactions, to figure out who it is. But data 
in and of itself doesn’t always map directly to an identity; an identity without data doesn’t tell you what 
they do. [Res_H 2011] 
As presented above, the question ‘who are you?’ is actually a referential question. It 
possibly invites an answer based on either one of tw  reference planes. The first one, immanent 
to the digital space itself, includes and designates that entity (‘you’) as represented within the 
structure and syntax of (in this context) the computer communication system itself. A name, for 
instance, may be a sufficient answer to that question on this plane, assuming that entities have a 
name (a consistently designating string of charactes) in the context at hand and that knowing a 
                                                 
99 I had already made a similar distinction between ‘who’ and ‘what’ (see chapter 2) by the time I became aware of 
Brands’ presentation. 
 
 
name is sufficient to provide the system with the informa
to behave with the entity thus named. 
when the (referential) entity in question is an embodied human being outside the computer 
system, the same still applies, as the human user interacting with a computer system will also 
have to be represented in one form or the other within the 
“understands,” – in a sense, according to the system’s
can talk about a second plane of reference which is the thick world of brick
world in which the actual body of the 
you?’ implies and requires the referential dimensio of identity in
dimension may be located either within the space of the system of representation itself (here a 
computer software system) or in the world outside that
for the data and the system itself m
Figure 
 
 
On the other hand, the question 
‘what’s your data?’ In other words: In the domain at hand, what are the diff rent pieces of data 
 
tion it needs in order to determine how 
In that condition, the name is an identifier.
computer system, which the system 
 language and syntax. In the latter case,
-and-
human user esides. Either way, the question ‘who are 
 order to be addressed; that 
 system, in which both the entity
aterially stand.  
6-2: A simple model of identity authentication 
‘what are you?’ is akin to ‘what data are you?’
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that relate to, or manifest the state of, this entity? Data flows on a network; at any given point in 
time it is the manifestation of the state of the entity it refers to. It generally is less permanent than 
the entity itself, and may sometimes be utterly transient, because the states evolve while the 
entity persists. One may argue that the ‘what’ dimension also is referential, to the extent that data 
relates to a subject. However in the case of the ‘w o,’ the reference is ontological, while it is 
only relational and contingent in the case of the ‘what.’ 
Moreover, the formulation of identity as combining the authentication of ‘who you are’ 
with the sharing of ‘what you are’ suggests a tight connection between authentication nd 
identity, so as to say: every authentication is one f identity. Any piece of data that provides 
sufficient information to link it to a single known or knowable entity in a given domain is identity 
data; authentication is the mechanism that demonstrates such link as accurate and certain 
(according to the rules established in that domain.) I  sum, the question ‘who are you?’ 
addresses the certainty or reliability of the referntial dimension of the data (which entity does 
the data exactly refer to, as its semantic source100, so to speak?) and the question ‘what are you?’ 
addresses the multiplicity of available data connected to ‘you’ – not only the data sui generis of 
‘your’ actions and transactions, but also metadata level information such as labels, requirements, 
rules and policies that are attached to the data and define the array of possible behaviors that data 
may follow or treatments it may be subjected to. (Fig. 7-3) 
Using the phrase ‘semantic source’ about the data subject also signals that beyond the 
mere content of the data point at hand, the need to have some knowledge or definition of such 
                                                 
100 I am calling semantic source what is also called data subject, i.e., the source or basis of its meaning. In semiotics 
terms, it is the entity which the sign (data) denotes. Any entity may be transmitting or processing personal data that is 
not their own (e.g., a data controller dealing with its customers’ data), at which time they are source of the process that is 
taking place, but not the semantic source of the data. I use the term ‘semantic source’ to distinguish the contingent 
source that is responsible for the data being in the circumstances it is at a given point in time, and the source that is the 
reference subject of the data, i.e. the very entity that the data is supposed to mean.  
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subject as referent source for the data is an important piece in the identity processes, and a 
semantic one by definition. As quoted above, one of the interviewees (Res_H) has made the 
point that transaction data without identity does not mean much and identity without data does 
not amount to much. This suggests that transaction data or identity-related data without the 
knowledge of the relevant identity is not fully meaningful and both are needed to give full sense 
to, and maximize the utility of, the data. In effect through the phrase ‘semantic source,’ I am also 
arguing that while any data has its proper and objectiv  meaning which is the state of things it is 
meant to capture, the primary information it is meant to convey, its referent subject is also part of 
its meaning when it comes to the notion of identity: in other words, knowing the data subject – 
i.e., the semantic source of the data – complements the knowledge of the data object – i.e., the 
meaning of the data content – to give the data its full meaning and utility as identity data. For 
example, on its face a data piece may mean that an individual who is nineteen bought alcohol at 
a given point in time. I cannot decide whether thatis legal or illegal unless I know a little more 
about that individual than the fact that he or she i  nineteen (in other words, unless I know 
beyond what the data says some other part of “who they are” in the actual world), even if I 
myself live in a jurisdiction where that transaction would be illegal. The same would apply to a 
variety of identity information, depending on the objective of the entity handling the plain data 
initially available.  
There are different requirements depending on where the mphasis lies, between data 
sharing and authentication. Higher the need for security, stronger the authentication, and vice 
versa. Conversely, where the main goal is to share d ta, then the solution adopted has less 
stringent authentication requirements. Whatever the angle adopted, it should be possible to 
combine different systems and solutions, taking into account the possibility to upgrade or 
 
 
emphasize capabilities and features related to one perspe
related to the other, as appropriate.
Fig. 6
6.2.2 Why do we need digital identity? 
The case for digital identity is not yet won in the eye of the average user, to say the least. 
may be observed through the first reaction and the reluctance to get beyond that whenever a 
public newly comes to learn about digital identity blue prints. Even the US Government’s first 
draft of the “National Strategy for Trusted Identity in Cyberspace” (
Strategy) released by the White House caused some discomfort and even resistance
therefore a serious challenge for the designers to address the question as to why digital identity
needed, and to convey a sense of its
main arguments coming so far out of this community of designers and developers
The final version of the Strategy lists a number of benefits of what it calls identity 
ecosystem (see related section infra
                                                 
101 This could be noted at the roundtable organized at Syracuse University to discuss the draft Strategy on September 3, 
2010: http://insct.syr.edu/insct_events.aspx?id=36507230109&terms=cyberspace
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identity. First, it must be noted that the document makes the claim that “[i]ndividuals are the 
first priority of the Strategy” [gov_nstic, p. 21]. The benefits to individuals lited therein are 
convenience, privacy and security. There will be less use of the “anti-pattern”  [Res_B] formed 
by the pair username-password with all of its flaws and limitations. The process of registering for 
and accessing online services will be streamlined, less amount of information being collected at 
every transaction. This in turn limits the exposure of user data and improves security. As to the 
private sector, they will be able to innovate with new and more efficient services, increasing 
customer enrollment and trust. And lastly, efficieny and transparency will be improved in 
government services to the satisfaction of its constituents; these technologies will bring about 
innovation and drive economic growth; and public safety will be improved with less cyber-
crime, better infrastructure protection and emergency response services. 
There is a fair concordance across the experts interv ewed as to why online identity 
technology is needed. Data sharing is an important p rt of online transactions, particularly 
including those transactions where PII is required. One expert emphasizes the virtue of 
exchanging identity information in order to enhance data sharing at a variety of levels. In that 
respondent’s view, we need large scale interoperabl Internet identity systems “because identity 
enablement makes it more practical to do selective sharing, and selective sharing is key to 
privacy and security.” [Res_B, 2010] 
Another one experienced the problem of identity as a loophole in the management of 
citizens’ records by a state administration, in the early years 2000. He provides further details as 
follows: 
All of this started looking like we were asking thesame question over and over again in a slightly different 
guise. … In determining eligibility for certain benefit systems you couldn’t actually compare social security 
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numbers because of, uh, federal laws, you know, regarding, you know, privacy of certain information. So it 
turned out that you get people with multiple records in the system and no way to verify whether they were 
the same person or not. And your trying to solve those kinds of problems was something that seemed to take 
up a lot of time.  [Res_M 2011] 
Likewise, to the question about the circumstances that led him to get involved in digital 
identity business, one of the respondents explained that the core structure of information in 
digital format being as abstract as a series of 0s and 1s, there is something missing when 
information of economic value and consequence is being transferred in digital media. According 
to him, that component which is needed to structure the information and realize its utility for 
backing up and carrying economic value is identity. 
If you have an exponential increase in something, ad it doesn’t have legal structure on it and that thing 
has value, then there’s a missing component. The [missing] infrastructure around that information pile is 
identity – that’s the skeleton necessary for the pil . Because identity, it isn’t just people, but it’s identity of 
people and entities and things. [Res_L 2011] 
Still in the same order of ideas, another interviewe  pinpoints the critical need to be able 
to overlay a meaningful structure on the huge amount f digital data that consumers now 
generate and which is constantly flowing. On the onhand you have data, raw and amorphous 
data in the sense that it is unstructured and makes littl  sense in terms of fully grasping its value. 
On the other hand, identity is the notion that can structure and help release the full meaning, 
value and implications of the data. Data without an identity construct can be anything; with an 
identity structure, data takes on a specific value. 
There’s a whole bunch of transactions, if you don’t k ow who made the transactions the data is less 
sensitive. You may be able just based on the knowledge of the transactions to figure out who it is. But data 
in and of itself doesn’t always map directly to an identity; an identity without data doesn’t tell you what 
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they do. So you say, what’s their behavior? What’s their asset, what do they do online, who are they? It is 
the connection of the two that’s explosive both in da ger and in opportunity. So when you’re thinking of the 
question of digital identity, to just think about it as identification of who this is, this isn’t sufficient … 
Identity isn’t a sufficient construct on its own for describing the behavior of the system; you have to think 
about it as personal data: digital identity plus data creating the union of the person plus the information 
produced by and about them. [Res_H 2010] 
More broadly, this interviewee adopts a societal pers ctive in order to highlight the value of 
identity in human societies. Based on the idea that digital identity is a “representation of the 
physical self” he points out the importance of individual identity historically, and therefore what 
digital identity means to a digital society, a digital economy, and a digital culture. 
Historically, part of what has allowed society to function is stable, legal and social identity: that you have 
a name that is stable, that you have forms of identfyi g yourself through driving license and the rest, and 
that you have legal personhood so that you can own property, you can be subject to certain laws and 
constraints, and that you have unified enough identity so that you can be subject to social norms. So part of 
what makes society function is that we have stable enough, and well understood enough, forms of identity. 
So that happened in the pre-digital world. As we’ve moved now (inaudible) increasingly our work, our 
play, our romance, our government, many, many spheres of human life have either a correlate online or in 
some cases happen predominantly online. [R s_H 2010]  
Here again, something has been missing in digital in eractions, said my interlocutor, which is 
identity – an identity that would be “stable enough, interoperable enough, and user-controlled 
enough” but also open enough to realize the full promises of an agile flow of personal data. He 
went on to stress how meaningful this is for the future of the society.   
I think what’s important too is to think about the structure of what kind of society it is we wanna live n... so 
that’s why these questions aren’t just commercial questions. And they’re not just governmental question . 
They are about the nature of relationship between th  private sector, the public sector, and citizens a d
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consumers. And so ... these are fundamental questions of political economy and civil society, as well as 
they are commercial questions. And we’re at a point f history where all the industry is trying to work them 
out. [Res_H 2010] 
Equally important from a societal perspective is the need for “creating due process for 
digital citizens” as another expert put it [Res_L 2011]. In a comparative perspective about law 
and technology, he holds that specifications are for technology what laws are for people, both 
enabling regularity for tools and humans, respectivly.  
The technology needs to be normalized. [Res_L 2011] 
Technology is made regular by specifications, peopl are made regular by law. ... Those laws are statutory, 
regulatory or contractual. That’s where duties come from, and duties regularize people’s behavior. [Idem] 
That normalization occurs through specifications and protocol standards. As a result, 
(normalized or standardized) technology changes “the risk profile of other people’s behavior” in 
a given environment where they interact with each other using the said technology. In the end, 
the parties to identity transactions are “paying for … the value proposition” which can be 
formulated as follows: “the regularity and reliability of other people’s behaviors, and those are 
behaviors with respect to data.” [Res_L 2011] 
Through those conversations, we have learned that digital identity is a tool necessary to 
put some meaningful structure on the flow of digital d ta. Without such structure, the data 
flowing in between end user terminals is amorphous and of a limited value. What these 
respondents seem to suggest is that a world of computer networks without any digital identity 
scheme would resemble a physical world where human beings for instance had no name, not 
even a substitute thereof (such as an identifier or a stable handle that can be recorded and 
remembered), no record whatsoever associated with them (and how could anything even be 
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associated with them if they have no name or substit te thereof?), a world where people have no 
legal status and where they exist for others only when and so long as their bodies are exposed to 
the immediate sight of those others, a world where there only are bodies without any information 
of any kind linked to them. That information can be securely and stably linked to human bodies 
and recorded as such affords the possibility to process that information on behalf of the related 
human individuals without their involvement or even presence while throughout the process it 
will still pertain specifically and exclusively to each individual it is meant to relate to.  
Described that way, the situation may sound quite dramatic, and that might be just about 
how it is in the eye of these technologists from their outlook on the potential for digital data 
sharing and transactions. While the counterfactual above is based on a parallel with the physical 
world as opposed to the digital world itself, it stll is enlightening in that any entities moving 
around and interacting within computer systems and networks are patterns of digital data and 
vice versa, just like human beings move around and interact in the physical world of human 
societies. Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest with that counterfactual that without a digital 
identity-enabling framework, without digital identity infrastructure, no personal information 
currently exists or can be recorded on the Internet (i.e., in digital form) about the end user, that 
there is no way for Web services to assemble or to discover the identity of the user they are 
dealing with (whatever identity entails in their context.) However, the existing processes and 
patterns are neither streamlined nor secure. They lack of a common framework applicable to the 
Internet as a whole. While every Web service may set up a sign-up mechanism that will provide 
the users with an identifier/username and a password, one may note, first, that their utility to 
protect valuable assets is critically limited (there is a reason why banks do not let their customers 
access their bank account online in the manner they do their email account), and second the lack 
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of common framework prevents the data to be transmitted still in understandable format from a 
system to another.  
The claim that without identifiable structure the data is just an indiscernible flow of 
zeroes and ones may have been overstated.102 Such claim suggests that it might even be 
impossible, certainly not practical, to see meaningful data patterns. How can one see patterns in 
the flow of data if there is no clear attributable source and no (meta-) structure to help figure out 
what this chunk of zeroes and ones are intended for as pposed to the next chunk? Arguably, 
there are pointers of data source and destination such as IP addresses and other control data103 
embedded in the data packets which could enable adding some value to the plain data stream. 
However, data moves around ultimately on behalf of human beings, and not being able to record 
and organize any identifiable information about the us r and his or her intentions, the value that 
can be gotten out of that processing and exchanging of data will be much less significant.    
The technologists seem to agree that the fact of not having digital identity technology 
drastically limits what could be achieved through computer networking, and that the cost of 
doing it without such technology (assuming this is po sible at all) is so high that it becomes a 
substantial waste of opportunity in an increasingly digital data-intensive environment – a waste 
that demands to be fixed. 
                                                 
102 The packets in every stream of user data or payload is affixed with headers and footers (control data or overheads) as 
they go down the layers of the TCP/IP stack from and back up to the applications layer. As a result the data is 
structured as far as computer devices are concerned but from identity standpoint, the data may need further structure for 
human and meaningful usage in human identity-related functions and transactions. 
103 Another piece of control data apart from the IP address is the media access control sub-layer address also known as 
MAC address which identifies the computing device.   
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6.2.3 A tentative timeline 
As rightfully noted by one of the interviewees and expert contacts during this investigation, the 
need for identity systems is not particular to the Int rnet; “it exists across all media.” He added: 
IdM [identity management] systems exist and will continue to evolve. New ones will emerge. IdM systems 
are a distributed, autonomous global phenomenon. [What is currently needed is] to facilitate more 
interoperable IdM systems… [Res_J 2011] 
In effect, as we have seen in previous chapters different technologies and media have historically 
raised the problem of the identity of all entities that can act or conduct some form of transaction 
using those media. In order to address the problem specific and different solutions are produced 
based on the capabilities the technology at hand affords.  
That being acknowledged, the focus of this investigation is on how the same challenge is 
being dealt with in open TCP/IP networks as epitomized by the Internet, after two decades of use 
by the broad public and availability to commerce without any consistent protocols for user 
identification. The latest iteration of efforts to s lve the identity problem in this global medium 
would have started a little more than a decade ago: 
Identity [in this context] is an umbrella term that was coined in the late nineties. Actually I do believe that 
Microsoft started that; they called it Network Identity in the late nineties when they were pursuing 
something called Passport. And then in 2001 a light goes off called Liberty Alliance. Actually I believe they 
introduced the term “digital identity.” Certainly it became popular around that time. [Brands_2010] 
Within that timeframe, I put further the emphasis on the latest surge of industrious activities that 
led to a new generation of protocols, which I locate round 2004-2005 when the talk of “user-
centric identity” started moving from conference hallw ys to the main stage [Res_M].   
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While there had been a number of individual or isolated efforts on the issue of digital 
identity before 2005, that year seems to mark a turn opening a period where identity concern in 
computer networks regained momentum particularly in the related US-based industry. One of my 
interlocutors involved in state government work around 2001-2002 recalled how often in his 
professional conversations then identity would come up as a challenge to the management of 
information flows in computer networks, be it the id ntity of people or that of things such as 
vehicles (e.g., car titling) etc.  
Forums such as the Digital ID World conference, which launched in October 2002, 
particularly focused on identity within organizations. However, informal talks begun then about 
personal or user identity at large [Res_M]. It was a time that saw the early trial of various URL-
based identity systems (i.e., using a website address as user identifier) while opening the 
discussions about token-based systems. Following that gestation period, the first Internet Identity 
Workshop was organized in May 2005 in Berkeley, California. 
Later in August that year at a different event, Dick Hardt, an entrepreneur in the field, 
delivered a keynote presentation104 on what he then called “Identity 2.0” focusing on user-centric 
identity while attempting to sketch out the recent his ory of Internet-based identity 
technologies.105 As is often the case, the pair of username and password commonly used for 
authentication online is both the start and the problem in this story. Being able to provide the 
appropriate pair of logins only proves that an individual is a directory entry, to use the 
                                                 
104 “Identity 2.0” keynote address at the O’Reilly Open Source Convention (OSCON 2005.) The presentation used to be 
available at http://identity20.com/media/OSCON2005/ 
105 This first proposed historical outline was then extended in the author’s sequel presentation at ETech 2006 “Who Is 
the Dick on My Site?” (Hardt_2006) which used to be available at http://identity20.com/media/ETECH_2006/ 
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presenter’s words, which he characterized as the gist of “identity 1.0” and described in the 
following terms:  
It’s directory-centric, it’s an opaque trust decision, there’s a single authority, there’s no credential choice, 
it’s not portable, it’s all in a silo.  (Hardt_2005) 
In the periodization offered by Hardt, the identity 1.0 paradigm developed during the 
1980’s. It was dominated by X.500 directory services standardized at the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Standard Organization (ISO), and the 
Directory Access Protocol (DAP) which was rather heavy due to very detailed features. In that 
model, identity verification simply requires to demonstrate to the system that one has knowledge 
of certain information which is pre-recorded in thesystem. In other words, ascertaining identity 
is completed through a test whereby the subject show  that he or she is in possession of some 
information which, it is assumed, only the rightful s bject would have. That test takes place 
when the subject presents herself to the system, one way or the other. It is in fact only an 
authentication test that pulls or activates the user’s identity, which is made of all the data the 
system has gathered and stored about the user. 
Verified digital identity is not anything you can give to the site, but it’s what a website knows about y .  
(Hardt_2005) 
In that sense, there is no portability: the user has no ownership of identity and cannot leverage it 
for further transactions away from the site where it is built. As the presenter elaborates, there is 
no way for the user to move her eBay reputation score over to Amazon.com or her purchase 
history from the latter over to Barnes & Noble’s web site or to her favorite book club’s site. 
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The next decade allegedly tilted the balance in the opposite direction. It brought the 
revenge of what the digital identity entrepreneur calls the “KISS crowd” (KISS for ‘Keep It 
Simple and Stupid’) which provided the lightweight version of DAP, the standardization of 
which was championed by the Netscape company at IETF. The result was a number of iterations 
of LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.) Based on that standard, Microsoft was able 
to build Active Directory service and came up with Passport for consumers. [Hardt_2006] 
 According to Stefan Brands the same decade was driven by a great deal of efforts and 
enthusiasm about strong cryptographic techniques, namely with the public key infrastructure 
(PKI) and smart cards. It wasn’t until late in the decade that PKI started receding to the back 
seat.  
In the late nineties, PKI was widely declared dead… PKI certificates… it’s one particular way to issue 
statements. Particularly what was called an identity certificate – who are you? – and this was standardized 
through a very long process. And ultimately, the biggest adoption there is SSL106 certificate, which was just 
a tiny niche of the overall space of applications where it could be used. In the late nineties actually, the 
industry started pursuing something called Attribute Certificates which was intended to solve the data 
sharing problem on top of the identity or identification problem. [Brands_2010] 
In the meantime, proliferation of applications and corporate acquisitions created the need 
to operate or virtually merge multiple directory services, which requires meta-directory and 
virtual directory technology (still domain-centric models.) Ultimately, federation was the answer 
to the need to enable the management of resources shared across multiple domains, which is 
“identity 1.5” in Hardt’s grading. SAML107 was the key piece of that identity framework, which 
                                                 
106 Security Socket Layer is a protocol for encrypting information transmitted over the Internet. 
107 Security Assertion Markup Language was the alternative adopted by Liberty Alliance and implemented with 
Shibboleth, a digital identity solution for education institutions. 
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creates a common token to move between domains and requires trust between sites. Eventually, 
federation emerged in the early years 2000 as a model f r the management of identity data flows.  
6.3 Design and architecture 
In this section, I propose to learn about basic identity management models and the design 
principles derived from the goal of building a digital identity infrastructure and systems centered 
on the user.  
6.3.1 Two models for managing identity across domains 
If federation is the first step away from the “identity silo” model, with the result or maybe side-
effect to reduce the login burden for the user, the us r-centric model will be the second one, with 
the aim to put identity credentials squarely in the hands of the user. 
Federation identity 
In the digital identity context, federation is a group of organizations running similar or 
compatible identity systems insofar as their respectiv  systems and domains recognize each 
other’s credentials: a legitimate user authenticated on one of the systems need not authenticate 
again on any one of the member organizations’ system b fore they have protected access as 
appropriate.  
 Another expert appears to corroborate the same view regarding the timing of the 
emergence of federated systems. He describes Microsoft Passport as the first attempt at identity 
federation solution for the users, albeit a “monolithic federation” [Res_G]. Actually launched in 
1999, Microsoft Passport was “a single-sign-in and wallet service for communication and 
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commerce on the Internet.”108 The challenge was mainly twofold: other commercial entities had 
to rely on Microsoft for identity transactions with t eir (prospective) customers, and privacy 
concerns regarding the company’s access and handling of the user’s data. In reaction and as a 
counter-weight to Microsoft’s Passport, Liberty Alliance emerged in late 2001 with the goal to 
realize a fully federated (and distributed) model of identity management based on open identity 
standards for strong authentication.109  
 Federation however only expands the boundaries of the domain where the identity 
solutions are applicable, with the size of the federation depending on business decisions made by 
the member organizations. The model doesn’t change much the equation for the user; it does not 
scale up based on the user needs. 
In a closed environment, say, Identity Management for all employees in a single company domain, a back-
end-centric identity solution may be just fine. [Brands_2010] 
What about the open Internet and the end user at lage? That approach does not offer an identity 
solution to the user, but only a solution to organiz tions for streamlining their identity 
management processes and maybe reducing maintenance and transaction costs. It does not bring 
a solution that might enable the users to go about their own identity-bound business around the 
Internet. Outside work transactions, the user is left with very little option in terms of using and 
managing their digital identity.  
…The user has no choice for their identity provider, which is actually okay in a work persona because 
you’re acting on behalf of the enterprise, so of course they should be able to control that. But what about 
your other personas? You know, what if you work on your retirement plan, your 401K, your health plan? 
                                                 
108 See http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/1999/10-11passport.mspx 
109 Liberty Alliance is a consortium of companies and other stakeholders forming a “standard organization with a global 
membership.” See http://www.projectliberty.org/ 
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Do you want your identity provider to be your employer? Who’s liable? What if something bad happens?… 
[Hardt_2006] 
In some ways however, federation is considered to be a first step in the recognition of 
identity as a platform service, at the infrastructure level [Brands_2010], for it takes identity 
management out of the silo where it was confined by involving more parties and enabling more 
transactions. But there is a need for further steps. It appears that in order to leverage identity 
management solutions for addressing user needs acros the Internet, the model and mechanisms 
of those solutions will have to be centered on the us r.  
In case of a single infrastructure that anyone can use in the online world, user-centric identity is the only 
scalable approach – federated IdM [identity management] a la the Liberty Alliance work does not scale, 
and has many privacy and security (vis-à-vis insider) problems. [Brands_2010] 
The insistence on the need to provide an appropriate solution whereby the user will be able to 
take their identity with them wherever they need to will lead to advocating for user-centric 
identity.  
User-centric identity 
This phrasal designation might have been inspired by the difference noted between online 
and off-line identity models and practices. While th online practices generate a “silo model” of 
identity verification/management (your identity is “what the website knows about you” which it 
keeps for itself), in the physical world one practically owns one’s identity credentials and can 
carry them around to use as needed, wherever needed. In other words, the portability of the 
identity assertions via credentials, and thus the avail bility of the latter to the extent needed by 
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- Identity verifier often referred to in the current digital identity design context also as 
Relying party: the entity that requires proof of identity or identity verification in the 
current instance of transaction. 
To explain user-centric identity, one of the experts has provided a very instructive 
metaphor: a model of identity management is as user-centric as a car is driver-centric. 
We all think of cars as driver-centric: a car doesn’t do anything that you don’t instruct it to do. But there 
are identity systems which are just like having a robot driving your car. ...Or better yet, that would be like a 
bus system or train system, right? Those systems, someone else is doing the driving. You’re getting some 
place you wanna go but you’re doing it on a system d signed by others, that’s being operated by others, fo  
which the pathways are limited. Whereas when you put yo rself… when you are the driver of the car, you
go where you wanna go. It doesn’t mean there aren’t speed limits and, you know, and roads, and other... 
other natural limits. You have the maximum degrees of choice.  And no one else is coercing you into, uh, 
where you can go. [Res_E 2010] 
Another analogy is that of “neighborhood watch,” for user-centric identity “empowers 
people so that they can recognize what looks odd.” This participant notes that it would be more 
practical and effective to adopt a user-centric approach for a global and interoperable digital 
identity system. In a world where every day several ntities move billions of dollars each through 
identity transactions, it is too cumbersome to create a system of enforceable obligations. He 
rather sees the “neighborhood watch” approach as the only practical way to avoid that burden 
while enabling identity transactions. 
My mom has to be able to look out and see when something looks funny on an email, she has to be able to 
say, be familiar enough with the system to say, oh that looks odd and then have a mechanism to be able to 
report it in some way. And so in a sense you’re creating an immune system for the entity. So yeah user-
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centric is inevitable just in terms of the energy requirements of making the system work... and, and it’s the 
right thing to do. [Res_L 2011] 
  In the case of this participant, user-centric identity is not so much about control over the 
availability or even communication of personal data, s it is about enabling the user to detect 
identity-related threats.  
If people want control of data about them, that data is not just gonna be available only from them, it’s 
gonna be available from the cloud generally. Because, again, everything that I’ve ever done is now data 
somewhere. Or not, right? I mean, if it’s not stored somewhere then it doesn’t matter to anybody. And 
everything I’ve done that is stored somewhere is potentially networkable now... [Res_L 2011] 
Yet another security-related argument has been made for why user-centric would be a 
better model to implement. Federated systems multiply vulnerability points while the user-
centric model may narrow the attack tactics to luring the user, which admittedly brings a whole 
other set of challenges in itself.  
User-centric federated identity solves a lot of problems that non-user centric identity systems face. For 
example, uh, non-user centric systems when they try to federate essentially end up with ways for… or 
channels for fraud to occur that get closed off once the user is involved. Uh, you know, because, there is no 
way for people to collude [inaudible] user doing something. … So now it’s back to ‘we have to trick the 
user,’ which is always gonna be true. I mean,… in alot of federated systems, you don’t even have to trick 
the user, you just have to have a couple of colluding people at various organizations and they can do what 
they need to do. So I actually think user-centric offers enough significant benefits that it’s going to 
eventually be the system that we use for federating identity even between organizations. [Res_M 2011] 
There are still nuances is the interpretation of the ‘user-centricity’ which is now a term 
some of the players are increasing less inclined to use. Every now and then, the question of the 
relationship of the subject with her personal data is r ised: Does the data subject own her data as 
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a property? On one end of the spectrum, there are those who think of the user as literally owning 
their personal data. 
At [software company], everybody understands users own their own data, that’s a principle, a norm. They 
are committed to full disclosure to the user about what’s happening. They would still like to be at the center 
as much as possible. As a counter measure, they now u derstand they should use anonymization and other 
privacy-enhancing technology while being at the center. [Res_G 2011] 
On the other end of the user-centric spectrum, a number of participants feel that over-
emphasizing the user (from their perspective) might be either counterproductive or even 
misleading. It might be counterproductive because such emphasis on protecting the user might be 
missing the mark when it comes to the prospect of ripping the fruits that may come out of digital 
identity technology and innovations. As a result while one may agree on the principle of user 
control, protecting personal data should not be in their view the primary, much less the exclusive, 
way of framing the identity solution efforts for Internet transactions. 
We definitely want to protect people but we also want to create incentives in the ecosystem for companies 
and government to operate in a way that... people having control over their identity, ... control over their 
personal data benefits everyone: you can think of it as a win-win-win scenario where governments are abl  
to deliver better services, to be able to protect the rights of individuals and groups, or corporations are 
able to be free from onerous regulations because they’re good actors (inaudible), and have a more efficient 
marketplace because people data is flowing more freely as [than?] they do now because ....(inaudible) 
controlled, and individuals can participate in online life both as consumer and producer economically, nd 
as participant in civil society and politics. All of that, in my view, relies on an identity that has not been 
given to you by someone else, purely, but one that you have the ability to control and curate… [Res_H 
2010] 
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Further in that direction, others think that the “cntricity” of the user might be misleading 
because the user does not exclusively hold the data and may not have total control over its 
availability.  
Is the user really truly in the center of where thedata is, or are they ... is the data sitting on their finger tips 
and they’re moving it out in spokes, akin to the old school centralized enterprise model? And the answer is 
no. They may be... in control of where the data is moving, but they’re not sitting on the data. So instead of 
using the term user-centric identity, uh, we’re gravit ting towards using the term user-managed. And user-
managed identity is where the user just simply has control of where their data flow, but they’re not actually 
holding it in their pocket, as happens in the spoke model. So it’s been a useful shift to move from user-
centric to user-managed. [Res_F 2010] 
So far, there is no legal regime that defines a form f property rights over one’s own 
personal data. Due to the (non-excludability) nature of information and in the absence and 
perhaps the impossibility of defining any viable form of property rights over personal data, the 
data subject is no more entitled to full ownership (as with a piece of property) of personal 
information than the data controller (the entity that collects and stores the data) or any third party 
who gets to have access rights to the data, including the possibility to process it. Even in policy 
regimes the most friendly to the rights of the data subject, such as the EU’s, those rights do not 
define legal property as in the ownership of tangible goods. Only by virtue of duties of 
transparency and notice required of the data controller t wards data subjects, the latter are given 
some control over the collection of their personal data (need for consent), the status of their 
personal information (right to update) and its use. These rights afforded to the data subject are 
based, I would submit, on the recognition of, and the need to protect, the individual’s autonomy, 
that is, the capability and the freedom for oneself to be the author of decisions and actions 
affecting one’s fundamental attributes or standing, or to consciously delegate that authority 
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otherwise. Ultimately and based on the above, the legal status and qualification of the 
relationship between an individual and her personal data only manifest through the consequences 
of the misappropriation and misuse of the data by another entity, and the harm that might result 
from that. 
The fading of the term “user-centric” from the discourse of the designers may be a 
symptom not only indicative of the lack of active user participation in the design deliberations, 
but also signaling difficulties encountered with user adoption regarding a technology that is 
designed in such a way as to raise the profile of user’s rights or capabilities.   
 There was no advocate for the end user; that’s the problem of the user-centricity. [Res_G 2011] 
In an enlightened society, government should be advocate of the end user… we will ultimately see that. 
[Idem] 
We may well see that, ultimately. In the meantime however some path-dependency may set in, as 
the implementation of some critical user-friendly technologies and features may be abandoned 
due to lack of interest and adoption from the end user.110  
Whether the phrase ‘user-centric’ or ‘user-managed’ is employed to frame the identity 
management model aimed at, all the differences of view within this community of actors for now 
seem to harmonize around the need to provide the user with more choice in the communication 
and use of their identity data, thus more tools that allow increasing the user’s awareness of their 
digital footprint. In fact, the elaboration of the d sign concept of identity metasystem provides a 
fuller insight into the principles being assumed by way of the label ‘user-centric identity.’  
                                                 
110 For instance in February 2011 as I was wrapping up this case study, Microsoft announced that it will no longer 
support Information Card, its exemplar of user-centric identity selector: read Eve Maler’s blog at 
http://blogs.forrester.com/eve_maler/11-02-24-cardspace_is_dead_long_live_back_channel_access 
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6.3.2 Identity metasystem architecture 
By 2005, efforts to enable future generations of digital identity solutions to interoperate across 
protocols, platforms and services were well underway, as manifest in the formulation of the 
design principles for the architecture of a universal identity metasystem (Microsoft 2005; 
Cameron and Jones 2005). The identity metasystem dos n t imply the replacement and 
integration of all existing identity systems into one; not even for voluntarily participating 
systems. Rather, it is intended to be a “system of systems” – those in existence and future ones. 
There still will be different applications and systems with which the user will register and which 
will handle the maintenance of the user’s identity information. It is rather about integration at the 
“meta-” level in order to enable backend compatibili y and interaction (in fact, seamless 
interoperation) between systems, as transactions will require. This is to ensure that there are 
common meta-standards for the different identity management systems in place, the latter being 
based on different protocols and technologies, so that they can communicate with one another 
while providing “applications with a technology-independent representation of identities” 
(Microsoft 2005: n. p.) and enabling the user to enjoy a consistent experience across systems. 
Cameron and Jones (2005) use a revealing analogy to cap ure the end goal driving the project of 
identity metasystem. 
Before 1982, the networking world was fragmented. If you wanted to write a network-enabled application 
you had to choose what network to write it for: Ethernet, Token Ring, Arc-Net, X.25, etc. The inventio of 
a Network Metasystem, the Internet Protocol (IP), changed all that. It made it possible to write networking 
applications that worked across networks without knowi g the particulars of each network. It even enabled 
those applications to work with new networks that hdn't been invented yet, such as 802.11 wireless 
networks. Digital identity is similarly fragmented today. If you want to write an identity-enabled 
application, you have to choose which identity system o write it for, such as Kerberos, SAML, X.509, 
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Liberty, custom username/password systems, etc. The Identity Metasystem is intended [to] change all that, 
just as IP did for networking. It will make it possible to write identity-enabled applications that can work 
across multiple identity systems and can even use new identity systems as they are invented and connected 
to the Identity Metasystem. (Cameron and Jones 2005) 
In order to do this, the stakeholders must agree upon a number of basic architectural 
principles. As it turns out, following multiple and long-ranging discussions among the computer 
industry and identity community participants, notably in the “blogosphere” and at conferences,111 
those principles have been formulated under the title: “the 7 Laws of Identity” (Cameron 2005). 
The identity metasystem is intended to be universal to the extent possible involving all potential 
parties that can make use of digital identities in any ways, whether they are natural individuals or 
organizational entities, government or nongovernmental, profit or nonprofit. Following is brief 
exposé of those seven Laws.  
1. User Control and Consent: Technical identity systems must only reveal information 
identifying a user with the user’s consent. 
2. Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use: The solution which discloses the least 
amount of identifying information and best limits iuse is the most stable long term 
solution. 
3. Justifiable Parties: Digital identity systems must be designed so the disclosure of 
identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary and justifiable place in a 
given identity relationship. 
                                                 
111 See Kim Cameron’s, the Microsoft Chief Identity Architect, weblog at http://www.identityblog.com/?p=354 where 
introducing the output of that process, he writes: “We have undertaken a project to develop a formal understanding of 
the dynamics causing digital identity systems to succeed or fail in various contexts, expressed as the Laws of Identity. 
[…] Those of us who work on or with identity systems need to obey the Laws of Identity.  Otherwise, we create a wake 
of reinforcing side-effects that eventually undermine all resulting technology.  The result is similar to what would happen 
if civil engineers were to flaunt the law of gravity. By following them we can build a unifying identity metasystem that 
is widely accepted and enduring.” 
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4. Directed Identity: A universal identity system must support both “omni-directional” 
identifiers (same identifier usable across contexts) for use by public entities and 
“unidirectional” identifiers for use by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while 
preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles. 
5. Pluralism of Operators and Technologies: A universal identity system must channel 
and enable the inter-working of multiple identity technologies run by multiple identity 
providers. 
6. Human Integration : The universal identity metasystem must define the human user to 
be a component of the distributed system integrated through unambiguous human-
machine communication mechanisms offering protection against identity attacks. 
7. Consistent Experience across Context: The unifying identity metasystem must 
guarantee its users a simple, consistent experience whil  enabling separation of contexts 
through multiple operators and technologies. 
Once those high-level principles are in place, a number of decisions or steps need to 
follow for the enablement of the identity metasystem. A dozen of them are identified as follows 
(Cameron and Jones 2005). First, in order for the metasystem to be able to integrate a variety of 
systems interoperating between each other, it requis an encapsulating protocol capable of 
handling and transmitting all different formats of identity data from any one system to any other 
system. This means the encapsulating protocol is different and independent from the “identity 
payload formats” and can use them all (idem, p. 7). 
Second, because any identity metasystem-enabled solution must accommodate a portfolio 
of different identities possible for any given user, it equires for each relevant platform some 
software that will present the user with the available portfolio of identities and let him or her 
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choose one of them for the transaction at hand. That software is name the Identity Selector. “A 
key decision was to implement an Identity Selector that is independent of any specific identity 
provider, technology, or operator” (idem). During the transaction, the Identity Selector 
establishes communication with the identity providers using standard protocols. 
  Third, the portfolio of identities to be presented by the Identity Selector is based on the 
“Metadata Store,” which is “the store of configuration info telling the identity selector how to 
contact an identity provider to obtain actual identity information” as well as the graphical 
elements representing each identity. While the metadata store software may have provided for 
the identity selector user interface, both are decoupled in order to enable more flexibility: the 
selector can run on several devices and the metadata store can repose at any location of the user’s 
choice (including in the cloud.)   
For various reasons (e.g., audit), a consistent handle/designation associated with each 
identity in every instance of use may be needed. The use of the same handle across instance may 
not be desirable as different relying parties among themselves or both relying parties and identity 
providers may collude in order to share data tracking the same user. In order to avoid that, or 
minimize that possibility, different handles or identifiers may be used for different relying parties 
(and possibly for different sessions.)  
A design decision was to mitigate this danger by supporting the use of “unidirectional identifiers” (see Law 
4) so that the identifiers given to each relying party can be distinct from the identifiers given to others. The 
system is able to automatically generate pairwise identifiers for each combination of identity provider and 
relying party that is used. No common URL, GUID [Global Unique Identifier], etc. is sent that could serve 
as a correlation handle between sites. (Cameron and Jo es 2005: 8) 
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Fifth: the selector keeps a memory of what information has previously been released to a 
site with the user’s consent so that the same information will readily be released to the same site 
whenever requested. The expected benefit of this design decision is to remove the burden of 
continuously storing, between uses, the user information with the cost of maintenance and the 
risks of data loss to both relying parties and users. The sixth decision states that “the metasystem 
design verifies the cryptography but leaves trust analysis for a higher layer that runs on top of the 
identity metasystem” (idem, p. 8). 
In the identity exchange process, it should be noted that the requirements pertaining to 
the human token may be different from those pertaining to the computational token, as the 
human user needs to be able to make sense of the bits that are being exchanged, in terms of 
identity information, between computer systems in order to make informed decisions. This 
means the identity selector should be able to display claim values in human readable language, 
which is a challenge given that the claim values come in different formats and languages, none 
of which the selector is necessarily meant to understand. The seventh design decision consists in 
having 
identity providers send claim values both in their native format and in a human-readable format (the 
“display token”), with the two sets of values cryptographically bound together to allow auditing of an 
identity provider either by users or by relying parties that understand the claims. (Idem, p. 8-9)  
Eight, a distinction is made between auditing and non-auditing identity providers. In 
effect, some transactions with a number of financial and government institutions may require an 
audit log of the sites visited by a particular identity. The identity metasystem is designed in such 
a way that the identity of the relying party is released to the identity providers that require 
auditing while that capability is disabled for providers with no such requirement. 
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The identity of a site should be proven to the user before the user is required to supply 
identity information to the site. This notably addresses phishing. Microsoft, VeriSign and other 
certificate authorities have joined efforts to develop a new type of stronger X.509 certificates to 
that end. These are supposed to compensate for the limitations of SSL.  
Tenth, in order to improve security it is important to minimize uncertainties and the 
possibility of hazard. The pathway of interactions between the user and the identity metasystem 
must be made “as simple, familiar, self-explanatory, and predictable as possible” (idem, p. 9). 
At June 2006 “Identity Mashup” conference hosted by Harvard Law School’s Berkman 
Center, leading players including Microsoft, IBM, Novell, The Higgins Project, VeriSign, 
NetMesh, Cordance and Sxip agreed to set up the OSIS working group, committing to promote 
the identity metasystem design principles through their respective projects and to collaborate in 
order to ensure the interoperability of their different technologies (Recordon and Reed 2006). 
Two years later, a call for participation112 was issued in order to form the technical committee on 
identity metasystem interoperability set up at OASIS113 (not to be confused with OSIS). In July 
2009, the technical committee concluded its proceedings114 with the completion of the current 
version of the identity metasystem interoperability standards. The identity metasystem is built 
using Web Services (WS-*) protocols, notably regarding trust (as related to the “encapsulating 
protocol used for claims transformation within the m tasystem,”) metadata exchange, security 
and security policy (idem, p. 7). Now let us considered more closely individual releases of digital 
                                                 
112 See http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/tc-announce/200808/msg00004.html 
113 Founded in 1993, this industry consortium was initially called “SGML Open” dedicated to promoting interoperability 
across products based on the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML). It became OASIS (Organization for the 
Advancement of Structured Information Standards) in 1998, reflecting the broadening of their mission scope. 
Nowadays, the banner on their website (http://www.oasis-open.org/org) reads “OASIS Advancing open standards for 
the information society,” marking an inflection towards open standards (see ‘About Us’ at http://www.oasis-
open.org/org). 
114 See http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/v1.0/identity.html 
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identity technology so as to exhibit the emerging functionalities it may afford and deepen our 
understanding of this technology.    
6.4 Description of digital identity technology cases 
I am now going to expound a number of specific software technologies or applications that have 
emerged over the last few years as instances of digital identity technology and detail as well as 
analyze their features and specifications. This is meant to provide the reader with awareness and 
understanding of the technological capabilities avail ble so far or in the process of being 
implemented. In that sense, whether these technologies have been rolled out or whether their 
originator has stopped supporting them (such as in the case of Microsoft with the information 
card), it still is relevant to understand them and the potential they make available to date, as their
capabilities are still out there for developers to build on.115 Furthermore, this investigation having 
been historically framed, it is critical to document very notable output of the processes at work 
and the social actors involved, whether those outputs eventually prevail or are abandoned. For by 
providing a well-documented backdrop with the full range of capabilities and options that were 
once available, they will help better understand the ultimate solutions that will be retained – and 
why those solutions have prevailed.   
6.4.1 CardSpace and Information Cards 
Windows CardSpace (initially referred to by the code name InfoCard) has been the main 
implementation of Microsoft’s broader project or ambition to create an identity metasystem as a 
unified, secure and interoperable identity layer to the Internet. It is a technology that enables 
                                                 
115 As an indication of this, the fact that Microsoft has decided not to ship the next iteration of the information card 
technology did not necessarily cause the dissolution of the Information Card Foundation which still is about promoting 
that technology and its underlying design principles.  
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users to store and manage various digital identities which they can use to communicate claims 
and assertions about themselves in order to complete any relevant transaction online. During 
transactions on enabled sites, when the user is requested to provide personally identifiable 
information, the CardSpace takes over with a pop-up window providing the user with options of 
digital identities or virtual information cards to choose from (each card represents an identity.) 
CardSpace is also called identity selector. It includes the CardSpace store (where the information 
cards are stored) and a complete self-issued identity provider which enables the user to run his or 
her own identity provider service for basic claims that do not need a third-party assurance. 
CardSpace has been designed for use on any machine run ing any operating system and 
to operate across systems. It uses any form of security tokens. Security tokens are an important 
notion in the area of digital identity and they areused in all related technologies. They are meant 
to convey the assertion that is being made along with a form of proof regarding the validation of 
that assertion or claim. 
[W]hen transmitted on the network, every digital identity is represented by some kind of security token. A 
security token is just a set of bytes that expresses information about a digital identity. … With most security 
tokens, some information is provided in order to prve that these claims really do belong to the user who's 
presenting them. One simple (and currently very comm n) way to do this is to send a password along with
the claims. A more powerful approach is to digitally sign all or part of the claims by using a private key, 
and then provide the corresponding public key, perhaps wrapped in a certificate.116 (Chappell 2006: para. 
10) 
In fact, all Internet users are familiar with security tokens, just in one particular form.  
                                                 
116 From this point on, the description, based on the then beta release of CardSpace, mainly draws on Chappell’s 
“Introducing Windows CardSpace” retrieved from http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa480189.aspx, which is 
the source of all the quotes in this section. I will therefore only specify the paragraph number for the quotes, as it is an 
HTML text. 
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The most common kind of security token on the Internet today is just a username. The most common way 
to prove that a username is really yours is by providing the password associated with it. (para. 29) 
While none of the traditional formats of a security token (i.e., username or any text string, 
X.509 certificates and Kerboros tickets) is designed to allow for the transmission of any random 
claim, SAML now provides the capability to generate security tokens that include any claims as 
needed. This makes it possible not to confine identty i formation to any arbitrarily preset 
attributes as was traditionally the case, but to open the field of what claims or assertions may be 
included in digital identity.   
Even though they're called "digital identities," there's no requirement that they must contain any 
information at all that can actually be used to identify a particular user. For many uses, all that's needed is a 
way to assert a claim, such as being 21 or older, that's backed up by a trusted authority. (para. 51) 
CardSpace can handle not only the traditional token formats mentioned above but also 
SAML tokens or any other format. And yet, the user i  spared the needless complexity stemming 
from that variety of security token formats through a graphic interface that is stable and intuitive 
(consistent with the user’s experience of the appearance of a card), thus making the process more 
intuitive for the user. 
 In a typical online transaction involving the user, a elying party and an identity provider, 
the user interacts with the relying party’s website or application (web server) through a web 
browser. Using the appropriate protocols (HTML, HTTPS, SSL, and WS-* protocols), the client-
side application (browser) discovers from the relying party’s policy statement what the security 
token requirements are in order for the requested transaction to be carried out. The browser then 
passes on the requirements information to CardSpace which then requires the proper token from 
a qualified identity provider. Finally, CardSpace receives a digitally signed token containing the 
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values for the set of claims requested, hands it over to the browser which transmits it to the 
relying party (Chappell 2006).  
As to how the information cards are actually installed, first, it is up to each identity 
provider to settle on the mechanism through which the cards will be delivered to the user, 
depending on what is the most appropriate in the current context. 
However it's acquired, each card (even one created by the self-issued identity provider) is digitally signed 
by the identity provider that issued it, and it comes with the identity provider's certificate. This signature is 
used to verify the identity of the identity provider itself. Once the card is on the user's machine, double-
clicking it brings up a screen that allows the user to install this card into the standard CardSpace store. This 
is also when the user must approve the identity provider as a source for security tokens, as described earlier 
(although this approval isn't required for information cards created by the self-issued identity provider). 
Once the user has done this, the card can be used to r quest security tokens. (para. 55) 
By default, the identity of the relying party is not revealed to the identity provider in 
order to protect the user’s privacy (just as the stores or services where one uses a government-
issued physical credential are not communicated to the government.) However, this may be 
required by some identity providers and it is up to the user to accept such policy depending on 
their need for enrolling with that provider. There is no sensitive data included in the information 
card and as a result, such data is never stored on the user’s device for the purpose of operating 
CardSpace, but remains with the identity provider. 
 As an additional protection, the user may add a personal identification number (PIN) to 
be required before a card can be used. Apart from PIN, some identity providers may also ask for 
a password or a smart card at every instance of use. A tolen card for instance cannot be used 
without that additional secret or the smart card which must be in the possession of the legitimate 
user. Additionally, 
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CardSpace creates a private Windows desktop for the identity selection screen that lets users choose a card. 
This is similar to the mechanism used to isolate the Windows login screen, and it prevents attacks by other 
locally-running processes. (para. 27) 
In order to enable roaming, it was planned to augment the CardSpace package with a 
portable USB-based device in order to enable the installation of CardSpace as well as a complete 
self-issued identity provider in mobile conditions. Following are a few examples of use cases. 
Rather than authenticating users with passwords, a relying party such as a website might instead 
authenticate users with security tokens. For example, a company providing a family of websites might also 
offer an identity provider, running on some machine a d accessible from any client, that is capable of 
issuing tokens that are accepted by all of the sites in that family. This approach minimizes the use of 
passwords, and it's certainly an option that can be used with CardSpace. Still, it's applicable only for a 
specific set of sites, since there's no single ident ty provider that all websites would accept in order to issue 
security tokens. (para. 31) 
As Chappell recognizes, the constraint resides in the fact that there is no third-party entity that is 
commonly accepted as legitimate, authoritative, competent or whatever is required in order for it 
to be accepted as issuer of security tokens on any random website.   
There are many more examples of how Windows CardSpace and the identity metasystem might be used. A 
provider of mobile phone service might offer an information card that its subscribers can use to charge 
online purchases to their phone bill. An employer might give its employees multiple digital identities, each 
with its own information card, for use on the company network. One identity could be used for normal 
access, while another, perhaps stripped of everything other than the fact that this person is an employee, 
might exist solely for the purpose of making anonymous suggestions to company management. Just as 
identities in the real world carry different information and are used for different purposes, digital identities 
can also be used in a variety of ways. The goal of CardSpace and the identity metasystem is to make this 
broad use possible. (para. 52) 
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The phishing problem requires further actions, since through graphical manipulations 
users may be lured into directly giving away sensible information other than an Internet 
account’s password, for instance a credit card number on the wrong website. This is the identity 
problem applied to the website. In addition to the easiness to confuse the user with the graphical 
appearance of a website, both authentic and imposter sites “can even use SSL to secure the 
communication, since phishers can acquire certificaes just like anybody else.” (para. 39) 
Today, a website typically proves its identity with the certificate used for SSL communication. This is 
better than nothing, but SSL certificates actually prove only that a given site has a particular DNS name. 
There's no assurance that this DNS name corresponds t  the information displayed on that site. A phisher 
might use a certificate issued for a DNS name that he owns, for example, to secure communication with a 
site that's been carefully crafted to look just like your bank. (para. 41) 
Microsoft and other players in the industry have ben seeking a certification solution of a higher 
level of assurance. “This higher-assurance certifica e will also be a more authoritative source of 
information because it’s more difficult to get, requiring a stronger agreement with the authority 
that issues it.” (para. 42) 
6.4.2 U-Prove 
U-Prove is a cryptographic technology that makes use of digital credentials in order to help 
prove attributes or assertions in the context of identity and access management.  
Digital Credentials are basic cryptographic constructs, much like digital signatures but much more 
powerful. They are issued to applicants by trusted parties, referred to as Credential Authorities. Each 
Credential Authority has its own key pair for digitally signing messages. When issuing a Digital Credential 
to Alice, the issuing Credential Authority through its own digital signature binds one or more attributes to a 
Digital Credential public key, the secret key of which only Alice should know. The whole package that 
Alice receives is called a Digital Credential…” (Brands 2002) 
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U-Prove tokens are data devices117 serving to carry digital credentials around and to present them 
either individually or in bundle. In this particular context, credentials are pieces of information 
such as identity attributes or assertions, which are signed by an entity that supposedly is to be 
trusted to provide accurate identity information. As such, they enable making and verifying 
identity-related claims. 
In what ways are digital credentials more powerful than digital signatures118? Elsewhere, 
we read that digital credentials are “much like digital signatures and equally efficient, but with 
much greater functionality” (Brands 2004: 3). Arguably, the value proposition of U-Prove 
technology is to tap into the greater strength of digital credential – as opposed to mere digital 
signatures – in order to build an identity management solution that is centered on user choices 
and reconciles the traditional tension between security and privacy. 
U-Prove is an innovative cryptographic technology that enables the issuance and presentation of 
cryptographically protected statements in a manner that provides what is known as “multi-party security:” 
issuing organizations, users, and relying parties can protect themselves not just against outsider attacks but 
also against attacks originating from each other. (Brands 2010) 
The whole of the token is signed by the Issuer applying its private key. This signature 
ensures the authenticity of the token. It assures of two things: first, the exact entity that issued the
token and second, that the token’s content has not been tempered with.  
• Each U-Prove Token consists of one or more attributes (which can represent any kind of information), a 
unique public key for the User of the token, and a digital signature of the Issuer on the token contents.  
                                                 
117 For this point on, I’ll refer to digital devices since the primary focus here is identity on the Internet; however, U-
Prove tokens may be embedded in physical devices, too. As of 2007, the type of tokens made with U-Prove technology 
was trademarked as ‘ID Token’ by Credentica Inc. (Credentica 2007). However, Microsoft has acquired the technology 
since 2008 and the term ‘U-Prove token’ is more frequently used instead. 
118 You may refer to Appendix D for an explanation of how digital signatures work. 
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• Each U-Prove Token public key corresponds to a private key that is known only to the token's User; it must 
be applied in order to perform the presentation protoc l.119 
The sequences of digits that make up the public key and the signature can each time be 
randomized during the exchange in such a way that the Issuer cannot know which User receives 
which sequences, while at the same time the User (who can perform the randomization and 
“blind” the credential’s public key as well as the Issuer’s signature) cannot however alter any of 
the attributes encoded by the Issuer into the digital credential or the token (Brands 2004).  
The basic roles of user-centric identity as we’ve se n, namely the Issuing Party, the 
Identity Subject (User) and the Relying Party, become in the context of U-Prove the Issuer, the 
Prover (User) and the Verifier, respectively. The issuance and the presentation of U-Prove tokens 
follow specific protocols. 
The issuance protocol enables taking in the information to be encoded into the token and 
applies a cryptographically original signature algorithm.120 The presentation protocol enables the 
transmission of a number of elements to the Verifier. These include the token attributes, the 
Issuer’s signature, the Prover’s token-specific public key, and her response to the presentation 
challenge obtained by applying the token-specific pr vate key to the presentation challenge, 
which is proof that the Prover was in possession of that private key without revealing it. 
Upon presentation of a token, a transcript may be generated showing the execution of the 
presentation protocol between the Prover and the Verifier. Such transcript is “a cryptographic 
proof that the presented U-Prove token, including the disclosed attributes, was presented by a 
                                                 
119 See http://www.credentica.com/unique_features.html (as of 02/01/2012) 
120 This signature is different from the traditional DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) standard for digital signatures and 
from the RSA algorithm for public-key cryptography.  
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party knowing its private key” (Brands 2010: 9). Asit is unforgeable even by the Verifier and the 
Issuer working in collusion, this transcript is an important piece of the audit log and can be 
verified by anyone at a later time. Furthermore, Prove  and Verifier may add a presentation 
message to the transcript which may include relevant information with regard to the application 
or transaction at hand. In addition to presenting a U-Prove token as an identity token to a Verifier 
(thus in an interactive mode), one may also use the tok n to digitally sign any sort of data such as 
documents, web form, etc. (a more unilateral mode of use.) 
The U-Prove tokens may be transient or long-lived. In the former case, it is issued on 
demand during and for a specific transaction only. 
Transient ID Tokens [U-Prove tokens] must be obtained from their Issuer on demand while interacting with 
a Verifier and can be used only with that particular Verifier for the duration of the session. Long-lived ID 
Tokens are stored by their Users upon issuance and can be used arbitrarily many times until they expire o  
are revoked, unless limitation measures are taken at issuing and/or presentation time. (Credentica 2007: 1). 
Each U-Prove token bears a random token identifier. The latter is “computed as a 
cryptographically secure hash of the U-Prove token’s public key and the Issuer’s signature” 
(Paquin 2011: 9). As a result, the identifier is universally unique. This furthers management 
capabilities relating, for instance, to the token’s lifecycle, revocation and several other functions. 
However, it is up to the Prover to choose repeatedly using the same token with the same Verifier 
enabling a continuous relationship, or using different tokens for different transactions so as to 
avoid any tracking and minimize also the prospects of identity theft. 
In addition to the information encoded by the Issuer, the User may further “encode 
application-specific attribute information into User Extension field” before presentation” (idem, 
p. 5).  However at presentation, the User has (in addition to the selective disclosure feature) the 
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ability to conceal any subset of additional information encoded by the Issuer. As a result, while 
the additional information encoded by the User for the purposes of the transaction at hand will be 
disclosed to the Verifier at token presentation, it may be hidden from the Issuer so that he cannot 
perform any correlation between the presented token and its issuance.  
The type of information the User may encode into the token includes human readable 
attributes or an encryption key. The possibility for the User to intervene in the encryption of the 
token between the Issuer and the Verifier is useful on at least two accounts: it makes it possible 
for the User to add transaction-specific or ad hoc information that may be needed which was not 
disclosed or stored with the Issuer (or which the Issuer needs not to be aware of,) and to include 
an encryption of the Verifier nonces121 so as to “prevent Verifiers from covertly encoding 
messages for the Issuer into them” (Paquin 2011: 15), while preventing these nonces from 
serving as correlation handles. 
One main aspect of U-Prove is to seek to reconcile the traditional tension between 
security and privacy. The features enabling stronger privacy than usually seen in identity design 
cases include the properties of untraceability, unlinkability and selective disclosure. 
Additionally, the ability for the User to supplement and edit information as needed or as 
desirable through the token’s information field further contributes to making this technology 
user-friendly or “user-centric.” 
Instances of use cannot be linked in that for each and every piece of data they handle or 
have access to, no participant in the chain of disclosure can aggregate the information and 
reconstitute the identity of the User. This unlinkability feature makes this technology dossier-
                                                 
121 “A nonce is a random number, the concatenation of Bob’s name and a counter, or any other fresh data provided by 
Bob.” (Brands 2004: 4) 
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resistant while still allowing for accountability. As designed, U-Prove tokens are also inherently 
untraceable, for they exclude any handles that may en ble a statistical correlation between 
issuance and use. Verifiers can only see, and make infer nces from, the disclosed attributes at 
token presentation as well as from “any application-specific attributes that may have been 
encoded into the token information fields” by the User (idem, p. 11). While anonymous and 
pseudonymous uses may also be securely accommodated in this technology, they are not 
necessary in order to ensure that identity transaction flows are not traceable.     
This untraceability property holds unconditionally in the following sense: the Issuer and all Verifiers 
cannot learn even a single bit of information beyond what can be inferred from the disclosed attributes in 
presented U-Prove tokens, even if they would collude from the outset (indeed, they may be the same entity) 
and would have unlimited computing time and resources at their disposal in a coordinated attempt to (1) 
build cryptographic backdoors into the Issuer parameters, (2) strategically deviate from the U-Prove token 
protocols, and (3) analyze the resulting protocol data flows. In other words, each Prover need merely t ust
the proper behavior of his or her own computing device. (Brands 2010: 11 and Paquin 2011: 12) 
As to the security aspects, this protocol is designed with a view to protecting the tokens 
against unauthorized uses. Following are baseline protections that are built into this technology 
while more security measures can be enabled depending on the application.    
• Integrity and source authenticity: Each issued U-Prove token contains an unforgeable digital signature of its 
Issuer on the entire contents, created by the Issuer by applying its private key. The Issuer’s signature serves 
as its authenticity mark on the U-Prove token; it enables anyone to verify that the U-Prove token was issued 
by the Issuer and that its contents have not been alt red.  
• Replay attack prevention: Each issued U-Prove token also contains a token-sp cific public key that is 
known only to the Prover. The Prover randomly generates it during the issuance protocol, together witha 
corresponding private key for the U-Prove token. In co trast to the token’s public key, this private key is 
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not part of the U-Prove token; the Prover never discloses it when using the U-Prove token. (Brands 2010: 
5-6) 
There may be further security measures pertaining to either software or hardware. There 
are software capabilities to revoke tokens or users and to prevent reuse as well as the transferring 
of tokens to other entities. Transferring of U-Prove tokens to another user is discouraged. One 
way this technology enables doing that is that the cryptographic design of its protocols requires 
that for any bit of encoded information to be used, the alleged Prover has to know the values of 
all attribute fields, whether they are required by the current transaction or not. One intuitive 
method suggested for discouraging the transferring of U-Prove tokens is to encode into the 
attribute fields some information that the Prover has a high or significant stake at keeping 
private, such as a credit card number. Additional measures will need to be taken in order to deter 
User from impersonating others by misappropriating heir tokens, or from giving copy of their 
own tokens to others. 
A token or a particular user may be revoked. This may be accomplished by blacklisting 
the universally unique identifier of the token or the targeted user (for instance, if he or she has 
abused the system.) The User can also self-revoke a token. When traceability is not an issue, the 
Issuer may also encode into the token information field of each token a value that is unique 
either to the token itself (much like the token identifier) or to the Prover. That value can then be 
blacklisted (the same way as the token identifier would.) Verifiers may also resort to requiring 
new on-demand (short-lived) tokens. It is also possible with this technology for the Issuer and 
the Verifiers to revoke long-lived tokens despite th fact that they are unlinkable and 
untraceable.  
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It is necessary to prevent a token from being re-used. The number of uses can be limited 
for both short- and long-lived tokens by keeping track of the number of presentations. 
Particularly with long-lived tokens potentially dealing with a variety of Verifiers that cannot be 
specified upfront, the Verifier will be able to perform a real time lookup of a database that 
records the number of times a token has been presented (the database need not to include 
information about where or by whom the token has been presented, that is, to whom it has been 
issued.) Furthermore, the “U-Prove technology also lows long-lived U-Prove tokens to be 
issued in such a manner that they can be traced if and only if they are used more times than 
allowed” (Brands 2010: 15).  
Hardware-level measures are another set of security options.  One may consist of splitting 
the private key of each token between the User’s teminal and a trusted computing device which 
may provide, for instance, biometric access control. The trusted device may be set up so as to 
resist any unauthorized use or manipulation of the rel vant tokens by the User or another party to 
the identity transaction. In addition the trusted dvice may include features that enhance the 
software-based security spelled out above.  
Furthermore, the trusted device could enable dynamic pol cy enforcement locally through 
an application-specific message included in the Verifier’s challenge – which will prove to be 
necessary anyway if the trusted device (designated bellow by “Device” with capital D) is used 
for a variety of tokens with different security characteristics.  
In a Device message a Verifier can specify, for example, a security policy, some of the data transmitted by 
the Prover, (e.g., attribute information encoded into the U-Prove token), U-Prove token protection 
characteristics (encoded, e.g., in the Token information field), and Verifier-specific information (e.g., the 
Verifier’s identity). The Device can inspect this data to make a policy decision as to whether or not to assist 
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the Prover in using the U-Prove token. In case of non-compliance, the Device could enter into suspension 
mode. (Paquin 2011: 19; see also Credentica 2007: 9) 
The trusted device may also be used to keep record of the details of the tokens and relevant 
activities for audit purposes. It would overall improve security as opposed to relying totally on 
the User’s terminal.  
6.4.3 OpenID 
The origin of the OpenID authentication protocol goes back to mid-2005 (Recordon and Reed 
2006). Since then, individuals and small enterprises have collaborated to improve the original 
protocol. Particularly, starting from 2007 this protocol has picked up momentum and 
progressively gained the support of the industry with corporation such as Symantec, Microsoft, 
AOL, Sun Microsystems, Yahoo!, MySpace, PayPal and Facebook, to name the most known, 
many of them accepting  OpenID credentials and some f them becoming OpenID providers. 
However, it has also had its critics due to limitations in security. 
OpenID122 is a lightweight and decentralized authentication mechanism, one of the first 
to outsource login credentials (username and password) to a third party, that is, another website. 
It helps with the management of multiple usernames and passwords and with reducing the 
number of sign-on requests that the user has to submit to. Here is the characterization given of 
OpenID by the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Office of Governmentwide Policy 
(OGP), responsible for the coordination and oversight of the government-wide Identity, 
Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) initiative: 
                                                 
122 Unless otherwise cited, I have largely consulted the following websites in order to provide this description of the 
protocol: http://openid.net/ and the ‘OpenID’ article in the Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org. See also 
http://openidexplained.com/ 
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OpenID 2.0 [the latest version of the protocol] authentication provides a way to prove that an end user
controls an Identifier. It does this without the RPneeding access to end user credentials such as a password 
or other sensitive information such as an email address. Implementation-wise, OpenID is a set of protoc l 
specifications that facilitate portable identity through the most open set of specifications and technologies 
possible. (ICAM 2009: 7)  
The user may register their identity details including a username and a password among 
other relevant attributes with an OpenID provider chosen from a list of available providers. The 
user may register more than one identity with different providers, as he or she wishes (but then 
again, registering as many OpenID identities as one might have password-based logins would 
defeat the very purpose of OpenID). It is a DNS-based identity mechanism  in that the 
registration creates an identity URL123 of such form as 
http://myusername.myopenidprovider.com/, assuming ‘myopenidprovider.com’ is the provider 
with whom the user registered for an OpenID (more precisely its domain name), where the user 
can log in in order to enable an identity exchange with another site. Typically, logging in enables 
the OpenID provider to confirm to the third party (he web site or service the user is trying to 
access, a.k.a. the Relying Party) that the user is who/what he or she claims to be as well as to 
forward, upon the user’s approval, specific attributes that the third party may request.  
One possible – perhaps the most likely – way the OpnID flow goes is that the need for 
identification or for logging in occurs while the user is browsing the OpenID-enabled website of 
the RP. The user will then chose the OpenID as opposed to, say, the password-based logins mode 
(there may be other options, possibly) by typing in his or her OpenID, e.g., 
                                                 
123 Actually, the OpenID identifier is more generally a URI (Hardt et al. 2007). In effect, it may also be considered a 
name (thus, a URN) and not only a locator (URL). Furthermore, the OpenID identifier may take the form of a 
resolvable address based on XRI, a resolution protocol for higher-level (more abstract) identifiers which applies to URIs 
as well as to internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs) based on a universal characters set (as opposed to the ASCII set 
only).   
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‘myusername.myopenidprovider.com’. Once the user’s OpenID is entered the browser redirect to 
the user’s OpenID provider website (there is a backend mechanism for the former site to 
discover, based on the provided OpenID string, the actual URL of the latter site, which could be 
something like: http:// myopenidprovider.com/openid-auth.php). At this point there is a series of 
query exchanges between the two sites initiated with a request that basically goes like this: 
“someone claiming to have this OpenID identity attempts to enter my protected domain; do you 
know her?” The user then has to log in to the OpenID provider site using the traditional 
username-password logins or possibly other mechanisms such as a smart card or biometrics, 
which enables the provider to acknowledge the claimed identity in response to the RP’s query.  
Furthermore, there are variants of the communication pr tocols between the two sites: 
one may include the end-user while another may be automatized between the two sites. It is also 
possible that the two sites establish a shared secret beforehand in order for the authenticating site 
to verify that the user’s credentials are coming from a legitimate source; otherwise further 
queries may be needed. While the background queries are ongoing, the OpenID provider 
presents the user with the different pieces of ident ty-related or personal information that the 
protected site is requesting in order for the user to approve communicating them to the latter if he 
or she so chooses.  Assuming this is approved by the user and after the necessary identity 
information has been communicated to the RP satisfac orily, the user is redirected to the RP 
website in order to carry on there with his or her original business. Alternately, the OpenID flow 
may originate from the provider with the user already signed in to his or her OpenID account 
before attempting to access a third-party website (th  RP to be). If that party supports OpenID, 
then a background exchange of messages will take place between the two sites. As a result, the 
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user will be able seamlessly to gain access to that third-party site which becomes the RP in the 
current transaction. 
6.4.4 OAuth 
OAuth is an authorization delegation protocol that allows the user to share her protected 
resources stored on a server with a third-party application without giving away her credentials 
(usually username and password) to the latter. Access onditions such as the scope as well as the 
validity period can also be controlled by the user. “Allowing one party to access someone else’s 
resources on their behalf is the core of the OAuth protocol and the void it seeks to fill.”124 It is 
based on a three-legged scenario of delegated access including the server hosting the protected 
resources, the client requesting access to those resources and the user who is the owner of those 
resources. The growth of distributed Web services and cloud computing has made the 
development of this protocol a necessity. The firstiteration of OAuth was developed out of two 
proprietary protocols implemented with Flickr’s API Auth and Google’s AuthSub. The purpose 
of tackling the OAuth protocol was to address “the common problem of enabling delegated 
access to protected resources” [RFC 5849]. 
The way the OAuth protocol is described implies that before this specification and its 
implementation, end-users would have had to give to a third-party application their credentials 
(generally a username and a password) enabling it to access their resources stored on a given 
server, if they wanted that application to use some f those resources in order to deliver a 
service. For instance, the user’s protected resources may be photographs stored on the server of a 
photo sharing service and the third-party application may be a photo printing service. Without 
                                                 
124 See this website by Eran Hammer: http://hueniverse.com/oauth/ 
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OAuth, the Internet end user would have to authenticate herself on the photo printing service 
page and the latter service will then present the authentication credentials thus collected to the 
photo sharing service in order to access the user’s photos. In those conditions, the third-party 
application is in possession of the user’s credentials and as such, it de facto has all the privileges 
of the actual user once it gains access to the user’s protected resources. OAuth makes it possible 
not to have a third-party service collect the user’s access credentials and also for the user to 
specify the scope and the timespan of the access granted to such service. Instead, the user is 
represented to the third-party website by a token, making it possible to manage the authorization 
process (e.g., revoke the authorization) without ever having to change the user’s credentials. 
“The decoupling of the User’s username and password fr m the Token is one of the most 
fundamental aspects of the OAuth architecture.”  (Hammer, http://hueniverse.com/oauth/) 
The purpose of the token is to make it unnecessary for the resource owner to share its credentials with the 
client. Unlike the resource owner credentials, tokens can be issued with restricted scope and limited 
lifetime, and revoked independently. [RFC 5849, p. 4] 
 In the OAuth protocol’s language, the client or consumer is the third-party service that 
needs to access the user’s protected resources and the server is the place where those resources 
are stored and which requires OAuth authentication (it is also referred to, at times, as service 
provider.) Synonymous of the user, the resource owner is defined as an “entity capable of 
accessing and controlling protected resources by using credentials to authenticate with the 
server.” Credentials are “a pair of unique identifier and a matching shared secret” commonly 
known as username and password, respectively. There ar  three types of credentials in OAuth 
serving to identify and authenticate the “client making the request” (client credentials), “the 
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authorization request” (temporary credentials) and “the access grant” (token credentials). 
[RFC 5849, p. 4]125    
A token is 
A unique identifier issued by the server and used by the client to associate authenticated requests with the 
resource owner whose authorization is requested or has been obtained by the client. Tokens have a matching 
shared-secret that is used by the client to establih its ownership of the token, and its authority to represent 
the resource owner. [RFC 5849, p. 5] 
In other words, tokens are mainly used, along with a secret, in order to authenticate requests on 
behalf of the resource owner (request token) as well as the authorization granted by the resource 
owner (access token). Those tokens along with theirpairing secret constitute what the OAuth 
protocol calls temporary credentials and token credentials, respectively.      
 HTTP redirection is, among others, just one way of pr visioning token credentials on 
request. The client obtains temporary credentials from the server, which credentials are used to 
identify and authenticate the access request. Once authorization is granted by the resource 
owner, the temporary credentials are used to request token credentials from the server; the latter 
credentials are used to identify and authenticate the access authorization. The temporary 
credentials must be expired as soon as the token credentials have been provisioned or issued. 
 In the photo example, after she uploaded her pictures to the photo sharing 
service/website (A) the user would go to the photo printing service/website (B) where she will 
initiate the printing ordering process.  As it turns out, B supports importing photos from the 
user’s A.  This implies that B has obtained client credentials from A in order to use them to 
                                                 
125 See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849 
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authenticate itself when interacting with the A’s OAuth-enabled API. Once the user has chosen 
her A among the list of services supported by B and clicked ‘Continue,’ a redirection takes place 
and the user will find herself at the login page of her A. What happens during that redirection is 
that B requests from A a Request Token which prompts A’s login page to open (at this point the 
Request Token is user-blind.)  The user then enters her logins in order to authenticate the request 
as initiated by her. After she logs into A, she is informed of B’s access request and asked to grant 
the type or level of access requested. Presumably here, she will have a number of options in 
order to specify the conditions of access (e.g., limited time of access, number of photos that may 
be downloaded, no editing, etc.) or to deny the request altogether. Once the user approves of the 
access request, the Request Token will be marked as user-authorized for that specific user. The 
Request Token thus marked can now be exchanged with an Access Token which is returned to B 
while the browser is redirected (from A) to B so that the latter can proceed with accessing the 
authorized resources for the requested service.  
 There are a number of security concerns listed in the RFC 5849. They include, in part, the 
following: 
- Spoofing: the protocol does not ensure the authenticity of the server, and as a result 
requests may be intercepted and misleading responses returned; 
- Nothing guarantees that the client application originates from a well-protected and trusted 
system, therefore the secrecy of the client’s credentials may be compromised, and additional 
verification measures should be used in order to verify the identity of the client; 
- Phishing: depending on the level of awareness and vigilance, resource owners may be 
victim of this practice which redirects end-users to fake websites where they are asked to enter 
their logins; 
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- Scoping of access rights: it is up to the implementers of this protocol to give the resource 
owner all relevant options of access rights that may be applicable to the resources being 
protected, and the resource owner needs to be educat  about the implications of the access they 
are granting; 
- Denial-of-service or resource-exhaustion attacks (in case of massive amount of incoming 
requests) may also work to the extent that this protocol requires significant computational 
capacities for a number of operations (e.g., signature verifications, tracking used nonces, etc.) 
- The hash algorithm SHA-1 has proven to present cryptographic weaknesses that may lead 
to collision attacks. 
All the protocols and technologies that have been pr sented above may have changed 
since the time when the sources used for these findings were published, as generally their 
proponents keep improving on their features and trying to close damaging loopholes to the extent 
possible or practical. However, the functionalities described here characterize those technologies 
and most of them are likely to be carried over and dapted as those applications evolve taking 
into account market demands and constraints as well as technological innovations.  
The above implementations or specifications of digital identity technology are the most 
concrete description of that technological phenomenon so far. They are meant to provide the 
reader with more clarity and specificity regarding what is designated under the phrase ‘digital 
identity.’ A definition of the concept and the description of management models may not be 
enough to appreciate the potential impact of those technologies. Their capabilities and the 
options they create for addressing identification needs and managing identity communication 
flows are such that we may be dealing with a new notio  of identity, which might require a 
revision of the prevailing, pre-digital concepts of identity. In any case, it is important to 
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understand those are the technologies the social actors here are involved with; they are what 
specifically further shape their intention and drive their actions beyond mere technology as they 
try to enable conditions conducive to those technologies being adopted, spreading and becoming 
a seamless part of our digital environment. Now I am going to turn to procedures and processes 
that span beyond technology specifications to involve institutional work.  
6.5 Enabling digital identity operation and rollout 
In this section, I am going to present operational and even broader institutional processes through 
which the social actors are trying to bring to fruition the effective rollout as well as widespread 
adoption and use of digital identity technology. These efforts, which purport to favor user choice, 
go beyond building the technology pieces and will eventually lead to the U.S. administration 
defining the “National Strategy for Trusted Identity in Cyberspace” (NSTIC).  
Beyond the specifications of individual technologies and before embedding this digital 
identity technology overall in institutional process , operational issues need to be addressed, 
particularly in this context where specific technologies or applications are meant to be 
interoperable. At the operational basis of any identity system is the problem of registration which 
possibly involved authenticating the reference of the identity being registered, that is, the original 
entity or individual represented by that identity. I will examine how that issue is addressed in the 
context of guidelines provided by the U.S. governmet to federal agencies, particularly while 
dealing with contractors.   
The phrase “identity ecosystem” surfaced in the process following the call by US 
government for the private sector to build the identity and authentication technology that is 
needed in order to support the online delivery of government services. One of the main elements 
in the outcomes of that public-private partnership process is the model of Open Identity Trust 
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Framework (OITF), also referred to hereafter as ‘Trust Framework.’ Eventually, it appears that 
this model is the first instance or the embryo of what is named in the NSTIC document the 
“identity ecosystem.” I will describe the OITF model and examine its first implementation which 
still is underway at the time of this research. I will then proceed with the broader, national 
Strategy under which those operational mechanisms are intended to be deployed. While its 
outcomes are still in the making, the NSTIC may alre dy be considered a landmark in the 
historical emergence of digital identity as a consumer product or technology in the U.S., as it 
endorses that technology as a viable way to enable the user to conduct identity transactions 
online, including with the government. I will briefly introduce the Strategy before closing this 
section by identifying a number of notable issues and challenges that remain to be addressed. But 
to start, I am going to address for this context and in some detail the procedures and requirements 
that must be at the basis of any digital identity mechanism, that is, the registration and 
authentication procedures. 
 
6.5.1 Registration and authentication 
Back in 2003 through a memorandum emanating from the Office of Management and Budget 
under the Executive Office of the President, the government already provided some guidelines 
for e-authentication for federal agencies [gov_omb04-04]. The focus of those guidelines was on 
risk assessments regarding electronic transactions, with a view to promoting a consistent 
approach across government.  
This guidance requires agencies to review new and existing electronic transactions to ensure that 
authentication processes provide the appropriate lev l of assurance. It establishes and describes four levels 
of identity assurance for electronic transactions requiring authentication. Assurance levels also provide the 
basis for assessing Credential Service Providers (CSPs) on behalf of Federal agencies. [gov_omb04-04] 
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Further: 
This guidance is intended to help agencies identify and analyze the risks associated with each step of the 
authentication process. The process includes (but is not limited to) identity proofing, credentialing, 
technical and administrative management, record keeping, auditing, and use of the credential. Each step of 
the process influences the technology’s overall conformance to the desired assurance level. [gov_omb04-
04] 
This memo stirs an effort started a year earlier (2002) with the NIST Special Publication 800-30 
that focused on methods of risk assessment and mitigation across information systems in use in 
the government [gov_nist800-30]. That document already pointed to concerns about information 
or IT systems assurance, but no specification profile r standard indicator regarding 
identity/authentication assurance was yet spelled out. That work will only start with the 2003 
memo and will continue in another NIST Special Publication of 2006 [gov_nist800-63]. 
Each assurance level describes the agency’s degree of c rtainty that the user has presented an identifi r (a 
credential in this context) that refers to his or her identity. In this context, assurance is defined as 1) the 
degree of confidence in the vetting process u ed to establish the identity of the individual to whom the 
credential was issued, and 2) the degree of confidece that the individual who uses the credential is the 
individual to whom that credential was issued. [gov_omb04-04] 
After outlining potential harm, impact levels and categories of harm, the document provides a 
characterization of the potential impact level in each category of harm which could result from 
possible authentication error. The four levels of assurance (LOA) deriving from that are 
described in Table 7-1. 
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Table 6-1: Registration levels of assurance and their baseline requirements for identity proofing  
Level 1 - Little or no confidence exists in the asserted identity. 
• Credentials may be anonymous (if applicable, level of proofing must be consistent with the 
requirements for the identity credential of level 1) 
• The name associated with the subscriber is provided by the applicant and accepted without 
verification 
 
Level 2 - On balance, confidence exists that the asserted identity is accurate (fair confidence) 
• Anonymous credentials (level of proofing must be consistent with the requirements for the identity 
credential of level 2) 
• Applicant supplies at least his or her full legal name, an address of record, an  date of birth. 
• Records of registration (including the individual’s identity information and the procedure used for its 
verification) shall be maintained either by the Registration Authority (RA) or by the Credential 
Service Provider (CSP), depending on the context.  
• The name associated with the subscriber may be pseudonymous but the RA or CSP must know the 
actual identity of the subscriber 
• Both in-person and remote registration are permitted 
 
Level 3 - High confidence in the accuracy of the asserted identity. People may use Level 3 
credentials to access restricted web services without the need for additional identity assertion 
controls. 
• Applicant supplies at least his or her full legal name, an address of record, an  date of birth. 
• Records of registration (including the individual’s identity information and the procedure used for its 
verification) shall be maintained either by the Registration Authority (RA) or by the Credential 
Service Provider (CSP), depending on the context.  
• The name associated with the subscriber must be meaningful. 
• Both in-person and remote registration are permitted 
 
Level 4 - Very high confidence in the accuracy of the asserted identity. Users may present 
Level 4 credentials to assert identity and gain access to highly restricted web resources, without 
the need for further identity assertion controls. 
• Applicant supplies at least his or her full legal name, an address of record, an  date of birth. 
• Records of registration (including the individual’s identity information and the procedure used for its 
verification) shall be maintained either by the Registration Authority (RA) or by the Credential 
Service Provider (CSP), depending on the context.  
• The name associated with the subscriber must be meaningful. 
• Only in-person registration is permitted 
 
Abstracted from NIST-SP 800-63 [gov_nist800-63] 
 
NIST provides a detailed view of the specific actions that must be taken by the RA for 
verification and which are requisites for issuing credentials by the CSP in order to execute these 
assurance requirements, both remotely and in-person [gov_nist800-63, pp. 22-24]. These 
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measures range from inspecting the appropriate ID number and account number check as well as 
running record checks for accuracy (remote) to inspecting a physical photo-ID and checking the 
accuracy of the information on that ID (in-person). The verification procedures and the 
credential-issuing justification are increasingly complex from level 2 to level 3 (remote) to level 
4 (in-person). If carried out remotely over a communication network,  
the entire registration transaction between RA and CSP shall be cryptographically authenticated using a  
authentication protocol that meets the requirements for the assurance level of the registration, and any 
secrets transmitted shall be encrypted using an Approved encryption method” [gov_nist800-63, p. 20].  
Furthermore, all personally identifying information collected in these registration processes must 
be protected against unauthorized access or alteration.  
The authentication process assumes that the concerned ntity has already been registered 
and issued a token. Here again, four assurance levels are defined increasing from 1 to 4 with the 
strength of the technical requirements for authentication. Successful authentication using secure 
authentication protocol is proof that the claimant controls the token. Further details about 
credential or token status and lifetime, acceptable ssertions, and protection of long term shared 
secret complement the basic requirements in Table 7-2. 
6.5.2 Open Identity Trust Framework: The model 
As we saw previously, the basic model that enables th  calability of identity transactions 
between perfect strangers requires three parties: th  two direct parties to the transaction and a 
third party that vouches for one of the first two by making the identity assertions included in the 
credential presented by the latter. Particularly in the context of the Internet, those three parties 
are often labeled the ‘user’ whose identity attributes needs to be ascertained, the verifier or 
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‘relying party’ who actually is the beneficiary of the identity verification and generally is a 
service provider, and the ‘identity provider’ who makes the identity assertions (through a proper 
credential) on behalf of the user.  
Table 6-2: Authentication requirement levels. (After NIST-SP 800-63) 
Level 1 Authentication requirements 
• Assurance that the same claimant is accessing protected resource  
• Claimant shall prove, through a secure authentication protocol, that s/he controls the token 
• Cryptographic methods required but shall not block ffline analysis by eavesdroppers 
• Any cryptographic techniques may be used 
• Long-term shared authentication secrets may be reveal d to verifiers 
Example: Password with a challenge generating an authentication reply 
 
Level 2 Authentication requirements 
• Accommodates a wide variety of authentication technologies, including password and level 3 or 4 tokens 
• Eavesdropper, replay, and on-line guessing attacks shall be prevented 
• Approved cryptographic techniques are required 
• Long term shared authentication secrets, if used, shall not be revealed to any party except the subscriber and 
CSP (however session/temporary shared secrets may be provided by the CSP to independent verifiers) 
Level 3 Authentication requirements 
• Based on proof of possession of a cryptographic key using a cryptographic protocol in order to protect the 
primary authentication token (a secret key or a private key) against compromise by the following protoc l 
threats: eavesdropper, replay, on-line guessing, verifier impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
• Two-factor authentication  (the key plus password or bi metric to activate the key) 
Level 4 Authentication requirements 
• Level 3 requirements 
• Only hardware cryptographic tokens are allowed 
• Strong cryptographic authentication (public key or symmetric key technology) of all parties and all sensitive 
data transfers between the parties 
• All sensitive data transfers shall be cryptographically authenticated using keys derived in the authentication 
process 
• Approved authentication techniques shall be used in all operations 
• Token shall protect the secret from compromise by malicious code attacks 
• Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, shall never be revealed to any party except the claimant and 
CSP (temporary shared secrets may be provided to verifiers or relying parties by the CSP).  
 
In the online world however, as scalable as it might be the three-party model may be only 
reliable if the identity provider specifically is in position to control reliable user data and if the 
relying party has reasons to trust the assertions made by the identity provider on behalf of the 
user. In other words, regardless of how robust the echnology in use actually is, or is claimed to 
 
 
be, there must be some arrangements that give the identity provider its capacity vis
user and the relying party, as part of 
tools and operation. Those arrangements will organize the conditions in which each party may 
depend on the other parties and expect they 
do, and with the appropriate care. 
 
Figure 6
Constructed a
 
Following is a summary description of the actors involved in the trust framework model 
and their roles [priv_oitf]: 
 Policymakers “set out the technical, operational, and legal requirements for exchanges 
of identity information over which they have authority”
group of social actors which they govern. They author e trust framework and make its 
rules. [priv_omsa]    
 
the social antecedents required to complement
perform their functions as they claim and commit to 
That is the purpose of the trust framework. 
-5: Trust framework flowchart 
fter the OITF Model description [priv_oitf] 
 
 [priv_oitf, p. 5] or on behalf of a 
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 The OITF Provider  is basically the administrator of the framework: the entity that 
implements the decisions and requirements settled on by the Policymakers towards a 
functioning trust framework. Based on those requirements (which it can complement with 
additional conditions of its own) it establishes the criteria for entry and operation 
applicable to the other actors below. It translates “the requirements into a blueprint for a 
trust framework that may include additional conditions of the OITF Provider. The OITF 
Provider vets identity service providers and relying parties and contracts with them to 
follow its trust framework requirements when conducting exchanges of identity 
information” [priv_oitf, p. 4]. As a result, it “typically operates a certification listing 
service that indicates which identity service providers and relying parties have been 
certified by which assessors, for which criteria, and for which trust frameworks” 
[priv_oitf, p. 3]. Elsewhere, it also reads: “The job of the TFP is to list assessors who 
meet the IT compliance auditing requirements of a particular trust framework at a 
particular LOA and/or LOP126.”  [priv_omsa, p. 6] 
 Assessors are the participants who carry out the certification of identity providers and 
relying parties, making sure they operate under the conditions and by the criteria 
required. They conduct an examination ex-ante, generally only once before the concerned 
operator joins the framework. Assessors perform their examination and certification 
against specific requirements for a number of Levels of Assurance (LOA) and Levels of 
Protection (LOP). A Special Assessor is the initial assessor in position to verify the 
                                                 
126 Level of Assurance and Level of Protection 
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qualification of those entities who will become Listed Assessors (or plain Assessors) who 
will then carry out the certification of identity service providers and relying parties.127  
 Auditors  may be called to audit systems and actors for the same purpose of compliance, 
but ex-post. This may happen on a regular basis, possibly discret onarily, or based on a 
critical event. They may also do so during an investigation in order to help uphold and 
enforce accountability measures. 
 Dispute Resolution Service Providers will try and resolve any potentially legal 
conflicts. These constitute a third-party entity distinct and independent from the OITF 
Providers. 
The trust framework is a broad multilateral arrangement built on a set of bilateral 
relationships (Fig. 7-5). This OITF model makes it clear that authority emanates from the “trust 
community.” The Identity Provider is no more than a particular kind of service provider 
performing on behalf of the Trust Framework Policymakers, as do all the other participants in the 
framework. While the participants are autonomous from one another, their functions and 
relations within the framework suggest a hierarchical role structure. Both aspects are captured in 
a layered diagram of the same model (Fig. 7-6). In order to live up to its purpose (trust), OITF 
rests on more than technical requirements; it also includes operational requirements for both 
transaction and maintenance procedures as well as leg l requirements for handling rights, duties 
and responsibilities of all the parties in the framework and towards each other. 
                                                 
127 It should be noted that the OITF Model [priv_oitf] does not mention the Special Assessor, but only its first 
implementation (OIX) provides some details [pric_omsa, p. 8]: A Special Assessor is “a party who both OIX and the 
Trust Framework publisher agree has the qualifications and experience to evaluate other Assessors for that trust 
framework. Note that, to avoid conflicts, a Special Assessor may not also serve as Listed Assessor for the same trust 
framework.” However, the notion of TF publisher introduced here is still not clear as opposed to the TF Provider (here 
OIX). 
 
 
To enable large-scale networks of trust, the solutio
– that is, a set of technical, operational, and legal requirements and enforcements mechanisms for parties 
exchanging identity information.
 
Figure 6-6: A layered model of the Open Identity Trust Framework (including the three
matrix). After the OITF Model description [priv_oitf]
 
 
The trust framework constitutes
identity matrix and their transaction flows.
the commitment between the parti
significantly increase the burden and the transaction costs every time at least a thir
involved, which is inevitable considering 
that for every single user, all the contractual terms between the
provider, between the identity service provider and
and the relying party would have to be agreed upon 
 
n proffered is an Open Identity Trust Framework (OITF) 
 [priv_oitf, p. 2] 
-party identity transaction 
 
 the immediate environment fostered by the three
 It resorts to contractual provisions in order to solidify 
es and ensure accountability. Pairwise contracts would 
the basic identity transaction matrix. They
user and the identity service 
the relying party, as well as between the user 
separately, leaving the door open to changes 
345 
 
-party 
d party is 
 would mean 
346 
 
 
 
and instability every time a new pair forms, that is, every time a new entity joins the relationship. 
This is hardly an efficient approach for a system predicated on a utility positively proportional 
with the degree of its scalability. The goal of an identity trust framework is to enable and provide 
a standard of trust which can then facilitate identity exchanges to scale rapidly among players 
who commit to the same quality standards and share t e same expectations.  
There are five categories of legal agreements (Fig.7-7) that structure the Open Identity 
Trust Framework: 
1. Service Agreement between Policymaker entity and the OITF Provider where all the 
basic requirements of the OITF (namely technical, operational and legal) are clearly 
formulated. 
2. Identity Service Provider Certification Agreements are contracts with the OITF Provider 
whereby the latter attests that a certain Identity Service Provider (IDSP) complies with 
the applicable requirements of the service agreement. In cases of pre-existing relationship 
between Policymakers and the IDSP, these agreements ay not be required. 
3. Relying Party Certification Agreements are contracts with the OITF Provider whereby 
the latter attests that a certain Relying Party (RP) complies with the applicable 
requirements of the service agreement. In cases of pre-existing relationship between 
Policymakers and the RP, these agreements may not be required. 
4. Assessor Agreements: Assessors have two types of contract on their hands. They first 
sign a contract with the OITF Providers where they agree to follow certain procedure in 
order to certify whether an IDSP and/or RP candidate to service the trust framework 
satisfy the required conditions. Then they sign contracts with these latter entities in order 
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to be able to carry out the evaluation and certification procedure. It is possible for some 
entities to self-certify if Policymakers so decide. 
5. Terms of Service (TOS) Agreements address certain rights and responsibilities for the 
users within the current trust framework. Unless those rights and responsibilities are 
already provided for in pre-existing TOS agreements between the user and the IDSP on 
the one hand, and the user and the RP on the other hand,“OITF Provider might 
promulgate a set of model terms to be included by ident ty service providers and relying 
parties in their TOS agreements with users.” (p. 7) 
Based on the information provided for the OIX instace of OITF, we can state that the 
certification process for identity service providers and, to some extent, the relying parties may 
include the following number of steps: 
i) Prepare the evidence of compliance with the trust framework’s requirements for the 
target Levels of Assurance or Levels of Protection as applicable; 
ii)  Allow a Listed Assessor to conduct the assessment of the evidence provided and the 
related objects; 
iii)  Upon successful assessment, document and submit a Membership Listing Application 
Form to the TFP; 
iv) After verification of the Form by TFP, the listing including the new member will be 
published in the TFP Listing Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-7: OITF contractual structure. 
 
This document [priv_oitf] promotes a number of principles for openness. The parties to identity 
exchanges within this framework are subject to the jurisdictions where such exchanges are 
conducted. Parties should avoid any ot
of the commitments under the trust framework”
nature the earliest possible. OITF Providers should make sure governments designate 
independent ombudsmen in countries where they do business. 
identity information … without the informed consent of he person in question, parties to the 
OITF who are ordered to share this information must involve the ombudsman”
Providers must ensure to widely publicize through a website the OITF mechanisms for 
 
After the Open Identity Trust Framework Model [priv_oitf]
 
her legal agreements that may “compromise the integrity 
 (p. 12) and disclose any potential conflict of that 
“If the law requires the sharing of 
 (idem). OI
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accountability. Particularly, they “must ensure that all agreements under the OITF afford the 
parties an effective right and mechanism to seek redress.” (Idem)     
Since it is up to different stakeholder groups to set up their own trust framework and its 
requirements, the so-called Open Identity Trust Framework becomes in a sense an open market 
where the user can shop for trust. As one of the respondents put it, market can be seen as a 
decision mechanism that allows for more flexibility and diverse outcomes, as opposed to the 
political decision-making process. Following in multiple statements is the way he expressed that 
notion. For him, the market is the  
expression of preferences by stakeholders in a coordinated fashion…  
In a market (and when I say market, again, it’s not jus  commercial) you do have expression of preferences 
by groups of people through different mechanisms…  
Market is what you do when you have a lot of variability and a dynamic situation [Res_L 2011]  
In other words, voting may work well in the political democratic arena where only a single 
outcome is required. In a situation where a variety of outcomes must be catered for, the fitting 
decision mechanism is the market, according to this respondent. 
 After describing and analyzing the blue print of what appears to be the central piece of 
the construction in progress of an “identity ecosystem” according to NSTIC, let us examine how 
the implementation might look like. In effect, there is already an experiment underway with the 
Open Identity Exchange.  
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6.5.3 Open Identity Trust Framework: An implementation 
The OITF Model has so far been implemented in one instance, which is the Open Identity 
Exchange (OIX). As President Obama took office in 2009, his administration signaled its interest 
in further promoting and implementing e-government services, especially but not exclusively in 
healthcare services. Then the Administration  
asked the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) how to start using open identity technologies to le  
the American public more easily, efficiently, and safely interact with federal websites such as the Nation l 
Institute of Health (NIH), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
[priv_omsa, p. 3] 
However a fundamental question quickly arose: if identity proofing and authentication 
technology and mechanisms were going to be outsourced, then what guarantee does the 
government have that the technology as well as those mechanisms will be reliable and compliant 
with all relevant laws and regulations applicable to government operations? 
 In April 2009, government and relevant private sector started a dialogue to explore and 
address the set of issues that may stand in the way of vailing digital identity capabilities to 
citizens in order to foster the delivery of government services online. The parties to that dialogue 
were represented for the US Government by an interagency coordination effort and structure 
called Federal ‘Identity Credential and Access Management’ (ICAM)128, and for the industry by 
the Information Card Foundation (ICF) and the OpenID Foundation (OIDF). The question put 
forth by the government before the two entities was: “how public/private partnership could best 
provide open identity solutions that could serve all members of the public while still meeting the 
                                                 
128 http://www.idmanagement.gov/ 
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identity assurance and protection requirements of U.S. government websites”?  [priv_tfpas, p. 
2]. Their effort also includes research and planning.  
Nine months of talks, research and planning led to the definition of an open identity trust 
framework model and the establishment by early 2010 of Open Identity Exchange Corporation 
(OIX) as the implementation of the model thus defind. OIX is a non-profit organization that was 
incorporated in Washington State on 3 February 2010. It is intended to be an international 
organization with appropriate status in all applicable jurisdictions; in the case of U.S., it operates 
under 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status. This is the outcome of resolutions adopted by the Board of 
Directors of both ICF and OIDF in January 2010. The articles of incorporation list five Board 
members as OIX founding Directors [priv_oixinc, articles 6.1 and 6.2].129  
 The organization has two-class membership: executive members and general members. 
Likewise, the Board of Directors includes from four to twelve Executive Board Members and 
from two to six At-Large Board Members. Those numbers may be changed at any point by 
super-majority vote of the standing board members. Every one of the executive (organizational) 
members can appoint one Executive Board Member. The Executive Board Members designate 
and appoint by a majority vote the initial At-Large Board Members. The Board may form 
temporary or standing committees as well as advisory c mmittees. [priv_oixbyl, particularly art. 
3.4, 3.5 and 3.12] 
 The OIX Trust Framework was approved for LOA 1 by ICAM on 15 February and begun 
operations on 3 March 2010 [priv_omsa]. In order to become a trust framework provider for 
ICAM on behalf of the government, OIX was required to document a number of items (Table 3), 
                                                 
129 Those directors are affiliated to organizations such as OIDF, Equifax, Google, PayPal and VeriSign [priv_tfpas]. A 
sixth director and organization (Verizon) is listed in the latter cited document.   
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based on the requirements formulated by the governmnt in the document titled: “Trust 
Framework Adoption Process for Levels of Assurance 1, 2 and non-PKI 3” [gov_tfpad and 
priv_tfpas]. 
Table 6-3: Information required by the federal government from TFP applicant (case of OIX) 
1. Applicant legal status 
2. Appropriate authorization to operate 
3. Legal authority to commit the Applicant to conducting assessments and certifying Identity 
Providers on behalf of the Federal government 
4. Financial capacity to manage the risks associated with conducting assessments and certifying 
Identity Providers on behalf of the Federal governme t 
5. Understanding of, and compliance with, any legal requirements incumbent on the Applicant in 
connection to conducting assessments and certifying Identity Providers on behalf of the Federal 
government 
6. Scope and extent of implemented security controls (e.g., access control, confidentiality of Identity 
Provider information) 
7. Documentation of policies and procedures 
8. Proof that Applicant practices are consistent with documented policies and procedures (e.g., via 
independent auditor reports, if required by LOA requirements) 
Adapted from [priv_tfpas] 
 
As a matter of general procedure, relevant entities mu t first become OIX general 
members in order to qualify and become OIX-registered assessors and identity service providers. 
Candidate assessors submit their application requirment packages to the Special Assessor to 
become Listed or Registered Assessors while identity service providers (IDSPs) submit theirs to 
Registered Assessors. The qualification procedure for operating in an OIX trust framework 
includes the following steps: 
1. The policymakers of the trust community (ICAM in the case of OIX) formulate the 
requirements for the role of Special Assessor, the entity that is going to verify the 
qualifications of other assessors before they are list d.  
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2. The Special Assessor is appointed by OIX, the trustf amework provider. 
3. The applicants submit their application form along with an executed (signed) copy of the 
Membership Agreement. The latter legally binds the signatory applicant to the OIX 
Operating Rules as well as the rules of any specific trust frameworks for which they 
register (an implication of the general rule stated above is that IDSP applicants can only 
apply after applicants are successful in becoming registered assessors.)  
4. Once the information is verified and their application approved, applicants become OIX 
General Members.  
5. This is followed by the application procedure for se vicing their selected trust 
frameworks at specific levels of assurance.  
6. Special Assessor or Registered Assessors conduct the evaluation of the applicants. 
7. Upon successful evaluation, Assessor and IDSP are required to submit further 
information about any specialized areas of competenc  they may have. 
8. OIX verifies the whole process and information submitted and updates their listing with 
the new registered members/operators. 
6.5.4 The “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace” 
As an outcome of its partnership with the private sector aiming at developing and promoting the 
adoption of digital identity solution, the U.S. government released in April 2011 its final draft for 
the “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.” The thrust of the Strategy is to lay 
out what it calls the “Identity Ecosystem” – interestingly enough, the document qualifies the 
ecosystem as “user-centric” (p. 2), claiming that “individuals are the first priority of the 
Strategy” (p. 21). This is a blueprint to create an environment where a certain number of actors 
playing their respective roles based on shared standards and policies will enable an environment 
354 
 
 
 
of trust, especially with regard to authenticating the digital identities of one another as well as 
those of affiliated users.  
The Identity Ecosystem consists of the participants, policies, processes, and technologies required for 
trusted identification, authentication, and authorization across diverse transaction types… All of the roles 
may be held by public or private-sector organizations or a combination of both, and single organization 
may provide services that cross multiple roles. [gov_nstic, p. 21] 
This framework accommodates all identity transactions, “from anonymous to fully-authenticated 
and from low- to high-value” (idem, p. 2). Adoption of the technology solutions will be
voluntary and will reflect the four core principles of the ecosystem: privacy-enhancement, 
security and resiliency, interoperability, as well as cost-effectiveness and ease-of-use. The 
document enumerates a number of participants which it also names “execution components” of 
the ecosystem.130 Among them are the individual , the subject of a transaction, attribute , digital 
identity , credentials (“the information objects used during a transaction t  provide evidence of 
the subject’s identity”), relying party  and participants (“refer to the collective subjects, identity 
providers, attribute providers, relying parties and identity media taking part in a given 
transaction.”) In addition to those, one may notice the emergence of the notion of non-person 
entity131 (NPE) applicable to “organizations, hardware, networks, software, or sevices [which] 
are treated much like individuals within the Identity Ecosystem.” An identity medium and an 
attribute provider are also added to the ecosystem. An identity medium is defined as:  
a device or object (physical or virtual) used for storing one or more credentials, claims, or attributes 
related to a subject. Identity media are available in many format, such as smart cards, security chips 
                                                 
130 All the following definitions and quotes about the ecosystem participants or “execution components” are found on 
pp. 21 and 22 in the NSTIC document. 
131 The designation of non-person entity might be misleading as there exist the notion of legal personhood for 
corporations and even a debate in the US about whether corporations are people. Instead, I suggest using any relevant 
combination of the following terms: non-natural or non-biological with individuals or persons. 
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embedded in personal computers, cell phones, software based certificates, and Universal Serial Bus (USB) 
devices. 
An attribute provider  is in charge of identity attributes throughout their lifecycle, 
including validation, update and revocation of relat d claims. It is also worth noting that the 
“identity provider may also verify the identity of and sign up (enroll) a subject” although a 
different entity may also play the role of enrolling agent. And finally a “ trustmark is used to 
indicate that a product or service provider has met th  requirements of the Identity Ecosystem, 
as determine by an accreditation authority.” 
 Table 6-4: The policy foundation of the identity ecosystem 
Policy component Role 
Identity Ecosystem Framework 
“overarching set of interoperability standards, risk 
models, privacy and liability policies, requirements, 
and accountability mechanisms that structure the 
Identity Ecosystem.” 
Steering Group 
“will administer the process for policy and standard 
development for the Identity Ecosystem Framework 
in accordance with the Guiding Principles in this 
Strategy… [and] also ensure that accreditation 
authorities validate participants’ adherence to the 
requirements of the Identity Ecosystem 
Framework.”  
Trust Framework 
“is developed by a community whose members 
have similar goals and perspectives. It defines the 
rights and responsibilities of that community’s 
participants in the Identity Ecosystem; specifies the 
policies and standard specific to the community; 
and defines the community-specific processes and 
procedures that provide assurance.” 
Accreditation Authority 
“assesses and validates identity providers, attribue 
providers, relying parties, and identity media, 
ensuring that they all adhere to an agreed-upon trust 
framework.” It “can issue trustmarks to the 
participants that they validate.” 
Trust Scheme 
“combination of criteria that is measured to 
determine service provider compliance with the 
Identity Ecosystem Framework.” 
 Abstracted from the NSTIC (2011) 
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The other important part of the Identity Ecosystem is comprised of the components of its 
policy foundation as shown in Table 7-4 (quoting from pages 24 and 25 of the Strategy.) The 
Ecosystem’s goals and objectives are reflected here in Fig. 7-8. Finally, the Strategy outline an 
action plan including the establishment of an interag ncy office within the Department of 
Commerce: the National Program Office will be “charged, consistent with statutory authorities, 
with achieving the goals of the Strategy” [gov_nstic, pp. 38-39].  
Following is an excerpt (p. 39) describing the mission of the Office.  
The NPO will lead the day-to-day coordination of NSTIC activities, working closely with 
the Cybersecurity Coordinator in the White House. The National Program Office will:  
• Promote private-sector involvement and engagement;  
• Support interagency collaboration and coordinate interagency efforts associated with 
achieving programmatic goals;  
• Build consensus on policy frameworks necessary to achieve the vision;  
• Identify areas for the government to lead by example in developing and supporting the 
Identity Ecosystem, particularly in the Executive Branch’s role as a provider and 
validator of key credentials;  
• Actively participate within and across relevant public- and private-sector fora; and  
• Assess progress against the goals, objectives, and milestones of the Strategy and the 
associated implementation activities.  
I have documented above the basic operational requirements for setting up a viable digital 
identity mechanism which would be acceptable to the U.S. government and other potential 
relying parties. Those requirements mainly relate to registration and authentication of identity 
 
 
subjects. I have then presented and analyzed the mod l, f llowed by an implementation
the social mechanism that is being proposed as trust
rollout of the technology. 
 
Figure 6-8: Goals and objectives of the identity ecosystem (NSTIC)
 
Finally, I introduced above the basics of the U.S. national Strategy for making digital identity 
happen in the life of consumers while helping to make the Net somewhat more reliable
maybe more secure for communicating identity data
those elements constitute the state of play as to 
identity as well as online identity transactions into eve
play out still are institutional processes between technology designers and companies, business 
stakeholders, government and sometimes 
 
-enabling device in order to support the 
 
After the NSTIC (2011) 
. A  the time of conducting this
the efforts made to bring the technology of digital 
ryday practice. So far, what we have seen 
civil society advocates and researchers. Market rollout 
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for individual consumers is yet to be seen and will probably come with its train of challenges and 
further issues to be resolved. In the meantime, I will point out below a few of the issues and 
challenges that I draw from analyzing the above operational and institutional processes.     
6.6 Issues and challenges 
I will here review a number of persistent challenges including outstanding objectives that are still 
to be achieved, issues of trust, liability, regulation and the politics of technology design. 
• Outstanding requirements 
While the Trust Framework model is a start to address institutional issues related to the 
deployment of digital identity technology and solutions, the work of building the actual 
infrastructure has hardly started. The latter is required for the TFs to function well and achieve 
their purpose. The stable interconnection and interop ration of all the moving parts of these 
systems, including the client-side components in both s ftware and hardware, all require well-
integrated mechanisms and infrastructural components. One interviewee emphasizes that without 
the parts of the technology through which the user will interact with the infrastructure, digital 
identity technology is unlikely to “happen.”    
… [I]t’s primarily a matter of having secure clients available on the majority of software and hardware 
platforms that individuals use. The identity ‘big bang’ will not happen until this is well underway. [Res_I, 
2011] 
Before these digital identity technologies can be widely implemented and used by both online 
businesses and users, 
[t]he secure client problem needs to be solved first, by way of practical solutions that are in the hands of 
sufficiently many internet users. [Res_I, 2011] 
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This requirement applies whatever the contexts. Even if stakeholders decide to use government-
issued credentials highly relied upon for legal identification purposes, that would not be 
sufficient; it would even be useless if the client-side security cannot be ensured to an acceptable 
degree of reliability and assurance.   
One of the hard parts is for the big players to agree on building the right infrastructure pieces on the client 
side, especially when client-side security is generally low. [Res_I, 2011] 
Overall however, there are many other parts that also need to be put in place before an 
effective and functioning infrastructure of user-managed identity systems emerges. Some of 
those components and capabilities have been mentiond by the interviewees as follows132: 
 More consistent protocol environment spanning the global coverage of the Internet 
infrastructure and smoothly integrating the variety of systems and the different 
stakeholders’ needs (not unlike the infrastructure of payment instruments). This issue also 
includes working on technical standardization in support of interoperability. 
 Portability or roaming capability: according to one of the respondents, the lack of 
convenient solution for this is probably one of thereasons why passwords are so 
successful (possibility to log in to one’s account from wherever and through whatever 
device one is connected to the Internet.) 
 A significant amount of cryptography is required and proper technology, security and 
policy solutions need to be figured out for the storage of the cryptographic keys, whether 
on the client side or with the intermediaries that enable diverse systems to interoperate 
(identity providers, claim transformers, etc.). 
                                                 
132 Some of these have been provided by Stefan Brands in the above referenced keynote address 
(http://hosting.epresence.tv/KMDI/1/watch/748.aspx) 
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 Addressing the problem of “root credential” (the basic credential than can be used in 
multiple domains with the capability to link identity across them if desirable) in a way 
that will be secure against spoofing and other ill-intended manipulations. 
 Integration capabilities between mobile and non-mobile forms of online identity, between 
mobile phone numbers and Web-based identity, especially g ven the prevalence and 
growth of mobile as platform for interacting with people as well as with the Internet 
infrastructure. 
Overall, there still is a long way to go, and it is not unusual in conversations with these 
designers to hear someone state that the technical challenges are the hardest with this technology, 
and later on in the same conversation the same person states that social issues such as norms and 
practices are harder to address. This is probably indicative of the level of difficulties faced at 
once from various fronts. As a matter of fact, resolving the technological challenges is part of the 
conditions of possibility that anything happen at all. One may interpret the fact of saying those 
challenges are the biggest as expression of the fact th t they are the most pressing, in terms of 
immediacy and requirement for getting things moving, until they get resolved. After all, 
technological innovations generally happen first before the society can fully realize the scale of 
their impact and begin to substantially address related societal concerns. Until there is a technical 
solution for every basic requirement for this technology to be successfully implemented, it is 
normal that what will appear most challenging for technologists can only be a part of their action 
items, themselves a subset of all items for which they are competent. However, as soon as one 
starts thinking carefully about implementation in the broader social environment, which is the 
case once comes the time to start concretely planning for rollout, one may realize that social 
requirements for widespread adoption might be daunting. Not only is there always the threat of a 
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gap between the designers’ assumptions about user behavior and the actual user behavior, but 
nothing guarantees that the preferences of all or most stakeholder groups involved in the design 
process are consistent among themselves or with the overarching norms that bind the social 
setting at hand. 
• The limits of Trust Frameworks 
As previously described, the Trust Framework (TF) is enacted through a set of legally binding 
agreements which also include the relying party (RP). This implies that unless the RP is part of a 
multilateral contractual relation with the other paticipants in the Framework, it won’t be party to 
a transaction using a credential originating from the Framework (at least not as far as the 
contractual provisions for that trust framework is concerned). Why should the RP be party to the 
set of agreements that hold the TF together? This is due to the need to ensure that the user’s 
identity data, even when stored with the RP, is handled according to specific policies, especially 
as regards their proper protection to the extent desired and stipulated by the concerned TF. Can 
this (ensuring the RP commitment to the TF policies) be achieved through other means? If not, 
what if the user needs to share data generated from a transaction within a TF with an external 
party (RP) from another TF, or an entity that is not party to any TF at all? What if there is a 
legitimate ground and a business value for a RP in a TF to share the user data with another 
relying party in another TF or outside any TF?  
If physical government-issued identity credentials are of any lesson, this model of Trust 
Framework may limit scalability, based on the issue pointed out above, as the number of RPs 
will be limited upfront to relevant entities that are parties to the contractual agreements in place. 
The question is: Is the Trust Framework model just another type of federation (potentially larger 
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than the original federation model)? Will there be a way to establish bridges between 
Frameworks or will these prove just to be larger silos than those enabled by the set of password-
based logins? Is it possible to accommodate relying parties that are not part of the trust 
framework prior? One understands that the online ident ty transaction processes are different 
from face-to-face ones, and once the RP has access to the data, they have it for good as there 
always is a trail of the information left in computer memory. Subsequently, the RP is in position 
to use the data as much as it wants thus, the need for this model to have the RP abide by certain 
requirements, notably the levels of protection (LOP) requirements, whatever they are within the 
framework at hand. 
The risk of isolation of each TF and the resulting potential challenge to the OITF model 
may find an answer in the possibility and the techni al capability to establish a “root credential.” 
In an email interview, one respondent wrote that the power of digital identity infrastructure 
cannot be unleashed unless a resolution is found to the problem of root credential. In a follow-up 
email exchange we had on that point, he further explained as follows:   
… if two organizations want to be able to securely share information about a person between them, 
whether via the individual or directly, then a common identifier for that person will need to be established 
across the two organizations. Unless the person can be trusted, that [identifier] will need to be issued in the 
form of a “credential” for the person. In part of the financial sector, the use of an SSN [social security 
number] serves this purpose; for certain healthcare services in many countries it is a health insurance 
number. These can be thought of as “root credentials” for a collection of services. There would be no need 
for them if all individuals would never try to defraud the system, but from an organization security 
perspective that is not a reasonable security. Note, in this example, that there is no secure way for a 
person’s data to reliably make its way over from a fin ncial service to a health service, unless in some 
manner a link between the two credentials is established by some trusted party; that in effect creates  new 
“root credential” across the two service domains. BUT, note that there is no need for individuals to sh w 
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that master root credential to all services in the wo domains. … Nonetheless, a root credential has been 
created, and for organization security this is inevitable - otherwise users could collude and transfer 
privileges, entitlements, and other personal information between them. 
What I am advocating is NOT a global root credential. In contrast, I am advocating that a root credential 
should only be created for each collection of services that have good reasons for needing to be able to 
reliably share information about an individual… [Res_I 2011] 
This expert specifies that whenever appropriate, the root credential should be used with an 
existing technology that allows the user not to use the credential directly with service providers 
but rather to use it first “ o obtain unlinkable authentication and attribute tokens” leaving to the 
user alone the capability to link her various activities across service domains. 
 On condition that those provisions are institutionally secured, the OITF model may have 
the potential to be sustainable and to expand. The possibility to bridge TFs and, particularly, to 
enable root credentials for various collections of ervices provides the opportunity for a real shift 
away from the silo model, however large the silo. Trust frameworks should be able to form other 
higher-level trust frameworks or federation of trus frameworks, some sort of meta-frameworks 
of trust. 
 Whatever the case, the designers recognize that trust is critical for this infrastructure, as 
we can presume it generally would be for any human relations-supporting technology. The need 
for trust here is ubiquitous, both as requisite and s outcome, both enabling and enabled by the 
use of the technology. With that in mind and the proposed Trust Framework model, by enabling 
stakeholders who share the same norms and the same goals to come together in the same 
framework, is meant to foster trust networks which will support the confident use of digital 
identity credentials within each network domain, and thus to foster safer digital identity 
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transactions. As one of the respondents suggests, for online processes as well as in the physical 
world, trust or at least the assumption thereof is a social lubricant absorbing or minimizing a lot 
of potential frictions as well as transaction costs.  
It’s gonna be the same thing that has over, you know, centuries produced the world’s financial systems, the 
banking system, and more recently in the last, you know, 40-50 years, the credit card system, um... and has, 
you know, at least produced the first 2 layers of the internet. Um…, they’re not without security hazards. 
But still we have a functioning internet today and I think it’s gonna keep functioning. That’s because we’re 
able to, uh…, you know, it’s the same thing that holds together the fabric of society... It rips (inaudible) in 
various places. There are wars and major conflicts, but overall, what holds society together is we’re better 
off with trust than without it. And so, we’re going to build successfully functioning digital identity networks 
because they provide superior trust: everyone wins, it’s not just government, it’s not just business, not just 
users. Everyone wins. [Res_E, 2010] 
He goes on to elaborate further based on the OIX imple entation of the trust framework model. 
The OIX framework provider – which he refers to as an “open industry foundation” – is: 
… an open approach to say: there is no one authority that is going to edict what trust has to look like on 
the Internet. It allows every community of actors to become a trust community that wants to say we hav
our requirements for determining trust levels of assurance - actually, levels of assurance, levels of 
protection, levels of controls - and those requirements, um…, they can then turn into trust framework t  
which OIX will oversee a certification process. OIX doesn’t actually do the certification; it just hosts a 
certification listing service and, uh…, essentially it’s a backbone against which assessors can be enroll d 
to provide certification against any particular trust framework… 
… In a lot of ways I use the analogy: If the network f identity providers is like the banking system, then the 
third party we’re talking about is a little bit like, uh…, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC (inaudible) 
assurance, uh...,  assurance wouldn’t be part of it... You basically just need a backbone for the banking 
system so that all the banks, uh, can be trusted that they’re, you know, protecting people’s money, in th s 
case it’s protecting people’s identity.” [Res_E, 2010] 
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Eventually, authority emanates from shared goals and interests, and one of its fundamental 
functions in this context is to foster trust. But in the end, it is up to real individuals to exercise 
trust and as such, there are factors that may incline them to trust and others that may challenge 
their trust. The notion of the risks attached to identity transactions and the absence of clarity 
regarding the distribution of responsibilities in case of failure are part of the latter set of factors. 
• Liability: a limit to trust 
When comparing the prospective identity credentials in the digital world to the past ones 
in the physical world with regard to the liability ssue, it may be tempting to say: when frauds are 
committed with government- or state-issued credentials (which happens, obviously), those 
issuers are not made liable for the harm caused in the process, and yet people still widely use and 
continue to rely on those credentials. Therefore, th  private entities issuing digital identity 
credentials should be held to the same standard. Unfortu ately, such comparison and argument 
do not achieve much in favor of the adoption of these technologies as long as this depends on 
user choice and confidence, in addition to the fact tha  they lead to a flawed conclusion for the 
reasons that follow.  
i. The need and capacity to enable private business and tr sactions has never been 
part of the government’s initial drive to fashioning identity credentials for citizens and nationals. 
As a consequence, it generally was neither a requirment nor an expectation that those 
credentials be used to conduct private business, certainly not financial transactions. Even if in 
some apparently limited cases such as in France, gov rnment strongly suggested to private 
organizations to encourage one way or another their staff or members to apply for their national 
identity card as a tactic to stimulate adoption, this was neither a requirement nor an expectation 
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for such private organizations to actually use or rely on that card in their own processes, but only 
a way for government to enlist the help of third parties so that the maximum number of citizens 
have their identity documented and their card availble in case government needs to check their 
identity. The use of those credentials was not meant to provide any profitable business 
opportunity to their issuer, or ultimately increase it  bottom line, so that there might be a reason 
for potential issuers to compete (e.g., several governments competing to issue to any citizens 
their passport, regardless of their nationality.)  
ii.  The government or the state designed ID credentials first and foremost for their 
own purposes. It is reasonable to assume, based on their initial goal, that they would have been 
fine with people using passports only to cross natio l borders, or national identity card only to 
authenticate their identity when dealing with government agencies, or driving licenses only to 
drive and show the police upon request in case of violation of the traffic regulation or if they are 
involved in some other traffic incident. 
iii.  As initially designed, the use of government-issued identity credentials does not 
automatically lead to storing or aggregating data about their holder or her transactions. When I 
use one of those credentials to buy alcohol at a liquor store, there normally is no data trail about 
me being at that store on that date at that time, of me buying alcohol such many times in that 
month or that year, or of any of my identity attribute being stored at the point of verification in a 
way that is easy to track or correlate with other reco ds.133 Likewise, in developing (and possibly 
some of developed) countries where the police patrols have no computer in every car, while a 
random identity check may be a possible deterrence against unlawful deeds, it is a mere 
ceremony that provides the law enforcers with some reassurance only on a limited number of 
                                                 
133 Again, I am referring here to the desiderata specified or embedded in the design of those credentials. Admittedly, this 
has changed overtime with the development of electronic networks with more and more opportunities to collect and 
retain identity data along with the growing amount and diversity of transactions.  
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facts (e.g., that the individual being verified holds a proper government-issued ID and, possibly 
but not necessarily, that in addition the photograph nd the description are roughly believable to 
be of that individual.) While the development of electronic technology has made it easy to store 
more and more data (e.g., controls at countries’ ports of entry have involved collecting 
information, matching some of it to pre-stored data and possibly storing further data collected at 
every control) those capabilities were not present at the time the passport was invented and did 
not motivate its design, which limits any attempt to assimilate the risk profile and resulting 
liability regime between nineteenth century passport and future digital identity credentials.  
Furthermore, respondents have suggested that the reasons why the user’s counterparts in 
Internet identity transactions – the ones that would be called relying parties within the new 
framework – might accept this emerging framework and its principles (even if that means giving 
up their capacity to collect and leverage the user data at their own guise) primarily include:  
cost, liability, and goodwill issues associated with protecting such data against breaches and dealing with 
inadvertent leakages [Res_I 2011].  
Reduced liability and compliance requirements are the two reasons that will drive internet-businesses to 
accept this identity technology. [Res_G 2011] 
This rationale raises a question, though. How can liability be a deterrent for online merchants to 
keep them from collecting and managing their customers’ PII when at the same time, the 
designers or proponents of these technologies consiste tly place a bold emphasis on disclaiming 
liability for potential identity providers who are precisely supposed to take over the custody and 
maintenance of those customers’ identity data? As often recognized by the technologists in this 
context, the issue of liability, in cases including but not limited to system failure, proves to be 
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probably the thorniest of all non-technical challeng s facing the rollout of digital identity 
technology. 
It is not clear whether commercial entities would be readily convinced to let go of their 
compulsive consumption and control of the user’s per onal data, even if presented with the 
prospects that this might somehow be better for busines  on the long run. Businesses’ voracity 
for personal data, as any user can experience daily on the Internet, is a matter of culture at this 
point and it might require more than one or two lines of rational argument to change it. However, 
it is not impossible that if that argument is consistently supported by empirical evidence over 
time, that business culture might change. But is it supported by such evidence? For now, more 
avenues need to be explored for new business models around personal data and identity 
technology so as to change the above mentioned business culture. 
• Insurance: trust-enabler and response to the burden of liability 
At present, it is abundantly clear that the Internet pr sents severe challenges to the user’s 
confidence, and no one can seriously claim that there are no more risks on the Internet than in 
face-to-face interactions generally (at least this ha not been evidently established, despite what 
any technologist may claim.) Those risks and challenges were the motivation for building digital 
identity technologies, in the first place, and that is why TFs have come about. At start and 
comparatively to the physical plane of interactions, there is a trust deficit on the Internet. 
Considering that relative deficit, is it even possible then to enable or enhance trust on the Internet 
while doing away with the institutional provisions (such as the FDIC’s) that were needed for 
trust in the world of brick-and-mortar (and without validly replacing them)?  
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It shall be noted that one of the key actors who, as a respondent in this investigation, has 
analogized the goal of the Trust Framework with the banking system’s backbone provided by 
FDIC quickly subtracted the insurance component from his conclusion, despite the fact that his 
own premises imply that component. In effect, the definition of the acronym FDIC (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) seems to indicate that insurance is its main purpose or 
instrument thereof and thus, a main part of its mission; in that context insurance appears to be a 
tool for enabling trust. In any case, one may wonder what trust in the banking system would have 
been, or whether it would have been possible at all, without the insurance component of the type 
of FDIC. When I visit my bank, I regularly notice a plaque at the desk of every teller where it 
reads: “Deposits are federally insured to $250,000 backed by the full faith and credit of the 
United States government.” It is reasonable to presume that for the federal government to feel the 
need to step in and reassure depositor with such promise, it is because without it banking might 
not have worked as successfully as it did, particularly in the initial stages – and without a 
thriving bank industry the financial sector would not be as vibrant and thus, not as supportive of 
the economy. 
Even beyond the analogy and considering the large socio-technical systems that rely on 
public trust or have become overtime trustworthy in the eyes of the public, this might not have 
happened if the user or customer was left all by him- or herself to make the determination 
whether those systems are trustworthy or not, and whether to trust them or not. Generally, 
individuals know that if they were to be victim of a disaster due to a system failure of the power 
grid, there are institutions and mechanisms that will help them deal with the situation in one 
manner or the other; in some ways and through appropriate mechanisms the society as a whole 
will be involved in dealing with the consequences alongside with them. Individuals know that a 
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plane crash is not something they will have to face in isolation only surrounded by their 
surviving loved ones, and that it will be a matter of concern for the society as a whole and as a 
consequence, the society has preventively put in place mechanisms and institutions in order to 
minimize the chances of that happening, and to helpd al with the consequences if it ever 
happens nonetheless. In sum, the determination as to whether such systems are trustworthy or 
not, and the decision whether to use and rely on them or not, are never made by the individual in 
isolation or exclusively based on the technical characteristics of those systems. Some people 
make such determination and decision clearly knowing their risks and recourses and assessing 
that, in balance, their chances are good getting through the risks. Others, maybe the majority, use 
the adhesion of a critical mass of people (or rather t ir experience living in a society where 
people and organizations are generally held accountable both to certain quality standards and 
legally)134, that is, the apparent consensus that the system may be relied upon, as a proxy for 
trustworthiness and then make the decision to actually rely on it.   
Contrariwise, as far as people can see around them in terms of risks to personal data and 
identity records, it appears that individuals are mostly left to themselves in order to fend off the 
consequences of related incidents when they occur, even when those consequences may 
jeopardize their livelihood. They may report to thepolice which may open a routine 
investigation, but until a definite resolution is found – which will most likely take years – the 
victims’ experience generally suggest that there is no ocially shared sense of the crisis they are 
going through and the associated burdens,135 as would be the case in a plane crash or (less 
                                                 
134 That common experience enabled by shared values leads a significant portion of the population to trust any assurance 
given by concerned institutions, thus the notion of critical mass here.  
135 As anecdotal evidence, a report was recently broadcasted on a national news cable about young children who are 
already plagued of considerable debts due to loans that they never took (car credits, home mortgages, etc.) and just 
because some unscrupulous individuals have managed to get hold of their SSN. The cable channel was able to trace 
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spectacularly) when a bank goes bankrupt in which latter case they might still recover the totality 
of their deposits if these amount to $250,000 or less. It is no surprise then that no one nowadays 
really thinks twice as to whether their deposits will be safe or not before they open a bank 
account. They may worry about many things but the saf ty of their deposit generally is not one 
of them, while they would be more than reluctant in thi king that a new Internet technology will 
make them safer with regard to the protection of their personal data just because someone has 
said so. A great deal of effort will need to be putinto demonstrating to them that this technology 
is a game changer, not just by itself but also in terms of how it shifts the attitude of the society as 
a whole towards related issues and potential consequences. Those elements of the social 
environment, those accompanying institutions are ess ntial ingredients for enabling the public’s 
trust in technologies and other institutions which users and customers at first might otherwise see 
as fraught of risks for themselves. To date, digital identity design activities do not provide any 
clear answer as to whether a functional substitute of insurance, in case something goes seriously 
wrong, will kick in to help alleviate the user’s burden or harm. That being said, the governance 
structures and mechanisms136 are still emerging and it is to be hoped that a viable solution to the 
burden of liability will also emerge.    
• The role of government and regulation 
In addition to user adoption concerns, several experts have emphasized the role that 
government could play either as regulatory policymaker or as a large customer and early adopter. 
First, the two sides of government intervention effects are acknowledged: potentially negative 
                                                                                                                                                             
down those individuals but they were still running free and thus far never got to be worried by the police. Other adult 
victims spend a lot of time and still their own money over many years in order to clean up their financial and even 
criminal records, with a considerable moral distress.  
136 Such as the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group, http://www.idecosystem.org/ (as of August 2012) 
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and potentially positive. The actions of the governme t may consist of “its ability to help both to 
set up identity but also to perform in ways that are not necessarily the best (eavesdropping etc.)” 
[Res_H 2010]. Then there is the view that public policy may steer incentives in the right 
directions due to “commercial incentives for providers to not be good actors in the systems, 
(inaudible) which need to be altered by policy” [Res_H 2010]. At the same time, others 
recognize the difficulties for policy to play any significant role at this stage in altering the 
distribution of incentives. 
In private-sector use cases, there are many incentiv s for businesses to not play nice with other parties, and 
public policy to deal with bad incentives will be a d unting challenge. [Res_I 2011] 
The same would however welcome the role of policy to steer standard-setting efforts through the 
definition of a single, overarching protocol that will provide a consistent logical infrastructure for
all varieties of Internet identity systems.  
Here, policy is particularly important, and can be v ry effective, in driving industry-wide efforts in (de 
facto) standardized protocols and other infrastructure elements. [Res_I 2011]  
This expert concludes that there is a need for a “single protocol guided by government, by 
legislation and policy, because ultimately identity is rooted in law and policy.” [Res_I 2011]  
This may be comparable to the air travel industry where air companies are owned by 
private entities, even airports may be operated privately, but within a broad interoperable 
regulatory framework agreed upon by national governme ts (e.g., security standards and various 
policies regarding the operation of aircrafts, lugga e handling, and travel documents). Clearly 
the work of harmonizing regulations in order to create a comparable regulatory regime in support 
of this interoperable, global digital identity infrastructure has not even begun. It is not even clear
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whether the sate actors see the need or relevance for this dynamic to start or whether it will result 
de facto from the dynamic created by the U.S. Strategy and the one that will follow the European 
Union’s regulation (OECD 2011, European Commission 2012 and [gov_nstic]). For now, the 
technology designers are facing what appears to be “inconsistent regulatory frameworks between 
jurisdictions” [Res_H 2010].  
As it stands right now, a major barrier to adopting a fully interoperable data flow, transborder data flow, 
personal data, [is] government regulation that prevents the flow of data, in a way that is clearly understood 
enough between jurisdictions that it can happen, in realistic way. [Res_F 2010] 
This expert sounds rather optimistic about the technology, although he also recognizes the 
challenge of user adoption. Is it enough for governme t to simply open the personal data 
floodgates for transborder flow – and the technology as well as the social and market forces will 
take care of the rest?  
The technologies are already there, they need to be stitched together, they need to be cleaned up, they ne d 
to be profiled in more effective ways, but it’s regulation and user adoption… (inaudible) Of course by 
enterprise interest, I mean, you know, there has to be economic interest to do so, but I think that’s clear. I 
think people understand that when personal data flow reely money will follow, money will be made. 
[Res_F 2010] 
It is not always clear to all the stakeholders where that money will go or which one(s) of them 
stand(s) to benefit the most from it and which one(s) might not, or what actions need to be taken, 
if any, in order to make sure all stakeholders benefit from it to the extent possible. 
• The politics of technology 
Part of the non-technical challenges that may be daunting to resolve include the politics 
implied in the design of something as sensitive as identity, among the actors involved in that 
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process. One of the individual actors acknowledges that “ultimately the fact that these 
infrastructures do create tremendous shift … in control [and] power” and that they raise 
concerns over “privacy and autonomy considerations..., that may be the biggest thing that has 
stood in the way of adoption so far” [Brandt_2010]. Concerns of power and control are not 
governments’ only. They also involve economic, commercial and any other social actors based 
on their particular interests. It is no surprise that all the big players controlling and trading with 
consumer data (Web portals with email service, social network platforms, credit reporting 
services, etc.) are represented in these digital identity processes; it is a sound business 
intelligence practice for them to stay abreast with any dynamic that could have a dramatic impact 
on their industry and try to make that potential impact positive for them. The question is: to what 
extent the fundamental principles that have been laid out – such as the guaranty of assurance to 
all stakeholders, including protections for the individual users, the principles of user-centric 
identity and the Seven Laws of identity – can resist the tensions between diverse and sometimes 
divergent or competing stakeholder interests?  
Any digital identity mechanism requires technological innovation upfront. The players 
involved in that work of innovation are private actors, that is, actors who invest private capital in 
R&D and business operations related one way or the ot r to that process. The expectations of 
reward as a consequence of their investment have implications for the outcomes. How possible is 
it then that the actors involved agree on an outcome that would live up to the design principles 
proclaimed upfront? What really are the incentives for doing so, if any? We previously saw the 
limits of the liability and cost argument as a deterrent. At this point, it appears that nothing will 
substantially change unless a remarkable shift occurs in business models and practices (although 
it is not clear how), or a set of reforms are put in place by a commonly accepted authority such as 
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the government, or there is at least some coordination process led by both government and the 
private sector towards the desired outcome. 
Furthermore, the potential implications of this technology command the involvement of 
social actors beyond the computer industry.  
The big industry players will need to agree on all the important common elements to be brought in place 
for an internet identity infrastructure. This is a debate that is not just of a technical nature, it should 
include representatives from all relevant stakeholder communities, including privacy proponents and civil 
liberties organizations. [Res_I, 2011] 
In that regard, the fact that there are mechanisms and entities that sit in the middle of anyone 
else’s communications and transactions may be troubling if there is no transparency about what 
the technology enables the intermediaries (or anyone who has some control over it) to do and, 
above all, what they are allowed to do – particularly if it is true that, as another r spondent 
claims, these efforts to build a digital identity infrastructure are about “creating due process for 
digital citizens” [Res_L 2011]. If that is the case then the infrastructure must not only 
accommodate strong authentication solutions in order to nable a secure correlation of identities 
with actual individual users, but some protections a d recourses must be afforded to the citizens 
as well with regard to their personal data. It only makes sense that such protections and due 
process requirements be secured beyond any one organization’s terms of service for consumers.  
 All the above concerns can only increase in magnitude as soon as one considers that the 
potential market for these technologies is global, and not only in terms of markets and 
consumers, but also in terms of jurisdictions and citizenry. In the “Cyberspace Policy Review” 
(USG 2009), it has been recognized that the US needto work with other countries in their efforts 
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to strike out solutions for securing the cyberinfrast ucture. As follows, the document raises a 
question to be considered:  
One area needing further study is whether and in what ways elements of the information and 
communications infrastructure ought to be treated as a global commons.(USG 2009: B-4) 
As I wrap up this investigation, the Department of C mmerce has put forwards a set of 
recommendations for establishing a governance structure for the “identity ecosystem.” Without 
commenting on the exact content, a few questions come t  mind: From a governance 
perspective, to what extent will the “identity ecosystem” be treated as a component of national 
(security) policy and to what extent will it as a component of “global commons”? To date, USG 
is still in a unique position with its capacity to c ntrol the logical infrastructure of the Internet 
through its exclusive oversight of ICANN and the IAN  contract 137, and that situation has 
presented some tensions with other governments around the world. With the governance of the 
“identity ecosystem,” are we headed in the same direction, even if unintentionally? The fact that 
the largest software and Internet companies are concentrated in the US and, as a result, have to 
work with USG and submit to the laws, policies and regulations of the U.S. only sharpens the 
issue of how to define the future relations between national jurisdictions in the context of this 
potentially global digital identity infrastructure.  
6.7 Conclusion 
In this Case III, I have investigated the present history and process of emergence of 
digital identity technologies. I have examined a number of sources offering insights into what 
                                                 
137 The contract that gives ICANN the authority, among other tasks, to manage the assignments of the Internet domain 
name suffixes and the allocation of Internet Protocol addresses (every Internet-connected device receives one) and 
Internet traffic routing numbers. 
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digital identity entails, including the social actors involved in the process of bringing about its 
technological implementations. From that a clearer understanding of digital identity has been 
gained (compared to what could have been assumed bas  on past historical experiences), as 
well as an awareness about its potential utility and the implications of its handling. I have 
presented four identity technology innovations illustrating the variations of the design models 
that have been developed so far, including OpenID, CardSpace/ Information Card, U-Prove and 
OAuth. I also have described the institutional and policy initiatives that have been taken in the 
U.S. – such as the Open Identity Trust Framework model, the Open Identity Exchange and the 
“National Strategy for Trusted Identities in the Cyberspace” – in order to accompany the 
technology innovation and support the implementation and adoption of the emerging 
technologies and systems. Those elements provide a state-of-the-art view of the digital identity 
innovation processes at the time of this investigation, both from the side of mere technology and 
from the social side.  
As those processes are still ongoing, the analysis has at first focused on the gaps, 
challenges, potential or outstanding issues still to be resolved two prominent of which include 
trust and liability. Based on an analogy outlined by one of the respondents interviewed during the 
investigation and pushing further that analogy, I suggest that the notion of insurance is one that 
wed together the notions of trust and liability and that looking at liability challenge through those 
lenses, it may stand better chances to be worked out in a sustainable manner. Other issues 
include the possible divergence of interests among players who are in position to impact the 
development and implementation of the technology, as well as concerns about national 
regulations as the emerging technologies are meant to be interoperable over the global Internet. 
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Now that we have thoroughly surveyed the historical fields of these three types of 
identity and authentication mechanisms – medieval se ls, passport and government-issued ID, 
and digital identity – I now propose to deepen the analysis while trying to elicit their potential 
relationship in broader terms.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Causal Mechanisms and Analytical Explanation 
 
7.1 Introduction 
I have now completed the three large historical case studies: Case I, Case II and Case III. In 
those cases, I have traced with much detail the history of medieval seals, modern passports 
(appended with a case of national ID) and digital identity credentials in terms of their historical 
emergence as identification mechanisms. Those threela g  cases have been designed and 
executed in order to address the general research question as applied to the three historical 
sequences and identity artifacts.  
I now propose in this last chapter before conclusion, first, to take stock and bring the 
main insights to bear on addressing the specific research questions for each one of those three 
identity mechanisms (see Table 3-2 recalled below). The second major content this chapter 
contributes is the depiction of diverse patterns of adoption, from deliberate tactics used by state 
actors in order to make the government-issued identity credentials an accepted necessity to the 
ambivalent implementation-adoption trajectories of digital technology torn between a user-
choice orientation and the comfort of automated processes. While I am at it, I outline a large 
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range of rationally possible scenarios that can be derived based on this historical investigation in 
terms of how an emerging identification mechanism might become authoritative in general, and 
particularly in the present time. As the third and last major item to be found in this chapter, I sum 
up the main analytical outcomes in an effort to provide a fitting causal explanation within the 
framework of sociohistorical inquiry and discourse.  Stated otherwise, this chapter is not a repeat 
of the histories already told in the previous ones although it builds on it. Instead, I go over those 
histories now less interested by the actual contexts and their specific time-space dependencies 
than I am interested in the analytical value of the rel vant narrative components and their 
potential to yield both an enlightening comparison between the three mechanisms and further 
characterization of each – more as a type or a model than as a particular. I abstract those 
components from the three Cases, and synthesize them in an effort to assemble an explanatory 
discourse of these mechanism-process phenomena.     
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Table 3-2: Research questions and design 
General 
Question 
How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the 
public at large? 
 Historical Case I Historical Case II Historical Case III 
General Q 
sequencing 
In what circumstances did the challenge of 
reliably representing individual identity 
within written records emerge in the 
Middle Ages and how was it resolved? 
How did identity credentials issued by the 
national state historically emerge and 
become authoritative? 
How are social actors, events or processes 
leading to the possible emergence of 
authoritative digital identity credentials 
for Internet end users at large? 
Specific research questions 
Specific Q.1 
[I.1] How were individuals led to use that 
solution to authenticate their own identity? 
[II.1] How have individuals been led to 
use government identity documents as a 
means to authenticate their own identity? 
[III.1] How would Internet end users 
come to use digital credentials to 
authenticate their identity online?  
Specific Q.2 
[I.2] How did social actors come to rely on 
that solution for authenticating the identity 
of their individual counterpart in a 
transaction?  
[II.2] How have social actors come to 
accept government identity documents as 
a reliable way to authenticate the identity 
of their individual counterpart in a 
transaction?  
[III.2] How would independent third 
parties come to accept a given digital 
identity technology or credential as a 
reliable mechanism for authenticating the 
end user’s identity online?  
Causal mechanisms and pathways in the historical emergence of identification systems 
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7.2 Addressing research specific questions 
I am, in the following, going to address precisely the overall research question by 
providing answers to the two specific questions for each type of identity mechanism 
investigated. 
7.2.1 Medieval seals 
I will start with the first specific question applicable to medieval seals formulated as 
follows: 
[I.1] - How were individuals led to use that solution [seals] to authenticate their own 
identity? 
The process that led individuals to rely on seals as a mechanism to authenticate 
their identity is based on a belief system that involves a religious worldview. I have 
extensively analyzed the predicates of that belief system based on theories and doctrines 
articulated by social actors of the time as well as on more fragmented but insightful clues 
drawn on analogies made by the same actors between seals and sacramental signs. As to 
the process itself however, it remarkably proves to be devoid of decision moments 
whereby a uniform rule was established regarding seal requirement for authenticating 
identity in transactional records or whereby a procedure was defined as to how to acquire 
authenticating seals for individuals. Rather, mutually reinforcing socio-cultural practices 
and doctrinal discourse shaped the use of seals as identity tokens in the Middle Ages 
from late 11th century onward. As a result, I argue that the process that led individuals to 
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use seals as authoritative identity mechanism is twofold. I distinguish first a cultural 
moment and then an institutional moment.  
In effect, the outcome of using seals as authoritative identity tokens depended 
upon the cultural phenomenon of generalized seal ownership and the belief system 
underlying that. By later 11th century, individuals from all strata of the medieval society 
were using seals as identity tokens in their personal a d transactional records, and there 
was a widely shared belief that the seal may signify the seal owner, just as any sign links 
a signifier to a signified. Culturally, the constant ssociation of seals with the authority of 
documents on the one hand and with a personified source of that authority (e.g., the king) 
on the other hand created the conditions for believing that seals were an effective 
mechanism to represent a person. It is never an easy task to delineate exactly the origins 
of cultural influences from a historical period that is so remote, but it has been suggested 
that the use of seals by early Merovingian rulers might have been modeled on Byzantine 
practices.138 I would also add that the early Augustinian doctrine of signs (4th – 5th  
century) also had an impact on the thinking and practices of the medieval elite society, 
including rulers, theologian-philosophers and legal scholars, as to how they referred to 
signs in general, and particularly to the signs of authority. On the long run, those elite 
practices might have served as a model for the layman’s practices from the society at 
large. 
As to the institutional moment, the Church developed a series of practices for 
establishing transaction records which are authenticated/validated using particular marks 
                                                 
138 “Its use imitated the usage of the Byzantine imperial chancery; to seal a document was, for the Merovingian 
kings, to behave as a ruler.” (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1512)  
384 
 
 
 
and signs including the appendage of seals that repres nted the parties to the transaction. 
By so doing, not only the Church put in practice thnotion that seals may signify 
individuals, but it also sanctioned the idea that seal  could be used to authenticate identity 
per se. The Church thus provided the basis for legitimizing a presumed ontological 
correspondence between the seal and the seal owner and brought that process to 
completion, with theological doctrines and religious discourse cementing that belief by 
linking it to the sacred foundations of medieval inst tutions.  
The Church personnel, theological thinkers and entrepreneurs, elaborated a 
narrative drawing on sacramental doctrines, particularly pertaining to the Eucharist and 
the Trinity. That narrative entertained the worldview whereby God remained the absolute 
reference and ultimate origin of any truth and authori y. However, God did no longer 
have to be the direct and authoritative source of the signification of all signs. That 
narrative and legitimation in turn reinforced private practices that were already common 
among the few literate as regards personal correspondence. While two private individuals 
conceivably could still enter in contract their own ay and without sealing any document, 
they might at some point have wanted however to operate by the norms of the Church 
institution. That would most likely have been the case for high value transactions, in the 
view of at least one of the parties involved. They could have wanted to proceed by the 
protocols of the Church institution because: i) the Church was visibly the largest norm-
setter and rule-maker of the time with significant e forcement capacity and leverages 
(including a court system) and yet still close to peo le, ii) the Church was for the society 
at large the best possible moral guarantor and refere  who could step in and mend fences 
in case of conflict, including outside formal court p oceedings, and iii) many transactions 
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were already conducted with the Church using the same protocols, notably donations 
made for the purpose of securing the salvation of one’s soul in the afterlife, which was an 
issue of extreme importance in the eye of the faithful at that time. In effect, the monopoly 
then retained by the Church as information broker and service provider in matters of 
afterlife, which constituted a strong incentive fordonations and bequeaths to the Church, 
also helped spread those practices of record-sealing in the public at large. 
At the first layer, the authority/authoritativeness of seals conceptually stems from 
the authentic relation between a sign and its referent. Authoritative identity then implies 
first and foremost personal authority over one’s own representations, based on an alleged 
ontological correspondence between the person and the seal-object via its figure-image. 
That correspondence is both enabled and captured in the figure-image which inscribes the 
“ego”  of the seal owner in the matter and substance of the seal. At the second layer, the 
authority of signs was founded on the relationship of likeness between God and his 
(once) living “signs” or manifestations (Christ on e side and the human being on the 
other), and authoritativeness was achieved in any pir of signifier-signified mimicking 
that likeness. 
[I.2] - How did social actors come to rely on that solution [seals] for authenticating 
the identity of their individual counterpart in a t ransaction?  
We can distinguish mainly two use categories for medieval seals by the general 
public: personal communications and binding transactions. In personal communications, 
counterparts were other individuals who adhered to the same belief system as described 
above and participated in the same cultural practice that preceded any discursive 
386 
 
 
 
articulation of its foundations. In binding transactions, there were first and mainly those 
conducted with the Church itself which was the leading player to be concerned with 
written records in general, and particularly with those transferring property rights to the 
Church and with other contractual documents. In effect, one should note that the Church 
being often at the receiving end of important transactions such as land donations, it is 
literally the first stakeholder in the reliability of the applicable identification mechanisms 
and the necessity that all other stakeholders buy into that reliability (or belief thereof).  
As a ubiquitous institution with the largest intellectual capital of the time, the 
Church provided the most competent personnel (as scribe  and notaries) not only to 
create written records, but also to attend to the specification of the protocols that 
organized related practices as well as to their valdation and their curation or custody. 
Based on the facts that on the one hand the Church was the predominant rule-maker, from 
the judiciary to record-making and documentary validation, and on the other hand it was 
the largest counterpart in sealed identity-bound transactions, it set the norms and the 
template to be followed by all potential institutional counterparts.  
The specific innovation of the 11th century was to create the symbolic and 
conceptual conditions but also the institutional environment leveraging the generalized 
practice of sealing, or simply seal ownership, in order to enable its systematic use as a 
stable and reliable identity tokens by any interested stakeholders. This was not achieved 
because an authority centrally defined the material specifications of seals and their 
validity as identity tokens. Rather and as was previously established, this was achieved 
by the fact that the most ubiquitous authority of the ime shared that practice and even 
promoted it by producing a discourse that endorsed, justified and legitimized seals as a 
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general mechanism for authenticating identity. This made most potential stakeholders 
confident in relying on it. In so doing, the Church as an effective political, economic, 
social and religious force contributed mostly to formalizing and institutionalizing the 
authoritativeness of seals as identity mechanism for the people at large. In that sense, 
seals were not only de facto, but became also de jure (normative) mechanism for 
authenticating identity.  
Now I will turn to the specific questions pertaining to the second historical 
episode and type of identity credential, that is, the passport and more broadly, 
government-issued identity documents. 
7.2.2 Passports and national ID 
The first specific question applicable to passports wa  formulated as follows: 
[II.1] - How have individuals been led to use government identity documents as a 
means to authenticate their own identity? 
In the passport case, the acceptance and use of this credential or a substitute in 
due form (e.g., a safe-conduct) by individual citizens for the purposes of traveling 
resulted from a mandate. They had no choice if theywanted to travel outside the country 
they found themselves living in after the passport requirement was enforced, although the 
weight of the mandate arguably is not as heavy at the exit of one’s country of legal 
residence as much as it is at the entry of a foreign country.139 In that sense, the first 
reason for a traveler to get a passport is that without it, he or she may not be able to enter 
the territory contemplated for a visit or for migration (except in cases of bilateral or 
                                                 
139 As early as the first Passport Conference in 1920, the League of Nations recommended the abolition of the 
exit visa (League of Nations 1920 and 1922). 
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regional agreement on a passport waiver program.) In the most common case of a visit, 
this also applies to the return trip back to the country where the travel originated, as that 
country will need some evidence of the prior relationship between the traveler and itself 
in order to let him or her back in.140 
The passport’s international requirement or mandate w s enabled by a three-prong 
arrangement. In a given group of countries, virtually ll the entities controlling the 
resource the passport was supposed to provide – i.e. acc ss to foreign territories, with 
each territory being foreign to all the others – agreed on:  
i) a shared policy of passport requirement as a pre-conditi n for access to 
territories by non-nationals in general,  
ii)  common specifications of passport components and format, and  
iii)  issuing a passport to their own citizens at an affordable cost, as a 
prerequisite for them to be able to access other territories.  
Note on the national ID card: 
As for the national identity card, the role of the issuing state in citizens using that 
credential is more direct. In some cases, the mandate to carry it around with oneself may 
be by law. But in the case I have considered in this t esis (France) legal mandate only 
applied to foreigners during the period investigated. Adoption by nationals was enabled 
through a series of incentives and policies that put an increasing burden on the citizens 
without a government ID, while making things easier with the state bureaucracy for 
individuals holding one. In effect, the state took a variety of measures in order to 
                                                 
140 “Aliens had increasingly come to be seen as lacking any prima facie claim to access to the territory of a state 
other than their own.” (Torpey 2000: 120) 
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encourage individuals to apply for and carry their government-issued ID and the other 
institutions to request their members or customers to do the same. The approach was 
gradual. For instance, at some point the government d cided first to recognize only 
identity documents that have been issued by whichever structure as long as it was done 
according to a format and guidelines the government itself set forth, and then later on it 
moved to only recognize documents directly issued by itself in lieu of the variety of 
private and sometimes ad hoc identity artifacts that were previously in currency. To that 
end, the government sought to incentivize organizations whose membership card was 
previously accepted in public administrations as identity credential so that they encourage 
their member to apply for the government ID instead, if they were to continue enjoying 
the same service from the part of those administratons.  
[II.2] - How have social actors come to accept government identity documents as a 
reliable way to authenticate the identity of their individual counterpart in a 
transaction?  
Before WWI there was no internationally uniform policy of passport requirement, 
a requirement which, for that matter, was unevenly implemented, if at all. During and 
after the war, passports were nationally re-enacted or maintained in the concerned 
countries, and then reinforced internationally through a common framework 
recommended by the League of Nations. It was never to recede again from the 
international landscape as a continuously growing number of countries progressively 
converged in their agreement on the recommended framework.  
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In the wake of WWI, all leading countries had security concerns, and there 
appeared to be a consensus that being able to control the identity of foreigners coming in 
and going out of a country was a necessary means and a good way to mitigate national 
security risks. However, a unilateral national policy can only ensure that citizens residing 
in a country be issued a passport by the government aking such policy, which defeats 
the purpose of controlling visitors. As a consequence, a coordinated effort was needed in 
order to enable an international policy of passport requirement.  
Furthermore, due to the principle of reciprocity most countries had an interest to 
participate in the process of establishing basic rules for an international-type passport, 
whether by contributing to define those rules or by implementing them. In effect, by 
default governments are expected to allow their citizens to travel at will. As a result, they 
should not take or fail to take any measures, which would either way result in barring 
their citizens from traveling (otherwise, this would clearly constitute a breach of the 
freedom of movement.) Likewise, they have a stake in their country being open to foreign 
visitors (e.g., growing tourism industry, international cooperation). In those conditions, 
the only way for a country to avoid the burden of having to address a wide variety of 
specifications of the passport requirement from all the other countries which its nationals 
may want to visit is to enable reciprocity, starting with creating and adopting shared 
standard practices in that regard as much as possible.141 The level of burden imposed by a 
government of a given country onto visitors from another country (hence onto the 
government of those visitors) is expected to be commensurate to the level of burden 
                                                 
141 National security which is today the big discriminating factor in passport and visa requirements was already 
cited as a possible ground for exception from the first Passport Conference (League of Nations 1920). 
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imposed on its own nationals (hence onto that governm nt itself) when they in turn visit 
the other country. 
As a result, governments were willing to find an inter ationally shared solution to 
enable traveling across countries while providing a means to mitigate national security 
risks and, maybe most importantly, quiet down their s curity concerns in the wake of 
WWI. The same three-prong approach outlined above led to a consensus among 
governments, resulted in the expansion of the passport worldwide. Coordination of 
passport requirement policies through collective resolutions including recommendations 
of common guidelines and basic specifications enables most of the states to issue a 
credential that is globally accepted by other governments for the purposes of international 
traveling and border-crossing, and to recognize passports issued by the other 
governments. 
As to the acceptance of, and reliance on, passport credentials by non-state actors, 
it is predicated on government recognition and acceptance. In a foreign country, the 
passport is the default identity credential until one has stayed long enough in that country 
to be assigned a local identifier due to one’s transaction needs or until one has built a 
durable institutional affiliation. In the meantime, a foreign passport duly stamped by 
customs services is good for an identity credential authenticating the individual foreigner 
with any stakeholder/verifier within the concerned country. However, one may note that 
if applicable, those counterparts and relying parties may favor a credential issued by a 
local or national authority over the foreign passport, although not necessarily always. I 
explain this by the notion that it is more feasible to deal with an authority within reach or 
easier to reach than an authority out of reach or more difficult to reach. It is more cost-
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effective to interact with the former than with the latter. This is particularly the case for 
entities of narrower scope than national-level authori y vis-à-vis a foreign national 
government.  
From the domestic side and concerning nationals, resorting to a passport for 
identification may be considered as using a hammer for a scalpel, if only because the 
expectation of holding a valid passport solely applies to people traveling overseas 
(generally further than the countries next door). Pesumably, at any point in time within a 
country the proportion of people who have applied for a passport within the last three to 
five years (depending on the validity timespan of apassport in that country) is still 
notably lesser than hundred percent of that country’s population in most countries. For an 
individual holding a passport however, this would generally be accepted by counterparts 
in identity transactions as authoritative identity credential, in lieu of any other nationally-
recognized identity credential, based on three factors:  
i) The passport is issued by the same authority as a ntional ID card 
wherever available, that is, by the highest national authority. In other words, the same top 
national authority vouches for the identity of the citizen in either case.   
ii)  To the possible exception of the one’s address, the basic identity data that 
is displayed on any alternate nationally-recognized id ntity credential is generally 
included in the passport as well, for whether leaving the country or staying inside, the 
government is consistently interested in the same set of identity attributes about the 
individuals. 
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iii)  Finally and more particularly, counterparts will accept the passport to the 
extent that the identity attribute they might be spcifically interested in, if any, also 
features on the passport based on reason ii) otherwise we are back to reason i) above. 
Note on the national ID card: 
1) The commandment of sovereignty: Since the Peace of Westphalia from the mid-
seventeenth century (Croxton and Tischer 2001), which resulted in the partitioning of the 
world space into national territories sharing equal power of sovereignty, the state has no 
legal competitor for wielding authority within the t rritory under its control. It is in a 
unique position, at the top of the authority pyramid which includes all other institutions 
that operate within that territory. In those conditions and in terms of the level of 
effectiveness/authority of identity credentials, an identity document issued by the 
government holds sway over any identity document issued by any other institution or 
organization in the same jurisdiction. The latter is usable across all institutions that come 
under the national jurisdiction and in every one of the subordinate jurisdictions, whereas 
a credential issued by any other organization or institution of a lesser scope is most likely 
to be usable with that entity alone or along with a limited number of affiliated structures. 
In any case, its use scope would be much narrower than the national jurisdiction.   
2) Authority to make and enforce laws: Related its capa ity to wield the powers 
of sovereignty, he government makes and enforces the law to which every inhabitant in a 
given country is subject to. This implies that if any stakeholder has been harmed or 
abused as a result of a transaction with an individual, in any case if an offense or crime 
occurs, the alleged victim would be more effective at finding and holding the responsible 
accountable if it were able to identify the suspect(s) to the state – i.e., the law enforcer – 
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using the very identifier that the state itself hasprovided than it would trying to do it 
using other identifiers that are foreign to the state apparatus.   
3) One person, one identity: Finally, a factor that plys into bringing other social 
actors and various entities to rely on government identity documents is, in a sense, their 
standard and monolithic nature in defining every individual with one limited, fixed and 
stable set of attributes. Every individual within the jurisdiction is potentially subject to 
documenting the same set of attributes and ideally very set of documented attributes is 
persistently linked to one and the same individual over time.  
Lastly, I am going to address the latest and contemporary experience of identity 
mechanisms in emergence and address the specific research questions regarding digital 
identity.  
7.2.3 Digital identity technology 
With regard to digital identity, the answers to thespecific research questions will be 
tentative, and at times resorting to informed conjectures, as we are not yet at a stage 
where authoritative identity credentials are in useonline and the processes that might take 
us there are still ongoing. But before I address the questions, I suggest noting a 
development that occurred in the digital identity industry as I was investigating this case.  
Microsoft made public its decision not to ship the n awaited release of 
CardSpace and thus to discontinue the development of the Information Card technology, 
which is considered one of the most user-centric identity technologies so far, during the 
2011 RSA Conference (a cryptography and information security annual gathering in San 
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Francisco) from 14 to 18 February.142 The company posted the news on its blog on 
February 15, which reads in part:   
Windows CardSpace was initially released and developed before the pervasive use of online 
identities across multiple services. Perhaps more importantly, we released the user component 
before we and others had delivered the tools for developers and administrators to easily create 
claims-ready services. The identity landscape has cnged with the evolution of tools and cloud 
services.  Based on the feedback we have received from partners and beta participants, we have 
decided not to ship Windows CardSpace 2.0.143 
By this, Microsoft admits that the value proposition f digital identity as an end in itself 
for the end user, even with the outmost focus on the user’s preferences, is marginal. It 
may satisfy the mind but the user doesn’t have much opportunity to use it, neither is 
he/she ever compelled to, therefore it is not a sustainable business proposition. The above 
interviewee (who broke the news to me at this occasion) expresses the same order of idea 
as follows: 
User adoption is gonna be driven exclusively by the feature domain of the applications they wanna 
run. And if those applications require a user-centric ubiquitous identifier approach then that’s 
what they will have… identity systems are just not big enough for users to care about them. … It 
really comes down to: what do users go online for? And they don’t go online to create accounts, 
they go online to go to particular websites. They go online to get something done, right? They’ve 
got a job that they need to get done… If you help them achieve that purpose or complete the task 
better, then they’ll do it. … But identity systems themselves are just too small to provide that kind 
of value to users; they’re enablers rather than the t ings that really provide value to users. The 
                                                 
142 I first learned of this development while interviewing one of my respondents for the digital identity case less 
than a week after it was announced. 
143 See http://blogs.msdn.com/b/card/archive/2011/02/15/beyond-windows-cardspace.aspx 
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applications layer has to demand them. …That’s something that has to be architected in. (Res_M 
2011) 
Eve Maler, a notable voice in the digital identity, access management and 
computer security industry writes this on her blog in reaction to the CardSpace news: 
The CardSpace model had nice phishing resistance properties that cloud-based identity selectors 
will find hard to replicate, alas. But without wide adoption on the open Web, that wasn’t going to 
make a dent anyway. We’ll have to look for other native-app solutions over time for that.144 
I will revert to this recent development with CardSpace and to the current trends 
regarding possible alternate solutions later on as I address the specific research questions 
applied to digital identity, starting with the first as follows.  
[III.1] - How would Internet end users come to use digital credentials to authenticate 
their identity online? 
With the particularity it has to ship most of the maningful exchanges relating to 
identity mechanisms from the physical world to the el ctronic medium, the Internet may 
present its own and maybe adoption pathways145 or what I also refer to as an 
implementation-adoption trajectory. In effect one may notice an emerging pattern in the 
choices that are being made by Internet businesses and Web service providers in order to 
bring the user to adopt or at least to make use of digital identity technologies that might 
be available. This is so because it is becoming increasingly clear that identity per se does 
                                                 
144 See http://blogs.forrester.com/eve_maler 
145 The term “pathway” applies specifically to adoption, that is, how to make the technology become part of 
individuals’ routines as Internet users. As such, it must be distinguished from its use in my later effort to 
outline scenarios toward the future emergence of possible authoritative identity systems/credentials themselves 
(see section 7.3) 
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not constitute a compelling sales pitch to the user; an identity service must relate to 
something else that is valuable to the user. For the user, an identity technology can only 
have the value that those other things may hold or offe . This may well be a factor in 
what led to Microsoft’s decision above regarding CardSpace. 
Early user-centric technologies such as Info Card are clearly predicated on a user 
that is as fully aware as possible, thus on her autonomy and ability to make informed 
decision. While that pattern of adoption seems to be losing steam at this point, instances 
of it may still be possible in the future (using for example U-Prove). In her blog146 Maler 
further elaborates on her diagnosis of the state of affairs offering some prospective 
thought:  
More significantly, I think neither CardSpace nor its IMI [identity metasystem interoperability] 
protocol have lived up to the “claims-based identity” mantra anyway, being too focused on fixed 
aggregations of claims from a single source. A more productive future path will be the OAuth 
pattern, of which Facebook Connect and Twitter are f miliar examples.  In this pattern, relying 
parties can score user-delegated access directly to each source of truth on a secure back channel, 
and can continue to pull fresh data even after the us r disconnects. 
In effect, the course of events is showing the emergence of a trajectory of 
implementation-adoption that is quite different from the promises of CardSpace. This 
latest trajectory reflects the Facebook-Connect (‘f-connect’) or the OAuth pattern. It 
consists of an implementation that bypasses (the self-aware involvement of) the user – if 
not completely, at least significantly – whether that is specifically the intention or not. 
                                                 
146 http://blogs.forrester.com/eve_maler  
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This is done by automating the communications requir d between servers using back 
channels, that is, by taking the user out of that communication loop. 
It is hard for any attentive observers not to see th  Microsoft’s decision about 
CardSpace, one of the most user-centric instances of digital identity design and 
implementation, against the backdrop of the perceived success of the OAuth pattern 
through the proxy of Facebook-Connect and more generally the business success of 
Facebook and Twitter. One respondent refers to that model as a “Trojan horse for this 
user-centric identity system.” [Res_M, 2011] 
OAuth enables websites to seamlessly share data on the user’s behalf at 
differentiated levels of access depending on the data to be shared and on user choice – at 
least ideally. It enables a smooth data exchange between sites and services on the Web at 
a one-click request of the user without the latter having to take any further action. We 
may experience this protocol with Facebook-Connect (or ‘f-connect’), which is a non-
standard version of the OAuth protocol, designed for data sharing between the social 
network and third-party sites or applications. That protocol is typically used for a totally 
automated access control by either a one-click sign-in to third-party site with one’s 
Facebook account/credentials or by clicking on a spon ored link from within one’s 
Facebook account. Generally, the user is not made aware of what exactly is taking place 
between Facebook servers and the other sites, other than (when accessing a sponsored 
link within own Facebook account) a dialog box that asks the user to confirm whether he 
or she wants to proceed to the external site. At the beginning, very few users might have 
understood the implications of this choice. Today, most probably understand that the 
other site has some level of access to their data, bu  it is not clear they understand exactly 
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what access level (does that include their name, their email address, their pictures, their 
residential location, their visited locations, their whole account history, or only their 
‘likes’ with or without any PII?), whether they can decide that, and how to choose and 
make the system behave in a way that exactly reflects their preference. In the meantime, 
Facebook users are expected to log into their account as human individuals using the 
“anti-pattern”  [Res_B, 2010] authentication procedure based on username and password, 
and not via some software automated procedure or othe  improved (more secure) 
protocols which would be agile enough to capture a wide range of user preferences 
upfront. 
In a nutshell, Internet users may be led to use online digital identity credentials 
seamlessly, basically the same way they have been using the Internet so far, with various 
processes taking place during browsing without the knowledge of the user even if they 
involve her personal data. We all are well too familiar with click-through agreements 
users have to adhere to for online services. Those s -called agreements spell out in 
legalese the terms of services as a full-fledged contract which no one but a lawyer would 
actually understand, let alone the average user. With such practice, if a company comes 
up with an online service that users are massively interested in and the company requires 
the use of a given digital identity system to access the service, chances are a great portion 
of the potential customers of that service will resolve using that identity system. At that 
point, the level afforded to user choice and the protections built in for the user may not be 
the factors determining adoption but the value of the service to be accessed (in the eye of 
the user) and the simplicity of the identification requirements (e.g., one or two clicks, and 
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the rest be left to automated, back-channel communications.) However, that solution 
alone does not make an identity system authoritative as I have defined in this dissertation.      
[III.2] - How would independent third parties come to accept a given digital identity 
technology or credential as a reliable mechanism for authenticating the end user’s 
identity online? 
 In effect, in order to realize the goal of authoritative identity credentials must be 
usable with entities other than their issuer. Here is how a respondent describes the shift 
from a historical context where identity did not require documentation to one where it 
eventually did. 
Um…, if you think about how people have done identity, even before computer existed, uh… You 
know, my grandfather probably didn’t have much in way of identifying documentation, and 
probably didn’t need much. Uh…, you know, most everybody he dealt with had known him his 
whole life, and... You know, he probably had a driver’s license, which was issued by the state, but 
I think people mostly thought of it as a driver’s license; they didn’t really think of it as identity. 
But, you know, somewhere around the middle of the last century, people started more and more to 
deal with people who they hadn’t known for a long time. And, so they looked around and said, 
well… can’t do. It turned out driver’s license was… maybe the most obvious way to start thinking 
about identity. And so the driver’s license, at least in the United States became the de facto 
identity document… In fact most drivers’ license burea s… still vehemently deny that they were 
identity documents. … But nevertheless, that was a very small foundation provided inadvertently 
by the government that allowed a fairly robust and workable system of identity to develop in the 
real world. Online I don’t think there has ever been any organization with sufficient authority or 
ubiquity to serve as that foundational identity system he way that driver’s license did. I think it 
would’ve been nice if somehow we were able to do that but it never did happen and I don’t think it 
ever will at this point. And so people have been searching for twenty or thirty years for ways to 
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essentially bootstrap a trust framework for online identity systems, and… and without something 
like the driver’s license it’s really hard. We may eventually get credentials that are relatively 
strong and backed by an organization with sufficient clout f trust but until that time we are left to 
solve the problem on our own, and people have trieda lot of different things… (Res_M 2011, 
emphasis added) 
It is hard to cite any exception to the fact that other institutions including private business 
have piggybacked government-issued IDs in all countries (see section 7.2.2). Although in 
the countries where formal ID documents were the earliest introduced in history, 
governments clearly designed identification systems ssentially for their own use, those 
artifacts have become everybody else’s way of identfyi g individuals. National ID 
documents, driver’s license and even social security numbers, all have followed that same 
pattern. Why? Because: 1) those tokens are generally fixed and maintain a stable and 
persistent link to the same individual over time, 2) they were established with the 
authority of the law enforcer to whom everybody else in a given society is legally 
accountable. The state is in that sense ubiquitous n the socio-physical world and 
certainly has a clout of authority, if not trust, as f r as discovering the identity of people 
is concerned. Therefore, everybody leverages the identity documents provided by the 
government in order to conduct their transactions. Could that sort of things happen on the 
Internet? 
 The same respondent seems to suggest that this might not be possible with the 
Internet. Raising concerns about the same issue, he mphasizes the trust (and authority) 
requirement for a working solution.  
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I think the systems that we’ve seen spring up over the last, uh…, 5 or 6 years, particularly things 
like Information Cards, which… Microsoft’s said they’r  no longer supporting, provided at least 
the technical framework for those kinds of systems of trust to take hold. You can imagine a world 
where something like Info Card is widely accepted an used by enough organizations with enough 
clout and standing to become, you know, a kind of foundational element for an identity system… 
But absent that, you know, in the world where things like OpenID are the de facto standard, I 
think it’s very hard to get any kind of system of trust that leads to a real link to a person’s identity. 
Certainly the fact that I have a Google account andthat I’ve used that account for twelve years, 
you know, gives that account some standing, but there’s no way to actually link that account to 
me. And so we’re kind of left with more ad hoc scenarios people are gonna continue to develop. 
And frankly we’ve developed business models that don’ epend as much on strong identity as they 
might. You know, every time I log in to my online banking site it frustrates the heck out of me 
because I just know there is a better way than what they’re doing but, you know, it’s just what 
we’re stuck with at this point.”  (Res_M 2011, emphasis added) 
In other words, no technical system has risen up to the authoritative status that may 
constitute virtually a breeding ground for a root credential or for the trust and reliance of 
a significant portion of digital identity stakeholders, whether organizational or individual.  
But beyond the analogy with society in the physical world, are there any other 
possible ways proper to the Internet to achieve the same goal? Maybe. We previously 
saw how technology may help online service providers spare themselves the need for a 
fully self-aware user adoption regarding the identity management component of their 
service. Here on top of technology, business model may possibly be the driving force to 
adoption by other social entities. We have had a glimpse of that with a notable number of 
websites that have sprung up, which display the ‘f-connect’ sign indicating that the user 
can log on to their servers with her Facebook logins (i  one click if they are already 
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logged onto Facebook.) Whether that number of third-party websites is now stagnant, 
decreasing or still increasing in the particular case of Facebook is immaterial. The fact is 
a Web service may reach a point where many other Web sit s or services may find it 
acceptable, even attractive, to accept the former’s identity credentials as a way of 
managing access to their own site or service. One may note that among those third-party 
sites are many that did not previously and may still not require logging in but will 
nevertheless prompt for Facebook logins if for some reasons147 they “think” the user of 
the computer requesting access is a Facebook user. This shows that the existence and 
popularity of platforms such as Facebook may generate new business models and perhaps 
alternate trajectories and opportunities for the emrgence of authoritative identity 
systems.    
Furthermore, it is remarkable that government is atthis point among the first 
movers on the customer side of this technology. This suggests at least that there is a clear 
need and demand for identity technology on the part of the government. Based on the 
history of the passport and its legacy to date, it should not come as a surprise to anyone 
that government is a big consumer of identification ols. While in the context of digital 
technology and networks, government is not the maker of the identity credentials, its 
demand and promotion of these may have, intentionally or not, the same effect that 
government-issued physical identity credentials have historically had. 
If the US government adopts these technologies it’s going to have a major impact on the market 
both because [of its] seal of approval and because US government is a major consumer. [Res_H 
2010]. 
                                                 
147 First of those reasons is that a Facebook account is already open in the same browser on the same 
computer. Potentially some sites may also use cookies to track possible Facebook users and ask for their logins.  
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If government-citizen business use cases take off first, however, business uses will naturally 
piggyback on the emerging identity infrastructures. [Res_I 2011] 
Clearly, it is not only the individual users’ adoption that might be impacted and 
fostered by government early adoption; this might also drive other organizations to rely 
on these identity technologies, which in turn might amplify user adoption.  To the extent 
that it is only a handful number of companies that will be building the digital identity 
infrastructure and systems, end user adoption and business adoption are in this context 
interdependent. If organizations and Web services do not adopt the technologies, 
particularly as relying parties, then users will have very little opportunities to use them, 
unless the vendors of these technologies are also on ine service providers so that they can 
directly enroll their retail customers to use their systems with their (providers’) own 
Websites. This obviously is not a formula for a widespread implementation of the 
technology, although some level of acceptance of the technology might still occur even in 
those conditions.  
Concerning the argument made earlier (section 6.6) about business adoption 
based on the incentive of being relieved of the burden and the risks of managing users’ 
personal data, some organizations may be more receptive than others to the cost 
component. In other words, they might want to be ridden of the costs of storing and 
managing their customers’ personal data, assuming those costs outstrip the revenue they 
may get from trading that data, as most of them do. These organizations may include 
universities, hospitals or government agencies. But what about large commercial entities: 
wouldn’t they want to keep dealing with every aspect of their business related to their 
customers’ personal data and therefore also become identity providers for their own sake 
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and that of their customers? This necessarily is neither a hindrance in itself nor a highly 
unlikely scenario since governments, too, initially provided identity credentials for their 
own sake and specific consumption.  
The fact is that there will not authoritative digital identity systems unless there is 
an infrastructure enabling interoperability between digital identity systems. Just as a form 
of “interoperability” had to be negotiated between governments through policy 
recommendations, interoperability must be negotiated mong private business actors and 
designers through standards. However, one layer that adds more complication to the case 
of interoperable digital identity – which was different from the passport case – is 
competing business interest. While for that reason, me technology solutions may 
emerge as more attractive to the consumers than others depending on a number of 
variables (other than technological ones) such as qu lity of service, variety of services 
and marketing effectiveness, etc., the lack of interop rability is definitely limiting for a 
few number of systems to become authoritative. It shall be noted that interoperability is 
not just a technical (infrastructure) problem but also a business problem as Web services 
will need to agree that they do not all necessarily have to issue credentials and yet accept 
credentials issued by others among them. In such technical and business condition, the 
market may move gradually toward a handful number of m st fitting solutions. In that 
respect, it is important that the initial offering be diverse enough and able to cater for all 
normative preferences and the whole spectrum of user choice. The issue is that nothing 
guarantees that, as not any entity can set up the nec ssary infrastructure to compete. For 
instance, will consumer associations be able to establi h their own TF and enroll a TF 
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provider and other businesses that will be willing to subscribe to the policy requirements 
of such associations? 
In this section I have addressed the specific reseach questions regarding the three 
historical sequences of identity mechanisms. In the following I am going to try and 
complement this picture with a number of scenarios that can be drawn on the insights 
gained so far from studying the three cases.   
7.3 Scenarios and pathways to authoritative digital identity 
In this section propose possible pathways deriving from the holistic and contextual 
understanding of the sociohistorical processes that have led to the emergence of past 
authoritative identity credentials. Those are hypothetical scenarios in that each one 
implies an hypothesis about what might be in the near and medium-term future, as the 
processes to bring about authoritative digital identity credentials evolve. The result is a 
set of five possible pragmatic-logical148 scenarios (which I also call pathways) in 
anticipation of how future identity mechanisms (in this case, a digital one) could emerge 
and become authoritative. There are three categories f scenarios: the first two derive 
each from the two types of credentials investigated from past history, that is, the seal 
(pathway 1 and 1bis) and the passport or government-issued ID (pathways 2 and 3), and 
the third includes projections (pathways 4 and 5) inferred from the identity-related 
change patterns that have been observed through history. All are described as follows. 
                                                 
148 By that I mean scenarios that are logical in that they relate in some rational way to antecedents that are 
defined in time and space – as a consequence, their rationality takes into account the pragmatic circumstances 
of their antecedents. In contrast, these scenarios are not the result of a mathematical combination ran over a 
finite set of entities or variables; they are presented with no claim whatsoever to exhaust all abstract-logically 
possible combination or configuration of any set of variables.   
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Pathway 1: An institution of a large scope149 and with a significant control over 
norm-setting in a social context endorses an existing likely mechanism, backing it 
with its value system, and prescribes the use of said mechanism to represent 
individuals and authenticate their identity in records that are meant to be 
(legally) binding.  
We might consider the following as a variant of that scenario:  
Pathways 1bis: An institution of a large scope, which can exercise influence 
through the technology infrastructure or through rulemaking, co-opts an existing 
likely mechanism (which already appears to be credibl  to most potential 
stakeholders as a reliable identification mechanism), or approves of new ones by 
actually accepting them in its own transactions for the purposes of authenticating 
individuals.  
This scenario is modeled on the example of the western medieval Church providing the 
normative and conceptual basis that justified and reinforced the belief that seals 
represented or signified the identity of their owner and, as such, they were a reliable 
instrument for the authentication of the latter. This scenario still is plausible in any 
updated form. For instance, a public institution that exercises authority through 
rulemaking or a private business entity controlling a significant portion of the Internet 
infrastructure or having a dominant market position in some type of Web services may, 
by adopting a particular digital identity technology, accelerate its rise to authoritative 
identity mechanism. As a matter of fact, it is the first closest scenario to the current 
                                                 
149 By this, I mean an institution whose role and influence in the social setting under consideration goes beyond 
organizational and proprietary boundaries – in other words, with which the public at large has to deal with.   
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developments for digital identity. The US government, law maker and enforcer, has given 
its approval to emerging digital identity technologies with its willingness to adopt them 
for its own transactions with citizens. With such endorsement by the government as early 
adopter, the industry may hope to get a critical mass of customers using those 
technologies so as to make them viable or to render them attractive to other institutions 
and more users.   
Pathway 2: The currently predominant identity authority (issuer of authoritative 
identity credentials) takes the necessary measures to digitally replicate existing 
identity mechanisms which are based on physical credentials and to issue a 
digital form of those credentials or a digital equivalent online. 
This scenario is based on the idea of a rather mechani al replication in digital form (or in 
any other applicable virtual form) of what already exists in physical form. It draws on the 
fact that the most widely recognizable identity authority being a public authority 
institution – particularly the national state with regard to the passport150 – authoritative 
digital identity credentials may just be a digital reproduction of the same mechanisms and 
credentials as designed by the state. Necessary measures shall be taken with regard to the 
technological infrastructure so as to provide at least the same level of security as with 
government-issued physical credentials. This scenario is highly unlikely in the U.S. in 
any foreseeable future due to its clear private sector orientation and the dynamism of its 
information technology market, but it may not be excluded for every country in the word.  
                                                 
150 Plus the national ID card in many places outside the US, and within the US, the individual states for the 
driver’s license. 
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Pathway 3: The cyberspace infrastructure, the digital identity infrastructure, or 
more generally the infrastructure supporting or enabling the type of resource to 
be controlled, is partitioned into domains each under the control of a single 
authority. All such authorities then cooperate towards a common framework of 
rules and procedures for issuing an identity-bound credential that addresses a 
shared concern or need. This enables them to recognize each other’s credential 
issued according to protocols defined by the common framework. That credential 
is then required of the customer in order to access the controlled resource. 
This is based on the passport pattern where authoritative identity is enabled through 
coordination and agreements between authority counterparts among which all the 
resource space available is partitioned. In the casof passports, the protected resource is 
territory of which the access by individuals was regulated through the passport 
requirement. Generalized to any kind of resource controlled by a definite number of 
entities, the latter may follow the template of theprocess that led the governments of the 
world to converge over time toward a common passport framework and policy, which has 
enabled that travel document to become as authoritative s it is.  
The scenario described in Pathway 3 is the second most likely given the current 
trends of digital identity processes, although it requires some more elaboration on their 
current state. If the OITF model works on the long run, from the standpoint of identity-
secured Internet, the Web will stylistically take th  form described in Pathway 3: it will 
be a digital domain partitioned between TFs. Then TFs might negotiate a broader 
framework in order to enable interoperability of their credentials across their boundaries. 
The notion of identity metasystem interoperability makes this even more plausible. 
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However, there is a notable difference as well: the possibility to still browse the Web 
anonymously – or whatever remains of anonymity – inany case without explicit 
identification requirement. 
Pathway 4: Online digital technology becomes the predominant mode for record-
creation, record-keeping and record-retrieving as well as the medium for most 
administrative functions carried out by public authority institutions, chiefly the 
national state administration at present. At that point, the relevant body of the 
highest public institution in a given social setting issues identity-bound digital 
credentials which may then be accepted as digital identity credentials by an 
indefinite number of other entities, by virtue of the fact that that institution’s 
authority supplants these entities’ especially when it comes to rule-making and 
enforcement. 
This is a projection based on the idea that the natio l state had come to issue identity 
documents after it mastered to a high degree the writing technology as a technique of 
administration (bureaucracy). And then the fact thaany other organizations and 
institutions are subject to the national state jurisdiction has contributed to government-
issued identity-bound credentials becoming authoritative identity credentials.  Hence if 
the authority in charge of public affairs in the future comes to do business mostly through 
the computer medium, then it might produce credentials hat may serve or be adopted by 
most of the stakeholders as authoritative identity credentials in that realm. As a 
projection, this scenario is a fiction with regard to the current state of affairs in digital 
identity. 
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Pathway 5: New authorities emerge due to their relevance and critical functions 
in the operation of the Internet and the provision of Web services. In that sense 
their authority will first derive from the fact that they are instrumental for access 
to the global Internet infrastructure and related services and that as such they 
happen to control large bases of user-specific data generally, and users’ personal 
data in particular, due to innovative services that they provide. This may further 
create emerging needs, applications and business models for which those 
providers may act as authoritative sources of identity information. 
This scenario is in a sense an alternate to the previous one, with this time new digital 
authorities emerging. It also is a projection scenario predicated on the prospect that 
electronic data may increasingly become an important p rt of individual and 
organizational assets, enabling further social and business transactions of increasing 
value through computer and communication networks. This will call for assembling and 
maintaining a cyberinfrastructure or data infrastructure that will support those 
transactions as well as future innovative and trusted ervices. Then new authorities may 
emerge due to their prominent role in enabling the data infrastructure. Their authority will 
be based at least on the d facto relationship that their operation or control of the 
infrastructure creates with the user, possibly supplemented by further mechanism in order 
to enhance the user’s confidence and the level of assur nce with regard to the 
representation of personal identity. 
 While the scenario in Pathway 5 is as fictitious as the one in Pathway 4, it might 
be more plausible or likely than the latter. Pathway 4 is a projection that still looks 
backward in that it basically transposes a past model into a future context, while Pathway 
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5 is forward-looking, as it makes allowance for further innovations and for the emergence 
of new types of actors and authority.  
At this point in the dissertation, I have addressed all the research questions 
formulated in chapters 1 and 3: the general research question as applied to the three 
historical sequences investigated as well as the two specific research questions for each 
one of the three cases. For this last section of this last chapter before concluding the 
dissertation, I seek to offer in more abstract terms an explanatory formulation of the 
mechanisms-processes that have been previously described in more time-space 
contextual and specific terms. In outlining this hitory-based causal explanation, my 
intention is to fulfill the commitment I articulated in chapter 3 (section 3.3) with regard to 
scholarship in sociohistorical inquiry. 
7.4 Mechanism-process explanation 
In this section, I will abstract from the previous narratives elements of explanatory 
relevance and reconstitute an explanatory discourse of the mechanisms-processes at work 
in the historical events that unfolded as part of the phenomena this dissertation has 
investigated. I first address the use of medieval se s under the rule of the Church, 
identity documents under the rule of the national st te and digital identity in an era of 
competing private actors. 
7.4.1 Seals and the rule of the Church 
Past the first millennium in Western Europe, the size of the population still was rather 
small. People lived in relatively stable settlements and by a community lifestyle built on 
personal ties and allegiances implying direct contacts with, and interpersonal knowledge 
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of, one another. Most traveled very little, and only short distances when they did. The 
serfdom regime at the time might have created situations that sometimes pushed people 
to move in search of a new settlement with better conditions of land tenure. However, 
they wouldn’t move to faraway distances even by 19th century’s standards. Most were 
exposed either to regular interactions with the Churc , which was a “transnational”151 and 
ubiquitous institution, or at least to the gaze of its authority as long as they lived a regular 
life. In all of those conditions, the Church had no need for assigning identity credentials 
to people for them to carry around.  
Furthermore, most transactions between people might have customarily been 
conducted face to face, in any case orally, as one would expect before writing and 
literacy was popularized. Even the Church could have contented itself with oral promises 
and commitments, based on the fact that people were always within its reach and 
potentially under its command, even if the risk that t ey may sometimes default is not nil. 
So why record and seal?  
1. Recording transactions: Why? 
The drive to write in general, and particularly to record transactions or 
commitments, is a response to the challenge time and distance pose to human endeavors, 
in other words, a means for managing time and distance, especially by institutions. First, 
the technology of writing with its capability for record creation enhances the human 
notion and experience of time through an objective and artificial memory. What could 
have been only said orally, and thus would have becom  completely elusive once uttered, 
                                                 
151 Here ‘transnational’ means literally across nations in the sense of peoples, and not across national state 
borders, as that kind of state did not exist then. 
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can now be consigned in writing and referred to in the future with much higher 
confidence in its accuracy as opposed to oral reporting. Writing contracts or abridges the 
time; it brings back to the present a time that is long gone.  
Secondly, writing quickly proved to be an arm to domesticate distance, a tool to 
resolve or at least contain the challenges posed by spatial extension. It has made it 
possible to communicate at distance by one’s own words. Writing can carry the “voice,” 
the speech or language of a person or entity to a physical location which that person or 
entity is otherwise far from. Appending his seal to written words, a 12th century 
gentleman or clergyman could practically delegate himself to a meeting without being 
physically present (of course with the limitations that he could not respond to follow-up 
interactions at the place and time where his speech was meant to be delivered.)  
As for the reasons why the Church recorded transactions, there are two salient 
factors to take into consideration in a possible explanation (apart from the fact that the 
technology of writing itself was already available th n.) First is the gravity in which the 
Church held perjury and any failure to honor debts or contractual obligations. In that 
context, it could only be useful to reinforce the oral commitment with a consigned and 
(presumably) faithful memory of it through an accurate transcription in order to limit the 
opportunities for, and to deter against, blatant repudiation of commitments, which 
repudiation might have likely been all the more tempting that the stake in the transaction 
was high.  
Second and maybe most importantly, the Church then was already a large and 
formal institution. It did not limit itself to the diocese and its local priest who de facto 
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was part of the community and, as such, participated in the personal connections and 
inter-knowledge that link every member of the community to other members. The Church 
was a large organization, the head and lungs of which were in Rome. As we saw in 
chapter 4 the wealth of the Church including estate tr nsactions and payments of any 
taxes related to its business were under the control of Rome. Writing down transactions 
was also a way to overcome or control the distance between the center and the periphery, 
between Rome and the diocese. It enabled or made it easier for Rome to claim the wealth 
of the corporate Church without depending on the contingencies of the relationship of a 
priest with members of the community he served – which could have been otherwise a 
comparative advantage for the local clergy relatively to an emissary or a collector sent 
from Rome. Arguably, we begin to see emerging here the feature shared by large 
administrative institutions which as such cannot sustain dealing with their constituents 
based on personal ties but have to develop alternate, impersonal mechanisms (such as a 
record system as an instrument of bureaucracy) in order to handle and sustain the 
business of their large and growing base of customers or patrons. In other words, the 
practice of recording transactions of all sorts which the institution engaged in was one of 
the mechanisms that facilitated the scaling of burea cratic action and the permanence of 
the institution through the permanence of its recorded transactions with its customers as 
well as of their outcomes.   
2. Binding persons to records: identity as a technique (Why seal?) 
In this historical context, people were largely identified based on their community 
ties and locale reputation. Literacy and the use of written artifacts were limited. The 
scope of individuals’ agency was closely tied to their physical or geographical situation. 
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As a result, there was no requirement for documented id ntity credentials, nor was there 
the need upfront for institutions to collect personal data that may have been used for 
identifying individuals (although the Church might have had records about people 
regarding their religious practices such as baptism and confession.) Then the primary 
objective of using seals was not for a party with no prior interaction with a person to be 
able to discover or ascertain who that person is according to an identity scheme designed 
and documented by some authority. Rather, the main objective was to secure parties’ 
relevant commitments and other expressions of will through formal and reliable records 
and, in the process, also to ascertain the consequences of those commitments and 
expressions by enabling proper attribution and thuscompelling accountability. 
Understandably, the primary practical concern of the C urch was to ensure the security of 
transactions involving property rights as well as other contractual obligations. Therefore 
the first challenge to resolve was how to make surecommitments made with the declared 
intention to fulfill them remained binding in the future to the extent applicable and vis-à-
vis the organized Church as a whole.  In that sense, the seal was not much an instrument 
for proving an embodied identity as an end in itself, as much as it was for manifesting, 
asserting, committing or binding identity as personhood (in the medieval language) of the 
seal owner or more precisely the sealer in every use instance whereby the sealer is the 
enunciating subject, the source of some speech. 
More than anything else, the seal was an instrument of agency. It was a response 
to the following question: “How to be present outside the visible body? How does one 
represent oneself at distance, in absentia, but with the full force of one’s presence?” It 
was a token of identity conceived of as a replica of the self and meant to engage or bind 
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the personhood of the sealer. And as such, it could carry out on behalf of the individual a 
mediated but direct discourse as well as be the vehicle through which the individual can 
delegate some of his or her performing capacity to documents, a vehicle which links the 
individual to the written expression of his or her will. The seal also was the self-
messenger, a self-token that performed as a messenger.  
While the Church was instrumental as authority in the formal and institutional 
relevance of seals for the society at large, the first characteristic about the 
authoritativeness of seals was not due to the prescription of an external authority but to 
the strength of the link it was able to establish between artifacts and a human source of 
speech, decision, commitment and action expressed in those artifacts. The 
authoritativeness primarily resided in the conditions and the efficacy of that linking. Any 
intervention of an external authority was only relevant to the extent that, on top of 
anything else, it supported, upheld or reinforced those conditions – as did the Church 
through its own narrative.   
The medieval moment in this investigation represents the first logical response (or 
step in the response) to the mediated identity challenge in any new form of record 
medium, that is, identity as a technique of binding persons to records in that new form of 
medium. In this case, identity itself is not yet a document – at least, not a uniformly 
defined document by design as we will come to know it in a later period – but a notion 
which is enabled through a cultural object. For now, identity is a material sign, a token 
materializing and meant to signify the presence of its referent, which is affixed to the 
document in lieu of said referent itself. As such, the seal was a necessary component in 
the makeup of certain categories of documents, particularly documents that required 
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commitment from any entities or individuals, hence depending on a secure and reliable 
(i.e., on an authenticating) representation of their p rson.  
Once a mechanism for binding people to records was figured out, this form of 
identity mainly needed to be asserted wherever the participation or commitment of the 
seal owner was specifically to be conveyed through written records, following the 
appropriate procedure required to that effect. The show or assertion of identity by means 
of seals occurred by replicating in some material form (e.g., waxen imprint) the original 
token representing the individual (seal-matrix) and, as need be, placing such replica 
within another material (the record to be sealed) which had its own form and purpose, i.e. 
another artifact designed to accomplish something else than demonstrating identity per 
se.  
Verification of identity could occur afterwards in a process of auditing the 
records, for example in order to confirm the actual involvement of the parties when new 
claims arose. The seal image (made of symbols and emblems) which constituted the 
operational category of seals as far as identity was concerned, displays an iconographic 
system that was partly the result and the reflection of a social order and partly the result 
of private and somewhat contingent choices (otherwise all people of the same social 
status and/or professional group would have had the same seal image.) As a consequence, 
identity could not be verified based on the accuracy of the seal image, meaning whether 
that image exactly “portrayed” its subject referent. Such notion was not much relevant in 
this context – which is not to say that those embles and symbols had no precise cultural 
significance in relation to the referent subject. As I stated before, recognizability of seals 
(that is, of seal images) and subsequently their proper attribution to a source was 
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predicated on their reputability in the social context of use, notably with the target public 
or the recipients of the sealed artifacts.152 However, when challenges occurred regarding 
the authenticity of the sealed act vis-à-vis the transacting parties, the image of the seal 
was not by itself good enough a probative device enabli g to quell any doubt or dispute 
about who the referent subject actually was (and subsequently who exactly was to be 
ascribed which obligations). In such cases, one referr d back to relationships and 
commitments in the actual world outside the sealed documents, as well as to the social 
capital and reputation of the parties involved. 
To the extent enabled by our historical investigation, I have explained above the 
workings of medieval seals and sealing. Now let us turn to the modern means devised by 
the national state to establish and authenticate identity. It is a process explanation that 
will take us through different phases and the way they interrelate to constitute a 
compelling explanation of the conditions of emergence as well as the mode of operation 
of those credentials.  
7.4.2 Identity documents and the rule of the State 
In an era where writing and written records have become the central tools of public 
management and state bureaucracy while the population has grown in literacy, passports 
and identity cards respond to the emerging basic need for the state to control territory as 
well as people living in and moving across that territory. I provide here an explanation 
regarding the mechanisms that resulted in and charaterized the state need to document 
                                                 
152 Referring specifically to the authentic seal, Bedos-Rezak writes: “By the thirteenth century, when jurists 
attempted to provide the authentic seal with a broader sociopolitical conception, they insisted that for a seal to 
function as an authenticating device, it must be well known. … they recognized that the meanings and agency 
of seals depended on local custom.” (2000: 1514) 
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people’s identity. I also pinpoint factors that make up the mechanism of government-
issued identity credentials. 
1. Emergence of the state’s need to identify people 
Three factors stand out in the shaping of the identfica ion rationale of the state. They 
include the need to control a territory, progress in the means of transportation and 
increased scope of mobility as well as the growing social role of the state. All three 
produce a demand driven by the state need to control people. 
i) Territorialization of the state 
Following the end of the medieval regimes of political rule the modern state 
becomes the central sociopolitical authority characterized by ideally well delineated and 
codified territorial limits. That work of codification historically began with the peace 
treaties of Westphalia in the 17th century. The Westphalian principle of sovereignty 
entails that political authority is rooted in territo y and that the world is partitioned into 
national states equal in sovereignty (thus the second principle of non-interference in 
domestic affairs by non-national agents). The people living in a territory thus delineated 
are supposed to form a nation (regardless of how culturally diverse they are) and the state 
jurisdiction scope is meant to extend to the confines of such nation’s boundaries as well 
as of the state territorial borders. Beyond those limits another state takes over with the 
same prerogatives, resulting in a series of concurrent and contiguous national 
jurisdictions.  
ii)  Transportation infrastructures and population mobility 
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In the late Middle Ages, trade-based growth enabled towns to multiply and to 
assert their autonomy vis-à-vis medieval structures of authority and allegiance. In the 
same time the development of trade and the bases of mercantilism also drove the 
development of transportation infrastructures over th  second millennium of this era, 
which has progressively increased the mobility of people and goods. With the continuous 
improvement of transportation means, capacity and performance, more and more people 
traveled farther and farther, crossing the space of different sovereigns and multiple 
jurisdictions. By the modern times, the increasing mobility of people projected the topic 
of immigration on the public policy agenda, leading policymakers to thrive to appropriate 
the concept and define the boundaries of nationality. In addition these development 
regarding transportation and mobility added their fair share of growing security concerns 
just a few decades away from a half-century of two of the largest wars between national 
states. A particularly marked progress in air transportation during the 20th century has 
only accelerated that trend, dramatically increasing the flow, speed and reach of 
international migration and transit, just as it raised the state security concerns. It was 
already clear that by itself one state had no viable mechanism for keeping under control 
the growing ranks of migrants and other travelers, b inging government focus, after the 
boundaries of nationality were clearly defined, to the need to collectively regulate 
corresponding territorial borders and access as well.  
iii)  People, rights and the social dimension of the state 
Concurrently to trade growth the population also grew emarkably throughout late 
medieval centuries, presumably because the economic growth led to an improvement in 
living conditions. By the time the modern state appeared to be viable, the social 
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configuration of local communities began to change under considerable demographic 
pressures as well as stress from the emerging state institutions and their power to effect 
social changes. The improvements in the transportati n sector did not only increase 
international transit but did domestic mobility too, which also was a concern to 
authorities in a period where the national state was still young and its national identity or 
cohesion fragile. In other words, at a time when strangers coming and going was not an 
ordinary fact or a salient feature of everyday social life, the sudden arrival of unfamiliar 
faces on a local scene, regardless of whether they hailed from another national/domestic 
location or from a foreign country, could equally arouse the suspicions of law 
enforcement. Furthermore, increasing mobility compounded with the increase in the 
population size of city dwellers brought about more and more anonymity among local 
inhabitants. In the same time, the role of the modern state in shaping the society through a 
number of policy instruments grew larger. As it turned out, the modern state, which was 
born on democratic promises, proved to be a consequential social player taking on the 
form of welfare state, as it not only created obligations but it also assigned rights. It then 
becomes a necessity for the state to know the people within its jurisdiction as its 
interactions with them multiplied. 
2. Rationale for authoritative credentials 
The partitioning of the world space into territories of exclusive sovereignty 
exercised by the state, plus the ability of the state to make and enforce the rules of law 
(rules of the highest force/authority and the largest scope applicable to all inhabitants in a 
state territory) are determinant factors that both put the state in need to control people as 
well as territory and put the lower-authority entities within the national jurisdiction in 
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such position as to depend on identity credentials issued by the national state, particularly 
the ones designed for domestic use. One should note that in situations where the national 
state is a federal system like the United States and where the principle of subsidiarity 
defers law- and policy-making authority to the membr states in relevant areas of 
competence, what I just described about the national state in general then applies to the 
individual states in those issue areas, safe the exercise of national sovereignty. In other 
words, in the US where there is no national ID card an  where the state is the authority 
issuing an identity-bound credential (i.e., the drive ’s license), such credential will tend to 
be relied on as authoritative identity credential by all other stakeholders, just like the 
national ID card in places where available.  
In fact, any credential issued by the state – natiol r otherwise – which includes 
enough information in order to enable the legal identification of its bearer is or will 
inevitably become an identity credential with potentially the largest scope and of the 
highest authoritativeness within that national or state territory. Otherwise stated, any 
identity-bound credential issued by the national stte, or whenever applicable by a 
member state in a federal system, tends to become an authoritative identity credential 
usable by all stakeholders who are subject to the jurisdiction of such state. 
For instance, while from the outset the primary goal behind the notion of passport 
was to control people’s movement (therefore applicab e only to the minority that could 
afford traveling long distances then) as opposed to es ablishing their identity per se, it has 
logically and inevitably become an identity credential, even if it is a requirement only for 
one purpose. To the extent that as a travel document th  passport included the description 
and details of every single individual it applied to (even in the case of family passport as 
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was initially the custom), and more importantly, to the extent that a passport eventually 
became a credential exclusively granted to a single i dividual at a time, it inevitably is an 
identity credential at least as much as a national identity card could be wherever 
available. Another example is the driver’s license, particularly in the case of the US, 
which I have not examined in this thesis. The driver’s license was most probably not 
designed to prove identity but as a credential for the lawful capacity to drive. It has 
inevitably morphed however into an authoritative idntity credential pure and simple, in 
the issuing state and sometimes beyond it but within the boundaries of the national state. 
3. Making a document out of a person, and an identity out of a document 
As we saw earlier, the control of a territory deemed national has become a 
defining component and the central concern of the dominant authority that is the national 
state. However, a territory cannot be controlled if there is no way whatsoever to control 
the people living in and using as well as the peopl who might enter that territory. With 
remarkable developments in transportation and the continuously improving access to 
traveling, it also becomes increasingly challenging to carry out and maintain an effective 
control of population movements. In effect, the marked progress of transportations only 
magnified both population’s mobility and subsequent anonymity in growing cities, 
making the identification of people a problem at a larger scale than in previous eras. 
Documenting the identity of citizens is an important way for enabling such control. With 
state-issued identity documents such as the passport and the national identity card, 
identity is now meant for control and to be controlled, as an end in itself. Authentication 
takes up a new meaning: verify or match up an identty that is already documented by the 
authority with its source, i.e. the identity subject. 
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The process whereby identity directly takes the form f a document amplifies 
with the modern state and its institutional drive to control territory and people. Physical 
individuals are verbally “translated” into documents and hence become documented 
identities as well as identity documents.153  Because the purpose of these documents 
inherently is to achieve identification, and to that effect identity has beforehand been 
established and documented to the extent necessary, the utility of this form of identity is 
tightly linked to its verifiability as an end in itself, which requires accuracy in its content 
as well as in its mapping to its referent. This has to rely on a referencing technique or 
method that is stable and objective enough in order to nsure concurrence and 
consistency in verification outcomes (between several verifying agents or by the same 
agent at different times). Examples of such technique include standardized description of 
bodily features and marks, objective measurements (a thropometry and dactyloscopy), 
mechanized representation (photography), etc. The show of identity by means of this 
credential is made by exhibiting the document that it is, simultaneously with the 
“measured body” – first at the verifying gaze of human law enforcement agents and 
possibly other interested third parties, and nowadays at the gaze of a technological 
apparatus (e.g., scanners connected to computer databases.) 
4. Nationality: a framing attribute (people, rights and obligations) 
The drive for identification and control is reinforced by the state social role by 
means of regulations entailing the allocation of rights/privileges as well as obligations. 
The rise of the welfare state is an ultimate consequence of what I have termed the 
                                                 
153 Despite a rough start regarding the correspondence between humans and documents, this is even truer 
today with biometrics embedded in identity documents. 
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naturalization of the state, that is, its identificat on or assimilation not only with a 
territory but most importantly with a people, a nation. In that context of rising welfare 
state, the increasing mobility of people and the fluidity of population movements in 
general consolidated the need and the rationale for the state to develop schemes in order 
to identify people. Linking effectively a people and a state, as per the ambition at the core 
of the nation-state building project, requires more than a decree; it requires actual practice 
and experience realized through interactions between th  people and the state apparatus. 
This leads the state to create frameworks, incentivs  and opportunities for these 
interactions to take place, all of which in turn become also as many occasions for the 
state to assert its authority. 
In order to manage the allocation of those rights/privileges and obligations, the 
state crafted a framing attribute to define a relationship posited as natural between its lf 
and a category of people. The term ‘nationality’ legally re-conceptualized appeared in the 
19th century to be opportune and fit for capturing and characterizing that naturalizing 
connection between the state and people who are deemed to belong to the state land. 
Nationality proved to be the single one category capable of serving both to sort out the 
people who, due to the location of the place they can call home, may one way or the other 
lay claim at least on parts of that very territory which the state means to control, and to 
regulate future claims particularly for access as well as other rights and privileges related 
to the same territory. As a consequence, nationality is not just a simple attribute like 
another. Rather, it frames the possible relevance, scope and meaning of other attributes 
and can enable further attributes, particularly in relation to rights and privileges granted 
by the state. The concept of nationality allows at a minimum the state to define and 
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categorize the people it might want to command by the very fact that they live or may 
aspire to live in its territory (with the expectation that the rest of the people not living 
there will be under the command of another peer authority); it frames the actual or 
potential relationship of any individuals to the space the state claims and strives to 
control.  
Nationality has become a core identity attribute as more and more rights – ones 
which only the state can provide, guarantee or enforce – become tied to it and more and 
more claims become dependent upon it, as the welfare utility of the state has kept 
growing larger and larger over time to the benefit of the national membership under its 
rule. It has then become increasingly necessary to dis inguish who does, from who does 
not, belong within the boundaries of nationality, which could not – and can even less in 
this global age – be done at a glance. Therefore individuals’ national identity has to be 
documented, and the ability to move across (not just physical territorial borders but also) 
those national boundaries protected, on a continuous basis if it were at least to be used to 
support or to deny any claims based directly or indirectly on nationality. 
5. Rationale of adoption patterns 
I have observed mainly two different patterns in the process towards ownership or 
acceptance of government-issued identity credentials by stakeholders, particularly the 
individual identity subjects. As I already clarified, at individuals’ level passport is a 
mandate for the purpose of travelling in areas where, as is the case for a given country in 
relation to most of the other countries around the world, there are no bilateral or regional 
arrangements to waive the passport requirement involvi g the country of issuance. A 
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corollary of this is that adoption was primarily a question for the state to deal with, not 
the individual. In this case, government is both provider and adopter. In fact, the 
government even drove the demand of the passport, and as a result adoption was not 
really an issue, only the harmonization of related practices. That harmonization occurred 
through the same three-prong approach referred to earlier on (section 7.2.2), which 
includes government convergence on passport requirement policy, common format 
specifications and readiness to supply to own citizens at an affordable cost. The first two 
elements required an international process while the last one was a decision for 
governments to make individually. The international process unfolded over time through 
cycles of proposed resolutions followed by feedback from individual states and by 
incremental efforts to agree on core principles (e.g., affordability, improving access to 
passport service, etc.) and to adjust to material specifications. In any case after WWI and 
since then, no government has been on record for contesting the utility of passports.  
As shown by the French case for domestic identity schemes, their emergence and 
acceptance reveal quite a different pattern. Due to the government’s security concerns 
generally at the origin of identity schemes (passport  as well as ID cards,) the process of 
going from the state (condition) of non-identified to the state of identified individuals 
starts off on a negative motive, at least from the standpoint of the identity subjects, and 
then proceeds through less negative to a more positive one.154 The state identification 
project first targets the “bad guys,” it means to reveal or expose the human vectors of ills 
which the good society or the honest people need to be protected from. It firstly applies to 
the “other” – the criminal, delinquent, illegal alien, etc. – starting particularly with those 
                                                 
154 This is one possible pathway to implementation-adoption; mandate could be another one just like for the 
passport. 
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already having a police record (recidivists). At a second stage, it includes populations that 
present in the eye of the government some risks of feeding or falling into the first target 
category, that is, foreign vagrants and then all foreigners. Lastly, it is extended to all 
people, including the honest citizens and nationals, first as a supported option and finally 
as a requirement or an expectation for all.155 Overall, the process first consists of securing 
the buy-in of the majority of its constituents, or perhaps simply the portion the state 
considers the most valuable (nationals and law-abiding citizens) by claiming that the goal 
of identity policies is to protect them against thedangers posed by foreigners as well as 
alleged or potential offenders and criminals. Then the process catches up on the rest of 
the population, nationals and law-abiding citizens included. At that point, the predicated 
national identity now becomes an established and important element of the affirmation 
and recognition of self-identity. In social context and terms, that affirmation and 
recognition operate on the basis of a meaningful relationship individuals experience with 
the social collective materialized by the state institutions. The latter provide plenty of 
opportunities to self-identify through the lens of national identity and by means of a state-
provided credential which is also a proof of the individual’s membership of that 
collective.  
The above mentioned difference in (domestic vs. international) pattern of 
emergence and acceptance can be explained as follows. In a given space it is more 
                                                 
155 This is the same pattern the UK government has decided to follow for its national identity scheme, starting 
with foreign nationals, then with workers on security-sensitive jobs such airports, and then incentives may be 
put in place for voluntary take-up by nationals. “They [opponents] accuse the government of incrementally 
chipping away at opposition by slowly bringing everyone in to the register over a decade, without having to win 
a debate over its actual merits. People with the least power to complain are being used as "guinea pigs" for an 
untried and controversial system.” 
(See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7634744.stm) 
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challenging to implement control over people who alre dy live in that space, than it is 
towards people from outside when they move into that sp ce, assuming that the latter are 
in much lesser number than the former and that the boundaries of the said space can be 
reasonably well monitored by the entity that seeks to control who is/comes in that space. 
Most people regularly living in a territory before the implementation of any such control 
measures would tend to think of themselves as “naturals” of that land (especially if their 
ancestry in that place runs several generations back) and new control measures would 
appear to them to be “foreign” and obtrusive. On the other hand if the territory is already 
under the domination of some authority that has the resources to monitor compliance 
with its rules and control people before they step in, then it is more feasible to ensure that 
those people comply (particularly with the conditions set forth by said authority as a 
prerequisite before they can get in). In that sense, it is normal that the passport 
implementation is completely a top-down process, while something like a national ID 
will be more complex and take more time to fully implement and be adopted at home.    
Overall, we can infer from this investigation that the following factors have been 
determinant in enabling the acceptance of government-issued identity documents by any 
other counterparts whom citizens may be involved in i e tity transactions with: 
a) The state or government is the law enforcer and therefore the identity 
recognized by the state (and used by the state itself to nforce the law and citizens 
accountability) is expected to provide reasonable security in ensuring that the bearer can 
be tracked down and held accountable if need be (which would be of primary interest to 
any third party relying on it for any significant transaction.) 
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b) The state in its various manifestations is the one entity that has the basic 
and most common identity information of the largest portion of the national population 
from the earliest time in their life and over the longest period of time. Hence and in 
combination with the preceding point, the state is the most likely to have the most 
complete and current information156 relevant for legal accountability including the record 
of any serious offenses (the awareness of which may be of interest to a number of 
potential relying third parties.)  
c) As the operative hand of the state commanding the national jurisdiction, 
the government is in a better position for issuing identity credentials that will be 
applicable across a wide variety of domains and contexts all operating under the same 
national state jurisdiction, in comparison to any other credential issued by any one 
particular of all the other institutions in that jurisdiction. By issuing official identity 
credentials to its nationals, the state puts itself in position of practically vouching for all 
of them to any entity that recognizes the state jurisdiction. As a consequence, to the 
public in general (including all stakeholders) the state is a universal default reference for 
individual identity. 
d) For a credential that requires recognition by other id ntity authorities as 
equal players, such as the passport, coordination towards consensus on common 
guidelines and procedures eventually leads to a result that is accepted by all parties to the 
                                                 
156 The situation might be more complex with the federal government in the US due to a regime of personal 
information privacy that leaves a lot of leeway to the private sector (amplified by several order of magnitude 
with the advent of the Internet) while being more prohibitive to the federal government. However, one may 
also note that federal law enforcement agencies are more and more using shadowy practices of online 
surveillance and data mining afforded by the Internet, e.g. social networks or the Internet domain name 
database WHOIS (on the latter, see Mueller and Chango 2008). In the end, this argument may still apply to the 
amount of reliable information detained by all public authority offices combined, from the local police to the 
Department of Motor Vehicles to the administration of entitlements programs to the federal law enforcement 
agencies. 
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process. Governments accept the passport issued by another government because they 
have agreed to have equal sovereignty de jure and they have participated in setting, or 
have approved of, the passport policy, procedures and requirements, which the other 
government has also accepted to abide by (and vice-versa). 
• Representing people’s identity within record artifacts 
In the era of writing on paper, from handwriting with the earlier forms of paper-
like surfaces to the print and typing techniques with flat and thin paper, we have seen two 
main mechanisms of authoritative identification. At first, the identity issue was just about 
being able to represent human individuals in specific instances within written records. 
The medieval West responded by putting in place an apparatus of specialized personnel 
to constitute in due form the record of commitments made by individuals and, by 
subsequent necessity, to fashion a binding representatio  of such individuals. This is a 
mechanism that responds to the need to control the information generated by individuals 
in a new medium,157 in the sense of having control over the value and use of that 
information, particularly whereby that information commits the said individuals. It is a 
situated need and response related to identity. In the historical case of medieval seals 
investigated in this thesis, it was driven by an important increase in high value 
transactions between parties. Those transactions involved a large and distributed 
institution that had mastery in the manipulation and control of that type of materials and 
surrounding practices. More than the seal in isolation, it was instances of its use based on 
fundamental beliefs (themselves grounded in religious doctrines) and specific protocols 
                                                 
157 What I mean by new medium, in a generic sense, is not necessarily a new technology. Written contracts may 
have once qualified as a new medium in a given sociohistorical setting while writing was nothing new in itself.   
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which produced authoritative identity. In addition t  the specialized personnel mentioned 
above, the general protocol included the layout of the page, written signs and formulas as 
well as witnesses.  
Authoritative identity by medieval seals was generated as part of a document of 
its own kind: a charter, a diploma or a deed. It was the identity of a signatory of such 
document. Once produced, it was generally stored away and was not expected to be 
carried around as a piece of evidence for proving one’s identity. While this is a distinctive 
feature of identity-seal in relation to later identity credentials, I nevertheless note that it is 
one particular manifestation of a common underlying pattern shared by all identity 
mechanisms: the need to create such mechanisms is always caused by a condition of 
cleavage, difference, gap, break or departure from a base or initial conditions of full 
presence and perfect (because unmediated) knowledge of th  subjects to be identified. 
The need to use seals to authenticate identity only aroused when and because people 
needed to be made or to make themselves “present” – to be presented – in places where 
they actually were not present. In that sense, sealing enabled a form of mobility, a virtual 
mobility applicable not to the embodied individual but to the sealed artifact, the 
possibility to extend (a form of) oneself from oneself, from one’s embodiment. It appears 
that the signed and sealed document was not self-sufficient in itself for the authentication 
of its signatory. Even used in private correspondence, the seal token relies on memory, if 
only under the guise of some level of prior knowledg  related to features such as the 
symbolism of the seal or the style of the writer or other distinctive marks. But even more 
importantly, sealed deeds draw their capability to authenticate their signatory’s identity 
from the memory of that which links the seal used to the seal owner as well as from the 
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memory of the actual act, that is, the foundational moment of (performing the ceremony 
of) signing and sealing the document – that moment when the signatories were bodily 
present, expressed certain will and such expression was witnessed and recorded. Seals 
and other related marks were devices to keep the signatories “present” in some form 
within the document thus produced, next to the written words that recorded the 
signatories’ expressed will. That ‘capacity-of-making-present’ enabled such expression 
of will, and the commitment it may generate, to be retained and re-actualized every time 
the deed could be exhibited and for as long as its validity was still current.  
• Representing people’s identity by record artifacts 
When the development of transportation means and infrastructures critically 
changed the population’s patterns of mobility, the nature of the need for identity 
representation also changed. Now the identity challenge came from the increasing 
mobility of actual people, that is, of human bodies. It became a different situation 
altogether when the identity issue turned to be one that referred to people with increased 
capacity to move across locations and many jurisdictions away from their community – 
as opposed to people simply projecting their will in time and space but under the same 
jurisdiction and even within the same physical and cultural setting. Now the focus, as it 
turned out, was on being able to know a minimum about an otherwise perfect stranger 
who at any time could anonymously show up in a new location. Identity then needed to 
be proved with regard to the embodied individual and thus, to be documented 
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beforehand. In this context of human mobility, an identity credential was also meant to 
bear witness of the provenance or origin of its holder.158 
In order to expect now increasingly mobile individuals to be ready to prove their 
identity upon request and wherever, such identity needed to be made portable so that they 
can carry it with themselves as they move around. It shall be noted that none of those two 
things – provability as an end in itself and portability – was required with sealing written 
records even though seals were portable. This trend did not start with the modern state, 
however. It was already in motion from the late Middle Ages as soon as lists of names 
were being established in order to control nomads, vagrants and other loose groups of 
people. This mode of identity is recognizable whenev r the purpose of identity is thought 
of in such a way that it can be exhausted with this one question: ‘Who are you?’ and the 
expectation that the answer come not directly from y u (who are a stranger and may not 
be trusted) but from statements by a (trusted or atleast recognizable) third-party about 
you. This mode of identity has only been dramatically improved by state bureaucracy, if 
only by giving it a standard material form. Its utility is significantly enhanced by its 
standard form as well as by its portability.  
7.4.3 Perspectives on digital credentials 
At this point in history, the development of digital identity capabilities responds 
to the need to represent people within record artifacts, as I have characterized above with 
                                                 
158 We may also want to recall here the diplomatic correspondence dimension of the passport – echoing the old 
royal letter of introduction granted to envoys and diplomats, etc. – whereby the authorities of a country request 
the authorities of another country to provide protection to a country fellow citizen traveling to their land. See 
Robertson (2010)  
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regard to seals. Computer technology has brought about a new way to create records, a 
new form of records.   
Within physical communities, people are known by other people at various 
degrees. They are related to some by family or household, by friendship or neighborhood, 
by acquaintanceship or work relationship, etc. They are integrated in the community 
through all those relationships that implicitly or explicitly vouch for them (in small 
communities, that vouching may not even be needed, as everybody knows everybody.) 
But as communities grow larger and larger and their boundaries become more porous and 
less defined, the need to document identity becomes more apparent – at least identity 
ceases to be readily available knowledge and requirs to be authenticated by some 
procedure, if it were to be treated with assurance.  
Now, that trend is taken to yet another level when w  leave the geophysical world 
inhabited by embodied individuals for a world of artif cts. Human beings are not actually 
present in artifacts, only signs are. In the world f artifacts, meaning comes from signs 
(words and nonverbal signs alike). Thus in the world f artifacts – i.e. records in this case 
relating to written artifacts – the question is how t  use signs to represent identity and 
how to use signs to make that representation reliabl . The two past-historical cases that I 
have investigated show that signs and artifacts need the mediation of authority to perform 
those tasks. In one case the operator of that authority is faith and in the other it is the 
force of the state (which is no other than the social entity that has successfully claimed 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, according to Weber.) What about the digital 
case? Where will digital signs derive their authority, their capacity to make identity and 
to make it reliable? If we retain the totality of our historical experience as source for our 
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potential hypotheses, we will have to answer: faith or legal mandate. But what do our 
contemporary observations suggest? 
From the development of digital identity processes o far, it appears that a legal 
requirement for individuals to use any given digital identity mechanism is highly unlikely 
in the US. That is because first of all, even in the p ysical world the idea of requiring US 
citizens to hold a federal government-defined ID159 for certain procedures has appeared in 
policy-making only over the last decade and has not been successfully implemented due 
to a long tradition of zero-ID requirement from government (and therefore less tolerance 
for government IDs). Secondly, digital identity is a private business sector in an emerging 
and competing Internet-based market, and as such, the government would be hard-
pressed to regulate it, let alone to impose any particular solution or even a set of solutions 
by law to Internet users. 
On the other hand, we know that the Internet is a medium made possible by a 
whole host of intermediaries and a place where users go voluntarily to carry out a variety 
of tasks (which is possible thanks to those intermediaries.) Furthermore, the execution of 
those tasks over time often creates a data relationsh p between the user and those 
intermediaries, meaning the latter have the capacity to know a broad range of facts about 
the user through the data that her activities generate and which they collect about her. 
Could any one of those intermediaries (access and service providers alike) achieve a 
position where they will be able to lend such authori y to any digital identity system that 
end users and third parties will want to rely on it? In the end, the main authority factors 
                                                 
159 See REAL ID Act of 2005 by the Congress 
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that can variably combine to bring about authoritative digital identity systems include: 
faith, law and technology. 
i) Faith: While this was obvious in the case of medieval seals, I also pointed out in 
chapter 5 that as initially designed, nothing prevented anyone who physically resembles 
enough another individual to identify themselves to a stranger using the other person’s 
passport. Nevertheless, even those early passports did the job because beyond certain 
threshold of acceptance or once there is a mandate, most people in mainstream probably 
wouldn’t even think of the option of gaming the passport or ID system, and most of those 
who might have thought about it would probably believe that it’s still in their best interest 
to do the right thing. Only a minor portion of people would go all the way to actually 
game the system and that is, in no small part, one of the factors that have made large 
identity systems work so far. Will that be true of the Internet, too? – Most likely. As 
surprising as that may be to hear this, of all those systems I have investigated, the Internet 
is the most opaque to the average user/customer/patron. Even if that statement is not 
factually true from a hypothetical panopticon perspective that can embrace the totality of 
history in a single gaze, the average Internet user is probably as clueless when it comes to 
cryptography, for instance, as was the illiterate medieval individual with regard to the 
procedures and elements that went into an authentic charter or deed. Most Internet users 
will have to believe the assurances given to them by designers and institutions for the 
project of authoritative digital identity systems to come through.   
ii)  Law: the backing of the law and the prospect of legal punishment (a powerful 
deterrent) was instrumental in the medieval context as well as in the modern state context 
for making seals and government documents sustainable in achieving their identification 
439 
 
 
 
purposes. Without credible signs of that backing and bility to redress and hold evildoers 
accountable, technology designers would be hard pressed to implement robust and 
authoritative Internet identity systems.    
iii)  Technology: some technology was involved in sealed documents and passports. 
This is even more the case today with a more technology advanced medium. And because 
the sources of authority are now multiple and they are competitors, technology will play 
an even greater role not only in defining standards but also in making a difference 
between services and business value through innovation.      
• Causal sequence and mechanism 
In order to organize the different factors playing out in these phenomena with a 
little more clarity, I have attempted to categorize and order them in tables. The first table 
(7-1) identifies and orders a variety of factors into a sequence of causal chain toward the 
formation of authoritative identity credentials.  The second table (7-2) abstracts and 
exhibits two clusters of the main factors that generally contribute, first, to the historical 
emergence of identity credentials and, second, to their authoritativeness. In the former, 
the main categories include basic conditions, critical conditions, outcome-enabling 
conditions, and outcomes. They respond to the questions included in the following 
paragraphs. While this categorization scheme has been constructed firstly based on the 
national state case of identity credentials, I subsequently propose to organize along the 
same lines the insights gained from the experience of medieval seals as well as from the 
emerging digital identity processes, too. 
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Table 7-1: Causal sequence and mechanism for authoritative identity: Cases I, II & III 
 Upstream causal path Downstream causal path 
 Basic conditions Critical conditions Outcome-enabling conditions Outcomes 
M
e
d
ie
va
l S
e
a
ls
 
 Church as monopoly of pure 
credence good (salvation of 
souls in the afterlife) and as 
local actor involved with people 
 Church as large formal structure 
with centralized authority and 
legislative & judicial powers 
(re. property rights, perjury, 
debts, etc.) 
 Investiture controversy and 
production of normative 
discourse (doctrines of Trinity 
and Eucharist) 
 Increase of valuable transactions 
with the Church 
 Need to secure donations 
against perjury, succession 
disputes, etc. 
 Belief in the sacred status of 
writing (deriving from Holy 
Scriptures) 
 Church as de facto monopoly of 
literacy and record-making 
techniques (chancery personnel 
and procedures) 
 Seals as authoritative 
identity token 
N
a
tio
n
a
l I
D
 
C
re
d
e
n
tia
ls
 
 Territorial sovereignty defining 
national jurisdiction 
 Concentration of executive, 
legislative and judicial powers 
in a central government 
 Dramatic increase in the 
mobility of people due to 
improvements in transportation 
infrastructures 
 National security concerns 
 Need for proper distribution of 
rights and obligations 
 Centralized state bureaucracy and 
its procedures 
 Nationality (linking state to 
nation) 
 Passport 
 National ID card 
D
ig
ita
l I
d
e
n
tit
y 
 Open and global Internet 
 Virtual mobility through 
Internet transactions 
 Anonymity by default in the 
Internet 
 Harm to users and hindrance to 
commerce & trust (ID theft, 
data breach, etc.) 
 Cybersecurity concerns 
 Need for proper attribution and 
legitimate appropriation of 
rights 
 Technical protocols and 
infrastructure of interoperable 
digital identity systems 
 Trust framework enabled by 
technology and institutional 
provisions 
 Authoritative digital 
identity credentials 
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Table 7-2: Drivers and factors in the emergence processes of identity mechanisms 
Drivers causing the emergence of the need for identity mechanisms Factors contributing to making an identity mechanism authoritative 
 Emergence of a new record-creation technology (RCT) or Formation 
of a new virtual space (1) 
 Need to secure transactions enabled by enabling RCT or in such 
virtual space, which result in transfers or alterations of rights 
 Need to address security concerns resulting from the movement of 
people or goods or from virtual mobility 
 Need for an authority to assign and manage rights and obligations, 
especially over a wide scope or a long period of time 
 Designed by the authority (2) of reference in the jurisdiction at hand 
(or by the highest authority whose jurisdiction everyone else is 
subjected to.) 
 Embraced and legitimized by the authority of reference, e.g. by using 
the mechanism in transactions where it has a stake of its own. 
 Trusted by all stakeholders in the system (widely shared values, 
cultural beliefs and assumptions, or contractual obligations) 
 All issuers also are the very actors who need to rely on the 
mechanism for its defined purpose, and they agree on the same set of 
rules to apply to that end 
  The issuer has the most relevant, comprehensive and accurate record 
available about the individuals to be potentially identified  
 
(1) A virtual space is a nonphysical space produced by any record-creation technology that is used to enable further interactions beyond physical encounters 
either between humans or between humans and non-human entities. More precisely, the virtual space is the realm or the plane of all the interactions thus enabled. 
A virtual space may result from the emergence of a new RCT or from new applications and uses of existing RCTs. 
(2) Authority here refers to an entity which is themain rule-maker and rule-enforcer in a given domain or jurisdiction. If those functions were to be separate, the 
entity in question must at least have ultimately the power to enforce rules. The meaning of rule here is g neric and may run from statute or law to private contract 
policies, etc. Alternately, authority may be an entity that stakeholders in a subject matter trust or defer to make decisions on that subject matter. 
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Basic conditions: Before emerges the need for identification, what are the main 
characteristics of the environment, which might be of any relevance to the issue/phenomenon at 
hand?  
I have extensively discussed these conditions with regard to medieval Church and seals 
as well as the state and government ID. With the Int rnet era, a new record-creation technology – 
electronic records as opposed to paper-written records – along with the s orage and transmission 
capabilities of computer networking have created a virtual space that has no boundaries but 
global. What makes Internet global is precisely that it is continuously open to further 
interconnection with any Internet Protocol networks that come along regardless of their location. 
The transmission capabilities of records in that spce define what I call virtual mobility (see table 
7-2) as such records may be used to effect changes i  the life of the actual individual. A defining 
aspect in that space is the notable vacuum regarding the means to ascertain the identity of 
communicating parties: we are in a situation where the default is anonymity and identification is 
mostly voluntary and based on self-assertions. Those features characterize the environment 
where the need for some form of reliable identification systems has arisen, and form the basis of 
the rationale for pursuing such endeavor. 
Critical conditions: Are there any specific circumstances that precipitate he 
manifestation of the problem (reasons for the need for identification) and press for a response?  
The above initial conditions – but more particularly the global nature of this virtual space 
and the default anonymity that it affords to users – lead to further issues and concerns. Mainly, 
these follow from challenges to accountability thus created by the basic conditions. They include 
issues such as identity theft and data breach, which may harm both commerce and individuals, 
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cybersecurity threats, and ultimately the difficulty of reliable attribution with regard to the users 
and their actions, rights and obligations. 
Outcome-enabling conditions: Are there any antecedents leading up to the outcome?   
The path to a solution and to the desired outcome starts with putting in place an 
infrastructure that enables identity transactions beyond the native system where the digital 
identity credential will be issued; that is the requirement of interoperability. That goal faces a 
basic challenge which is recognized as a trust issue: tr st is a necessary ingredient at all levels, 
starting from adoption by end users to interoperability to authoritative credentials. It has 
technical components that need to feature in the technology by design but it also has institutional 
components which the user can relate to. The different digital identity technologies I have 
described in section 6.4 include elements designed to provide choice and protections to users and 
possibly to win their trust. At a more social/institu ional level, the designers and other relevant 
social actors have started tackling that challenge by setting up a model and an implementation of 
a trust framework. That process is underway and it is too early to predict its chances to success.   
Outcome: What is eventually the solution adopted or implemented?  
Obviously, digital identity credentials that are widely used, accepted and relied upon are 
the desired outcome. However, my thesis is that they will only be realized along with the ability 
to locate clearly where authority lies among the stakeholders, which itself is needed to bring 
about trust beyond the boundaries of a private contract and its terms of service. Put otherwise, it 
is necessary to locate the main authority operators or enablers including faith, law and 
technological innovation.  
• Factors for emergence and authoritativeness of digital identity mechanisms 
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We have seen that the need for an authoritative identity mechanism stems either from the 
fact that people can move (their body) in the physical space across jurisdictions (under the 
modern state rule) or from their capacity to enact their personhood and agency in a virtual space 
(e.g., under the medieval Church rule). By virtual space, I here do not particularly mean the 
space created by digital networks, such as the so-called cyberspace. Rather, considering that the 
physical space is the one in which embodied individuals operate, move around, meet and speak 
with one another face to face, a virtual space is any nonphysical space produced by any record-
creation technology that is used to enable further int actions beyond physical encounters either 
between humans or between humans and non-human entities (e.g., institutions). The virtual 
space is precisely the realm of those alternate-levl interactions. The changes effected in such 
space are made mainly by creating, modifying or moving records that include a representation of 
a source of agency. I use the phrase ‘virtual mobility’ as a conceptual category to capture the 
idea that physical individuals may remain relatively immobile and yet still be impacted (and their 
life circumstances changed) due to records being altered and moved around – just as could 
happen through physical mobility.    
Any technology enabling a new mode of record-creation and a new plane of 
interaction/transaction opens up a new space of agency, that is, the above defined virtual space. 
To the extent that that space is accessible to the public at large, it will sooner or later require new 
and proper mechanisms of identification in order to regulate some aspect of human activity 
enabled by and in that new space, that new interaction plane, and in order to enable a proper 
control of the record thus generated. This is not a absolute necessity, for the new space may 
remain a place where only ad hoc solutions are fashioned in case of need and for one c text at a 
time, or where only interactions that do not require a significant level of assurance vis-à-vis the 
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identity of the interacting parties are carried out. However, the provision of such mechanism will 
be a condition for further enabling consequential transactions and activities that require a higher 
level of control, trust or reliability of interacting parties and relevant stakeholders. Following 
this, I identify as follows the factors that bring about the need for an identity mechanism (table 7-
2). 
1) Emergence of a new record-creation technology (RCT) or Formation of a new virtual space 
This criterion applies to digital identity. The basic technological infrastructure where the need for 
digital identity plays out is made up of computers and their connectivity (computer networks, 
and particularly the Internet). Computers have introduced a different record-creation technology 
and the Internet has enabled further interactions between agents through the use of electronic 
records. The digital space, also referred to as cyberspace, is in effect a nonphysical space 
produced by computers the networking of which enables further interactions between humans 
and beyond physical encounters. 
2) Need to secure transactions enabled by such RCT or in such virtual space, which result in 
transfers or alterations of rights 
The Internet is a network of transaction highways (to use an old metaphor) as much as it is a 
gigantic storage facility. We have learned from some of the interviewees that digital identity is 
an effort to structure massive data flows (transactions) that are otherwise unstructured and much 
less meaningful as a result. The main structure in this context is one that enables the computer 
system to securely and consistently attach to a digital representation (‘who you are’) all the 
digital objects (‘what you are’) and only those that relate to it and the value and contexts of that 
relation. In that way, the implementation of digital dentity technology secures transactions of all 
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sorts – all the information flows it applies to – including transactions that might result in 
transfers or alterations of rights, which are among the most prominent in the motivation of 
creating the technology. The emergence of the need for robust digital identity technologies was 
driven by the trust and security problems posed by the Internet’s original design, including 
identity frauds and other harms that jeopardize or unduly alter users’ rights. The fact that the 
Internet can be used as a medium to alter legitimate cl ims or make false claims and to 
(mis)appropriate rights is at the center of the effort to develop adequate identity technologies. 
This translates the importance to secure Internet tansactions that can impact the existing and 
proper attribution of rights, in other words, to secure accountability at all relevant levels.  
3) Need to address security concerns resulting from the movement of people or goods (e.g., 
national security concerns) 
While no government representative has been interviewed, there are a few indications that the 
currency of digital identity topic on government agenda is also related to cybersecurity concerns. 
For instance the NSTIC is clearly a spin-off of theWhite House’s 2009 “Cyberspace Policy 
Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure” 
(USG 2009) which calls for immediately starting a di log on cybersecurity in the US.160 Digital 
identity issue falls under the action line 10 (table 7-3), and in the document, it is listed as one of 
the areas where the government is meant to encourage innovation (USG 2009: 33). 
4) Need for an authority to assign and manage rights and obligations 
                                                 
160 Following the release of the Review, Howard Schmidt (former eBay Chief Security Strategist) has been appointed in 
December 2009 the US Cybersecurity Coordinator and, as such, one of the President’s National Security as well as 
National Economic Council staff. He has also been the point man in the White House administration for the 
development of the NSTIC. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity and also 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/22/introducing-new-cybersecurity-coordinator 
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The leading role taken by the current US Administration in the adoption of digital identity 
technologies suggest that the rights and obligations of US citizens may be managed online using 
digital identity-related technologies. We can see how existing rights and obligations may be 
managed in new ways through the technology. The question is whether we will see the 
emergence of new, digital rights granted or secured, as well as digital obligations assigned, by 
Internet-borne authorities – whether those rights and obligations are to be limited to the 
cyberspace or they may be effective in the socio-physical polity as well.  
 It is clear that some of the traditional rights of individuals (privacy, notably) are being 
strained by a combination of technological capabilities and business models and practices, such 
as social networks’, where the main feature that makes those models profitable resides in 
monetizing access to the users’ personal data throug  advertisement as well as applications. In 
that sense, the boundaries of individuals’ rights are shifting as corporations are gaining new 
terrains in the control of data in general, and personal data particularly. If anything, new regimes 
of rights may be emerging de facto from commercial practices.  
Of the five contributing factors that have been identified in table 7-2, four do not seem to 
apply to the digital identity case. These technologies have not been designed by the government 
(and clearly there are multiple potential digital identity providers, not just one); there is no 
evidence that trust prevails among all stakeholders including the user; and all the potential 
relying parties are not set to become identity providers. Furthermore, to date there is not a single 
entity that can uniformly be said to have the most c mprehensive and accurate digital record  
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Table 7-3: US Near-Term Action Plan for cyberspace policy (excerpt from the White House “Cyberspace Policy 
Review”) 
 
1.  Appoint a cybersecurity policy official responsible for coordinating the Nation’s cybersecurity 
policies and activities; establish a strong NSC directorate, under the direction of the cybersecurity 
policy official dual-hatted to the NSC and the NEC, to coordinate interagency development of 
cybersecurity-related strategy and policy.  
2.  Prepare for the President’s approval an updated national strategy to secure the information and 
communications infrastructure. This strategy should include continued evaluation of CNCI 
activities and, where appropriate, build on its successes.  
3.  Designate cybersecurity as one of the President’s key management priorities and establish 
performance metrics.  
4.  Designate a privacy and civil liberties official to the NSC cybersecurity directorate.  
5.  Convene appropriate interagency mechanisms to condut interagency-cleared legal analyses of 
priority cybersecurity-related issues identified during the policy-development process and 
formulate coherent unified policy guidance that clarifies roles, responsibilities, and the 
application of agency authorities for cybersecurity- elated activities across the Federal 
government.  
6.  Initiate a national public awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity.  
7.  Develop U.S. Government positions for an international cybersecurity policy framework and 
strengthen our international partnerships to create initiatives that address the full range of 
activities, policies, and opportunities associated with cybersecurity.  
8.  Prepare a cybersecurity incident response plan; initiate a dialog to enhance public-private 
partnerships with an eye toward streamlining, alignin , and providing resources to optimize their 
contribution and engagement  
9.  In collaboration with other EOP entities, develop a framework for research and development 
strategies that focus on game-changing technologies that have the potential to enhance the 
security, reliability, resilience, and trustworthiness of digital infrastructure; provide the research 
community access to event data to facilitate developing tools, testing theories, and identifying 
workable solutions.  
10.  Build a cybersecurity-based identity management vision and strategy that addresses  
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available on most Internet users. While it is clear th t users leave a huge amount of data behind 
them in their Web browsing trail, any entity that would claim to amass all the data possible about 
all users (even from US citizens only) will be subject to the objections of other entities which 
might claim the same (thus, they won’t agree on whoill be the authoritative source) and to the 
contingency that in a given population there will alw ys be a non-negligible number of people 
who have never signed up for an account with that enti y or Web service.   
Embrace and legitimization of the authority of refence 
The only relevant contributing factor here is that the government has embraced these 
technologies by adopting them for its own transactions with citizens. In so doing, the government 
projects the notion that these technologies are reliabl ; this potentially legitimizes them in the 
eye of the public as online identity mechanism. This will get at least a portion of the citizenry to 
start using the related credentials. If they are satisfied with their government online service 
experience thus enabled, those citizens may be moreinclined to use these technologies in some 
of their other identity transaction domains.  
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have addressed the specific reseach questions deriving from the main research 
question and the definition of the central concept I have used to frame it. Particularly, I have 
pulled together the results of the analysis of the thr e cases in order to respond to relevant 
variants of the following question formulas: first, how are individuals led to use the emerging 
identity mechanism at hand to authenticate their idntity? And then: what are the processes that 
lead transaction counterparts to relying on the emerging identity mechanism for authenticating 
individuals’ identity? I have then identified different approaches to implementing the various 
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identity systems – especially government identity documents and digital identity technologies – 
and to enabling adoption. With digital systems which are still evolving to provide a stable and 
recognizable configuration of digital identity credentials to be widely used by Internet users at 
large, I have pointed out shifts and differences that may indicate potential or actual tensions with 
that technology. I have complemented that picture with history-supported scenarios and rational 
projections defining foreseeable pathways toward any possible configurations of authoritative 
identity mechanisms. 
Lastly, I have pulled together the main analytical outcomes of the case studies in order to outline 
causal mechanisms characterizing the emergence of authoritative identity systems or the 
discursive formation of their project. First, focusing separately on each one of the three histories 
I have isolated main events and historical features into four sequences of explanatory factors, 
which include: basic conditions, critical conditions, outcome-enabling conditions and outcome. 
The top two categories form the upstream causal path while the second half constitutes the 
downstream causal path leading to the identity solutions eventually adopted. Secondly, I have 
explained in more general terms why the need for such ystems emerges, by identifying four 
drivers, and how they become authoritative, by isolating five factors contributing to that. With 
that, I will now proceed to conclude this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion: Key findings and Recommendations 
 
In closing this dissertation, I shall highlight the k y findings, their implications, the limitations of 
this inquiry and prospects for possible future research. While outlining the implications of this 
research, I also put forward a few recommendations f r policy and technology design. 
8.1 Key findings 
Before highlighting key contributions, following is the outline of what this investigation has 
accomplished in substance. 
8.1.1 Summing up the cases 
I started this investigation with the motivation to inform current efforts to build a digital identity 
infrastructure with a view to uncovering the social antecedents required to enable Internet-based 
identity management systems which most stakeholders could readily rely on, at least as much as 
they do physical identity credentials. Giving the paucity of information and relevant research 
available to provide a clear path from the current situation to the realization of the envisioned 
digital identity framework, I made the research design decision to start this inquiry with the 
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formulation of the following general question:  How do social actors, events or processes enable 
the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the public at large?  
No theory is found in the literature at this point to help anticipate the answer to that 
question and define a pathway to a solution for the practical challenge faced by technology 
designers. Otherwise, such theory could have been applied directly to the digital identity 
phenomenon, if not to fully test the theory (which may not be possible since the emergence of 
digital identity systems is still unfolding), but possibly to anticipate and recommend to designers 
and policymakers the next moves towards a successful outcome, according to the hypothetical 
theory. Instead, I have opted for the use of history in lieu of a theory yet to be found or to be 
developed, if at all possible. In order to address the general research question, I have divided 
history in three big chunks sliced around what appers to be historical manifestations of the same 
generic phenomenon. First, there is the present which holds the particular phenomenon that 
includes the unknown I seek to explain or specifically apprehend – that is the sequence of digital 
identity systems. Second, there is a past history that still is very much in contact with our present, 
a history that has produced outcomes that still shape our present experiences of authoritative 
identity credentials – that is the sequence of governm nt identification documents, particularly 
the passport. Third and lastly, comes a more remote and even apparently alien past but which 
contains the potential to speak to us about the challenges of establishing an identity mechanism 
within the means of a new type of medium or a technology of record creation (new if only in 
ways it is being used) – that is the sequence of medieval seals. As a result, this dissertation has 
investigated in this order the use of medieval seals, the advent of the passport as well as the 
continuous efforts to build digital identity systems that share meaningful objectives with the 
previous systems.  
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The first historical case has addressed the following question: In what circumstances did 
the challenge of reliably representing individual identity within written records emerge in the 
Middle Ages and how was it resolved? The examination of this case through historical accounts 
pertinent to the use of seals in the 11th and 12th centuries in the medieval West has exhibited a 
number of historical facts. The dissemination of seal  as identity tokens was enabled by a process 
that ran from top (rulers) to bottom (laypeople and the society at large.) Regularly, the agential 
capacity and authority of the rulers, notably but not exclusively through documents, was visually 
associated with the symbols of their seals and ultimately with the seal device. Those were signs 
of power – not only the political power in the narrow sense but the power to make something 
happen in the world. The literate elite in the medieval West adopted the same device to link 
themselves to their own writings, lending to the latter the authority that may have been theirs in 
person. Eventually, the population at large embraced th  practice of owning seals either by 
simple mimicry (which could also be justified by the fact that the mere possession of a seal in 
itself then became a material attribute of personhod) r by the growing likelihood that one may 
sooner or later need to engage one’s own agency throug  written records. That growing 
likelihood itself occurred at a time where both theinstitutional authority and the organizational 
structure of the Church reached a height, in the wake of the Investiture Controversy against 
secular rulers. The Church truly became an economic power, and revival in Roman law studies 
increasingly ventured beyond Canon law to produce a growing corpus of legal rules which are 
put to task on civil matters throughout a Church-enabled court system.  
In the same time the Investiture Controversy brought about among the social actors a 
debate about signs and their power, leading to an update of the doctrines in currency within the 
Church. In that process, explanations were offered on the mode of operation of seals as identity 
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tokens. As it turns out, that mode needed to be cohrent with the mode of signification of signs in 
general, as churchmen had previously theorized. Eventually, the operational mode of seals was 
predicated on the efficacy of sacramental signs in play within the Trinity and the Eucharist, 
according to the doctrines.  Humans were in essence linked to their seal-matrix which could then 
be replicated in multiple waxen seals in the same way that in God, the Father is linked to the Son 
through whom humans, God’s creatures, relate to the Father. The Trinity of the divine person as 
well as the possibility availed by the Eucharist to change substance while retaining identity 
justified in the Church’s discourse the possibility that waxen seals may stand as identity tokens 
for human beings and, as a result, they were used to authenticate their identity in written records. 
The second historical case has traced the process of mergence of the passport and its 
evolution into an internationally accepted identity-bound credential, particularly for the purpose 
of traveling. I have examined this case with the aim to answer the following question: How did 
identity credentials issued by the national state historically emerge and become authoritative? 
The analysis has shown that the road of the modern state towards its apparent status of the 
highest and ultimate identity authority actually was a historical process strewn with 
contingencies, the central legal concept of national ty being one of those.  After early 
developments featuring in parallel diplomatic practices of letter of introduction, safe-conduct and 
laissez-passer on the one hand and, on the other, policing practices of writing down and listing 
names for reasons of security and legal accountability, the need arose for authorities to issue 
some kind of documents enabling them to control the movements of some categories of 
profession. These notably include the itineraries of royal couriers and soldiers’ discharge and 
leave from duty stations. Since then, the early form f passport and then other identity papers had 
been progressively expanding to the people at large but unevenly across European nations until 
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WWI, after which a consensus emerged among leading governments to start an international 
policy process of passport requirement and harmonization. Even then, the passport was believed 
to be a temporary solution to mitigate legitimate security risks and concerns caused by the war; it 
was hoped to expire as the world would return to toal peace. But instead from conference to 
conference and through cycles of recommendations and feedback, not only was the passport 
requirement renewed, but the consensus among governments on that requirement only got 
reinforced over time and its scope extended to further populations (e.g., passport or identity 
document to immigrants and people without effective nationality). Overall, the passport has 
become a universal artifact enabling the authentication of individuals’ identity worldwide, an 
identity-bound credential that is needed in general as a prerequisite for traveling internationally.   
Finally, in the last historical case I have addressed a phenomenon presently still 
developing but whose design objectives are clear and significant aspects already known. Broadly 
speaking, this case tackles the following question: How are social actors, events or processes 
leading to the possible emergence of authoritative digital identity credentials for Internet end 
users at large? I have presented the context of emergence and the case made by a number of the 
social actors involved as to why these digital identity systems should be built or implemented. I 
have also introduced the reader to a range of specifications and functionalities known to date 
through a few identity management technology cases, and then proceeded to outline the broader-
scope social processes that have more recently begun to take place in order to create the 
conditions for a widespread adoption whereby authoritative digital identity credentials may come 
about and be usable. There are still enormous challenges to be addressed, however. 
After the investigation of the three historical cases, I sought to pull together the analytical 
insights into an overall explanation of the causal mechanism at work in those historical 
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processes.  I started with the first two phenomena which already have completely unfolded. I 
have identified the main features that historically bring about the need for identity credentials 
and those that characterize their authoritative formation. From the rich histories that this inquiry 
has brought into focus, I have pinned down defining events which I have abstracted and phased 
into a sequence of conditions forming the causal mechanism leading to the outcome of 
authoritative identity credentials. I have finally used this analytical framework to further analyze 
the case of emerging digital identity. In the process, I have outlined different adoption-
implementation strategies and trajectories taking into account differences and similarities 
presented by the three phenomena in their respective historical contexts. 
8.1.2 Contributing to knowledge 
Knowledge contributed through this research is of three kinds: empirical, conceptual and 
method-theoretical. I briefly summarize here those in ights and knowledge outcomes. 
 This research has first and foremost clarified and expanded our understanding of identity 
and its underlying processes. It has led to a more p t nt reformulation of the concept of identity 
in the sense of an artifact reliably representing a person.  
Identity is a mechanism for binding to data any single one of a collection of entities in 
such a way that the result consistently enables the discovery of the specific entity thus 
bound.  
Individuals may exercise their agency through artifc s or media that are used to 
represent such data. In that sense, identity is an information artifact that is structured so 
as to enable its consistent and reliable association with a given entity and only with that 
457 
 
 
 
one, as well as to enable the reliable attribution of further relevant information to the 
same entity if and only if applicable. 
While in general terms, as the definition of a concept should be, by focusing on information 
artifact or the binding to data the above definitio has the advantage to provide a clear 
delineation of scope so as to avoid philosophical and psychological wanderings about identity. 
With that definition, the concept of identity may become more visible and easier to recognize as 
object of social sciences and information studies.   
Still, the concept definition by itself is silent about where the information artifact comes 
from; it does not instruct any more about who defines the mechanism and protocols for binding 
individuals and data than it does about what the purpose would be. The investigation however 
has shown that empirically identity has most of the time been defined in a form including a set of 
characteristics that enable the authority of reference to achieve certain goals. Medieval Church 
used seals as identity tokens in order to secure deeds and donations under terms and conditions 
that were consistent with its ideology and interests. National state defined individuals’ identity 
through terms or attributes over which it had already secured some control, that is, birth data and 
geo-physical location. After defining identity as any set of attributes about a subject, identity 
technologists have moved to increasingly define it as a set of claims, thus reflecting their concern 
with identity which is to enable the sharing of data (hence, the need to assess the truthfulness of 
claims to access to data.) As a result, the goals of the designers/issuers have historically included 
ensuring compliance, accountability, integrity of rights, fulfillment of duties, ascertaining the 
truthfulness of claims, etc. 
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It follows that an identity scheme is not a given; it is defined and designed in a way that 
fulfills the needs of the entity that requires it. In that sense, individuals resort to an identity 
credential only when they are required to use it, or hey find some interest in using it. They may 
be required to use it not only by the issuer, but also by other social entities that find it useful to 
their business to piggyback on such credential in order to authenticate the identity of individuals 
they deal with. Obviously in that case, the credential in question becomes a strong one which I 
refer to as authoritative identity.  
On the other hand, rare are the occasions comparatively speaking where individuals by 
themselves find it necessary and relevant to establi h a means for proving or authenticating their 
own identity. When they do while they are not obliged by any legal requirement, it is generally 
in response to an entity they depend on to achieve some objectives they are interested in. While 
both institutions and individuals may detect the ned for such mechanisms, institutions are first, 
if not the only ones, to demand a standard mechanism of identity. Institutions need memory; they 
are great consumers of memory-making or record-creation technologies. This is an important 
factor in the way they persist overtime as institutions. Important amounts of records relating to 
people eventually require an adequate identity mechanism. It follows that formal institutions are 
also great consumers of identity technologies and mechanisms. In that sense, the record-making 
practices of the medieval Church provides a preview of the modern state bureaucracy.   
The implications for digital identity is this: either an established authority which most 
Internet users in a given context have to deal withrequires and provides a presumably secure, 
usable and functional digital identity solution in their dealing with the public online (the early 
adoption by the US government may eventually exemplify this model), or some innovation in 
online services including a digital identity solution leads to a massive adoption by Internet users, 
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in which case the built-in identity solution might naturally tend to spread online and across the 
industry (Facebook-Connect has given a glimpse of that model). At this point in time, it is too 
early to say whether any one of those models is going to prevail or whether either would be 
sustainable on the long run, as online technologies can be volatile with quite dramatic changes 
due to unexpected innovations.   
A notable empirical item of knowledge this dissertation has uncovered is that what we 
generally consider as identity mechanisms (documents, artifacts or credentials, etc.) are less 
rather than more often mechanisms actually designed to prove identity as an end in itself. At the 
notable exception of national identity cards where available, they are generally designed for 
other purposes defined by the designers or authority f reference and seem to fulfill plain 
identification function only as a secondary effect and more so with third parties (not involved as 
issuers of the identity mechanisms concerned). The passport is a credential enabling one to cross 
borders and driver’s license is a credential to prove ne can lawfully drive a vehicle on the public 
ways. Even the investigation of medieval seals suggests that it is an object that had had multiple 
purposes before and along with its use in the 11th century as identity token in the process of 
authenticating sealed acts and, as a result, the identity of the individuals represented in those acts. 
To the extent that a credential is bound to individual identities, it simply becomes, even 
unintentionally, a full-fledged identity credential for many actors who rely on the source of that 
credential for reasons I have explained in the previous chapter. 
The paradox, and challenge to digital identity, is that it is the monolithic authority behind 
seals and passports which made those mechanisms reliable and credible. If those sources of 
authority are dismissed in the context of digital identity, what to replace them with? Who is the 
powerful authority, or rather, who are the prevailing authorities that can make digital identity 
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credible, believable? What would be the relationship between such authorities, if they were to 
exist, so that digital credentials can truly be authori ative (be used and accepted beyond settings 
controlled by the originating authority only)? Past credentials were objectively flawed in that 
nobody could seriously claim that they could not be forged or used to misrepresent. What made 
them work within acceptable limits was the power of their proponent, backer, designer or 
sponsor, and the latter’s command over potential users or its presumed trustworthiness. In the 
absence of such authority for digital identity, can the mere technology provide authority and 
trustworthiness? One of the critical contributions f this research is to have shown that 
authoritative identity systems only based on technology, on material capabilities, are no more 
likely today than they were in the 11th century.  Rather, there are three factors that variably 
combine to enable authoritative identity systems – the authority factors – which include faith, 
law and technology. 
First of all, technology is involved in any record-making and identity system: paper or 
parchment, ink, stylus, type, print, booklet, computer, codes are all technological objects at 
various levels of complexity. Then faith most visibly applies in the case of medieval seals but so 
too does law. While the basis of the medieval Churc was religious faith, its normative discourse 
and ruling exceeded religious doctrines and Canon law to cover civil and criminal matters 
(especially economic crimes), all in a context of monopoly for wielding such powers and 
authority, particularly in the wake of the Investiture Controversy.  The force of law is most 
visible as authority factor in the case of governmet identity credentials. However, everybody 
holding on to their government-assigned documents doe  not do so by fear of the law. Past some 
initial much needed cultural adjustments to the notion hat it is possible and legitimate for 
government to define individuals’ identity on a piece of paper, most people eventually identify 
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themselves to those documents (not in small part thnks to the notion of nationality which 
emerged in the 19th century as a politico-legal fiction.) The belief tha  every member of the world 
population belongs to a specific nationality legally controlled by a government, that individuality 
can be uniquely captured by the government using a arrow set of attributes and that, as a result, 
everyone would better off relying on government-issued credentials to authenticate people’s 
identity is part of what has made those credentials work so well.  
What about the Internet? At first, it appears that echnology is driving everything in the 
case of the Internet. There might even be a claim out there on the part of technology designers, 
certainly a suggestion, that technology by itself can ommand trust, which brings to mind a 
related question: can technology establish authority? That is, in a sense, the life-scale hypothesis 
that is waiting to be tested by the outcome of the current process toward authoritative digital 
identity without Church and without Government, unless private Corporation takes on some of 
the functions of either one of those institutions with regard to driving, backing and enabling the 
operation of identity systems. But we already see that even in the US where that would normally 
be unusual, the government has stepped in to accompany the process. Still, we shall not prejudge 
the ultimate scope or configuration of the role of the government but shall wait and see how that 
plays out. In addition, while technology in a competing market place can innovate and transform 
institutions, the opacity of the medium, that is, the Internet for the average user is a feature that 
requires such user’s “blind” trust in order to proceed using the technology– which resembles an 
attitude closer to faith than, say, the fact of writing on a piece of paper and handing it over to 
another physical individual. It is possible that beyond the technology as such, most Internet users 
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will just have to believe the assurances given to them by designers and institutions161 for any 
materialization of authoritative digital identity sstems to come through. 
  In terms of expanding our comprehension of identity processes, this research has helped 
us understand that while identity credentials enable nd expand agency (individual level), they 
also enable structures (institutions) to act upon indiv duals, to restrain or expand the array of 
possible courses of action available to them. Governm nt-issued identity documents are a perfect 
example of that, particularly the passport. As Stefan Zweig (1964) shows in his autobiography, 
the world does not look the same when one can go anywhere one pleases and can afford, without 
the burden of procuring documents and submitting to all manners of control, as when one must 
undergo those constraints. Identity credentials change people’s behavioral patterns; they augment 
the possibilities or capabilities of some people or ntities while decreasing some others’. While 
digital identity may seem neutral at first because traditional structures of authority are not 
replicated, the complexity of the technology constituting the medium may be source of 
discrimination among users. This includes the emerging inclination of technology designers to 
favor innovations that take the user awareness, and sometimes consent, out of the equation. 
This inquiry has also produced a general but clear d finition of the concept of virtual 
space and proposes the term ‘virtual mobility’ as an analytical construct. A virtual space is a 
nonphysical space produced by any record-creation technology that is used to enable further 
interactions between humans and beyond physical encounters. More precisely, the virtual space 
is the realm or the plane of all the new interactions thus carried out. Based on this, virtual 
mobility is mobility through virtual space, that is, the capacity to enact change at a distance, 
which is done by creating records or moving them around. In other words, while physically 
                                                 
161 Analyzing the discourse of such assurances might prove as interesting as the analysis of the medieval discourses on 
the efficacy of signs. 
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immobile, an individual may go to places and do things by browsing the Internet or by sending a 
written note. That is a virtual form of mobility (which is not limited to digital technology.) While 
it is empirically clear that the mobility of people in the physical space was, as this research has 
shown, the most potent drive for the emergence of the s ate’s need to require people to bear 
passports and other identity documents, that could not be transferred to the Internet, nor to 
medieval charters and diplomas for that matter. The analytical construct of virtual mobility 
enables us to frame and analyze the need for identity i  all three cases in relation to the category 
of mobility and the reaction of control it can elicit.  
This investigation has uncovered a number of factors driving the emergence of the need 
for identity mechanisms. They include: 
 Emergence of a new record-creation technology (RCT) or formation of a new virtual 
space  
 Need to secure transactions enabled by emerging RCT, which may result in transfers or 
alterations of rights 
 National security concerns (territory, people and virtual space) 
 Managing the distribution of rights and obligations by the authority expressing the need 
Contributing factors for rendering emerging identity mechanisms authoritative include: 
 Designed by the authority of reference in the jurisdiction at hand (or by the highest 
authority to whose jurisdiction everyone else is subjected to.) 
 Embraced and legitimized by the authority of reference, e.g. by using the mechanism in 
transactions where it has a stake. 
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 Trusted by all stakeholders in the system (either based on widely shared values, cultural 
beliefs and assumptions or on contractual obligations) 
 All issuers are also potential relying parties and they agree on the same set of protocol 
specifications 
 The issuer has the most comprehensive and accurate record available about the 
individuals to be potentially identified 
This dissertation has made the case of a relationship between trust, insurance and 
liability. On the one hand, in this identity business it would be neither fair nor realistic to have 
the identity provider solely be liable for the breakdown or the failure of a system for some 
reason. On the other hand, trust – an outwardly yet personal disposition – cannot occur in a 
context of impersonal processes unless it is based on experience (same as between humans) or 
aided by a number of devices. The notion of insurance is one that allows allying trust and 
liability in a way that might alleviate the burden or limitations of each one of those items taken 
separately.  
From a methodological standpoint, I propose a general framework for analyzing 
phenomena that occur over large historical sequences. The framework comprises four 
breakpoints distributed in two parts: the first part constitutes what I call upstream causal path and 
the second is the downstream causal path. The upstream causal path includes two sequences: 
basic conditions are relevant to understanding the context that makes it possible for the issue to 
emerge and critical conditions precipitate the issue into clear focus. The downstream causal path 
also includes two sequences: outcome-enabling conditi s and finally the outcome itself. These 
different categories of factors respond to the following questions: 
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Basic conditions: Before emerges the need for identification, what are the main characteristics 
of the environment, which might be of any relevance to the issue/phenomenon at hand?  
Critical conditions: Are there any specific circumstances that precipitate he manifestation of the 
problem (reasons for the need for identification) ad press for a response?  
Outcome-enabling conditions: Are there any antecedents leading up to the outcome?   
Outcome: What is eventually the solution adopted or implemented?  
With all of the above, this dissertation has illuminated several fundamental yet 
theoretically undeveloped aspects of identity mechanisms and the various processes involved in 
assembling an identity infrastructure. These include preliminary results, new concepts, ideas, or 
principles aiming to advance and deepen our understanding of identity management systems. I 
have identified emerging patterns of implementation-adoption and proposed a series of history-
based projections as hypothetical pathways toward authoritative identity systems in the future. 
8.2 Recommendations for policy and design 
This sociohistorical inquiry has been conducted within he context of public policy scholarship in 
Internet studies. As such, it is good practice to offer a few policy recommendations as part of the 
research outcomes. Given the contemporary circumstances of the phenomenon, I will outline 
below a few guidelines, principles or recommendations that might be of interest to policymakers 
and designers alike. Additionally, civil liberties advocates and prospective future users of digital 
identity may also benefit from being informed by these outcomes. I shall note that due to the 
practical nature of recommendations in general, the ones I offer below are the result of both the 
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research findings strictly speaking and insights gained from my overall experience in the course 
of this investigation and beyond the only data thatspecifically address my research questions.  
 First of all, the Internet could well remain as it currently is, blossoming of free Web 
services continuously competing for new ideas in order to get the user’s attention and personal 
data. Some will argue that that is precisely what mkes the Internet such an innovative force. Is 
then the idea that the Internet needs some robust iden ity scheme a bad one? From the array of 
identity technologies described in chapter 6 and their functionalities, this research rather 
indicates that it might be a good thing to implement an Internet-level identity system. Because 
first of all, they can cater for a wide variety of use cases, from the user self-issued identity tokens 
(not unlike the medieval seals) to third-party certification schemes and to secure yet untraceable 
and unlinkable credentials, all taking advantage of the latest advances in cryptography and finer 
awareness of user needs. Of course, nothing is hundred percent full-proof in the absolute, 
especially when it comes to security – in this case, security of the user personal data with 
authentication capabilities. However, some of those technologies demonstrate that it is possible 
to have a digital identity system that operates past the security threshold people have come to 
expect in the physical world. Undoubtedly, they candeliver much better security than a set of 
username and password, let alone multiple sets to be maintained by the same user. However, the 
problem for the Internet is that the more things are ‘open’ the more they demand the cooperation 
of the user in order to work at their best. That principle raises two main challenges: i) it tends to 
increase the number of moving parts that need to beintegrated, even synchronized, for an 
optimal behavior of the system, ii) it also seems to go against the marketing principle of keeping 
simplicity always on the side of the user/customer.  
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Another challenge is also that there is no sufficient user advocacy involved during the 
design phase so that the design choices that are mad will inevitably tend to tilt notably toward 
‘what sells better’ at the expense of ‘what would protect the user’s personal data better’. This can 
only get worse as companies and designers come to th  realization that identity in itself doesn’t 
sell well to the user. The question becomes: identity for what? What could make identity 
marketable to the user? Generally, the standard answer to any marketing question in the context 
of prevailing Internet business model is ‘indirect marketing’: offer some service that a great 
number of users might want, for free, and then monetize their attention and personal information, 
preferably without telling them about it.  If identity itself cannot be that capture-service – 
because the user doesn’t see the purpose – then what could be it? It will have to be a service that, 
in addiction to attracting the user, will  
i) yield information or data that advertisers might be int rested in 
ii)  provide useful information or data that can help establish and manage identities  
Experience shows numerous instances where the first two requirements (attracting users and 
advertisers) are easily met. The latter requirement is the most uncertain at this point. In the 
current state of affairs, services that are most likely to address that one requirement include: 
email service; social networking and merchant sites (sites that have regular financial transactions 
with users.162) Of the three, email (webmail) and social networking services are probably the 
                                                 
162 One might immediately think about banks. However, banks don’t appear willing to deliberately take on the business 
of providing online identity services to their customers for other purposes than their own online banking services. 
Therefore I will stick in this discussion to those native online services that could and would be willing to address the 
three requirements. There is also the hybrid or rather intermediary case of PayPal (between the user and the merchant 
and the bank) which I will not discuss here as it seems to be a relatively isolated model. 
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most common and the most interested in addressing potential digital identity demand.163 That 
was what led Microsoft to contemplate the .Net Passport service, and that is part of the reason 
why social networking sites (Google+ and Facebook) have been seen lately pushing for a ‘real 
name’ policy, that is, a policy that requires or strongly suggests to users to use their formally 
documented name on their account.   
However, nothing guarantees that, because by name I have presumably been using an 
email account for a decade, that account is linked to me for certain. And a lot of people can still 
sign up for a social networking account with a name of their fancy. That is not to say those 
services cannot enable identity transactions; they still can on behalf of whomever holds or is 
using the account. That will be however only for a limited set of identity use-cases. From all of 
this, I can see going forward options for two distinc  major digital identity frameworks. 
First, either Web companies approach digital identity as they do now with Webmail and 
social networking accounts. In that case, it will all come down to how far they can reach with 
‘marketing seduction’ techniques with the great mass of users who think they have no choice, or 
do not care, or are just clueless about what is being or can be done with their personal data on the 
Internet – which in total is most of us. Those companies will keep competing on the next big idea 
that would bring masses of users to subscribe, betting certainly on network effect and maybe 
continuous innovation to keep them around, and hoping that other Web services will eventually 
recognize and adopt their digital identity solutions (even if the main reason for this is access to 
customers more than any merit of the identity technology.) 
                                                 
163 Large merchant sites such Amazon.com have seemed generally content with getting paid for what they sell to users 
(using credit card details, mostly), although they also might be bundling and trading their customers’ shopping and 
preference lists. 
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The second major alternative would be that those companies are willing to openly accept 
their role and responsibilities as authority. This means they will have a more direct relationship 
with their users (at least within a given national or regional jurisdiction at a time), be able to 
communicate, for instance on phone, with their user outside the boundaries of the online services 
they offer, and make sure there is a framework in place for their users to get in touch with them 
(whether online or off line) with confidence that their issues will be addressed fairly. Those 
companies might even want to be at maternity bedsid when there is a newborn in order to 
collect vital data, with the parents’ consent, and maybe offer some future service in exchange 
(after all, Facebook displays at the bottom of their user’s ‘timeline’ page the image of a baby 
with the birth date or at least the birth year provided by the concerned user.) We might also 
remember that before the national state and public administration take custody of vital records 
with the enactment of the civil status, those records were to be found with the Church which 
previously was the sole authoritative source for such data about people. Without necessarily 
suggesting that Corporation is next in line for the ex rcise of sovereign authority, certain forms 
of relationships with constituencies or customer bases, which include the implementation of a 
few basic public responsibilities, can make it easir for users to get the sense that they can expect 
some kind of accountability. It suggests that their r lationship with the company (potential 
identity provider) is not limited to the terms of service which generally convey the sense that 
they are rather designed to protect corporate interes s against potential lawsuits. 
In the former scenario above, the road will remain as uncertain as any Internet innovation 
that rises to popularity (and business success thanks to advertisers), then is taken over by the next 
big thing (in terms of technology that addresses th identity issue on the Net, even if that issue 
will not go away.) In the latter scenario, there may be an opportunity for a more stable 
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framework, more trustworthy in the eye of the user. Perhaps in this case, a few of the companies 
in place will get themselves a very good reputation for managing digital identity and grow strong 
enough to become more and more seen as authoritative in the matter.       
    Following are a few other recommendations or issue  to be considered. 
As early adopter, the government has the responsibility to demonstrate best practices in 
relevant use-cases as well as in every aspect of digital identity transactions it is involved in. 
Generally, government services are ones that only governments provide. By being an 
early adopter while the identity solution is delivered by the private sector, this presents a 
tremendous opportunity for users to test the waters and for providers to improve on their 
capabilities in real-time uses. This could be a pilot case for incrementally building the digital 
identity infrastructure.   
For a successful adoption, it must be clear not only for the designers but for the users as well 
that these efforts address due process for citizens. 
Unless it is clear to the users that new standards re being set and are implemented, not 
only technically but in business and institutional processes, they are unlikely to change their own 
assumptions whether positive or negative. The citizens may need to know that their rights are 
clearly at least as protected online as they are off-line. The user may need to see some 
compelling evidence that there is a fundamentally new framework in which the government is 
resolute to do a serious job as user’s and citizen’s advocate, instead of giving the impression to 
be complacent with, and only protective of, commerce – as the perception may be.  
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While technical specifications may be left to those who have the technical capacity to 
contribute, the technical design process should be accompanied with an institutional 
framework design process which government and civil society participate in. The decision-
making process should be truly multi-stakeholder and a fair hearing given to the inputs and 
concern of all stakeholders. 
The users may not readily content themselves with the information that protocol drafters 
and software designers and programmers take the user interests at heart. Most importantly, as 
one of the experts himself suggests, government need to be the user’s advocate. This is a real 
opportunity for government to play that role as it i  in a relatively neutral position. The 
government both supports commerce and understands like most stakeholders now that the user 
buy-in is necessary for these systems to work. Governm nt is also chiefly concerned about 
cybersecurity and it is increasingly understood that privacy and security do not necessarily make 
for a zero-sum game. By any account, the credibility of each stakeholder group will be greater in 
an open and multi-stakeholder process that includes business, civil society and government. 
While avoiding undue regulation, a public office should be established where government and 
civil society representatives can come together with Web companies and businesses in order to 
develop principles and guidelines on critical aspects of digital identity management. 
 As innovative services and use-cases emerge, it is important to maintain a set of 
principles that can frame the operation of the technology in new ways, on the basis that identity 
technology is not like any other of the technologies users can shop around for. In some cases, the 
office might need to issue advice before a technology is implemented or after. This is not meant 
to be legally binding but to serve as a public compass for stakeholders. Companies may still 
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innovate, propose alternate routes and let the market decide (provided that they accurately inform 
the public.) 
The industry and policymakers should cooperate in a w y that promotes innovations as well as 
a variety of models of identity transactions and value-adding services for the end user. 
Needs and uses shaped the emergence, evolution and stabilization of the passport with a 
practically universal adoption. That type of adoptin may be the long-term goal for the digital 
identity infrastructure (while maintaining competition and innovation at the level of 
interoperable systems and digital identity services.) It is more likely that digital identity will also 
have to go through a number of trials and emerging use cases while adjusting overtime to the 
needs of the stakeholders, including consumers. 
Government, business and civil society stakeholder should join efforts to participate in the 
definition of a framework protocol for digital identity – the overarching single protocol that 
will define the infrastructure while accommodating a diversity of systems.  
Based on the fact that rules and claims are at the core of digital identity systems, identity 
management will very much be policy-driven. Stakeholders should be involved in defining the 
ground rules and specifying as much as possible the different types and levels of transactions. 
The framework protocol should allow for updates andupgrades as the technology evolves with 
implementation. This Protocol is different from the principles or guidelines referred to above. 
This is about the design of the infrastructure and much of it is technical. At this level however, it 
should be possible to describe the technical functio al ties in human-understandable language so 
that all stakeholders can engage in a meaningful conversation.   
Ensure user awareness 
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While actors who are in charge of organizing the rel vant space clearly see the pertinence 
of identity capabilities, the user does not necessarily. Users and citizens need to be equally aware 
and educated about the promises and potential benefits as well as about the risks of digital 
identity technology. It is unlikely nowadays that a fairly educated user who is not well aware 
about an emerging Internet technology will start with the assumption that it is largely risk-proof. 
Therefore, she might as well be given accurate information, which may inspire trust rather than 
mistrust or suspicion. Moreover, the user may be making the sweeping assumption that 
conducting business online is systematically more perilous than engaging in any off-line 
transactions where they can rely on physical or material cues (except that the former is more 
convenient). And yet, the fact that online interactions lack of many of those cues does not make 
online transactions necessarily riskier.  
Notwithstanding how robust and user-friendly the technology and how rich the 
capabilities, it is hard to see how this can change the users’ assumptions and attitude if they are 
hardly aware of the existence of the said technology and what it positively does for them. The 
user education component is the social complement of the technical issue of client-side security. 
It is all the more critical that if technologists succeed in building the right infrastructure, most of 
the attackers’ attention may converge even more on the users and ways to trick them.  
An identity technology is not an end in itself, unless it is to be mandated. Voluntary identity 
mechanisms require incentives to be built in upfront for the user: value-adding services, 
privileges, rights, etc.  
In itself identity technology may not be a valuable service in the eyes of the user. First of 
all there always is the danger for an identity system o be misused and to become an instrument 
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against individual rights and civil liberties. Second, even assuming a well-functioning 
democracy, identity technology will appear valuable to the users only if it enables them to 
accomplish certain tasks more effectively, if it enha ces their existing relationships, or if it 
enables new relationships and services they are interested in having. The value-adding aspect for 
the user needs to feature upfront and be demonstrated.  
Demonstrating utility for improving adoption: as a corollary of the above, the technology 
needs to demonstrate utility from the user’s standpoint other than enabling identification. 
The technology need to offer use cases that demonstrate trustworthiness, utility and 
response to user needs. It seems unlikely to get a positive user response in change of habits and 
attitude, without demonstrating any added value. The research shows that utility may also be 
demonstrated negatively based on the distribution of i centives/disincentives. If the burden of 
not using a credential increases, the chances that it is used increases as well. However, 
perception of risks and liability could be strong disincentives and should be addressed with clear 
commitments. There must also be a demonstration of a net plus regarding usability and privacy. 
Designing a more usable and intuitive user interfac lways enhances adoption and use. 
Regarding privacy, simple declarations may not suffice.  
In order to promote scalability in the “Identity Ecosystem” solutions should be explored so as 
to enable business without overburden between a User and a Relying Party even if they were 
not initially in the same Trust Framework. 
Relying Parties may have digital identity technology-related agreement templates that they 
execute beforehand. Provided that they have the appropriate infrastructure and operate at the 
levels required (levels of assurance, etc.), they ma then be able to service the identity 
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credentials of a customer issued from any of the Trust Frameworks, by just checking the relevant 
statements in the agreement template. 
Linking the Trust Frameworks 
The TFs are not the final answer; otherwise they will be reproducing the silo effect that 
needed to be removed. Linking them may necessitate a root credential, which takes us back to 
the problem of authoritative identity. This in turn demands a concerted effort towards 
infrastructure design as opposed to individual system  and applications. However, this 
infrastructure must be designed and built in a way th t protects against linking and tracing use 
instances unless the user has opted for that. 
Building the digital identity infrastructure 
An all piecemeal approach to this endeavor may not be the best solution for the realization of its 
goal. Some overall framework may need to be pursued not only in terms of national strategy but 
in terms of the Internet infrastructure itself. Technology players should seize the interest and 
involvement of the government to set an agenda for R&D initiatives to that end. 
 Those are a few recommendations and propositions design stakeholders might consider if 
their goal is to achieve an interoperable infrastructure for identity management on the Internet, 
and possibly the implementation of identity systems that might become authoritative. To close 
this dissertation, I will now pinpoint a number of shortcomings in the outcome of this endeavor, 
and indicate different directions that are worth considering for future research.  
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8.3 Limitations and future directions 
To conclude, I will pinpoint some aspects where this dissertation could have produced a better 
research outcome. Following that I will indicate two or three avenues where it could be taken 
further, and then close with a few remarks. 
8.3.1 Research value and limitations 
The first limitation – in fact, challenge – of this research is in the conditions of the phenomenon 
of digital identity technology. This still is an evol ing phenomenon, a moving target. As a 
consequence, information that may have not been available at the time of research design might 
have become so before the research concluded. In fact, it was the case that when this 
investigation started the energy and attention of the designers were more focused on clarifying 
the technical requirements and building the small pieces of the infrastructure to come. Very little 
was said about the broader, social requisites and implications of that project. 
 However by 2010, there was a momentum in the production of information addressing 
the larger social and institutional context thanks, among other things, to the interest of USG to be 
an early adopter and promote the implementation of those technologies. At this point there is 
enough relevant information coming from the actors involved in order to write a single, in-depth 
case dissertation on the institutional challenges to the emergence and deployment of digital 
identity technology.  
Instead, this dissertation has reached for a very broad scope in an effort to find in history 
a sort of Archimedean point from where to comprehend the contemporary phenomenon. This 
gives an exploratory aspect to the research which fo uses more on understanding and analyzing 
in detail the phenomena studied as well as their historical contexts and less on theory.    
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Regarding particularly the medieval part, limitation f resources have not permitted a 
direct examination of some original materials and artifacts; only accessible secondary sources 
were used, albeit it was fortunate enough that relevant materials in French were covered and 
translated. However, I feel that being able to investigate archival materials would have helped 
gained further insights into the material culture and the local economies surrounding the 
production of seal. The results might have been riche , if we could better understand who made 
the seal, how the seal-maker profession was exactly organized, how the production was 
organized, whether it had any economic significance, how they were designed (the choice of the 
images, symbols), what the scope (and possibly other aspects) of the relationship between seal 
and seal owner was outside sealed deed and letters, e c. 
The timespan of the phenomenon investigated is also a challenge. A researcher can more 
easily make false assumptions when trying to understand the dynamics of a social context several 
centuries away. However I am here in good company with other researchers more qualified in 
the historical field; I have only taken the risk to build a careful reasoning from as straightforward 
a reading as possible. Nevertheless, comparative case studies in social sciences would generally 
address cases that are instances of more obviously similar phenomenon or, in historical case 
studies in particular, close enough time-space settings hat comparisons are more straightforward 
and richer. It is quite a wager to undertake a comparison of an 11th century phenomenon with a 
21st century phenomenon. The task is undoubtedly daunting for a gain that was not certain, or 
might be too little to be worth the effort.    
 In the end, this investigation has the potential to bring together a couple of different 
disciplinary discourses including history, anthropology, semiotics, information science and even 
international relations and political economy. Within the boundaries of available sources, the 
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individual cases have been thoroughly investigated which is the expectation for specific history 
as well as for situational history (recall Table 3-1 from Hall 1999). With the exception of 
radically new facts or findings emerging from relevant literature that would have escaped not 
only my attention but that of the historians referenc d, further research of the same question 
should not yield contradictory results. 
  The components of the emerging analytical framework have themselves emerged (in my 
mind at least) very late in the research process. An interview protocol tightly designed to elicit 
responses about those factors would have made the interview data more valuable for the analysis 
of the third case and increase the value of the casfindings. However, the overall data that has 
been used in Case III and the diversity of sources and types of data present a solid and 
convincing case description (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1993). I hope the reader gets the sense of 
the authenticity of my account, as I have been observing these processes and talking first hand to 
the actors for the last few years. Plausibility is the next criterion put forward by Golden-Biddle 
and Locke to evaluate the convincing quality with et nographic texts. Case III has been 
documented in such detail so as to provide the reader with a full sense of the reality being 
described, without any gaping hole or overstretch that would leave a hint of unreal-ness. 
Criticality is the third and last criterion: while I find these processes interesting to investigate, my 
analysis in the latter part of the chapter 7 strives to recognize challenges and shortcomings in the 
steps taken so far by the actors without being overly unrealistic. In the end it is up to the reader 
to make a determination about this work against those evaluation criteria, or any other criteria of 
scientific import as long as it is applicable to this scholarship and could make this research 
better.       
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Finally, the analytical framework based on causal mechanisms proceeds from contingent 
generalizations (George and Bennett 2005) which are more bounded and contextual. This may 
further enable an analytical generalization, which could have been completed if the third case 
was fully constituted and hypotheses could be formed and tested through comparison.    
8.3.2 Future directions 
I anticipate future research building on this wide-ranging investigation which could be thought of 
as laying the groundwork. I wish to connect this inquiry and its gains to two theoretical fields: 
the institutional and the sociotechnical.  
The so-called ecosystem with the Open Identity Trust Framework model, for instance is a 
mechanism to watch closely with a thought on institutional processes, while the process of 
assembling the digital identity infrastructure might probably be rich in puzzles for sociotechnical 
scholarship, and vice-versa.  
I also intend to keep following the developments of digital identity efforts and pursue the 
conversations with the expert practitioners not only i  order to collect their feedback, but also to 
get them further interested in the potential contribution of social sciences to their endeavors and 
perhaps foster research partnerships.  
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Glossary 
Terms Definitions 
Attribute 
Naturally occurring, assigned or reputed characteristic of an entity / 
Reputed, assigned or naturally occurring characteristic of an entity 
Authentication 
It is the procedure or the act of seeking or providing evidence in order to establish the 
truth about a claim or the authenticity of an artifct. It entails some type of verification 
and, if conclusive, leads to the validation of a clim in any form. 
Authenticity 
Quality of conforming to one’s real identity or true nature. Quality of an artifact truly 
being what it is claimed to be. 
Authoritative identity 
Identity that has been issued by an identity authority , in other words, by any entity 
considered a reliable source of identification by most actual and potential stakeholders. 
An authoritative identity requires both authenticity and reliability. 
Claim 
Assertion of a fact generally associated to oneself in the context of identity 
Confidence 
Quality of a human subject who believes with assurance in something or someone 
Digital identity 
• Identity is an information artifact that is associated to an entity and structured so as 
to enable the attribution of further information to the same entity if and whenever 
applicable  
• Digital identity encompasses a variety of rules andmechanisms that enable to 
reliably relate a piece of data to a specific digital entity if and whenever applicable. 
The challenge remains the link between that digital entity to the physical entity it 
pertains to if applicable. 
Identification 
• Demonstrate identity 
• Register an identity 
• Authenticate identity 
• Verify identity 
Identity 
A mechanism for binding 
to data any single one of a 
collection of entities in 
such a way that the result 
enables the discovery of 
the specific entity thus 
bound. Individuals 
exercise their agency 
through artifacts or media 
that are used to represent 
such data.  
• Collection of information or set of data that is sufficient to clearly discern, in a given 
context, an individual entity from a population of similar entities. 
• Complete set of pre-defined data entries documented about a specific individual. 
(The data set is designed so as when fully documented, it enables to single out one 
individual among a population of entities).  
• Any form of evidence that enables ascribing an action to the legal person who is the 
author of that action, or a change in the state of a record to the single autonomous 
individual whom that change pertains to. 
• Identity is an information artifact that is structured so as to enable its consistent and 
reliable association with a given entity and only with that one, as well as to enable 
the reliable attribution of further relevant information to the same entity if and only 
if applicable. 
Identity Authority  
Any entity: 
• who defines the requirements and components of an identity schema   
• who performs original identity proofing or authenticates original identity attributes 
in order to issue a credential, or  
• whose assertions about a party in an identity transaction is relied upon by some other 
party as proof of identity 
Trust Relationship of a subject to any entity in which the subject provides whatever might be 
asked of him/her and expects that subsequent course f actions or events will unfold as 
planned or as stated on behalf of the entity.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A 
Digital Identity Documentary Data Sources 
Ref. Code Document Title Source (and date) 
priv_oitf The Open Identity Trust Framework 
(OITF) Model 
Open Identity Exchange, 
http://openidentityexchange.org/white-papers 
Mar. 2010 
priv_omsa An Open Market Solution for Online 
Identity Assurance 
http://openidentityexchange.org/white-papers 
Mar. 2010 
priv_tfpas Trust Framework Provider 
Assessment Package 
http://openidentityexchange.org/  
Feb. 12, 2010 
priv_oixinc Certificate of Incorporation to Open 
Identity Exchange 
http://openidentityexchange.org/sites/default/files/oix-
articles-of-incorporation-2010-02-04.pdf 
priv_oixbyl Bylaws of Open Identity Exchange http://openidentityexchange.org/sites/default/files/oix-
bylaws-2010-02-25.pdf 
priv_oixgui Trust Framework Requirements and 
Guidelines V1 (Draft 01) 
http://openidentityexchange.org/white-papers 
priv_iafov Identity Assurance Framework: 
Overview.  
Kantara Initiative, http://kantarainitiative.org  
Feb. 26, 2010 
gov_tfpad Trust Framework Provider Adoption 
Process 
US Government, http://www.idmanagement.gov  
Sep. 4, 2009 
gov_nist800-30 Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems 
(NIST Special Publication 800-30) 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
30/sp800-30.pdf  
July 2002 
gov_omb04-04 E-authentication Guidance for 
Federal Agencies (Memorandum M-
04-04 to the Heads of all 
Departments and Agencies) 
Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/me
moranda/fy04/m04-04.pdf 
Dec. 16, 2003 
gov_nist800-63 Electronic Authentication Guideline 
(NIST Special Publication 800-63) 
NIST, US Department of Commerce 
Apr. 2006 
gov_ficam Federal Identity, Credential, and 
Access Management (FICAM) 
Roadmap and Implementation 
Guidance 
Federal Chief Information Officers Council and 
Federal Enterprise Architecture 
Nov. 10, 2009 
gov_nstic-0 National Strategy for Trusted 
Identities in Cyberspace (Draft) 
White House 
July 2010 
gov_nstic National Strategy for Trusted 
Identities in Cyberspace 
White House, http://www.nist.gov/nstic/ 
Apr. 15, 2011 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocols 
 
Dissertation Research Interview Protocol on Digital Identity 
(Final version: February 2011) 
Mawaki Chango 
Syracuse University, School of Information Studies 
Note: The conversation may get into more detail on some points or be cursory on some others, depending on the area 
of expertise, the experience or the role of a given respondent in relation to the topic. 
I. In your opinion, what have been the major advances (technological and otherwise) in the 
development of digital identity technology in recent (10 to 15) years? 
a. Would you say there is today a consensus in the Internet industry on the need to create a framework 
enabling various Internet identity systems to interoperate globally? 
b. If so, could you briefly tell me, according to you, the events and reasons which led to that consensus? 
II. So, do you personally think we needed to create new systems for identity management on 
the Internet? Why?  
III. In your opinion, to what extent do we need these systems to be interoperable?  
a. Seamlessly all across the global Internet, or should they be limited within some narrower boundaries 
(national, organizational, other geographical or non-geographical scale)? 
IV. What model of identity management do you think is best suited for interoperable identity 
systems on the Internet? Please explain. 
a. Examples of models include, but are not necessarily limited to: Fully centralized, decentralized, 
federated, user-controlled, etc. 
V. To what extent do you think digital identity systems on the Internet really establish 
identity? How is this technology function different from authentication or access control?  
VI. What might motivate Internet-based businesses to accept an identity system that would 
ultimately take away their ability to collect and store their own customers’ identity data?  
a. Do you see any ways market forces might lead to that outcome? Please explain. 
b. Can public policy play a role here? Please explain. 
VII. Do you think we might soon reach a point where Internet-based businesses will largely 
expect or require their customers to establish their identity (prove their identity assertions) 
by using the emerging digital identity technologies? 
VIII. In your opinion, what features of digital identity technology are likely to drive end user’s 
voluntary adoption?  
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IX. What other (extraneous) factors would be necessary to enable voluntary adoption by end 
users? (e.g., the role of government, market mechanisms, and possibly others.) Please briefly 
explain how that might work. 
X. In order for digital identity to have the same level of authority in online identity 
transactions as the passport or a national ID card in the physical ones, does it need to be 
based on data derived from these official documents (or from the same pieces of evidence 
that are used to issue them)? 
a. Physical identity documents typically include baseline data such as names, date of birth, and some 
form of affiliation (nationality, employee, student, etc.), plus any particular attribute of relevance. 
Does digital technology allows breaking away from that paradigm while still retaining the capability 
to ascertain legal identity? 
b. Do we need innovative sources of identity data, and new forms of authority for the cyberspace?  
XI. In order to achieve most reliable identity transactions online, what do you think the 
mechanisms should be for authentication and registration of the identity subject? 
a. Please specify the nature and scope of the relationship between the identity subject and the entities 
ensuring those functions 
XII. Which entities do you think are best suited to carry out those functions (in the context of 
digital identity services for the general public)?  
a. Do market forces contribute to define those players? How? 
b. Is there a role for public policy in this? Which one?   
XIII. What should be the main characteristics of the governance structure and mechanisms for a 
digital identity infrastructure? 
a. For examples: To whom will the operators or players be accountable? What recourses should the 
users and the relevant players have if the system fails? 
XIV. In summary, what in your opinion are the fundamental challenges that still remain in the 
way of a successful implementation of globally interoperable digital identity systems? 
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Interview Protocol  
Pilot version: October 2009 
Mawaki Chango, Syracuse University iSchool, PhD Program 
 
For how long have you been involved in digital identity business? 
In what roles? 
Is your role or interest rather: 
(  ) Technically oriented? (e.g., developers, programmers) 
(  ) Socially oriented? 
(  ) Both? 
Is your affiliation primarily in: 
(  ) the proprietary software industry? 
(  ) the open source software industry? 
(  ) other: specify _______   
Are you a participant in any of the following projects or products (check all that apply)?  
(  ) Higgins framework  
(  ) Identity metasystem interoperability  
(  ) i-Card  
(  ) U-Prove 
(  ) ITU Identity Management activities (Focus Group or otherwise) 
(  ) Other (specify) __________ 
I want your opinion on a number of questions as follows. There is no right or wrong answers. 
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AUTHORITY 
Specifications of digital identity systems and governance refer to entities such as Certification 
Authority or Credential Authority:  
1. How would you define the notion of authority in this context? 
2. What are the different ways Digital Identity systems being developed can become 
authoritative? 
3. What would be the basis for that authority? 
4. Is there any difference, in your view, between Identity Provider or Issuing Party on the one 
hand, and Certification or Credential Authority? 
5. If so what is it? 
6. What are the conditions required for the public to rely on Identity Providers or Issuing 
Parties as authoritative? 
7. What are the different steps that can be taken to get there from here?  
TRUST 
1. What is the role of trust in this process of establishing authority for identity providers? 
2. Do you generally trust government-issued identity documents? 
3. Do you think people in general trust government-issued identity documents? 
Why? 
4. In the narrow sense technologists talk about trust systems and credential authority: What 
does trust have to do with authority in your opinion? 
5. Is trust (as in ‘trust system’) a necessary condition to generate authority? 
6. Is trust sufficient to generate authority? 
7. In the context of digital identity more broadly, is trust a: 
(  ) a technological problem 
- Is it essentially enabled by cryptography? 
(  ) a social problem 
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(  ) both technological and social problem 
8. What else could you say in definition of trust? 
RISK 
It is a common wisdom to think that faceless transactions are more subject to deceit than face-to-
face ones.  
1. Is that a fair assessment in your view today? 
2. How do you compare the risks of deceit and fraud between off-line physical and online 
digital identity transactions? 
3. What is the highest risk presented by Digital Identity compared to traditional physical ID 
tokens? 
In an online secured transaction based on a validated and verified credential provided by a 
Credential Authority: 
4. What are the types of risks, if any, that still persist for fraud? 
5. How should we approach the problem of liability for a Certification or Credential Authority 
should its certified credentials be tampered with leading to a fraudulent transaction? 
6. Would you say the system is completely safe, in the sense that even if forgery or attempt to 
deception occurs, they would be detected somewhere down the process before a transaction 
is completed? 
7. Are the risks of fraud or forgery higher or lower with off-line government or state-issued 
identity than with digital identity?  
8. To what extent or in what ways will identity metasystem interoperability be universal? 
9. How does it compare with payment card networks? What is similar and what is different? 
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Appendix C: Interview and other records 
 
Interviews Conducted 
Interv.# Month and Year Format Ref. Code 
1 November, 2009  Face-to-Face Res_C 
2 November, 2009 Face-to-Face Res_D 
3 November, 2009 Face-to-Face Res_B 
4 November, 2009 Face-to-Face Res_A 
5 August 2010 Face-to-Face  Res_F 
6 August 2010 Face-to-Face  Res_H 
7 August 2010 Face-to-Face  Res_E 
8 October 2010 Written Res_B 
9 January 2011 Phone Res_G 
10 February 2011 Written  Res_I 
11 February 2011 Phone  Res_L 
12 February 2011 Written  Res_J 
13 March 2011 Phone  Res_J 
14 March 2011 Phone (non-recorded) Res_K 
15 March 2011 Phone  Res_M 
16 April 2011 Phone Res_N 
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Appendix D: Digital signatures (reading notes) 
A digital signature is a two-phase process whereby a file is generated which allows 
authenticating communications; contrary to manuscript signature which is meant to be stable and 
fairly identical over time, digital signature is a unique and different file issued at each iteration of 
use, based on the main file to which it is affixed. First, the original file or communication content 
is algorithmically processed into a value known as h h value, in such a way that the change of a 
single character in the text being signed would yield a different hash value: "Hashing is a 
technique by which electronic information can be reduced to a unique fixed-length code: if even 
a single character in the file is modified in transmi sion or storage, the resulting hash value will 
change. By comparing the original hash value with the current one, one can determine whether a 
document has been altered or not" (Dekeyser 2002:81). The hash value is also dubbed the digital 
fingerprint of electronic files. Second, the original hash value must be encrypted for the result of 
the verification to be reliable and meaningful; that w y, it is secured against any unauthorized 
manipulation so that while the initial document may still be tempered with, the original hash 
value will remain consistent so as to show in that case that the output document is not the one 
originally signed (its hash value would not match the original one.) Encryption transforms a 
transparent, legible text into a cipher text, that is, a series of characters that cannot be made sens 
of by any natural linguistic or semiotic system. Befor  one can make sense of the result of an 
encryption, one must use a software device called key in order to reverse the encrypted or cipher 
text into a plain text. There are two main modes of encryption: symmetrical and asymmetrical. 
The former allows the two ends of the communication, and ideally only them, to share the 
encryption key, while the former is based on pairs of keys proper to each user with one out of a 
501 
 
 
 
pair being public and the other one secret. In the case of symmetrical encryption, the system is 
secure as long as the key is not known to other illegitimate parties and none of the two parties 
tries to impersonate the other using the shared key for illegitimate purposes. The asymmetrical 
encryption mode enables to overcome those risks. Here th re is a split regarding the appropriate 
key to use for encryption, which may be the sender's private key or the receiver's public key, 
depending on where the assurance emphasis is placed. Th  former assures any receiver of the 
truthful source of the communication while the latter assures the sender that only the intended 
recipient will access the communication.   
To sum up, digital signature based on asymmetrical encryption allows one: i) to send 
someone a message that only they can decrypt and access (when their public key is used to 
encrypt the message), and ii) to assure the recipients of a message that a specific person has 
indeed sent it (while the said person uses her private key to encrypt the message).   
As noted by Dekeyser (2002), hash values as well as public and private keys are not 
proofs of identity: "these are just numerical values. In this sense, the term digital seal would be 
more accurate for that technology" (Dekeyser 2002:81, emphasis added). The assurance is that a 
message decrypted with a given public key has certainly been encrypted by the corresponding 
private key, thus by the owner of that private key, to the extent that the latter can be known. But 
the system does not provide that knowledge by itself.    
In open network environments, like the Internet, a public key infrastructure must be in place in order to tie 
public keys to the identity of their rightful owners.  
A public key infrastructure offers a number of services related to digital signatures. Firstly, the service of 
creating key pairs with which digital signatures can be placed. A second service is public key certification, 
whereby the link between a public key and its rightful owner is published for the benefit of recipients of 
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signed documents. Depending on the type of certifica e, the owner's identity is checked more or less 
thoroughly. Typically, a directory is kept of all certificates issued as well as revocation list, which is 
important in the case of the theft of a private key. Lastly, time-stamping is an important service, as it is 
necessary to know whether a digital signature was pl ced before or after the revocation of a public key 
certificate. (Idem) 
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